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achieved in 2016, as moderation in the People’s Republic of China is balanced by a healthy pickup in most 
other economies in the region. 
Inflation revived to 2.5% in 2016, on the back of strong consumer demand and rebounding global 
commodity prices. The pace will accelerate further to 3.0% in 2017 and 3.2% in 2018, still below the 
average rate for the past 10 years. 
The region faces risks from uncertain policy direction in the advanced economies, including the pace of 
interest rate normalization in the United States. While short-term risks seem manageable, regional policy 
makers should remain vigilant to respond to possible spillover through capital flows and exchange rate 
movements. 
Decades of rapid growth transformed developing Asia from a low-income region to middle income. 
Sustaining growth to power the transition into high income will depend on much greater improvement to 
productivity. Innovation, human capital, and infrastructure are the three pillars of productivity growth. 
Supportive institutions and policies, underpinned by macroeconomic stability, can strengthen all three 
pillars. Asia’s dynamic track record suggests that the journey to high income, while challenging, is 
achievable. Chief Economist 
Keywords 
Asia, development, economic growth, income, industrial economies 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Asian Development Bank. (2017). Asian development outlook 2017: Transcending the middle-income 
challenge. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Author. 
Required Publisher's Statement 
© Asian Development Back. Available at ADB’s Open Access Repository under a Creative Commons 
Attribution license (CC BY 3.0 IGO). 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/533 
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
A
SIA
N
 D
EVELO
PM
EN
T O
U
TLO
O
K 2017
Transcending the M
iddle-Incom
e Challenge
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
OUTLOOK 2017
TRANSCENDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME CHALLENGE
Asian Development Outlook 2017
Transcending the Middle-Income Challenge
The annual Asian Development Outlook analyzes economic performance in the past year and o ers forecasts 
for the next 2 years for the 45 economies in Asia and the Pacifi c that make up developing Asia.
Most regional economies saw recovery propelled last year by higher external demand and rebounding global 
commodity prices. These factors will likely continue to support growth this year and next despite rebalancing 
in the People’s Republic of China and tepid recovery in the advanced economies. Risks to growth stem from 
uncertain policy directions in the advanced economies, including an anticipated tightening of US monetary 
policy. While short-term risks appear manageable, spillover to capital fl ows and exchange rates require 
monitoring. 
Decades of rapid growth lifted most of developing Asia from low- to middle-income status. Sustained 
growth to escape the middle-income trap must come largely from improved total factor productivity, which 
is achieved by fostering entrepreneurial innovation and investing in human capital and infrastructure. The 
di  cult transition from middle to high income further demands a sound institutional framework and policy 
environment anchored on macroeconomic stability. Developing Asia’s dynamic yet sure-footed track record 
indicates that it can transcend the middle-income challenge. 
About the Asian Development Bank
ADB’s vision is an Asia and Pacifi c region free of poverty. Its mission is to help its developing member 
countries reduce poverty and improve the quality of life of their people. Despite the region’s many successes, 
it remains home to a large share of the world’s poor. ADB is committed to reducing poverty through inclusive 
economic growth, environmentally sustainable growth, and regional integration.
Based in Manila, ADB is owned by 67 members, including 48 from the region. Its main instruments for 
helping its developing member countries are policy dialogue, loans, equity investments, guarantees, grants, 
and technical assistance.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City
1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
www.adb.org
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT
OUTLOOK 2017
TrANScENDINg ThE MIDDLE-INcOME chALLENgE
Printed on recycled paper
  Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)
© 2017 Asian Development Bank
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, Philippines
Tel +63 2 632 4444; Fax +63 2 636 2444
www.adb.org
Some rights reserved. Published in 2017. 
Printed in the Philippines. 
ISBN 978-92-9257-787-2 (Print), 978-92-9257-788-9 (e-ISBN) 
ISSN 0117-0481
Publication Stock No. FLS178632-3 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/FLS178632-3
Cataloging-In-Publication Data
Asian Development Bank.
 Asian development outlook 2017. Transcending the middle-income challenge.
Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2017.
1. Economics.  2. Finance.  3. Asia.  I. Asian Development Bank.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. 
ADB does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any 
consequence of their use. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are 
endorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
By making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or by using the term “country” in this 
document, ADB does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
This work is available under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license (CC BY 3.0 IGO)  
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/. By using the content of this publication, you agree to be  
bound by the terms of this license.
This CC license does not apply to non-ADB copyright materials in this publication. If the material is attributed to another 
source, please contact the copyright owner or publisher of that source for permission to reproduce it. ADB cannot be held 
liable for any claims that arise as a result of your use of the material.
Attribution—In acknowledging ADB as the source, please be sure to include all of the following information: 
Author. Year of publication. Title of the material. © Asian Development Bank [and/or Publisher].  
URL. Available under a CC BY 3.0 IGO license. 
Translations—Any translations you create should carry the following disclaimer:
Originally published by the Asian Development Bank in English under the title [title] © [Year of publication] Asian 
Development Bank. All rights reserved. The quality of this translation and its coherence with the original text is the sole 
responsibility of the [translator]. The English original of this work is the only official version.
Adaptations—Any adaptations you create should carry the following disclaimer:
This is an adaptation of an original Work © Asian Development Bank [Year]. The views expressed here are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of ADB or its Board of Governors or the governments they 
represent. ADB does not endorse this work or guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts 
no responsibility for any consequence of their use.
Please contact publications@adb.org if you have questions or comments with respect to content, or if you wish to obtain 
copyright permission for your intended use that does not fall within these terms, or for permission to use the ADB logo.
Notes: 
In this publication, “$” refers to US dollars. 
Corrigenda to ADB publications may be found at: http://www.adb.org/publications/corrigenda 
ADB recognizes “China” by the name People’s Republic of China.
Foreword           
Acknowledgments           
Definitions           
Abbreviations           
ADO 2017—Highlights      
Part 1  Solid growth despite policy uncertainty
Asia tacks to shifting headwinds
Risk of sharper US interest rate hikes
Capital flows and financial risks
Annex:  Cautious optimism for a modest rebound
Part 2  Transcending the middle-income challenge
Sustaining growth at middle income
Innovation for diversifying and upgrading production
Human capital for emerging workplace needs
Infrastructure investment for facilitating structural change
Reaching toward high income
Part 3  Economic trends and prospects 
in developing Asia       
Central Asia           
Armenia           
Azerbaijan           
Georgia           
Kazakhstan           
Kyrgyz Republic           
Tajikistan           
Turkmenistan           
Uzbekistan           
East Asia           
People’s Republic of China            
Hong Kong, China           
Republic of Korea           
Mongolia           
Taipei,China           
contents
South Asia           
Afghanistan            
Bangladesh           
Bhutan           
India           
Maldives           
Nepal           
Pakistan           
Sri Lanka           
Southeast Asia           
Brunei Darussalam           
Cambodia           
Indonesia           
Lao People’s Democratic Republic           
Malaysia           
Myanmar           
Philippines           
Singapore           
Thailand           
Viet Nam          
The Pacific           
Fiji           
Papua New Guinea           
Solomon Islands           
Timor-Leste           
Vanuatu           
North Pacific economies           
South Pacific economies           
Small island economies           
Statistical appendix          
Foreword
Developing Asia is set to grow steadily, and it is well positioned to 
handle any risks that might stem from policy uncertainty abroad. 
Asian Development Outlook 2017 forecasts gross domestic product in the 
region expanding by 5.7% in 2017 and 2018, near the 5.8% pace in 2016. 
Higher external demand, rebounding global commodity prices, and 
domestic reform support widespread acceleration, with growth picking 
up in two-thirds of the region’s 45 economies. Developing Asia will 
continue to be the largest regional contributor to global growth, even 
with growth moderation in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), its 
largest economy.
Consumption expenditure last year drove growth at 6.7% in 
the PRC, where the authorities are rebalancing the economy to rely 
more on domestic demand than exports. This is expected to temper 
growth further to 6.5% in 2017 and 6.2% in 2018, with the government 
prioritizing financial and fiscal stability. While the forecast is for 
a slower growth in East Asia, all other subregions will see growth 
accelerate in the near term. 
In South Asia, India moderated to 7.1% growth in 2016 as fixed 
investment stalled and the demonetization of large banknotes 
temporarily stymied cash-reliant commerce. As reform gains 
momentum, it is spurring investor confidence, and the economy is 
expected to rebound to higher growth at 7.4% in 2017 and 7.6% in 2018. 
An expected recovery in global fuel and food prices will benefit 
commodity producers in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Pacific. 
Yet rises for commodities will be too modest to endanger price stability. 
While regional inflation is projected to accelerate to 3.0% in 2017 and 
3.2% in 2018, these rates remain well below the region’s 10-year average 
of 3.9%.
Prospects for developing Asia are supported by improving fortunes 
for the major industrial economies in the United States, euro area, and 
Japan. Yet uncertain policy direction in these economies, including the 
pace of interest rate normalization in the US, poses risks to the region’s 
outlook. While short-term risks are manageable, policy makers need to 
monitor developments closely and intervene decisively if warranted. 
When the Asian Development Bank opened its doors in 1966, most 
of the region’s citizens lived in low-income economies. Since then, 
cumulative national development efforts have transformed the region. 
Today, with most economies having successfully climbed the income 
ladder—including the most populous economies in the PRC, India, and 
Indonesia—roughly 95% of the population lives in a middle-income 
economy. The development challenge now is to climb one more rung to 
high income.
History has shown this last rung to be a reach. The key is to 
move from a basic development model that drives growth by applying 
more factors of production—land, labor, and capital—toward a more 
sophisticated model that emphasizes catalyzing the productivity of all 
factors. The Asian Development Outlook 2017 special chapter points to 
the nexus of innovation, human capital, and infrastructure to boost 
productivity. Innovation enables the development of a diverse and 
sophisticated product mix. Investment in human capital helps workers 
meet emerging workplace needs, and investment in infrastructure 
facilitates structural change. 
We at the Asian Development Bank take pride in our role supporting 
the region’s transformation over the past 50 years. But we cannot 
be complacent. Several challenges remain and new challenges have 
emerged in Asia. As governments adapt their development paradigms 
to sustain growth and eliminate the poverty that remains along the 
path to high income, we will adapt to help our clients meet their 
new challenges.
TAKEHIKO NAKAO 
President 
Asian Development Bank
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The economies discussed in Asian Development Outlook 2017 (ADO 2017) are 
classified by major analytic or geographic group. For the purposes of this 
publication, the following apply:
• Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
• Developing Asia comprises the 45 members of the Asian Development Bank 
listed below. 
• Newly industrialized economies (NIEs) comprises Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China.
• Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
• East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China.
• South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, 
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Unless otherwise specified, the symbol “$” and the word “dollar” refer to 
US dollars. ADO 2017 is generally based on data available up to 3 March 2017.
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Developing Asia continued to perform well even as recovery in the major 
industrial economies remained weak. The region is forecast to expand by 5.7% 
in 2017 and 2018, nearly the 5.8% growth achieved in 2016, as moderation in 
the People’s Republic of China is balanced by a healthy pickup in most other 
economies in the region. 
Infl ation revived to 2.5% in 2016, on the back of strong consumer demand and 
rebounding global commodity prices. The pace will accelerate further to 3.0% 
in 2017 and 3.2% in 2018, still below the average rate for the past 10 years.
The region faces risks from uncertain policy direction in the advanced 
economies, including the pace of interest rate normalization in the 
United States. While short-term risks seem manageable, regional policy makers 
should remain vigilant to respond to possible spillover through capital fl ows and 
exchange rate movements. 
Decades of rapid growth transformed developing Asia from a low-income 
region to middle income. Sustaining growth to power the transition into high 
income will depend on much greater improvement to productivity. Innovation, 
human capital, and infrastructure are the three pillars of productivity growth. 
Supportive institutions and policies, underpinned by macroeconomic stability, 
can strengthen all three pillars. Asia’s dynamic track record suggests that the 
journey to high income, while challenging, is achievable.
Yasuyuki Sawada
Chief Economist
Asian Development Bank
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Solid growth despite policy uncertainty
Asia tacks to shifting headwinds
ɂ Continued expansion helps developing Asia deliver more than 60% of global 
growth. Gross domestic product (GDP) for the region as a whole is expected to grow by 
5.7% in 2017 and 2018, a tick down from the 2016 outcome of 5.8% as the controlled 
moderation of growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is balanced by expected 
healthy growth elsewhere. Excluding the high-income newly industrialized economies—
the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China—regional growth 
is expected to reach 6.3% in 2017 and 6.2% in 2018. Growth is picking up in 30 of the 
45 economies in developing Asia, supported by higher external demand and rebounding 
global commodity prices.
» The industrial economies are gathering some growth momentum. After slowing 
in the first half of 2016, the United States, the euro area, and Japan are forecast 
to grow collectively by 1.9% in both 2017 and 2018. Recovery in the US is solid as 
unemployment has declined to 4.7%, and as consumer and business confidence 
soar, but confidence depends on the policy directions under the new administration. 
In the euro area as well, recovery is evident but more fragile in light of the uncertain 
future of the economic union. In Japan, the recovery will continue but may lose some 
steam unless export growth maintains its new momentum.
» The PRC continues to rebalance, depending more on consumption to drive 
growth. A further shift of economic activity from industry to services shows 
rebalancing progressing as planned. Growth in the PRC now relies more on internal 
demand and less on exports. Moderate deceleration of growth to 6.5% is expected 
in 2017, within the government’s target range, and further to 6.2% in 2018. The 
authorities are likely to emphasize the maintenance of financial and fiscal stability 
and accept the cost of marginally lower growth. 
» India’s expansion will bounce back from a temporary liquidity squeeze.
The decision to demonetize high-denomination banknotes in November 2016 
quelled cash-intensive economic activity, but the impact is expected to be 
short lived. Government deregulation and reform of taxes on goods and services, 
among other areas, should improve confidence and thus business investment and 
growth prospects. Growth is expected to edge up to 7.4% in 2017 and 7.6% in 2018.
» Growth in Southeast Asia is forecast to accelerate further. After rising 
0.1 percentage points to 4.7% in 2016, growth will continue to improve to 4.8% 
in 2017 and 5.0% in 2018, with nearly all Southeast Asian economies showing an 
upward trend. Recovery for global food and fuel prices and in agricultural output will 
help commodity producers such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Viet Nam. Indonesia, 
the largest economy in the subregion, should see fiscal and structural reforms boost 
domestic demand.
» Prospects for Central Asia and the Pacific rise along with commodity prices.
Higher oil prices will support fiscal spending in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and 
one-off currency depreciation in these economies has already improved net exports. 
Growth in Central Asia is projected to accelerate to 3.1% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018, 
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though individual economies are growing at significantly different rates. In the 
Pacific, rising commodity prices are taking some pressure off a fiscal crunch in 
Papua New Guinea. With Fiji and Vanuatu recovering from natural disasters suffered 
in 2015, the Pacific subregion as a whole will grow by 2.9% in 2017 and 3.3% in 2018.
ɂ Strong consumer demand and rising global commodity prices will boost inflation. 
After rising 0.3 percentage points to 2.5% in 2016, regional inflation is projected to 
accelerate further to 3.0% in 2017 and 3.2% in 2018. The pickup also reflects the 
temporary effects of the large devaluations in some Central Asian economies. Overall, 
price rises are still reasonable, below the 10-year average of 3.9%, and unlikely to alter 
Asian expectations of relatively stable prices.
ɂ The region’s current account surplus will narrow even as exports recover. As a share 
of world GDP, developing Asia’s current account surplus is forecast to narrow from 0.7% 
in 2016 to less than 0.5% in both 2017 and 2018. Recent data suggest improved exports 
from many Asian economies, particularly traditional exporters of manufactured goods, 
yet the recovery in imports is even stronger. At the same time, though, rebalancing is 
progressing in the PRC as it relies more on private consumption for growth. 
ɂ Uncertain policy directions abroad could undermine the regional outlook.
While baseline assumptions have factored in gradual increases in US interest rates, 
sharper-than-expected US monetary tightening could have further consequences for 
developing Asia. Economies in the region with high corporate or household debt would 
be particularly vulnerable to financial shock. Possible shifts in trade and tax policies, 
especially policy changes being discussed in the US, could create uncertainty for business 
investment and export growth in developing Asia. While a potential boon to the region’s 
oil importers, weaker-than-expected oil price trends could delay recovery in the oil and 
gas exporters in Central Asia and the Pacific.
Risk of sharper US interest rate hikes
ɂ The US Federal Reserve is unlikely to raise interest rates sharply. As Asia braces 
for higher US interest rates, the question is how much higher? A recent surge in US 
inflation may accelerate the tightening cycle for interest rates that is now under way. 
However, interest rate increases sharper than the expected gradual rise would have to 
be accompanied by more acceleration in US economic growth than is currently forecast. 
Such a scenario could be envisaged under a possible fiscal stimulus later in 2017, but 
even then, any pickup in US growth would take time to materialize.
ɂ The consequences would differ across Asia depending on exchange rate regime. 
US monetary tightening would put pressure on Asian currencies to depreciate against 
the dollar, but the impact would depend on how the exchange rate is managed. Absent 
monetary policy response from regional authorities, economies with more open capital 
accounts would tend to experience deeper currency depreciation. Economies where the 
authorities intervene to maintain a stable currency would tend to forfeit export price 
competitiveness to those with more flexible exchange rate regimes. However, inflation 
could intensify under flexible arrangements, imperiling domestic macroeconomic 
stability. In this case, the authorities might find it necessary to tighten domestic liquidity 
to contain pressures on exchange rates and consumer prices.
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Capital flows and financial risks
ɂ Economies in emerging Asia are already experiencing net capital outflows. The PRC 
drives the overall direction of flows in the region, and outflows from its banking activities 
and portfolio investments generated net outflows of $35 billion beginning in the second 
quarter of 2014 that expanded to exceed $130 billion in the third quarter of 2016. 
Even foreign direct investment has turned to net outflow since the second half of 2015 as 
PRC investment abroad has risen and inflows declined. Despite the negative trend in net 
flows overall, some variation persists, with India, Indonesia, and Viet Nam notable among 
those still capitalizing on net inflows of foreign direct investment. 
ɂ Net outflow from economies in emerging Asia is expected to continue next year.
As the global economy starts to pick up, uncertainty will become a key theme for 
investors in 2017. Continuing US economic improvement, as marked by normalization of 
its monetary policy, will be a pull factor for capital to flow out of the region. Other major 
risks to financial markets in emerging Asia are policy and political uncertainty in the US 
and the euro area, as well as possible further currency depreciation in the PRC.
ɂ Global liquidity conditions mitigate the risk of destabilizing capital outflows.
Although US monetary policy normalization raises the prospect of outflows from 
developing Asia, the continuation of accommodative monetary policies in other 
advanced economies limits the tightening of overall global liquidity. Since this eases the 
pressure on central banks to raise interest rates to manage capital movements, they still 
retain some scope for supporting the region’s growth momentum.
ɂ One risk is mounting household debt in some Asian economies. The ratio of debt to 
GDP has surged in several economies, notably rising in the Republic of Korea from 74% 
in late 2008 to nearly 91% in the third quarter of 2016, and to about 71% in Malaysia 
and Thailand. So far the risk from high household leverage in the region is contained 
by favorable growth and employment conditions, fairly stable asset prices, and well 
capitalized banking sectors with low nonperforming loan ratios. However, there is scope 
to further bolster macroprudential policy, such as tightening ratios of debt to income and 
of loans to asset values. Policy makers may also have to stress-test their banking sectors 
regularly to track bank exposure and identify needs for special reserves. They may have 
to intervene more decisively in housing markets as well to cool speculative demand and 
head off asset bubbles.
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Outlook by subregion
ɂ Average growth in developing Asia slows, upstaging higher projections for most 
economies. Growth is forecast to accelerate in two-thirds of the region’s economies and 
in all of the subregions except East Asia. The external environment generally supports 
growth. A projected mild rise in commodity prices will help oil and gas exporters but 
not at the expense of importers. Demand for the region’s exports in general will benefit 
from an expected pickup in the major industrial economies and the Russian Federation. 
However, country-specific factors still generate considerable diversity in expected growth 
and inflation across the region. 
ɂ East Asia’s growth slowdown reflects continued moderation in the PRC. Subregional 
growth dipped by 0.1 percentage points to 6.0% in 2016. The PRC slowed to 6.7% 
despite fiscal and monetary support as private investment weakened. Growth also 
dipped in Mongolia as construction faltered and in Hong Kong, China as tourist arrivals 
dropped. The rate is projected to moderate further in the PRC to 6.5% this year and 
6.2% next as structural reform continues and the authorities emphasize financial 
stability. This will push the subregional average down to 5.8% in 2017 and 5.6% in 2018. 
Yet large government outlays will lift growth in Taipei,China and Hong Kong, China this 
year and the next. Mining investment will buoy growth in Mongolia, and the return of 
political stability in the Republic of Korea should pay a mild growth dividend in 2018. 
Inflation accelerated in East Asia last year but slowed in Mongolia on lower meat prices. 
It is expected to pick up modestly from 1.9% in 2016 to 2.3% in 2017 and 2.6% in 2018. 
ɂ South Asia resumes faster growth after a brief pause. Subregional growth dropped 
by 0.5 percentage points to 6.7% in 2016 on account of slowing growth in India. 
Despite stronger government consumption and external demand, growth faltered in 
India to 7.1% from 7.9% in 2015 as fixed investment languished and demonetization 
temporarily stymied commerce. Growth in South Asia is forecast to rebound to 7.0% 
in 2017 and pick up further to 7.2% in 2018. India will see growth reaccelerate to 7.4% 
in fiscal 2017 and 7.6% in 2018 despite drag caused by excessive corporate investment 
in the past and bank lending currently constrained by a heavy load of stressed assets. 
Elsewhere, growth will be lifted by spending on earthquake reconstruction in Nepal, 
hydropower investment and output in Bhutan, and economic corridor investment from 
the PRC in Pakistan. Inflation in South Asia has trended lower in recent years, easing 
to 4.6% in 2016 as buyers benefited from low prices for oil and other commodities. 
With these prices turning upward over the forecast period, inflation in South Asia is 
projected to revive to 5.2% in 2017 and 5.4% in 2018. 
ɂ Southeast Asian prospects brighten with buoyant growth across the subregion. 
Economic expansion accelerated by 4.7% in 2016, up by 0.1 percentage points from 
the previous year, as growth edged higher in several larger economies: Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. With normal weather supporting agriculture and 
steady recovery in the major industrial economies boosting exports, growth will pick 
up in nearly all of the economies in the subregion, nudging average growth to 4.8% 
in 2017 and 5.0% in 2018. The only exception is the Philippines, where growth will 
moderate from its record 6.8% in 2016 to a pace approximating 6.5% this year and next. 
While higher infrastructure investment will provide an additional impetus to growth in 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Philippines, 
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and Thailand, record foreign direct investment will be a key factor supporting growth 
in Viet Nam. Strengthening growth and rising international oil prices will mean higher 
inflation and a narrower current account surplus for the subregion. Average inflation is 
forecast to rise from 2.1% in 2016 to 3.3% this year, edging up further to 3.5% next year. 
ɂ Central Asia looks forward to a modest growth rebound. Continued low oil prices, 
recession in the Russian Federation, and weakness in other trading partners cut growth 
in Central Asia to 2.1% in 2016 from 3.1% a year earlier. Declining oil revenues hit 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan particularly hard, with the latter falling into recession. 
Anticipated recovery for international oil prices and for growth in the Russian Federation 
are projected to boost expansion in the subregion to 3.1% in 2017. Growth will accelerate 
further to 3.5% in 2018 as every economy except Kazakhstan improves its performance. 
The lagged effects of currency depreciation in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and to a lesser 
extent in Tajikistan, stoked inflation by almost 5 percentage points to 11.1% in 2016, even 
as inflation slowed in Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and 
sank into deflation in Armenia. As the effects from currency depreciation abate, inflation 
is projected to decelerate to 7.8% in 2017 and 7.3% in 2018. 
ɂ The Pacific will see growth revive on developments in Papua New Guinea. Growth 
slowed substantially to 2.6% in 2016 as contraction hit the oil and gas sector in Papua 
New Guinea, slashing the growth rate in the subregion’s predominant economy by 
10.0 percentage points to 2.0%. Elsewhere, growth picked up in 2016 in most Pacific 
economies—by more than 4 percentage points in Nauru, Samoa, and Vanuatu. Increased 
mining and agriculture output is forecast to spur a mild recovery in Papua New Guinea, 
which will translate into a modest rebound for the subregion to 2.9% growth this year 
and 3.3% next. Steady or slower growth is expected in most other economies, with 
declines in public expenditure inducing relatively sharp slowdowns in Nauru, Samoa, 
and Timor-Leste. Although inflation eased in most economies in 2016, the aggregate 
inflation rate rose by 0.6 percentage points to 4.6%, driven by rising consumer prices 
in Papua New Guinea. Rising oil and food prices will push inflation higher in most of 
the economies this year. Subregional inflation is expected to be 5.2% in 2017 and 5.4% 
in 2018.
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Transcending the middle-income challenge
Sustaining growth at middle income
 ɂ Rapid growth has lifted most economies in developing Asia to middle income. 
The rise of Asia’s newly industrialized economies in the 1970s and 1980s was well 
documented. Less publicized was that more than 90% of the people in the region still 
lived in low-income economies in 1991, half again the global average of less than 60%. 
By 2015, the story had changed. Propelled by the rising fortunes of the most populous 
Asian economies—the PRC, India, and Indonesia—more than 95% of the population 
lived in middle-income economies. The question now is how a largely middle-income 
region can build on its past success.
 ɂ Global experience suggests that the jump to high income can be difficult. The 
rapid transition of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China, which moved from middle 
income to high in barely a quarter of a century, raised hopes for the region’s current 
middle-income cohort. However, the experience of most developing economies globally 
threatens to put these hopes on hold. Brazil and Colombia, for example, have been 
middle income for more than half a century. Middle-income economies face a difficult 
task in sustaining growth sufficiently to clear the hurdle to high income.
 ɂ As economies evolve from low to middle income, so do their growth drivers. While 
accumulating physical and human capital remains important for growth in middle-
income economies, these economies have already significantly expanded their stocks 
of both. The median number of years of schooling for middle-income economies is 6.1, 
more than double the 2.5 years for low-income economies. Similarly, middle-income 
economies have more capital per worker and better-developed financial systems than do 
low-income economies. Total factor productivity improvement, or growth in production 
not derived from higher use of inputs, plays a bigger role in growth for middle-income 
economies, particularly those successfully reaching high income.
 ɂ The successful middle-income growth model emphasizes productivity. Innovation 
becomes more important when economies already reap the benefits of efficiently using 
existing resources. Even as they accumulate more physical and human capital, the focus 
shifts to areas with more positive productivity spillover, like advanced infrastructure and 
higher education. Finally, the whole process must be underpinned by a supportive policy 
environment and a stable macroeconomic environment.
Innovation for diversifying and upgrading production
 ɂ Innovation matters more as economies approach the technological frontier. 
A more central role in productivity growth falls to innovation with the decline of other 
sources, such as labor’s migration from agriculture to manufacturing. Middle-income 
economies that have graduated to high income have more than 2.5 times the research 
and development stock per worker as other middle-income economies. Risk-taking 
entrepreneurs take the lead in fostering innovation, and these individuals respond 
to incentives that are either strengthened or weakened by economic policies and 
institutions. Governments can promote innovative entrepreneurship through stronger 
intellectual property protection and rule of law, better access to finance, and effective 
competition policies. 
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ɂ Entrepreneurship turns new ideas or technology into innovation-based growth. 
As economies become more sophisticated, opportunity-driven entrepreneurship, which 
is often built on new ideas or technology, increasingly outweighs necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship, which responds to existing market needs. The ratio of opportunity-
driven to necessity-driven entrepreneurship is 1.6 times higher in high-income 
economies than in middle-income ones. Therefore, to reach high income, middle-income 
economies should encourage and nurture new business entries that pursue new business 
opportunities and provide products or services novel to the market. 
ɂ Graduation to high income requires a diverse and sophisticated product mix. In 
addition to producing a wider range of goods, middle-income economies must aim to 
produce more complex goods, such as sophisticated machinery and modern chemicals 
and alloys, that support higher productivity and better wages. Noteworthy is the 
experience of the PRC, which ranked for product complexity at only 48 in the mid-1990s 
but at 19 in 2014. Enhanced human capital is the foundation for a transition to a more 
diverse and complex product mix.
Human capital for emerging workplace needs
ɂ Human capital accumulation can promote both growth and equity. Estimates 
indicate that a 20% increase in human capital spending per capita can raise labor 
productivity by up to 3.1% and narrow labor income inequality by up to 4.5%. The bonus 
in income growth is more salient among poorer families, which may explain the income-
equalizing effect. Public education in particular enhances equity, yet some regional 
economies spend less per child than other economies at the same income. Evidence 
shows that higher public spending on education need not harm public finances. 
Augmented labor incomes expand the tax base and hence tax revenues. Finally, as 
regional populations age, enhancing worker quality can help compensate for the shrinking 
share of the working-age population. 
ɂ The emphasis needs to be on ramping up the quality of education. Increasing the 
average years of schooling a young person receives can boost growth but less so than 
improving the quality of education and enhancing cognitive skills like math and science. 
Economies with relatively high cognitive skills benefit from having a critical mass of 
students likely to become innovators. Research indicates that, as economies move 
closer to the technological frontier, the returns on research-oriented innovation pick up 
tangibly. Consequently, middle-income Asia needs to strengthen its research-oriented 
education while sustaining its achievements in basic education. 
ɂ Middle-income economies need to close education gaps with high-income 
economies. While differences in educational attainment remain substantial, especially 
in tertiary education, gaps in the quality of education offered by different education 
systems are spectacular. In globally standardized math and science tests, the proportion 
of top-performing 15-year-old students in the advanced economies is on average 4–5 
times the proportion in middle-income economies, while the share of low performers in 
middle-income economies is more than 2 times the advanced average. An exception like 
Viet Nam, which ranks at 8 among the 72 economies covered, appears to demonstrate 
that the gap can be closed with sound education policies.
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Infrastructure investment for facilitating structural change
ɂ Economies prioritize different types of infrastructure as they develop.
ADB reported this year that developing Asia has large investment needs across all 
types of infrastructure—from water supply and sanitation to transport, power, and 
telecommunications. But infrastructure needs shift as an economy becomes more 
complex and sophisticated. Low-income economies focus first on such basic needs as 
water supply, sanitation, and a transportation network to get goods and people to market. 
As basic needs are met and economic structures evolve, more importance is attached to 
electricity supply and advanced infrastructure such as information and communication 
technology.
ɂ Advanced infrastructure can help sustain growth in middle-income economies. 
The fastest-growing middle-income economies differ from their slower-growing peers in 
a couple of important ways. They invest more in infrastructure and tend to have more of 
certain types of infrastructure. Mobile telephone and broadband networks, for example, 
are vital tools for creating and disseminating knowledge. Middle-income economies 
that graduate to high income have 18 more internet users and 31 more mobile phone 
subscriptions per 100 people than their peers. Investment in advanced infrastructure can 
boost growth by promoting both innovation and human capital. The nexus of advanced 
infrastructure, highly developed skills, and innovation can help sustain growth enough to 
ensure a successful transition to high income.
ɂ Investment in infrastructure boosts output, not least in middle-income economies. 
Analysis using a sample of developing economies shows that a one-time increase in 
public infrastructure investment that equals 1.0% of GDP immediately lifts output 
by 0.3% of GDP and by nearly 1.2% after 7 years. Notably, this significantly positive 
effect, both in the short term and over the long run, is still robust when the sample is 
narrowed to middle-income economies. This underscores the potential benefits of an 
infrastructure push.
Reaching toward high income
ɂ Sound policies and institutions are vital to transformative growth. The role of 
government necessarily evolves as an economy progresses, becoming more nuanced 
as the private sector develops. Government must shape an environment conducive to 
innovative entrepreneurship by promoting investment in education and infrastructure. 
As shown by Thailand’s successful experience with industry–government coordination 
in the automobile industry, direct government intervention can, if selective and well 
targeted, foster an output mix that is more diverse and sophisticated. The case for 
intervention is stronger when a government has adequate institutional capacity. 
ɂ An environment conducive to growth needs macroeconomic stability. Empirical 
estimates show that when a country reaches middle income, its growth rate is more 
vulnerable to indicators affecting macroeconomic stability—such as whether the country 
faces a banking or currency crisis, the extent of capital inflows other than foreign 
investment, and government debt as a share of GDP. The region should continue to 
protect macroeconomic stability, as it has done very well in the past. 
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ɂ Sustaining rapid growth is not easy but is within reach for middle-income Asia. 
Many norms that served the region well at low income, such as macroeconomic stability 
and high investment, still serve it well at middle income. At the same time, the pattern 
of growth will have to evolve if Asia is to sustain rapid growth and eventually reach high 
income. In particular, education, innovation, and infrastructure all have vital roles to play. 
The region’s dynamic track record encourages optimism that governments can adapt 
their growth models to meet the middle-income challenge.
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GDP growth rate and inflation, % per year
Growth rate of GDP Inflation 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 5.2 3.1 2.1 3.1 3.5 5.9 6.3 11.1 7.8 7.3
Armenia 3.6 3.0 0.2 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.7 –1.4 1.2 1.8
Azerbaijan 2.8 1.1 –3.8 –1.1 1.2 1.4 4.0 12.4 9.0 8.0
Georgia 4.6 2.9 2.7 3.8 4.5 3.1 4.0 2.1 4.2 4.5
Kazakhstan 4.2 1.2 1.0 2.4 2.2 6.7 6.6 14.6 8.0 7.0
Kyrgyz Republic 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.0 3.5 7.5 6.5 0.4 5.0 4.0
Tajikistan 6.7 6.0 6.9 4.8 5.5 6.1 5.1 6.1 8.0 7.0
Turkmenistan 10.3 6.5 6.2 6.5 7.0 6.0 6.4 6.0 6.0 6.0
Uzbekistan 8.1 8.0 7.8 7.0 7.3 9.1 8.5 8.4 9.5 10.0
East Asia 6.6 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.6 1.9 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.6
China, People’s Rep. of 7.3 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.2 2.0 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.8
Hong Kong, China 2.8 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.1 4.4 3.0 2.4 2.0 2.1
Korea, Rep. of 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.7 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.8
Mongolia 7.9 2.4 1.0 2.5 2.0 12.8 6.6 1.1 3.5 3.9
Taipei,China 4.0 0.7 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.2 –0.3 1.4 1.3 1.2
South Asia 6.7 7.2 6.7 7.0 7.2 6.3 4.9 4.6 5.2 5.4
Afghanistan 1.3 0.8 2.0 2.5 3.0 4.7 –1.5 4.5 5.5 5.8
Bangladesh 6.1 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.3 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.3
Bhutan 4.0 6.1 6.4 8.2 9.9 9.6 6.6 3.3 4.9 5.4
India 7.2 7.9 7.1 7.4 7.6 6.0 4.9 4.7 5.2 5.4
Maldives 6.0 2.8 3.4 3.8 4.1 2.1 1.0 0.5 2.1 2.3
Nepal 5.7 2.3 0.8 5.6 5.4 9.1 7.2 9.9 6.0 6.5
Pakistan 4.1 4.0 4.7 5.2 5.5 8.6 4.5 2.9 4.0 4.8
Sri Lanka 5.0 4.8 4.4 5.0 5.0 3.3 3.8 4.0 6.0 6.0
Southeast Asia 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.1 2.8 2.1 3.3 3.5
Brunei Darussalam –2.5 –0.4 –2.5 1.0 2.5 –0.2 –0.4 –0.7 0.1 0.1
Cambodia 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1 3.9 1.2 3.0 3.4 3.5
Indonesia 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.3 6.4 6.4 3.5 4.3 4.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.5 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0 4.2 1.3 1.6 2.5 3.0
Malaysia 6.0 5.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 3.1 2.1 2.1 3.3 2.7
Myanmar 8.0 7.3 6.4 7.7 8.0 5.9 11.4 6.5 7.0 7.5
Philippines 6.2 5.9 6.8 6.4 6.6 4.1 1.4 1.8 3.5 3.7
Singapore 3.6 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 1.0 –0.5 –0.5 1.0 1.5
Thailand 0.9 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.6 1.9 –0.9 0.2 1.8 2.0
Viet Nam 6.0 6.7 6.2 6.5 6.7 4.1 0.6 2.7 4.0 5.0
The Pacific 9.6 8.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.4
Cook Islands 4.5 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.0 1.6 3.0 –0.1 0.5 1.2
Fiji 5.6 3.6 2.0 3.5 4.0 0.6 1.4 3.9 2.5 2.5
Kiribati 2.4 3.5 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.1 0.6 0.7 2.0 2.0
Marshall Islands –0.9 0.6 1.5 4.0 2.5 1.1 –2.2 –1.3 1.5 1.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of –2.4 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.5 0.7 –0.2 –0.3 1.5 2.0
Nauru 36.5 2.8 7.2 4.3 –4.5 3.0 11.4 7.2 5.7 1.8
Palau 4.8 11.6 2.2 3.0 5.5 4.0 2.2 –1.3 1.5 2.0
Papua New Guinea 13.3 12.0 2.0 2.5 2.8 5.2 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.5
Samoa 1.2 1.6 6.6 2.0 1.5 –1.3 1.9 0.1 2.0 2.0
Solomon Islands 2.0 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.8 5.2 –0.5 1.1 1.8 2.2
Timor-Leste 5.9 3.5 5.4 4.0 6.0 0.7 0.6 –1.4 1.2 3.0
Tonga 2.0 3.7 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.5 –1.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
Tuvalu 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.1 3.2 2.0 2.0 2.0
Vanuatu 2.3 –1.0 3.8 4.3 3.8 1.0 2.5 0.9 2.4 2.6
Developing Asia 6.3 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.7 3.0 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.2
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 3.2 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.5
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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SLOW GROWTH 
DESPITE POLICY 
UNCERTAINTY

Growth in Asia moderated in 2016 despite improving trends in 
the second half. The main reasons for the nascent turnaround 
were the bottoming out of oil prices, higher external demand 
from the United States and the European Union, and fi scal 
stimulus and a slight easing of fi nancial conditions in some 
economies (Figure 1.0.1). This occurred against the backdrop 
of looming structural change in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and other East Asian economies that, coupled with 
a need for corporate debt restructuring, could undermine 
growth. Some fast-growing economies in South and Southeast 
Asia will need to pick up the slack. The PRC is now the 
world’s second-largest economy and larger than the rest of 
Asia and the Pacifi c combined (Figure 1.0.2). The next largest 
economies, India and Indonesia, are implementing important 
structural reforms that should improve their medium-term 
growth prospects, and the benefi ts are already coming into 
view in the turnaround in regional growth.
Infl ation soared in 2016, and the forecast for 2017 and 2018 
is for more increases across the board except in Central Asia, 
where infl ation will moderate because of a high base in 2016 
following currency devaluation the year before. Asia’s external 
current account maintained its surplus with the rest of the 
world in 2016, but it is likely to narrow in 2017 and 2018.
Asia’s near-term outlook is solid. Growth in the PRC 
will continue to moderate but do so manageably as long as 
fi nancial fl ows remain stable. The outlook assumes that, as 
the United States economy normalizes in 2017 and 2018, 
the Fed funds rate will rise. However, if US rates rise too 
quickly, central banks in Asia may need to follow suit. Possible 
changes in US tax and trade policies may dampen business 
sentiment for globally oriented companies investing in Asia. In 
general, developing Asia’s outlook would be undercut if trade 
became less open, but real impact from any policy changes is 
unlikely to materialize until the second half of 2018.
Solid growth despite 
policy uncertainty
This chapter was written by Valerie Mercer-Blackman, Arief Ramayandi, Benno Ferrarini, 
Madhavi Pundit, Shiela Camingue-Romance, Cindy Castillejos-Petalcorin, Marthe 
Hinojales, Nedelyn Magtibay-Ramos, Pilipinas Quising, and Dennis Sorino, of the 
Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila.
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Asia tacks to shifting headwinds
Developing Asia is forecast to maintain stable growth this 
year and the next. Aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) 
in the region will expand by 5.7% in 2017 and 2018, down 
slightly from 5.8% in 2016 (Figure 1.1.1). The slower expansion 
refl ects moderating growth in the PRC that more than off sets 
faster expansion elsewhere. The PRC continues its shift 
toward less dependence on investment and manufacturing. In 
2017, growth in the region will remain steady as solid growth 
in India and a pickup in other larger economies, notably in 
Southeast Asia, off set continued slowing of growth in the 
PRC. Average infl ation in the region will rise from 2.5% in 
2016 to 3.0% in 2017 on strengthening domestic demand and 
recovery in global commodity prices, and further to 3.2% in 
2018 with a further rise in oil prices (Figure 1.1.2). 
The region’s aggregate current account surplus will 
narrow from 2.3% in 2016 to 1.9% in 2017 and further to 1.7% 
in 2018 as export growth is likely to be outpaced in most 
economies by import growth to support domestic economic 
activity (Figure 1.1.3). Further, the recovery in the industrial 
economies remains modest (Box 1.1.1).
Slower growth in 2016
Growth in developing Asia slowed in 2016 for a third consecutive 
year, mirroring continued growth moderation in the PRC and the 
modest outturn in most economies last year. The growth slowdown 
was widespread, aff ecting most economies in the region, 
particularly in East and Central Asia. Average growth slipped 
from 6.0% in 2015 to 5.8% in 2016.
Growth in East Asia edged down to 6.0% in 2016 from 
6.1% in 2015 as private consumption slowed and exports 
withered. Moderating growth in the PRC continued to weigh 
on the region’s performance, reducing growth for a third 
straight year. In Mongolia, growth dropped by 1.4 percentage 
points, and in Hong Kong, China by 0.5 points, because of 
lackluster consumer spending. Growth improved by less 
than a percentage point in the Republic of Korea (ROK), 
and by 0.8 percentage points in Taipei,China, as strong 
investment—propelled by higher construction in the ROK and 
by strong demand for machinery and transport equipment in 
Taipei,China—countered feeble exports. 
In Central Asia, growth weakened to 2.1% from 3.1% 
in 2015 as seven of the eight economies, excepting only Tajikistan, 
posted slower growth on account of weaker global oil prices, higher 
prices for nonfood imports resulting from currency depreciation, and 
recession in the Russian Federation, a key trade partner and source 
1.1.1  Developing Asia’s growth and subregional 
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1.1.1 Clear but fragile recovery in 2016
Combined growth in the major industrial economies—the 
euro area, Japan, and the US—was stronger in 2016 and 
the first quarter of 2017 than forecast. On that basis, the 
baseline outlook is stable to positive. 
After a weak start in the first half of 2016, US economic 
activity strengthened significantly in the second half, 
particularly in the third quarter. Consumption continues to 
grow, with consumer confidence rebounding quite strongly 
in February 2017 to reach its highest monthly level since 
July 2001. Manufacturing is gradually recovering, while 
industrial production and purchasing managers’ indexes 
show moderate expansion in February 2017, suggesting 
continuing production recovery. Meanwhile, a positive trend 
in the labor market continued as the unemployment rate fell 
further in February 2017 to 4.7%. 
With signs that the output gap may have closed, the 
Federal Reserve is expected to tighten monetary policy 
in 2017. Headline inflation is on a rising trend since 2015. 
The trend continued in 2017 with inflation climbing to 2.5% 
in January. The Fed raised the target range for the federal 
funds rate by 25 basis points in December 2016 and by 
another 25 basis points in March 2017. Continuing gradual 
increases are expected during the next 2 years, bringing the 
rate to about 1.4% by the end of 2017 and 2.4% at the end of 
2018. This expectation of rate hikes have been incorporated 
into the baseline projections. Higher interest rates will 
likely strengthen the US dollar further, as it continues to 
appreciate against most major currencies. GDP will grow at 
2.4% in both 2017 and 2018 as growth momentum continues.
Growth momentum in the euro area strengthened in 
the past year. After a blip in the second quarter of 2016, 
which coincided with the United Kingdom’s Brexit 
referendum in June, recovery in the euro area continued to 
accelerate in the second half, bringing GDP growth to 1.7% 
for the whole of 2016. Domestic demand was supported 
by accomodative policies and improving labor markets. 
The recovery in exports remains fragile. The unemployment 
rate improved to 9.6% in December, its lowest since April 
2009. Consumer confidence remain upbeat while the 
composite purchasing managers’ index has risen to its 
highest since April 2011, suggesting that corporate activity 
is picking up. In February, economic sentiment climbed to 
its highest point in 6 years. The United Kingdom’s decision 
to leave the European Union seems thus far to have slowed 
regional growth less than expected, and economic sentiment 
appears to be positive, however fragile.
Despite emerging price pressures, the European Central 
Bank kept its interest rates unchanged at its March 2017 
meeting. Earlier in December, it decided to extend its 
quantitative easing program by 9 months to the end of 2017. 
In February, inflation accelerated further to 2.0% with a 
sharper jump in energy prices. The euro remains somewhat 
weak, but this may help net exports recover.
The baseline projection assumes GDP growth will hold 
steady at 1.6% in 2017 and 2018. While negotiations on the 
United Kingdom’s separation from the European Union has 
been triggered, they are unlikely to drag significantly on 
growth until perhaps late 2018, when the shape of Brexit 
may be clearer. Meanwhile, concerns about Greek debt 
have resurfaced and could dampen business confidence 
as elections loom in France, Germany, and possibly Italy. 
The baseline forecast assumes an improving outlook for 
global growth and trade, as well as some recovery in 
investment.
Japan’s economy grew by 1.0%, less than in 2015. 
Growth in 2016 came from strong expansion in the first half 
of the year, first an uptick in consumption and net exports, 
and then in private investment. Exports contributed to 
growth, particularly in the fourth quarter, when they rose 
by 8.9%. As recent monthly indicators suggest that domestic 
demand remains sluggish, the recovery may lose steam. 
For example, manufacturing growth turned positive in the 
third quarter of 2016 but improved only slightly thereafter. 
Other data suggest that business sentiment remains 
cautious, though the purchasing managers’ index is above 
the threshold of 50, indicating expansion in manufacturing. 
Consumer confidence, which in September hit its highest 
point in 3 years, declined in the following months owing to 
weak wage growth. With government stimulus, the Bank 
of Japan projects that public investment will rise through 
FY2017 (ends 31 March 2018). With inflation stirring to 
only 0.5% in January 2017, the short-term policy interest 
rate was kept at –0.1 percent and the target yield for 10-year 
Japanese government bonds continues to be zero. 
The Japanese economy is expected to continue 
expanding at a modest pace, with growth forecast at 1.0% 
for 2017. The recovery is precariously balanced. While a 
weak yen and an uptick in global demand have boosted 
exports recently, confidence has yet to show a very robust 
response.
GDP growth in the major industrial economies (%)
Area
2015 2016 2017 2018
Actual ADO projection
Major industrial economies 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.9
 United States 2.6 1.6 2.4 2.4
 Euro area 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6
 Japan 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9
ADO = Asian Development Outlook.
Notes: Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method. 
More details in Table A1.1 on page 32. 
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,  
http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; Economic and 
Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; Consensus Forecasts; 
Bloomberg; CEIC Data Company; Haver; World Bank, Global Commodity 
Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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of remittances, which quelled demand. Azerbaijan fell into 
recession with the decline in domestic demand on top of 
the adverse impact of weaker oil production and exports. 
Oil-dependent Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also slowed, 
but less than in 2015 as declining oil export earnings were 
countered by higher government spending in Kazakhstan 
and increased investment in Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, 
growth improved by 0.9 percentage points thanks to timely 
and robust expansion in public investment, and despite lower 
remittances. Weak exports slowed growth marginally in the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. 
Growth in South Asia eased to 6.7% in 2016 from 
7.2% in 2015 even as fi ve of the eight economies posted 
higher growth. The deceleration was largely attributed to 
India, where growth decelerated to 7.1% in 2016 from 7.9% in 2015 on 
account of weak expansion in private investment, a halt to the slide in 
international oil prices, and the government’s demonetization of high-
denomination banknotes in November 2016, which temporarily stymied 
many transactions in this cash-intensive economy. Growth in Nepal also 
slowed, hurt by delayed reconstruction following an earthquake in April 
2015 and by trade and supply disruptions in early 2016. In Sri Lanka, 
growth moderated as adverse weather weakened agricultural production. 
Steady growth in the rest of the South Asian economies refl ected higher 
consumption and investment and a rebound in high-end tourism. 
In the Pacifi c, aggregate growth in 2016 eased to just a third of 
the subregion’s remarkable 8.3% expansion in 2015 as growth slowed 
in the larger island economies. Low commodity prices and soft global 
demand sharply weakened growth in the subregion’s largest economy, 
Papua New Guinea. In Fiji, growth eased due to damage and losses from 
Cyclone Winston, while in Timor-Leste growth improved as higher 
infrastructure investment off set slack petroleum exports and revenues. 
In contrast with slower growth elsewhere, aggregate growth in 
Southeast Asia improved slightly to 4.7% in 2016 from 4.6% in 2015, 
even as growth slowed in 4 of the 10 economies and recession deepened 
in Brunei Darussalam. This largely refl ected a higher weighting 
for Indonesia, where growth accelerated last year on higher fi xed 
investment and consumption after slowing for 4 straight years. In 
Malaysia, growth dipped for a second year in a row, weighed down 
by declining fi xed investment, weaker government spending, and 
lower exports. In Thailand, growth improved marginally from last 
year on higher consumption, aided by a tax rebate for shopping and 
dining, higher rural incomes, and recovery in net exports. Growth in 
Viet Nam slowed as weaker agriculture and mining production off set 
robust expansion in manufacturing and construction. Adverse weather 
hurt agricultural production in the Philippines and Viet Nam. In the 
Philippines, though, huge improvements in public infrastructure kicked 
in, lifting growth to a rate on par with the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and behind only Cambodia.
External demand slowed growth in several large economies. 
In 7 of the 11 regional economies with data on contributions 
to growth, net exports trimmed growth in 2016 (Figure 1.1.4). 
1.1.3  Current account balance in developing Asia
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1.1.4  Demand-side contributions to growth, 
selected economies
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Consumption remained the dominant source of expansion 
last year, with over half of growth in most of these economies 
fueled mainly by private spending, even as consumer 
confidence was mostly bleak (Figure 1.1.5).
Consumer confidence started low in 2016 in most of the 
large economies examined but rose gradually in four of the 
seven in the second half of the year. In the PRC, consumer 
confidence was strong throughout 2016 and translated into 
higher spending on a wide range of goods and services. In 
Hong Kong, China, consumer confidence fluctuated as more 
cautious views took hold about the economic outlook, job 
prospects, and spending plans. After slipping in mid-2016 
because of declines in tourist arrivals, particularly from the 
PRC, consumer confidence in Hong Kong, China recovered in 
the second half on better expectations about jobs and stock 
market movements. Consumer confidence in Indonesia also 
swung, soaring to a 21-month high in October 2016 on public 
approval for government reform programs, including tax 
amnesty, before falling slowly toward the end of last year due 
to a modest change in outlook for jobs and incomes. In the 
Philippines, the better outlook for business activity, jobs, and 
incomes improved consumer sentiment.
Faced with a sluggish economic outlook and critical 
domestic issues, the ROK, Thailand, and Taipei,China saw consumer 
sentiment slump and remain negative for most of 2016. In the ROK, 
consumer sentiment fell to its lowest in more than 7.5 years in 
December, as residents anticipated a weaker economy because of the 
crisis surrounding the President and resulting turbulent financial 
markets. In Taipei,China, consumer confidence weakened from January 
to June in line with economic contraction in the first quarter and 
1.1.5  Consumer confidence and expectations, selected developing Asia
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fragile recovery in the second. Slight improvements occurred in the 
second half, but confidence remains low, reflecting uncertainty over the 
economic outlook.
In contrast, consumer confidence in Malaysia improved in 2016 
as consumers remained hopeful despite worries about the economic 
outlook and job security.
Retailers in most economies saw better growth in 2016 with the 
fragile recovery in consumer sentiment (Figure 1.1.6). Retail sales in 
Hong Kong, China dropped year on year during most of 2016, reflecting 
lower tourist spending and, to some extent, volatility in equity markets. 
Spending in February, usually a better month because of the Lunar 
New Year, was particularly weak in Hong Kong, China compared with 
other economies in East Asia. February retail sales were lower in the 
PRC as well than in the previous year, but sales held up well toward the 
end of the year. On average, consumption improved in line with rising 
consumer sentiment for the medium term. The ROK and Taipei,China, 
by comparison, enjoyed higher sales during February and saw this trend 
continue to December.
In Thailand, retail sales recovered after contracting during most of 
2015. Retail sales continued to rise year on year in Malaysia and Viet 
Nam, sustained by rising incomes, but they fell in Singapore as spending 
on recreational goods, clothing and furniture, and other consumer goods 
slowed. In Indonesia, better macroeconomic and banking conditions, 
supported by relatively stable electricity rates and moderate gas and oil 
prices, helped boost retail sales.
Trends in industrial production reflect modest economic 
expansion in export-oriented economies. In East Asia, industrial 
production in 2016 rose by 6.0% in the PRC, 2.9% in the ROK, and 
1.5% in Taipei,China, while it contracted by 0.4% in Hong Kong, China 
(Figure 1.1.7). Industrial expansion in Taipei,China came as a wide array 
1.1.6 Retail sales, selected developing Asia
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1.1.7 Industrial production index
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of manufacturing industries such as electronics, electrical machinery, 
manufactured goods, and base and fabricated metals grew, fueled by 
expansionary fiscal policies. Industrial production fluctuated in the 
ROK, rising toward the second quarter of 2016 and then falling in the 
third with a slump in the production of automobiles and mobile devices, 
but it remained generally positive. Lower car sales with the expiration 
of the government’s excise tax cuts on passenger cars prompted car 
manufacturers to cut production—and strikes in some plants did the 
same. Meanwhile, the worldwide production halt and massive recall of 
a newly released Samsung phone caused output of mobile devices to fall. 
Industrial production held steady in the PRC thanks largely to a strong 
high-tech industry. 
In Southeast Asia, industrial production was volatile, except in 
Viet Nam, where it fell steadily after February because of a steep decline 
in mining. Countering this decline were strong gains in processing and 
manufacturing that lifted overall production by 16.5%, up from 12.3% 
growth in 2015. Recovery in the Philippines and Thailand followed a 
contraction in 2015, while expansion in Singapore remained at 3.6% 
because of double-digit increases in electronic and pharmaceutical 
output in the last 2 months of the year. After posting solid gains in 
2015, growth in Indonesian industrial production moderated to 4.0% in 
2016 as performance varied across subsectors and spending by goods 
producers turned cautious. In Malaysia, production gains halved in 2016 
from 4.5% the previous year as mining output shrank and production 
fell for electrical and electronics products and for transport equipment.
Cautious spending by the private sector and uncertainty in both the 
domestic and the external environment weakened investment in most 
of the larger economies. Gross investment declined in India, the ROK, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand in 2016. Investment expansion in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, 
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China came mainly from increased private sector investment, 
spurred by higher outlays for industrial machinery and 
equipment, construction, and inventories in anticipation 
of higher domestic activity later in the year (Figure 1.1.8). 
Investment growth in the PRC declined only slightly 
in 2016, reflecting the offsetting effects of lower industrial 
investment, rising infrastructure and real estate investment, 
and large outlays by emerging high-value technology firms.
Reform in India and the PRC  
to consolidate growth
India’s economy continued to recover strongly. Its high 
dependence on oil imports meant it benefited from a large 
improvement in its terms of trade. Further, effective policy 
actions over the past year brought a new bankruptcy code, 
formalized an inflation-targeting framework, enacted 
constitutional changes to allow the implementation of a 
goods and services tax, and gradually lifted fuel subsidies. 
For the past 4 years or so, the economy has experienced a 
gradual cyclical recovery and is estimated to have grown 
by 7.1% in 2016. Favorable agricultural output aided by 
well-timed monsoon rains also supported growth. Stronger consumer 
demand even under gradual fiscal consolidation helped boost consumer 
sentiment. 
India decided in November 2016 to withdrawal from circulation, 
or demonetize, Rs500 and Rs1,000 banknotes—about 86% of the 
currency in circulation by value—and replace them with new Rs500 
and Rs2,000 notes. The decision was designed to trip up corruption, 
counterfeiting, and the funding of terrorism in the near term while, 
over the medium term, improving tax compliance and increasing the 
amount of savings channeled through the formal financial system. This 
initiative caused temporary disruption in sectors heavily dependent on 
cash. These disruptions, along with a continued slowdown in private 
investment and stabilization in oil prices, decelerated GDP growth from 
7.9% in 2015 to 7.1%. The economy is expected to fully recover from 
demonetization in 2017, to grow at a projected 7.4%. Over the medium 
term, structural policies already implemented should help maintain 
long-term GDP growth well above 7.0%.
Investment was sluggish in much of 2016 as private investment 
was weighed down by low capacity utilization and slow progress in 
deleveraging. Demonetization may have temporarily stalled investment 
plans in some sectors. Nonetheless, net foreign direct investment 
inflows in FY2016 rose by about 15%, reflecting steps to augment 
investment by simplifying guidelines and allowing foreign direct 
investment in sectors such as real estate, airport and air transport 
services, and e-commerce. Better business conditions going forward 
should improve investment prospects in general. 
India’s current account deficit has declined sharply in recent years 
with lower commodity prices, in particular for oil and gold, which 
1.1.8  Contributions to investment growth in developing Asia
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together accounted for 27.3% of imports in 2016. External 
vulnerabilities are in check, while international reserves 
provide an adequate buffer, standing at $360 billion in 
late December 2016 and providing 8 months of import 
cover. Nonetheless, as commodity prices rebound, import 
demand strengthens, and foreign demand continues to 
decline, especially from the Gulf, the deficit is projected to 
expand a bit in the next 2 years. The current account deficit 
is expected to be comfortably financed by stable capital 
inflows. 
Rebalancing in the PRC further moderated growth 
last year, and expansion in 2017 will likely slow a bit more 
with continuing structural reform. Growth has been 
decelerating steadily since 2010, slowing from 6.9% in 2015 
to 6.7% as Asia’s largest economy changes its development 
paradigm. On the supply side, services remained the main 
growth driver, with strong growth across many service 
industries. Real estate investment grew from a low base but was buoyed 
by the lowering of mortgage interest payments and down-payment 
requirements. The balance of payments weakened slightly in 2016 as 
exports of goods fell by 7.2% year on year, more steeply than the 4.5% 
drop in 2015. As exports are measured in US dollars, some of this drop 
reflects renminbi appreciation against the dollar in 2016. 
More recent monthly data show industrial production growing 
steadily by 6% throughout 2016 as manufacturing expanded on spillover 
from an invigorated real estate market, a jump in car production, robust 
construction, and continued high electricity generation. 
In India, industrial production shook off its malaise to expand in 
mid-2016, though industry expansion at 1% was well below the 6% 
recorded in the PRC in the fourth quarter (Figure 1.1.9). 
Merchandise export growth in India turned positive toward 
the end of 2016, and the purchasing managers’ index turned 
positive for both the PRC and India in 2016, indicating 
renewed economic activity (Figure 1.1.10). The two major 
economies together account for almost 70% of regional GDP. 
Growth is expected to remain strong in the near term 
in the PRC, helped by fiscal stimulus from infrastructure 
spending, robust credit growth, and strong real estate 
investment. However, slower progress with reining in credit 
and reforming state enterprises is a risk to medium-term 
growth. As the government is concerned about maintaining 
stability in financial and labor markets, it will not push for 
faster growth. Likewise, India’s economy is expected to 
continue to record strong and broad growth, aided in part by 
favorable external demand. In both economies, momentum 
from strong growth in major export markets, the mild 
rebound of commodity prices, and robust public investment 
in particular present upside risks to the growth forecast. 
1.1.9 Production indicators
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1.1.10 Merchandise exports and purchasing managers’ index
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Inflation inches back up
Inflation was generally higher in 2016 than in 2015. However, 
many of the factors that kept inflation low in 2016, notably 
lackluster demand in the region and falling international 
prices for oil and other commodities, reversed in the second 
half of the year. The highest inflation rates occurred in 
Central Asia, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, 
where producer prices shot up in 2016 as a lagged result of 
currency depreciation by roughly half in 2015 and, toward 
the end of the year, as recovery in demand stabilized oil and 
food prices. Elsewhere, especially in Southeast Asia and in 
some newly industrialized economies, notably the ROK and 
Taipei,China, fiscal stimulus is helping to revive domestic 
demand. However, inflation is expected to remain generally 
low in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Southeast Asia. 
With inflation in single digits throughout these subregions 
in 2017, consumer and business expectations are for stable 
inflation. 
Producer price indexes have been low to negative in some 
economies (Figure 1.1.11). However, monthly data suggest 
that producer price inflation, having lagged the consumer 
price index, began to creep up toward the end of 2016.
Substantial differences in inflation remain across the 
subregions. Inflation is still lowest in East Asia, in line with 
substantial moderation in growth over the past few years 
(Figure 1.1.12). Inflation rose in most subregions in 2016, 
the exceptions being Southeast Asia, where it slowed from 
2.8% in 2015 to 2.1% mainly because inflation halved in Indonesia, 
and South Asia, where a very small decline largely reflected lower 
inflation in India. In South Asia and the Pacific, inflation was broadly 
steady below 5%. The biggest jump occurred in Central Asia, as sharp 
increases in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan offset deceleration in most 
other economies.
Exports return to growth
After falling dramatically in 2015, merchandise exports have 
begun to recover, except in East Asia, where exports shrunk 
anew, most notably in the PRC, and in the Pacific, because 
of poor export performance by Papua New Guinea. Export 
earnings in Central Asia fell mainly because of the drop in 
commodity prices, but lower demand from trade partners 
had a role in the slow recovery in earnings for South Asia 
and Southeast Asia (Figure 1.1.13). With demand recovering 
in major trading partners, exports are expected to recover 
gradually in 2017 and 2018. It is still early days, but monthly 
merchandise exports have risen noticeably since the end 
of 2016 (Figure 1.1.14), reversing the trend of the past 2 
years, particularly in the newly industrialized economies, 
the larger economies in Southeast Asia, and, as discussed 
above, in the PRC and India. Moderating growth in the PRC 
1.1.11  Consumer and producer prices, 2016
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has been partly responsible for the decline in exports over 
the past 2 years, particularly from Singapore, the ROK, and 
Taipei,China (Figure 1.1.15), but the larger slowdown was 
in demand from other trading partners, mainly the major 
industrial economies. 
Merchandise imports in 2016 were mixed by subregion 
(Figure 1.1.16). In Central Asia, a steep drop in imports 
resulted from slower growth and the lagged impact of 
large currency devaluation in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
Imports in East Asia also fell, mostly in the PRC, but less 
so than in 2015. In the other subregions, import growth 
resumed on recovering domestic demand after fairly steep 
declines in 2015 that partly reflected falling US dollar costs 
for commodity imports. The forecast for 2017 and 2018 is for 
import growth to accelerate as expansion in major trading 
partners outside of Asia remains steady and commodity 
prices inch up. Nonetheless, as discussed in more detail 
below in the section on risks, substantial uncertainty bedevils 
this forecast. That said, because many of the risk scenarios 
stem from possible policy changes in the European Union, 
PRC, and US, their impact is likely to be muted in 2017 but 
possibly affect trade flows in 2018.
The region’s current account surplus narrowed to 2.3% in 
2016, with East and Southeast Asia still showing significant 
surpluses (Figure 1.1.17). A narrower surplus for the PRC 
in 2017 and a slightly wider deficit in South Asia as imports 
to India rise will likely trim the region’s surplus to the 
equivalent of 1.9% of GDP. 
Asia and the Pacific continue to have a current account 
surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Figure 1.1.18). In 
particular, the combined surpluses of the PRC and Japan 
roughly match the US deficit, with the rest of the world 
showing a combined surplus equal to 0.36% of world GDP in 
2016. The surplus in developing Asia is expected to narrow 
somewhat, from 0.7% of global GDP in 2016 to less than 0.5% 
in 2017 and 2018. This will reflect lower net exports for the 
PRC as it progressively replaces outward-oriented growth 
with growth led by domestic consumption. Rebalancing 
towards smaller surpluses and deficits is a welcome trend for 
global financial stability.
Stable growth outlook continues
Growth in developing Asia will likely slow slightly this year and in 2018 
as controlled deceleration in PRC growth continues, slightly offsetting 
robust growth elsewhere—a strong effect as GDP in the PRC accounts 
for 58% of regional GDP (Figure 1.1.19). 
Despite growth moderation since 2010, developing Asia will still be 
the world’s fastest-growing region and greatest contributor to global 
growth (Figure 1.1.20). Early in 2016, global economic uncertainty and 
meager expansion in the major industrial economies hampered export 
1.1.13 Export growth by subregion
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1.1.14 Export growth, selected economies
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growth in economies with strong trade and financial links 
with the West, but this trend is reversing. Higher exports will 
help the newly industrialized economies, which have grown 
more slowly than the rest of developing Asia because of their 
advanced stage of development (Box 1.1.2). Economies in the 
region can attain higher growth trajectories in the future 
through continued structural reform to boost productivity, 
support for domestic demand, and, particularly in South Asia, 
a better investment climate.
East Asian growth is expected to slow to 5.8% in 2017 
and further to 5.6% in 2018, mirroring growth moderation in 
the PRC. The PRC is likely to grow by 6.5% in 2017 and 6.2% 
in 2018. Recent monthly data show infrastructure and real 
estate investment still strong. The desire to keep the medium-
term growth strategy on track will require stable financial 
markets and employment, so the government will strive to 
avoid deviating from a smooth minor deceleration. 
Though on a lower trajectory, growth in the PRC will 
reflect strong domestic consumption, solid wage growth, 
urban job creation, and public infrastructure investment. 
Downward pressure on PRC growth will continue to come from a 
declining working-age population, the ongoing shift toward consumption 
and services and away from investment and industry, and convergence 
with slower-growing high-income economies. However, structural 
reform to help ease growth in corporate and household debt can help 
offset these pressures, as discussed below. Despite continued monetary 
and fiscal support, growth in 2018 is expected to moderate to 6.2%.
South Asia’s expansion is forecast at 7.0% in 2017 with a faster 
recovery expected in India, and growth is forecast to rise 
further to 7.2% in 2018 as expansion in the rest of the region 
also accelerates. In India, government reform and ongoing 
deleveraging by private corporations will support recovery 
in investment, and the slight rise in growth prospects for 
the advanced economies will boost exports this year and 
next. Growth in 2018 is expected to accelerate slightly to 
7.6%. As India’s GDP is 80% of South Asian aggregate GDP, 
India’s improved outlook dominates the subregional forecast, 
masking some uncertainty in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
In Southeast Asia, growth is forecast at 4.8% in 2017 and 
5.0% in 2017, with Malaysia and Viet Nam recovering from 
slow growth in agricultural output and, in particular, a surge 
in public and private investment. Thailand is continuing 
structural reform and will continue its public spending to 
boost productivity, which promises to lift growth slightly to 
3.5% in 2017 and 3.6% in 2018. The Philippines is the only 
economy in Southeast Asia projected to see lower growth 
in 2017, as smaller remittances from the Gulf states and 
lower demand from trading partners offsets a healthy rise in domestic 
consumption and investment. 
1.1.15  Change in exports to the People’s Republic of China 
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1.1.16 Import growth by subregion
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1.1.2 Has high-income Asia converged? 
Convergence occurs when poorer economies grow 
faster than richer ones, closing the income gap between 
them. As their incomes rise and the gap with the richest 
economies narrows, growth tends to slow. This is the case 
of the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) in Asia—the 
ROK, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China—
which experienced rapid growth in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Now, with average 2015 population-weighted per capita 
income at $28,824—which is 6.8 times greater than the 
$4,239 average in the rest of developing Asia—slower 
growth is the norm. Yet even at the slower growth pace, 
these economies continue to converge with the major 
industrial economies. The NIEs grew in the decade ending 
in 2016 at an average annual rate of 3.4%, which is 4 times 
growth in the major industrialized economies, but much 
less than the 7.8% average in the rest of developing Asia 
(box figure 1). 
Despite the different growth rates, spillover from the 
slowdown in external demand from the PRC and the major 
industrial economies affected the NIEs as much as it did the 
rest of developing Asia because of their high dependence 
on exports. The NIEs were well equipped to weather 
these shocks, however, with their healthy fiscal positions 
and well-regulated financial systems. Indeed, all the NIEs 
provided fiscal stimulus to some extent in 2015 and 2016 as 
growth slowed (box figure 2). 
Going forward, lower potential growth rates in the NIEs 
relative to the rest of developing Asia will reflect reduced 
labor supply because of changing demographic factors 
such as aging populations and higher dependency ratios, 
and their response by shifting production toward high 
technology. The NIEs are expected to grow by 2.3% in 2017 
and 2.5% in 2018 as the rest of developing Asia grows by 
6.3% and then 6.2%. 
Hong Kong, China depends heavily on services in its role 
as a trading and financial hub. This makes it vulnerable to 
volatility in global financial markets, unexpected changes in 
demand from the PRC, and US interest rate hikes that are 
higher than expected, especially as it would have to raise its 
own interest rates to avoid putting too much stress on its 
exchange rate link to the US dollar. 
The ROK has seen growth weakened considerably over 
the past 3 years by lower external demand, as exports 
make up more than half of GDP. Uncertainty brought on by 
political troubles dampened consumer demand in 2016 and 
will do the same in the first part of 2017. The ROK faces a 
number of structural challenges, including an impending 
decline in its working–age population, a limited social 
safety net for its stage of development, a need for corporate 
restructuring, and high household debt. 
Singapore’s average growth in the past 3 years has 
slowed partly from structural factors such as restrictions 
on foreign worker inflows but also slow trade growth and 
soft manufacturing as low oil prices hit its refining industry. 
Economic support is expected from increased fiscal outlays 
to improve public services and investment incentives for 
high-tech manufacturing.
Taipei,China has also struggled with lower trade growth 
and shifting demographics. The authorities have expanded 
infrastructure spending through an ambitious new industrial 
strategy. The plan is to develop a program of investment in 
high technology. 
In sum, with inflation below 2.5%, the short-term 
outlook for the NIEs is robust.
1  Average growth and per capita income, newly 
industrialized economies vs rest of developing Asia
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Central Asia will reverse its growth slowdown and 
accelerate expansion in the next 2 years with recovering 
oil prices and higher export demand following currency 
depreciation in 2015 in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Growth 
is expected to quicken to 3.1% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018. 
The Pacifi c is seen improving its aggregate growth 
rate to 2.9% in 2017 and further to 3.3% in 2018, mostly on 
account of the economic recovery in Papua New Guinea, the 
subregion’s largest economy. Fiji and Vanuatu are recovering 
from natural disasters in 2015.
Growth in the NIEs will slow marginally in line with 
deceleration in the PRC, to 2.2% in 2017 and then rising to 
2.5% in 2018. Growth is expected to rise in particular in 
Singapore and Taipei,China as government investment in 
infrastructure and higher growth in manufacturing and 
electronics boosts these economies. However, growth in 
Hong Kong, China will be a modest 2.0% in 2017 as services 
are not expected to recover quickly and the economy is 
very susceptible to changes in monetary policy and the 
value of the US dollar—and, for that matter, to any fi nancial 
developments in the US. In the ROK, the political uncertainty 
that suppressed domestic demand in 2016 is expected to 
dispel somewhat by mid-2017, and export-led growth should 
resume in 2018.
Regional infl ation is projected to accelerate from 2.5% 
last year to 3.0% this year and 3.2% in 2018 because of rising 
global commodity prices and consumer demand. In the PRC, 
strong credit and household income growth will, along with 
the fi scal stimulus from infrastructure spending, underpin 
growth in domestic demand. Infl ation in the PRC will thus 
accelerate at a similar pace, from 2.0% last year to 2.4% 
this year and 2.8% in 2018. South Asia in particular will 
see demand prod infl ation from 4.6% last year to 5.2% this 
year, rising a bit further to 5.4% in 2018. A few commodity 
exporters in Central Asia will continue to experience 
infl ation approaching 10% as the eff ects of earlier currency depreciation 
pass through from imports to consumer prices. A rise in the Pacifi c 
will be led by higher infl ation in Papua New Guinea, resulting from 
higher growth and the expected return of gold and copper mines to full 
production capacity.
Risks to the outlook 
Risks to the outlook seem to come from all directions yet not really from 
anywhere. An eventful 2016 brought a US presidential election fraught 
with potential policy change, the historic Brexit referendum, and sudden 
demonetization in India. Yet these events seem so far to have had only 
minor short-term eff ects on consumer and business confi dence. The 
resumption of growth in the advanced economies and in developing 
Asia, and the corresponding rise in exports indicated in very recent 
data, suggest that the output gap in the US has closed, making future 
1.1.17 Current account balance by subregion
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interest rate hikes there more certain. Markets have already factored in 
this apparent inevitability, and the baseline forecast assumes 
a modest rise in interest rates. 
The forecast faces four main risks that could undermine 
developing Asia’s growth trajectory, but the region as a 
whole can easily manage them over the short term. The 
first involves monetary tightening in the US and an ensuing 
response from Asian central banks to avoid capital outflows. 
The second risk is that abrupt changes in financial flows 
could imperil highly indebted corporations and households. 
The impact of higher interest rates in the US on the region’s 
economies, and on rapidly rising household debt, are analyzed 
in the following section. The third risk is sudden shifts in 
trade and tax policies in the major industrial economies. 
The final risk—a less likely one—is oil price recovery that is 
weaker than expected. 
The first risk to the forecast comes from higher-than-
expected real interest rates in the US and further slight 
appreciation of the dollar against many Asian currencies. 
This could cause asset prices to plunge and private capital to flow out 
of emerging Asia in search of higher returns elsewhere. A sudden shift 
would be destabilizing and possibly erode consumer confidence. If, on 
the other hand, rate changes come gradually, central banks in the region 
will have sufficient time to respond by tightening monetary policy 
without undermining balanced growth.
A second risk, related to the first, comes from 
unexpectedly sharp interest rate hikes in the US and 
Europe, which could affect highly leveraged corporations 
and governments in the region. Such corporations in large 
economies are vulnerable to sudden shifts in asset prices 
that could undermine their ability to service debt. Moreover, 
economies in the region with growing household debt 
may see households spend less in response to higher debt 
servicing obligations, undermining heretofore strong growth 
in consumer demand. 
A third uncertainty comes from possible shifts in US 
tax and trade policy. The administration withdrew from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, has called for the renegotiation of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, and has raised 
the possibility of stiff tariff increases. If stiff taxes and tariffs 
are implemented, however, they would likely take effect in 
mid-2018 at the earliest. The immediate risk is that rising 
rhetoric could encourage beggar-thy-neighbor tendencies 
outside of developing Asia that squelch international trade 
to the benefit of large domestic conglomerates, particularly 
in South and Southeast Asia. No one can say how great the 
impact will be or where it will be felt, especially as most manufactures 
and traded services are produced by global value chains present in 
different parts of the world. Thus, policy-induced volatility may be 
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spread around enough to have only limited impact on any particular 
economy, but trade would likely decline overall if the risk materializes. 
The final risk involves oil prices. The baseline assumptions call  
for a mild and steady rise in the price of Brent crude oil, averaging  
$56/barrel in 2017 and $58/barrel in 2018. However, anticipated 
deregulation of supply in the US—including the opening of the Keystone 
pipeline, which will allow the fast delivery of Canadian crude to oil 
refineries along the Gulf Coast for export to Latin America, may increase 
global output enough to undo the supply cutback agreed in late-2016 
by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Developing 
Asia as a whole is a net importer of oil and other commodities, so low oil 
prices would help keep oil import bills in check, which is of particular 
importance to India, the Philippines, and the NIEs. On the other 
hand, continued low prices would delay fragile recovery in oil and gas 
exporters in Central Asia and the Pacific.
The following pages address the first two risks, those connected 
with monetary policy, and develop detailed scenarios for developing Asia 
if they were to materialize. Sharply higher US interest rates would likely 
affect the region through two channels. The first would be spillovers 
affecting exchange rates, which would play out in different ways across 
Asia depending on the exchange rate regime. Economies with more 
flexible exchange rates would likely become more competitive at the 
expense of their less flexible competitors, but probably at the cost of 
unwelcome inflation. The second channel would be abrupt capital 
outflows from the region in search of higher returns. This could 
destabilize financial sectors in some regional economies, particularly 
those with high corporate and consumer debt, but central banks would 
likely be able to respond promptly and effectively. 
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Risk of sharper US interest  
rate hikes
Before the March 2017 increase in the Fed funds rate, the 
US Federal Reserve had raised its benchmark policy interest 
rate only twice since it set the rate at its historic low in 
October 2008. The first hike was in December 2015 and the 
second in December 2016. On all three occasions, the Fed 
funds rate was raised by only 25 basis points, which still 
leaves it ultralow, perpetuating accommodative monetary 
policy. The question remains: How fast will the Fed raise 
interest rates going forward? The opinion of the Federal Open 
Market Committee is fluid. It projected in March last year 
much faster interest rate increases for 2017 and 2018 than it 
did in March this year (Figure 1.2.1). If, however, emerging 
economic conditions warrant a trajectory of steep policy 
rate rises—one more like the March 2016 projection than 
the March 2017 projection—the effects will ripple across the 
global economy and affect the outlook for developing Asia.
How fast will the Fed normalize rates?
The most recent Fed funds rate increase did little to quell a debate 
about whether the Fed is behind the curve in its monetary policy. 
Some analysts argue that recent trends, bringing higher inflation 
and lower unemployment as the economy recovers, leave the current 
interest rate too low if one considers lessons learned in an inflation 
surge in the mid-1960s. Others agree that Fed’s current policy is 
behind the curve but base their assessment on the Taylor Rule. 
Introduced in Taylor (1993), it describes a likely policy rate given the 
deviation of inflation from its target, the neutral interest rate (the 
equilibrium real interest rate when the economy is operating at its 
potential), and the deviation of output from its potential or trend.
Fed policy makers have repeatedly countered that their monetary 
policy is responsive to data. Some observers agree. In an historical 
analysis of error in forecasts of the Fed funds rate, Nechio and 
Rudebusch (2016) argued that the rates set by the Fed in 2016 were 
not unusually low relative to what was projected at the end of 2015. 
That is, the distance between the policy rate and its higher projection 
appears to be consistent with what the Fed has done historically in 
response to evolving economic data. It also argued that the neutral 
interest rate is currently lower than what it was in Taylor (1993). 
Therefore, it concludes, with appropriate adjustments to the interest 
rate policy rule, the Fed does not seem to be behind the curve.
While the debate on this issue is inconclusive, a look at how the 
Fed policy rate has related to inflation in the recent past provides 
valuable insights about the likely future trend for the Fed funds rate. 
1.2.1  Range of Fed interest rates projection, March 2016 
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Following the burst of the dot-com bubble in early 2001, 
the Fed slashed its benchmark interest rate repeatedly to 
stimulate the economy. The Fed funds rate fell from 6.5% 
in December 2000 to a low of 1.0% in June 2003 (Figure 
1.2.2). As inflationary pressures returned in mid-2004, 
the Fed actively lifted its benchmark policy interest rate. 
Within 2 years, the Fed funds rate was raised by 425 basis 
points. This period of low interest rates had passed, but not 
before it contributed to the housing bubble that eventually 
triggered the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. 
In response to the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, 
the Fed again aggressively brought down its benchmark 
interest rate to an historic low approaching zero percent and 
then kept it there until the end of 2015. During this episode, 
international oil prices reached more than $100/barrel and 
caused headline inflation in the US to shoot up. Inflation 
was seen as externally driven, however, at a time of benign domestic 
price pressures. It therefore did not trigger a policy reaction from the 
Fed. When international oil prices fell in 2015, headline inflation in the 
US followed suit. 
Although oil prices have not climbed back up to anywhere near 
their peak in 2011–2014, US inflation has recently been back on the 
rise, suggesting that domestic factors have a role in pushing up 
aggregate prices. Under these circumstances, the Fed can be expected 
to start raising its benchmark rate, but the speed at which US interest 
rates will rise remains an open question. The Asian Development 
Outlook 2017 (ADO 2017) baseline assumptions have the Fed funds 
rate increasing only gradually to the forecast horizon (Figure 1.2.2). A 
much faster increase in interest rates is possible, however, especially 
if concerns of a repeat financial crisis come to the fore. If this were to 
happen, what would the global implications be? 
Modeling spillover from US monetary policy
The following pages consider two alternative scenarios to the ADO 2017 
baseline with faster US interest rate hikes. The analysis examines each 
scenario’s first-round effects, should they materialize, on economies 
other than the US. The two alternative simulations are conducted using 
the Global Projection Model appropriately calibrated to accommodate 
ADO 2017 baseline assumptions. Discussion begins with the scenario 
of interest rate increases accelerating independently, then follows up 
with a scenario in which acceleration is induced by a large increase in 
aggregate demand in the US. The analysis suggests that neither scenario 
is likely to materialize.
Faster hikes in US interest rates
To model US interest rate hikes occurring much faster than expected, 
the assumptions mirror the period observed prior to the global financial 
crisis of 2008–2009, which saw interest rates raised by 425 basis points 
over 2 years. The target range of the Fed funds rate is assumed to be 
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hiked to 4.75%–5.00% by the end of 2018 with rate increases 
especially fast in the last 3 quarters of 2017, followed by a 
more measured distribution of hikes in 2018 (Figure 1.2.3).
Table 1.2.1 shows the likely consequences of the shocks in 
terms of GDP growth and inflation deviating from ADO 2017 
baseline assumptions. Much more rapid interest rate 
increases in the US would squeeze liquidity in the domestic 
market and bring down inflation within the forecast horizon. 
The combination of higher interest rates and lower domestic 
inflation would cause the US dollar to appreciate against 
other currencies as demand for the currency grows.
This faster pace of US interest rate hikes would be 
costly for the US. The model indicates that, relative to 
the ADO 2017 baseline projection, GDP growth would be 
suppressed by 0.2 percentage points in 2017 and slashed 
by 0.6 percentage points in 2018. Such deductions from 
growth would risk widening the output gap and hurting 
economic recovery, which would contradict the Fed policy 
of sustaining healthy economic growth. Consequently, a faster hike 
1.2.3  US interest rates, baseline assumption versus faster 
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1.2.1 The Global Projection Model 
The Global Projection Model (GPM7) is a quarterly model 
for seven global regions currently used by many central 
banks and international organizations for forecasting and 
policy analysis.a The regional blocks covered by GPM7—
the US, the euro area, Japan, the PRC, Latin America, 
emerging Asia (excluding the PRC), and “remaining 
countries”—together account for 85% of global GDP. 
Emerging Asia consists of India, Indonesia, the ROK, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taipei,China, 
and Hong Kong, China. The PRC and emerging Asia 
together account for over 90% of developing Asia’s 
GDP in purchasing power parity terms. GPM7 focuses 
on a few variables that interest policy makers the most: 
output, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, and global 
commodity prices.
Each region is described by four behavioral equations 
familiar and interpretable to policy makers: an output 
gap equation that measures the difference between actual 
and potential GDP, a Philips curve that shows the inverse 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
inflation rate, a Taylor rule that stipulates how much a 
monetary authority should change the nominal interest 
rate in response to changes in inflation and output, and an 
uncovered interest parity condition with risk premiums, 
which links real interest rates with real exchange rates. 
For the advanced economies—the European Union, 
Japan, and the US—the model also incorporates linkages 
between finance and the real economy by including relevant 
indicators of bank lending tightness. These linkages can 
proxy for global financial shocks as they can be correlated 
across regions and have spillover beyond the advanced 
economies. The PRC is modeled somewhat differently from 
other regions as interest rate and exchange rate responses 
have historically been more persistent than in other 
economies. 
GPM7 is often described as a “gap model” because it 
uses deviations from equilibrium values—potential output, 
the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment, the 
equilibrium real interest rate, and the equilibrium real 
exchange rate—in the behavioral equations mentioned 
above. Equilibrium values are unobserved and specified as 
stochastic processes, with lead–lag structures and stochastic 
shocks to both levels and growth rates. Finally, GPM7 
includes world commodity prices for oil, food, and metals, 
which are functions of the world output gap and affect 
inflation and output across regions.
a GPM7 was developed and is maintained by the International 
Monetary Fund and Centre pour la Recherche Économique 
et ses Applications with support from a network of members 
in many countries. The approach used in GPM7, which is 
described in detail in Blagrave et al. (2013), attempts to strike 
a balance between fully micro-founded dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models, which are theoretically sound 
but only at the cost of empirical accuracy, and time-series 
models, which are empirically accurate but only at the cost of 
theoretical consistency.
Source: Blagrave P., P. Elliott, R. Garcia-Saltos, D. Hostland, D. 
Laxton, and F. Zhang. 2013. Adding [People’s Republic of ] China 
to the Global Projection Model. IMF Working Paper 13/256. 
International Monetary Fund.
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in US interest rates is unlikely, occupying on the risk curve a distant 
point at the tail end. 
Assuming this tail-end risk nevertheless materializes, the euro area 
and Japan would not be substantially affected, as they would maintain 
their easy monetary policy to keep stimulating growth in their own 
economies. GDP growth and inflation would not deviate much from 
what the baseline suggests (Table 1.2.1). Interest rate differentials 
would likely induce capital flight, causing the euro and the yen to 
depreciate against the US dollar. This would eventually improve real 
effective exchange rates in the euro area and Japan and thus their 
price competitiveness against the US and other economies with less 
responsive exchange rates.
The likely implications for emerging Asia are slightly different. 
Economies that manage their currencies to maintain a stable exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, like the PRC for example, would tend to 
experience less currency depreciation than those that historically have 
experienced more volatile currency movements. While dampening 
excessive currency volatility helps manage country risks, these 
economies would tend to lose out in terms of price competitiveness 
and have to sacrifice part of their global market share to economies 
with more exposed currencies. 
Most economies in emerging Asia have flexible exchange rates. 
Consequently, they would tend to be among those that benefit from 
improved real effective exchange rates. However, this benefit comes 
with a cost. As most economies in emerging Asia already operate at 
or near their potential, inflation would shoot up rapidly in line with 
a faster rate of currency depreciation. This might imperil domestic 
economic stability, requiring the authorities to tighten domestic 
liquidity.
Interest rate hikes induced by aggregate demand
A somewhat more likely scenario is that faster US interest rate 
increases occur in response to a surge in aggregate demand. The 
new US administration intends to raise the annual growth rate to 
1.2.1 Effects of faster US interest rate hikes (deviations from the baseline, 
percentage points)
GDP Inflation
2017 2018 2017 2018
United States –0.2 –0.6 –0.1 –0.5
Euro area  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1
Japan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
People’s Republic of China  0.0 –0.2  0.0  0.0
Emerging Asia  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.4
Note: Emerging Asia includes India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China. 
Source: Asian Development Outlook database; ADB estimates.
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1.2.4  Effects of US aggregate demand boost
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3.5%–4.0%. To assess the implications of such a boost to 
the economy, the analysis assumes faster growth in the US 
starting in the third quarter of 2017 that lifts GDP growth 
by almost 0.2 percentage points above the baseline for 
that year and brings the growth rate to 3.5% in 2018, or 1.1 
percentage points above the baseline projection (Figure 
1.2.4). 
An aggregate demand shock raises inflation by about 0.4 
percentage points in 2018 above the baseline (the blue bar 
in Figure 1.2.4b). To fend off such inflationary pressure, the 
Fed is assumed to raise interest rates at the same rate as 
the independent interest rate shock discussed above. This 
move from the Fed mitigates the inflationary effect of the 
aggregate demand shock but at the cost of slower growth 
(the orange bars in Figure 1.2.4a). After the Fed’s response, 
US growth in 2018 will be up by only about 0.5 percentage 
points from the baseline, but with inflation relatively 
unaffected. 
The aggregate demand shock in the US would tend to 
strengthen the US dollar further. Absent any worsening 
of trade friction globally, this should benefit US trading 
partners and stimulate growth elsewhere, including in Asia. 
This effect could be accompanied by intensified inflationary 
pressure in economies whose currencies depreciate. The 
global implications of the Fed’s faster interest rate increases 
in response to domestic demand pressures in the US are 
similar to the effects discussed above in the section Faster 
Hikes in US Interest Rates. In short, the benefit of increased 
aggregate demand accompanied by faster monetary 
tightening in the US would be shared unevenly by trading 
partners depending on how rigid their exchange rates were, 
and the inflationary cost of resulting currency movements 
would tend to be greater in economies that already operated 
at or near their potential.
A catch is that a surge in aggregate demand in the US would not 
necessarily follow from a public spending binge there, which itself is 
less than likely given the slow pace of the budgetary approval process, 
particularly when considering appropriations large enough to deliver a 
surge in aggregate demand of the magnitude envisaged here.
Accelerated capital outflow from Asia?
This analysis argues that, absent any domestic policy responses, 
economies with more flexible exchange rate regimes and more open 
capital accounts would tend to benefit at the expense of those with 
more closely managed currencies. As the open economies became more 
price competitive in trade, the managed economies would sacrifice 
global market share.
Such an outcome would call for policy responses in economies 
outside the US. The responses would complicate economic relations 
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globally, but these second-round effects are beyond the scope of this 
analysis. An obvious possible response would be intervention to adjust 
the exchange rate to maintain price competitiveness. This is consistent 
with Benigno et al. (2016), for example, which argues that an exchange 
rate policy that has no cost in terms of efficiency may be the best 
option. However, this analysis also shows that policy intended to limit 
the unwanted implications of currency depreciation may be required 
when exchange rate policy does entail efficiency costs such as a surge 
in inflation. The inflationary impact of such policies, for example, may 
then be addressed through appropriate adjustments to monetary and 
fiscal policies.
Faster interest rate hikes in the US could further drain foreign 
investment from emerging Asia but to varying degrees in individual 
economies. As international capital flows are typically sensitive to the 
US dollar exchange rate, different rates of currency depreciation may 
influence the volume and destinations of capital flows. A multitude of 
factors may enter into an explanation for this trend, but investment 
movements are essentially driven by changes in expected returns, 
which depend fundamentally on expected movements in interest and 
exchange rates.
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Capital flows and financial risks
The normalization of US monetary policy discussed in the 
preceding section raises the prospect of capital outflows from 
developing Asia. If Asian central banks follow suit and raise 
their own interest rates, highly leveraged households could 
be compromised, posing a risk to financial stability. However, 
the risks from capital flows and household debt appear to 
be manageable in the short term, and continued vigilance 
by policy makers promises to further strengthen financial 
stability and resilience.
Region facing capital outflows 
Higher US interest rates may pose risks to financial stability 
in emerging Asia. Along with better US economic prospects, 
higher interest rates and consequently a strong US dollar may 
tilt global investor sentiment such that capital flows out of 
Asian markets, exerting downward pressure on asset prices 
in emerging Asia. Because international capital flows are 
sensitive to the US dollar exchange rate, emerging Asia has in 
the past experienced net capital inflows when the dollar was 
weak and, this time since the second half of 2014, outflows 
when the dollar strengthened (Figure 1.3.1a). Additional 
interest rate hikes in the US could further drain foreign 
investment from emerging Asia.
Net capital flows to large economies in emerging 
Asia—the PRC, India, Indonesia, the ROK, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Taipei,China, 
and Hong Kong, China—have declined since the second 
quarter of 2014. While net flows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into the region held up initially, they too started to 
reverse and flow out of the region beginning in the second 
half of 2015. This last episode of capital outflow has notably 
affected the PRC but not every other economy in emerging 
Asia, some of which were still receiving positive net flows of 
FDI in the third quarter of 2016. 
Capital began flowing out of the PRC in the second 
quarter of 2014 in the amount of $35 billion that quarter. 
Outflows picked up the pace to exceed $130 billion in the 
third quarter of 2016 (Figure 1.3.1b). Most of these outflows 
involved banking activities (the “other investments” 
category) and portfolio investment. Since the second half 
of 2015, they have included net outflows of FDI. In the rest 
of emerging Asia, net portfolio outflows amounted to $38 
billion in the third quarter of 2016. However, FDI recorded 
1.3.1  Capital flows from selected Asian economies
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a net inflow of $24 billion during the quarter, reducing the total net 
outflow to $19 billion after accounting for outflows from banking 
activities (Figure 1.3.1c). Despite the broad negative trend in net flows, 
some variation has occurred in emerging Asia. India, Indonesia, and 
Singapore received net capital inflows after recovering in the fourth 
quarter of 2013 from investors’ response to the Federal Reserve Board 
announcement that it was tapering purchases of government and 
mortgage-backed securities. Viet Nam has received net inflows as well 
since the fourth quarter of 2015. India, Indonesia, and Viet Nam are still 
benefiting from net flows of FDI into their economies. 
Net capital outflows from economies in emerging Asia are expected 
to continue this year and next. The Asia Bond Monitor (ADB 2017) 
identifies three potential risks to Asia’s financial stability. First, a 
pickup in the global economy, particularly in the US, and uncertainty 
surrounding the global economic landscape will become a key theme 
for investors in 2017. Second, policy and political uncertainty in the 
US and the euro area may influence the global economic outlook and 
become a key risk to financial markets in emerging Asia. Third, although 
unlikely, a sharp depreciation of the PRC renminbi would pose a risk to 
economies and financial markets elsewhere in emerging East Asia.
Higher US interest rates may exert further downward pressure 
on local currencies. Although many regional economies are adopting 
a wait-and-see approach and keeping their monetary policy stable, 
worsening depreciation pressures may push central banks to tighten 
their domestic monetary stance. Because many emerging Asian 
economies have accumulated substantial foreign and local currency debt 
in the low-interest-rate environment prevailing since the global financial 
crisis, the possible tightening of monetary policy could undermine their 
financial stability. Higher domestic interest rates may also add pressure 
on highly leveraged households in Asia (see below). Nevertheless, solid 
economic prospects and sufficient international reserves should cushion 
the impact of possible shocks. 
Emerging Asia faces uncertainty concerning the domestic monetary 
stance of many economies that have lowered policy rates over the past 
2 years to support investment and growth. Tighter monetary policy in 
the US may affect these economies, especially those with open capital 
accounts and flexible exchange rate regimes. If currency depreciation 
accelerates, central banks may want to follow the Fed in tightening 
policy. Policy rates in emerging Asia have historically been strongly 
correlated as common external shocks elicited parallel responses, 
and now with growing regional integration. Rising interest rates may 
adversely affect liquidity across the region. At the same time, the 
authorities in emerging Asia may want to delay monetary tightening to 
maintain growth momentum. Although emerging Asia faces risks from 
an uncertain liquidity environment, they appear to be manageable in the 
short term. Moreover, differences in monetary policy among the major 
industrial economies suggest that the era of easy global liquidity may 
not yet be over. 
Concerns over political and policy uncertainty in the US and the 
euro area have influenced the global economic outlook, creating risks 
for financial markets in emerging Asia. The new US administration 
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has mooted possible radical changes to tax and trade policies, raising 
questions about US commitment to the open movement of goods and 
capital. The United Kingdom invoked Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 29 March 2017, but this did nothing to clarify the timing or outcome 
of Brexit negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union. The euro area still faces major unresolved problems such as 
Greek sovereign debt and fragile banks in Italy. These concerns add to 
the vulnerability of recovery in the euro area. Despite global recovery, 
prices for safe-haven assets such as gold remain robust, reflecting 
investor concern about political risks and the sustainability of economic 
recovery in the advanced economies. Asian financial markets may adjust 
further, pricing in these risks, which would exacerbate volatility.
A weaker renminbi might curb exports from emerging East Asia to 
the PRC, the region’s largest trader, and intensify competition for export 
markets in the US and other economies. In the unlikely case of rapid 
renminbi depreciation, capital outflow from the PRC could undermine 
asset prices there and the balance sheets of financial institutions, 
challenging highly leveraged investors in the PRC. Any negative investor 
sentiment that results could spill over into other markets in emerging 
Asia, further driving capital out of the region.
Risks from highly leveraged households in Asia
Abundant global and local liquidity since 2008 has boosted commercial 
and household borrowing in developing Asia, more so than in other 
emerging regions. Macroeconomic vulnerability has worsened in some 
economies as a result, causing capital flow reversals and financial market 
volatility. The Fed’s tightening cycle has intensified fiscal and financial 
risk in the region, particularly in economies with highly leveraged 
private sectors. This requires close attention from policy makers. 
Besides commercial debt (discussed at length in ADO 2016 Update), 
growing household debt has been a primary cause of rising leverage 
in the region. Fueled by the global availability of relatively cheap and 
abundant credit, consumer debt has surged in many Asian economies 
toward purchases of property, cars, and motorcycles, as well as many 
other consumer goods financed without collateral. Mortgage loans 
comprise the bulk of household debt in Asia.
Of some concern has been the speed with which household leverage 
has spiked in recent years. In the ROK, the ratio of household debt to 
GDP rose from 74% in late 2008 to nearly 91% in the third quarter of 
2016. Thailand’s household debt ratio jumped by 26 percentage points in 
the same period, and Malaysia’s by 21 points, both reaching about 71%. 
In addition, the PRC, Singapore, and Hong Kong, China saw household 
debt increase substantially. In other economies where data are available, 
including India and Indonesia, debt ratios grew less and remain low 
(Figure 1.3.2). 
In Malaysia, sustained economic growth in recent years has 
boosted household incomes and consumer confidence, encouraging 
debt acquisition. Buoyant credit demand has come from a relatively 
young workforce and the influx of a more affluent population in urban 
areas, as home purchases continue to account for the largest portion 
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of household debt. Government policies instituting fiscal 
incentives for homebuyers, streamlined and reduced duties 
on cars, and a government-sponsored property lender have 
further spurred demand for household credit. 
Thailand’s debt levels also reflect the impact of quasi-
fiscal measures. Following floods in 2011, the government 
introduced a program for first car buyers in 2012 to support 
the hard-hit auto industry, raising demand for auto loans 
(IMF 2016). The program has since expired, but its impact 
on household debt lingers. Households have relied on credit 
cards to smooth consumption, further raising their debt. 
A survey conducted in September 2016 confirmed that 
recent increases in average household debt resulted mainly 
from purchases of vehicles and other consumer products, 
often using credit cards (University of the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce 2016). 
Household leverage in some Asian economies has 
reached high levels seen in mature economies, which sets 
the region apart from the rest of the developing world, 
where households are generally less indebted. By itself, household 
debt is unlikely to trigger financial crises in the region, at least not if 
unemployment stays low, asset prices remain fairly stable (Figure 1.3.3), 
and banks continue to be profitable and well capitalized (Figure 1.3.4). 
None of these parameters currently poses a problem for highly leveraged 
economies in the region. In Malaysia, for example, households’ capacity 
to service debt has been supported by stable domestic employment 
and a favorable income outlook. Heightened market volatility has 
caused a small decline in the value of household equity investments, 
but the aggregate household balance sheet remains healthy, with 
household financial assets valued at double their debt in the 
past 5 years. Further, stress tests suggest that potential bank 
losses are limited in Malaysia and easily covered by banks’ 
capital buffers. 
Ratios of nonperforming mortgage loans have remained 
low in the region. This is true even in Thailand, where 
delinquencies have increased in recent years, mostly 
involving younger people (Figure 1.3.5). The balance sheets 
of Thai commercial banks remain healthy, though other 
specialized financial institutions are more exposed to lower-
income households. A recent Bank of Thailand assessment 
of these institutions found no imminent systemic risks 
but recommended heightened vigilance about sector risk 
exposure.
However, households, financial systems, and central 
banks are bound to feel it this year when rising US interest 
rates exert upward pressure on local borrowing costs, which 
have been fairly stable in the past 5 years (Figure 1.3.6). 
Higher rates will challenge households’ ability to service 
debt, particularly in economies such as Malaysia that have 
seen household debt service ratios rise (Figure 1.3.7). Loan delinquency 
will increase as a result, and households’ financial struggles may depress 
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private consumption. In this situation, central banks could 
find themselves torn, wanting on the one hand to lower 
interest rates to support growth and householder balance 
sheets, but on the other to raise rates to stem capital outflow 
and support national currencies. 
This could be the case in the ROK, where low interest 
rates and government stimulus that eased property 
regulations have lifted household leverage ratios to the 
highest in developing Asia. Although delinquency ratios 
remain low, at 0.5% for bank loans and 2.7% for nonbank 
loans, the pressure on households and the financial system is 
rising fast. The June 2016 Financial Stability Report from the 
Bank of Korea, the central bank, shows that nearly a third 
of household debt is held by households in distress, whose 
net financial assets are less than zero and who spend at 
least 40% of their disposable income on debt servicing. With 
62% of mortgages at floating rates and another 30% with 
adjustable rates that shift to floating rates a certain point, the 
sector is highly vulnerable to a sharp hike in interest rates, 
particularly if combined with a growth slowdown and rising 
unemployment that would complicate central bank intervention. 
To stem the risks from raising interest rates, the 
government has raised the target shares of fixed-interest 
loans in banks’ portfolio; borrowers are encouraged to use 
them to refinance their adjustable-rate loans. In August 2016, 
it further tightened banks’ loan-screening requirements 
and lending by mutual finance institutions. This followed 
a more comprehensive package to manage household 
debt implemented the year before that sought to improve 
household loan quality, sharpen the assessment of borrowers’ 
repayment ability, and strengthen banks’ ability to respond to 
shocks and absorb losses. 
Other policy makers in the region have been monitoring 
rising household debt for the past several years and enacting 
macroprudential policies to strengthen household and bank 
financial health. For example, Bank Negara Malaysia recently 
tightened limits on loan-to-deposit ratios and unsecured 
lending. It also required domestic banks to improve the asset 
quality of their balance sheets. The Bank of Thailand has 
been using loan-to-value ratios to limit household leveraging 
and property speculation. 
In some other economies, though, macroprudential 
policies remain relatively loose, and across the region the sensitivity 
of household debt to changing interest rates remains a risk to financial 
stability. This requires policy makers to stay vigilant and tighten policy 
where warranted. In particular, the authorities should assess the 
scope for further tightening loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios 
and requirements that banks set aside special reserves and actively 
monitor and account for debt service ratios in their lending decisions. 
Further interventions may be needed in some housing markets to cool 
speculative demand and avoid asset bubbles. 
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Strong growth momentum  
and the transition to high income
Developing Asia continues to perform well despite policy 
uncertainty in the advanced economies. Growth projected 
at 5.7% in both 2017 and 2018 means that Asia will 
continue to be the fastest-growing region of the world 
and make a significant contribution to global growth. It is 
true that regional growth has, along with growth in the 
world economy, languished somewhat since the global 
financial crisis of 2008–2009. To some extent, the regional 
slowdown reflects global factors, in particular the global 
trade slowdown since the crisis. Another major cause is 
the slowdown of the PRC, which is a normal and welcome 
transition to a somewhat slower growth trajectory that is 
more sustainable but still robust. Exceptionally rapid growth 
has lifted the PRC to upper-middle income, at which growth 
typically decelerates. These considerations help to keep 
the region’s less-stellar post-crisis growth performance in 
perspective.
This broader perspective suggests that developing Asia’s 
strong growth prospects in the short run basically extend 
from its impressive growth performance in recent decades. 
Rapid growth has transformed the region from mostly low 
income to mostly middle income within a single generation. 
This naturally gives rise to a long-term structural question: 
Can developing Asia make the transition from middle 
income to high income—just as it successfully completed 
the journey from low income to middle income—in a 
relatively short period of time? Asia’s past performance and 
short-run prospects give plenty of cause for optimism. In 
addition, many economies in developing Asia have sound 
macroeconomic policies and invest heavily in physical and 
human capital. Yet past success is no guarantee of future 
success, and a growth paradigm that worked well at low 
income may need to adjust and evolve after an economy 
reaches middle income. The failure of many middle-income 
economies in Latin America and elsewhere to reach high 
income quickly and smoothly suggests that the transition 
from middle to high income can be challenging.
The following theme chapter of ADO 2017 examines 
the issue of what developing Asia, now an overwhelmingly 
middle-income region, must do to reach high income. Some 
prerequisites for growth, such as macroeconomic stability, 
are universal and apply to all income levels. A stable 
macroeconomic environment at home mitigates the adverse 
impact of global shocks such as higher global interest rates 
and militates against the emergence of domestic imbalances such as 
excessive household debt. At the same time, the landscape of economic 
growth evolves as an economy develops. Above all, productivity growth 
comes to the fore as an economy approaches high income. Further, in 
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middle-income economies, productivity growth relies to a great extent 
on innovation, which is supported by human capital and infrastructure. 
These challenges are perhaps epitomized by the PRC in its current quest 
to transition seamlessly from investment-led growth to innovation-led 
growth as it bends toward a more sustainable growth path. Whether 
the PRC and developing Asia successfully make the final transition has 
enormous implications for the region and beyond.
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Annex:  Cautious optimism for a 
modest rebound
In 2016, economic growth slowed in the United States, the euro area, 
and Japan, with expansion decelerating in all three and the aggregate 
growth rate slipping from 2.2% to 1.6% (Table A1.1). The US is expected 
to add 0.8 percentage points and grow by 2.4% in 2017 and 2018 on 
strong private consumption and investment, lifting growth for the group 
to 1.9% in both years. Firm labor markets will help modest expansion 
to continue in the euro area, but the outlook for the currency union is 
clouded by upcoming elections in several large economies, with euro 
skeptics potentially gaining ground, and by the risk of Greek default. 
Rising exports should help to sustain modest growth in Japan, but 
prospects could be undermined by possible changes to US trade policy. 
With growth accelerating in the US, the Federal Reserve is expected to 
continue its incremental policy tightening. In the euro area and Japan, 
by contrast, accommodative monetary policy is likely to the forecast 
horizon in 2018. 
A1.1 Baseline assumptions on the international economy
2015 2016 2017 2018
Actual 
ADO 2017 
Projection
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economiesa  2.2  1.6  1.9  1.9
United States  2.6  1.6  2.4  2.4
Euro area  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.6
Japan  1.2  1.0  1.0  0.9
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices (average, $ per barrel) 52.4 44.0 56.0 58.0
Food index (2010 = 100, % change) –15.4  1.6  3.0  2.0
Consumer price index inflation  
(major industrial economies’ average, %)
 0.2  0.7  1.7  1.8
Interest rates
United States federal funds rate (average, %)  0.1  0.4  1.0  2.0
European Central Bank refinancing rate (average, %)  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1
Bank of Japan overnight call rate (average, %)  0.1  0.0 –0.1 –0.1
$ Liborb (%)  0.2  0.5  1.0  2.0
ADO = Asian Development Outlook, GDP = gross domestic product.
a Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method.
b Average London interbank offered rate quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat,  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.
go.jp; Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; CEIC Data Company; Haver Analytics; and the World Bank, 
Global Commodity Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
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Recent developments in the  
major industrial economies
United States
Although the growth rate slowed, economic performance improved as 
the year proceeded. After a weak start in the first half of 
2016, economic activity in the US strengthened noticeably 
in the third quarter. In the fourth quarter, a drop in exports 
slowed growth again, but GDP still expanded at a seasonally 
adjusted annualized rate (saar) of 2.1%, with private 
investment rising by 9.4% and contributing 1.5 percentage 
points (Figure A1.1). Private consumption, the main source 
of expansion, contributed 2.4 percentage points. While 
government outlays remain unchanged from the previous 
quarter, net foreign trade experienced a sharp correction in 
exports and a jump in imports, dragging output down. GDP 
expanded by 1.6% in the full year, 1.0 percentage point less 
than in 2015. While the economic performance for the whole 
year looks less vibrant than in 2015, a trend reversal during 
the year encourages optimism.
Private consumption remained the backbone of growth 
in 2016. After a disappointing 1.6% expansion in the first 
quarter, it jumped by 4.3% in the second quarter and 
subsequently posted stellar figures. The trend in consumer 
confidence also turned positive during the year (Figure A1.2), 
particularly in the second half, and remained high as wage 
growth accelerated. The consumer confidence index surpassed its  
2007 reading in November 2016 and has continued rising 
since then, reaching 111.1 in February 2017, the highest since 
July 2001. Retail sales also rose throughout the year. These 
trends suggest, as does accelerating income growth, that 
private consumption will remain strong and likely be an 
important driver of future growth. 
Investment declined in the first half of 2016 but 
improved in the second half on a rise in inventory. Industrial 
production remained flat but edged toward growth near 
the end of the second quarter as economic activity turned 
up after declining since the last quarter of 2015. The 
purchasing managers’ index showed a similar trend, but 
its readings have never recently foretold contraction in US 
production. Manufacturing is gradually recovering from 
a sharp appreciation of the dollar in 2014 and 2015, and 
global manufacturing conditions also improved. Industrial 
production and the purchasing managers’ index both rose 
in the last quarter of 2016 and continued rising in the first 
2 months of 2017, suggesting continuing recovery in US 
production. 
The labor market strengthened in 2016 and the first 2 
months of 2017. The number of nonfarm jobs rose by more 
than 235,000 in both January and February 2017, outpacing 
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job growth of 155,000 in December 2016. The surge in 
employment pushed the unemployment rate down to 4.7% 
in February 2017 despite higher labor force participation. 
Moreover, the average duration of unemployment shortened 
to 25 weeks in February 2017 from 29 weeks at the start 
of 2016 (Figure A1.3). Average hourly earnings also rose in 
February, by 2.8%, following 2.6% growth in January 2017. 
Headline inflation, on a rising trend since 2015, 
accelerated further in 2016 from an annual rate of 0.8% in 
July to 2.1% in December, reflecting in part the rise in global 
commodity prices. The trend continued in 2017 with inflation 
climbing to 2.5% in January, its highest rate since March 
2012, driven mainly by higher prices for gasoline, clothing, 
and footwear. Core inflation rose at a slower rate but hovered 
just above 2.0% throughout 2016 and accelerated to 2.3% 
in January 2017 (Figure A1.4), suggesting that less volatile 
components are propping up aggregate prices. 
The Federal Reserve raised the target range of the federal 
funds rate by 25 basis points in December 2016 and by 
another 25 basis points in March 2017. Given the expectation 
for sustained growth in the US, continuing gradual increases 
are expected during the next 2 years, bringing the rate to 
about 1.4% by the end of 2017 and about 2.4% at the end of 
2018. Higher interest rates will likely strengthen the US 
dollar, discouraging exports, encouraging imports, and 
making it hard for trade to contribute much to growth. 
Despite the interest rate increases, inflation is expected to 
quicken to 2.3% in both 2017 and 2018, reflecting a robust 
economy. 
Underlying strength in private consumption and 
investment points to growth at 2.4% in both 2017 and 2018. 
Risks to the forecasts seem to be mainly on the upside, 
considering the possibility of fiscal expansion from the 
new US administration. However, the probability of an 
accelerating rise in interest rates and lingering global 
uncertainty temper optimism.
Euro area
After a blip in the second quarter of 2016 that coincided with the Brexit 
referendum in the United Kingdom, growth strengthened in the euro 
area for the rest of the year. In the fourth quarter, GDP rose by 1.6% 
saar to bring annual growth to 1.7% (Figure A1.5). This was less than 
the 1.9% recorded in 2015, however, as protracted uncertainty on both 
the economic and the political front weighed on market sentiment. 
Domestic demand remained the primary growth driver, supported by 
accommodative monetary and fiscal policies, as well as an improving 
labor market and steady incomes. Recovery in exports remained fragile, 
despite recent weakness in the euro. Investment recovered notably 
in the fourth quarter to contribute 0.8 percentage points to growth, 
close to the private consumption contribution of 1.0 percentage point. 
A1.3  Unemployment rate and average duration, 
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Both helped offset a negative contribution from external 
trade. Performance varied across the major economies. In 
the fourth quarter, only France and Germany managed to 
augment their growth rate—both expanding by 1.7%—but 
growth in Spain was sustained at 2.8%. Portugal slowed to 
2.7%, while Italy’s expansion weakened to 0.7% because of 
internal risks. Greece contracted by 4.8%, reversing earlier 
sustained growth.
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European 
Union seems to have slowed regional growth less than 
expected so far, and economic sentiment appears to be 
positive, however fragile. Retail sales improved somewhat 
in the fourth quarter of 2016 after stagnating in the third 
quarter, helped by low inflation and falling unemployment. 
Unemployment inched down further to 9.6% in December, 
the lowest since April 2009, helping to boost consumer 
confidence (Figure A1.6). Company sentiment also appears 
to have improved. The composite purchasing managers’ 
index reached a 5-year high in December, suggesting 
that company activity is expanding. Although industrial production 
contracted unexpectedly in December, as Germany saw its biggest 
drop since January 2009, it has already rebounded in January, and new 
orders signal accelerating production in the coming months. Leading 
indicators suggest that growth momentum in the latter half of 2016 is 
likely to continue. Economic sentiment rose further in February to its 
highest in almost 6 years, while consumer sentiment remained upbeat 
despite upcoming political change in the region. The March purchasing 
managers’ index neared a 6-year high, indicating continued robust 
activity (Figure A1.7).
While inflationary pressures were mostly weak in 2016, inflation 
finally returned to the euro area, rising from zero in 2015 
to 0.2% for the full year. In December, inflation accelerated 
sharply to 1.1%, the highest since August 2013, after averaging 
0.2% in the previous 11 months. The causes were a marked 
rise in energy prices and higher prices for food, alcohol, and 
tobacco. In February 2017, inflation accelerated further to 
2.0% from a bigger jump in energy prices.
The European Central Bank kept its interest rates 
unchanged at its March 2017 meeting. It extended its 
quantitative easing program from the planned March 2017 
close to the end of the year, aiming to buoy inflation and 
market liquidity over the continuing growth doldrums. 
However, from April it will curtail its monthly purchases of 
bonds from $80 billion to $60 billion.
In 2017, GDP is forecast to expand moderately by 1.6% as 
improving labor markets keep consumption robust and export 
growth accelerates with a euro weakened by divergence 
between monetary policies on either side of the Atlantic. However, a 
delayed and fragile recovery in business and investment could offset 
the gains from improved external trade. A surge in inflation could 
dampen real incomes and spending, further depressed by uncertainty 
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with the approach of national elections in France, Germany, 
and possibly Italy. Victory for euro skeptics in any of them 
could spell a continental Brexit redux, seriously jeopardizing 
the European Union. Moreover, markets are responding 
again to fears of a Greek default because of a debt repayment 
looming in July and the current impasse with quarreling 
creditors (Box A1.1). In Italy, the government’s creation of 
a €20 billion fund in December to recapitalize its third-
largest bank and a number of smaller regional lenders 
currently awaits European Union approval, dependent on 
compliance with rules limiting governments’ ability to pump 
state money into banks. Besides these internal challenges, 
difficult and complex negotiations on the separation of the 
United Kingdom from the union will start this year and are 
likely to complicate growth prospects in the euro area. Many 
investment decisions will probably be delayed until at least 
some matters have been resolved, and trade with the United 
Kingdom, an important trading partner, is bound to drop 
significantly. 
In 2018, barring adverse systemic shocks, expansion will likely 
remain modest at 1.6%. Employment growth is seen to provide solid 
support for consumer demand. Inflation is expected to rise but will 
likely remain below the European Central Bank target. Improving 
growth in major trading partners should boost the region’s exports, 
assuming that world trade has not been slowed by radical shifts in US 
trade policy. And while constrained by uncertainty, investment will 
continue to benefit from low financing costs and the coming online of 
projects under the European Union’s new programming period and the 
Investment Plan for Europe. 
Japan
Japan’s economy recorded positive growth in every quarter 
of 2016, but annual growth slipped to 1.0% from 1.2% in 
2015 (Figure A1.8). The introduction of new national income 
accounting standards in December 2016 prompted an upward 
revision of growth estimates for the past 3 years and early 
2016. Expansion was thus revised as stronger in the first 
half of the year. Growth at 1.9% saar in the first quarter was 
driven by consumption and net exports. Growth at 2.2% in 
the second quarter was driven by private investment but 
softened in the latter portion. Private investment dragged 
growth down to 1.2% in the third quarter. In the fourth 
quarter, GDP growth was unchanged but this time slowed 
by public investment. Private and government consumption 
languished, but private investment rebounded for a positive 
contribution. GDP growth slowed despite a boost to net 
exports from a weakening yen, which compensated only 
partly for weak domestic demand. 
Monthly indicators suggest that recovery in the external 
sector started benefiting domestic industrial activity and 
A1.8 Demand-side contributions to growth, Japan
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A1.7  Economic sentiment and purchasing managers’ 
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A1.1 Uncertainty over a third Greek bailout 
The Greek bailout is back in the news, pushing up yields 
on Greek sovereign debt at the start of the year (box fi gure 
1). The European Commission, euro area governments, and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) disagree about the 
country’s economic performance, outlook, and how to achieve 
debt sustainability. The latest debt sustainability analysis from 
the IMF describes public and external debt ratios higher than 
in previous projections and concludes that even with the 
full implementation of policies agreed under the European 
Stability Mechanism, “public debt and fi nancing needs will 
become explosive in the long run” (box fi gure 2).
The IMF has long argued that sustainability requires 
substantial new debt relief but also strict compliance with 
fi scal pledges. Changes to debt maturities and interest 
rates granted by European creditors have not satisfi ed 
the IMF, which has given Greece no disbursements in 3 
years. The IMF refuses to join the third program without a 
change in European requests and macroeconomic and fi scal 
assumptions. Meanwhile, the IMF asked that Greece pre-
legislate additional fi scal measures that would be triggered 
automatically if austerity targets are missed, which the 
Greek government has so far failed to do. 
The president of the euro area fi nancial ministers’ body 
Eurogroup argues that the IMF debt sustainability analysis 
and its conclusions do not refl ect improved growth and fi scal 
progress in Greece. The managing director of the European 
Stability Mechanism contends that the IMF ignores 
the long-time support and fi nancial assistance that the 
mechanism provides. Neither argument has yet convinced 
the IMF Executive Board, which has not ruled out 
participating in the third program but may fi nally do so. This 
is a serious problem in view of parliamentary requirements 
in Germany and other states that the IMF endorse and 
oversee any Greek program. With elections looming in 
Germany, the impasse risks jeopardizing parliamentary 
approvals in time for the release of bailout funds. 
Greece has enough funds to last until July without 
additional aid but will need bailout money to meet payments 
of nearly €7 billion falling due then. Investor confi dence is 
eroding, and all parties know that a solution must be found 
rapidly. To reach a deal, Greece must adopt additional policy 
measures to meet program targets, Germany and other 
European countries must grant real debt relief and ease their 
request for a 3.5% primary surplus in the medium term, and 
the IMF must admit that its debt sustainability analysis will 
keep showing Greek public and external debt unsustainable 
without some compromise in its assumptions. Common 
ground may be found eventually. A promising sign is that 
the latest meeting between the Greek authorities, euro area 
fi nance ministers, and the IMF, on 20 February 2017, ended 
with preliminary agreement that the Greek government 
would legislate structural reform, including pension cuts 
and income tax measures if necessary, to meet agreed fi scal 
targets. However, details about the size of additional debt 
relief or the exact role of the IMF in the program have yet to 
emerge. Pressure has nevertheless eased somewhat on Greek 
sovereign bonds, and markets appear to be appeased for the 
time being.
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business conditions toward the end of last year. Following 8 quarters 
of decline, manufacturing started expanding in the third 
quarter of 2016 and strengthened further in the fourth 
(Figure A1.9). However, a drop in January, by 0.7% month 
on month, saw 2017 begin more slowly. Machinery orders, 
considered a leading indicator of capital spending and hence 
of nonresidential investment, rebounded strongly in the 
fourth quarter. Further, the Nikkei flash manufacturing 
purchasing managers’ index crossed the threshold of 50 in 
September last year, signaling expansion in manufacturing, 
and rose further to 53.3 in February, for the highest reading 
since March 2014. Business sentiment, as reflected in Tankan 
surveys, appears to be generally optimistic, supported by 
accommodative monetary policy and financial conditions. 
Owing to government stimulus, the Bank of Japan projects 
that public investment will increase through fiscal 2017 and 
thereafter remain relatively high as preparations begin for 
the Olympic Games in 2020.
In the national accounts, private consumption expanded 
fairly strongly in the first 3 quarters of 2016 but barely grew 
in the fourth. Monthly retail sales also slumped toward 
the end of the year. Although sales rose by a seasonally adjusted 0.5% 
in January and consumer confidence approached a 3-year high, the 
recovery in consumption seems restrained as real household spending 
declined in January by 1.2% year on year. The unemployment rate in 
January was, at 3.0%, the lowest since the mid-1990s. Despite a tight 
labor market, wage growth has been moderate and could be a factor 
limiting consumer spending. With domestic demand fragile, 
the government delayed from April 2017 to October 2019 
its consumption tax hike, which was originally slated for 
October 2015.
Inflation picked up only slowly from 0.3% saar in 
December 2016 to 0.5% in January, reflecting higher 
energy prices. Core inflation, which excludes food and 
energy, turned negative in December but then rose as well 
in January, to 0.1%. In its March meeting, the Bank of 
Japan announced that it would continue as necessary its 
quantitative and qualitative monetary easing with yield curve 
control, which it introduced last year, to achieve its 2.0% 
inflation target in a stable manner. Accordingly, the short-
term policy interest rate was kept at –0.1%, and the target for 
10-year Japanese government bond yields is zero percent.
Merchandise exports recorded positive year-on-year 
growth in June 2016 for the first time in several months on 
strengthening external demand. They ended the year with a 
robust 8.9% rise in the fourth quarter, as the yen had begun weakening 
against the US dollar in September (Figure A1.10). Most recent data 
suggest that export growth continued with a 4.4% rise in January. 
Imports also grew strongly by 11.8%, generating a trade deficit of $9.5 
billion in January.
A1.9  Consumption and business indicators, Japan
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The economy is expected to continue expanding at a modest pace, 
above its technical potential in the short term, with growth forecast 
at 1.0% in 2017. But the recovery is precarious, relying excessively 
on higher exports. A weak yen and an uptick in global demand 
have boosted exports and domestic manufacturing, but a decline in 
manufacturing at the start of the year sounded a note of caution. 
Additionally, consumer spending could hesitate under strengthening 
price pressures as the effects of low energy prices wane and the 
depreciating yen raises import prices. Moreover, uncertainty 
attached to emerging US trade policies casts a shadow over 
buoyancy in the external sector. The forecast for 2018 is 
therefore lower at 0.9%.
Australia and New Zealand
The Australian economy expanded by 4.4% saar in the 
fourth quarter of 2016, recovering from 2.0% contraction in 
the previous quarter (Figure A1.11). Fixed capital formation 
was the main driver of growth, contributing 2.6 percentage 
points, with consumption adding 2.1 points and net exports 
0.7 points, while change in inventories deducted 0.6 
points. Seasonally adjusted retail sales expanded by 0.4% 
in January 2017, an improvement from 0.1% contraction in 
December 2016. The consumer sentiment index rose to 99.6 
in February from 97.4 in January, still slightly below 100, 
the line dividing pessimists from optimists. The seasonally 
adjusted unemployment rate declined marginally to 5.7% in 
January from 5.8% in December. The Australian Industry 
Group’s performance of manufacturing index jumped to 
59.3 points in February from 51.2 in the previous month, well above the 
threshold at 50 that indicates expansion in manufacturing. Seasonally 
adjusted inflation accelerated to 1.5% in the fourth quarter of 2016 from 
1.3% in the previous quarter, still less than the central bank 
target of 2.0%–3.0%. Even with meager expansion in mining 
hampering growth, rising commodity prices and non-mining 
business investment will sustain expansion this year. Panelists 
for the FocusEconomics Consensus Forecast expect GDP to 
grow by 2.5% in 2017, marginally above last year’s 2.4%, and 
accelerate further to 2.8% in 2018. 
New Zealand’s economy grew by 5.7% in the third 
quarter of 2016, outperforming 5.0% growth in the previous 
quarter. Consumption was the biggest contributor to growth, 
adding 4.5 percentage points. Also boosting growth were 
fixed capital, contributing 1.4 percentage points, and change 
in inventories, contributing 2.0 points, while net exports 
subtracted 2.4 points (Figure A1.12). Retail sales expanded 
by 4.7% in the fourth quarter, slightly above the 4.6% rise 
in the third quarter. The seasonally adjusted performance 
manufacturing index declined to 51.6 in January 2017 from 
54.2 in December 2016, staying above the threshold of 50 
indicating expansion. The business confidence index, which 
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A1.11  Demand-side contributions to growth, Australia
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subtracts the percentage of pessimists from that of optimists, dropped to 
16.6 in February from 21.7 in December but stayed in positive territory. 
Consumer confidence also remained positive above the threshold at 
100, rising by 5.1 points to 113.1 in the fourth quarter of 2016. Inflation 
was stable at 0.4% in the first three quarters of 2016 but jumped to 
1.3% in the fourth quarter, satisfying the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
target of 1.0%–3.0% for the first time since the third quarter of 2014. 
The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate rose to 5.2% in the fourth 
quarter from 4.9% in the previous quarter. Weighing an accommodative 
monetary policy, higher dairy prices, and a robust domestic economy, the 
FocusEconomics Consensus Panel projects GDP expanding by 3.1% in 
2017 and 2.8% in 2018. 
Commodity prices
Average commodity prices continued their decline in 2016, albeit at a 
much slower pace than in the previous year. International oil prices 
remained low with improved supply and weak demand. They are 
expected to recover in the next 2 years as the global oil market rebalances. 
Food prices are similarly forecast to rise with increased demand and 
higher oil prices, but the rise will be tempered by good supply.
Oil price movements and prospects
Brent crude oil prices averaged $44/barrel in 2016, 16% lower 
than the average price of $52/barrel in 2015 (Figure A1.13). 
Relatively high production and stocks constrained oil prices 
throughout most of 2016. However, upward pressure on 
prices came in the second half of the year from negotiations 
and eventual agreement among members of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to cut crude 
oil production, reinforced by similar pledges from some key 
producers outside of OPEC. Consequently, Brent crude ended 
2016 at just above $55/barrel, coincidentally 55% above its 
price a year earlier.
Global oil supply continued to grow in 2016, albeit much 
more slowly than in the previous year. In 2016, global oil 
supply increased by only 0.4 million barrels per day (mbd), 
a fraction of the 3.1 mbd rise in the previous year. After 
increasing by 1.5 mbd in 2015, non-OPEC supply declined by 
0.8 mbd in 2016. The US accounted for most of the decrease as its crude 
oil production fell by 5.7%, from 9.4 mbd to 8.9 mbd. Supply from OPEC, 
by contrast, rose by 1.2 mbd. Most of the increase came from Iran, Iraq, 
and Saudi Arabia, whose combined additional output accounted for 91% 
of the rise in OPEC production. World oil demand increased by 1.6 mbd 
in 2016, down from the 5-year-high 2.0 mbd increase in 2015, when oil 
prices fell sharply. However, growth in 2016 still exceeded the 5-year 
average of 1.3 mbd in 2011–2015. With the rise in oil demand outpacing 
supply growth, expansion in global oil inventories eased to 0.4 mbd in 
2016, or one quarter of the inventory buildup in 2015.
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Oil prices have been relatively steady since 30 November, when 
OPEC and a number of non-OPEC producers agreed to cut production 
by 1.8 mbd in the first half of 2017. The agreement to cut production 
has improved sentiment in global oil markets, and oil price volatility 
has been ebbing since December. In February, Brent crude oil traded 
at $53.50–$56.90/barrel, the narrowest monthly range since January 
2005. Although oil prices have risen by more than 10% since the 
announcement of the production cut, they have been unable to stay 
above $55/barrel for long because upward price pressures 
from the OPEC-led production cuts are countered by 
concerns over renascent US shale production. 
In its Oil 2017 report, the International Energy Agency 
predicted a tightening of the oil market in the next 5 years. 
Underpinned by the projected acceleration of global economic 
growth, world oil demand is expected to rise by 1.4 mbd in 
2017 and 1.3 mbd in 2018. However the forecast increase 
is lower than the increase in 2016 as oil consumption is 
constrained by factors like the persistent strengthening of 
the US dollar, a stronger focus on cleaner energy, and slowing 
growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
World oil supply this year and next depends on how current 
restraint on output plays out. According to initial reports, 
adherence so far has been high. OPEC production in February 
decreased by nearly 1.1 mbd from December production, to 
average 32.0 mbd. Gabon, Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates reduced production by more than what 
was required. Preliminary estimates show the 11 non-OPEC 
producers that together committed to cut production by 
558,000 barrels/day having delivered 60% of the agreed cuts. Outside of 
the production agreement, other non-OPEC producers—Brazil, Canada, 
and the US—are expected to significantly increase their output. The largest 
increase will come from the US, whose oil production reportedly bottomed 
out in early October 2016 and is now forecast to increase by 0.4 mbd in 
2017 and 0.6 mbd in 2018. 
Oil price movements over the rest of the year will depend mostly 
on supply developments. Cuts in oil production will accelerate the 
drawdown of the large oil stock overhang that has weighed on markets 
since mid-2014. An extension of the agreement to cut production after 
6 months will exert further upward pressure on the oil price. With a 
tighter oil market, any supply disruption exerts upward pressure on 
prices. According to the Energy Information Agency, 2.1 mbd were 
removed from oil markets in February 2017. 
Meanwhile, US inventories have started to rise again. In the week 
ending on 3 March alone, US crude inventories climbed by 8.2 million 
barrels. If US shale output starts rising briskly, OPEC may be forced 
to cancel its production cuts to protect market share. This possibility 
exerts further downward pressure on oil prices, as do forecast 
production increases from other major oil producers. The pressure can 
be seen in futures markets that show Brent crude trading below $60/
barrel to the forecast horizon (Figure A1.14). Market expectations that 
production restraint will not be extended can be seen in the futures 
curve, which shows a sharp increase in short-term prices but relatively 
A1.14 Brent crude futures and spot prices
20
40
60
80
100
120
Jan
2014
Jan
2015
Jan
2016
Jan
2017
Jan
2018
Jan
2019
Jan
2020
Jan
2021
$/barrel
23 January 2017
8 March 2017
12 December 2016
11 March 2016
Average spot price
Source: Bloomberg (accessed 9 March 2017).
42  Asian Development Outlook 2017
little movement further out. Barring major supply disruptions, the price 
of Brent crude is forecast to average $56/barrel in 2017 and reach $58/
barrel in 2018. 
Food price movements and prospects
Agricultural prices fell for a fifth consecutive year in 2016. 
The index averaged 89.1 points, 0.2% below its 2015 average, 
but the drop was much smaller than in 2015 because higher 
food prices largely offset a price fall for beverages and raw 
materials. Still, the 2016 agricultural index was 27% below 
its peak in 2011 as downward price pressures from favorable 
supply and low energy prices have negated upward pressure 
from higher demand. 
After falling for 3 consecutive years, food prices rose 
by 1.6% in 2016. Increased prices for edible oils and other 
foods more than compensated for lower grain prices (Figure 
A1.15). The price index for edible oil and meal rose by 5.2%, 
driven mostly by higher prices for palm products, coconut 
oil, and soybean. Disappointing harvests in Malaysia and 
Indonesia helped raise palm prices, while rising soybean 
prices reflected weather concerns in Argentina and forecast 
demand increases for biodiesel. Coconut oil production has fallen as 
bad weather caused by El Niño tightened supplies of copra, from which 
coconut oil is drawn. After falling in 2015, the “other food” category rose 
by 5% in 2016, mainly reflecting a sharp 34% increase in sugar prices 
after 4 consecutive years of declines. Sugar prices soared because of 
reduced production in both Brazil and India, and as a strengthening 
Brazilian real against the US dollar encouraged sugar farmers to retain 
their stocks rather than sell them. Excepting rice, prices for all other 
components of the grain index fell in 2016, reflecting ample supply from 
good crop yields. Wheat and barley prices dropped by more 
than 18%, and maize prices were down by 6%. Prices for rice 
rose by 2.6% as inclement weather worsened crop prospects, 
particularly in the PRC and Viet Nam. 
The rise in food prices has continued in 2017, with 
the index up by 10.9% in the first 2 months of the year on 
increases for most subindexes. The supply of sugar stayed 
tight, but the edible oil index turned down in February, 
marking its first month-on-month decline since October 2016. 
Better crop prospects and slowing global import demand 
put downward pressure on edible oil prices. Grain prices 
continued to decline year on year, the grain price index now 
at half of its April 2008 peak. The decline in grain prices 
reflects news of bumper rice crops in most East Asian rice 
producers and expectations for better wheat and maize 
harvests.
Global supplies of the three major grains—combining 
stocks and production of maize, rice, and wheat—remain 
healthy. The latest prospects, as reported in March 2017 
by the US Department of Agriculture, show global supplies 
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of these crops reaching 2.8 billion tons in the 2016/17 crop year, 4.9% 
above the previous year. Global production of wheat is expected to be 
2.2% higher in 2016/17, driving a 15-year high in the ratio of stock to use 
(Figure A1.16). Similarly, the market for maize is forecast to loosen, with 
global production in 2016/17 increasing by 8.3%, thanks to higher crop 
yields in Argentina, Canada, India, Mexico, South Africa, and Ukraine. 
Despite increased production, higher consumption is projected to leave 
the ratio of stock to use only marginally higher. Recovering from El 
Niño, global rice production is expected to expand by 1.7%. Output from 
major rice exporters India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Viet Nam is forecast 
to rise by 3.3%, but the ratio of stock to use will remain close to its 
10-year average at 24.6%. 
The outlook for edible oil and meal remains positive, with 
supplies projected to rise in 2016/17 by 4% after a slight fall in the 
previous crop year. Supplies are expected to remain high because of 
elevated stock carryover, especially for soybeans, which experienced 
a production increase in 2015/16 by 12% from 2013/14, when high 
carryover began. 
Regarding La Niña, which usually follows El Niño, the 9 February 
2017 update from the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration found La Niña conditions no longer present, which 
bodes well for crops. Upward price pressures will stem from increased 
demand, higher oil prices, and inevitable unfavorable weather in some 
areas. However, with adequate supply in most food commodity markets, 
food prices are forecast to rise by only 3.0% in 2017 and 2.0% in 2018.
External environment in sum
With the industrial economies recovering, albeit at different speeds, 
developing Asia should be able to experience a pick up in external 
demand. Fiscal adjustment and structural reform in some economies 
will pay off with sustained growth as external demand from the 
industrial economies picks up. An assumption is that growth will remain 
steady in the region as the PRC continues its controlled deceleration but 
is countered by slightly higher growth in the rest of developing Asia, 
particularly in South Asia. Improved consumer and business confidence 
is reflected in a recent turnaround in exports. Uncertainty nevertheless 
clouds the medium-term outlook for export growth given the unknown 
direction of trade and financial policies in the US and Europe.
A very mild pickup in inflation reflects mostly higher commodity 
prices, but inflationary expectations are well anchored. The Federal 
Reserve is likely to increase interest rates, but if the increases are 
gradual and anticipated by markets, they will help maintain financial 
stability in the PRC and the region as a whole.
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Transcending the  
middle-income challenge
Developing Asia has transformed itself through sustained 
rapid growth from a largely low-income region to a largely 
middle-income one. The vast majority of the region’s 
population now lives in middle-income economies, presenting 
a remarkable turnaround. As recently as 1991, more than 90% 
of Asians lived in low-income economies, half again the world 
average of less than 60% (Figure 2.0.1). The region continues 
to grow at a healthy pace, its strong growth momentum 
motivating optimism about the region’s ability to eventually 
reach high income. However, the transition from middle 
income to high will not be driven by the same factors that 
lifted economies out of low income. Further, the historical 
track record is mixed. Some middle-income economies have 
been at this stage for a very long time—notably in Latin 
America—and only a handful of economies have successfully 
made the final transition, most famously Asia’s four newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs): the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China. 
This chapter explores some key development challenges 
that middle-income Asian economies face and presents some policy options for 
tackling them. While the middle-income challenge has many dimensions, the 
central theme is the need to foster productivity to sustain economic growth. 
Focusing on three interlinked productivity-enhancing factors—encouraging 
innovation and technological progress, upgrading human capital quality, and 
investing in information and communication technology (ICT) and other 
advanced infrastructure—can support economic growth in middle-income 
economies as they aspire to graduate to high income. 
In many ways, the transition from middle income to high is fundamentally 
different from the transition from low to middle. The government typically 
plays a more nuanced role in the economy in the more advanced transition, 
especially as the private sector becomes more developed. Moreover, as 
an economy matures, productivity growth has to come increasingly from 
innovation rather than the more basic sources of productivity growth, such as 
reallocating workers from low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity 
manufacturing and services. To successfully make the transition to high 
income, middle-income economies therefore need to shift their attention to 
areas that foster innovation and create positive productivity spillover.
2.0.1  Population share by income groups,  
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Sustaining growth at middle income
2.1.1  Distribution by income class
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Developing Asia’s transition out of a low-income state is almost 
complete, with virtually the whole region now considered middle 
income. The region’s relatively smooth and rapid transition, as well as 
its robust current growth, encourage optimism about prospects for 
the next milestone: moving from middle to high income. However, 
international historical experience suggests that this transition may 
be more challenging. It also suggests that, while human and physical 
capital accumulation continues to matter at middle income, more 
rapid productivity growth is essential to achieving high income. 
Innovation supported by human capital and infrastructure offers a 
promising pathway to productivity and economic growth. 
Asia’s transformation to middle income
Over the past 50 years or so, developing Asia has undergone a dramatic 
shift from a region consisting mainly of low-income economies to 
one dominated by middle-income economies. Income classification 
constructed relative to per capita income in the United States in 
1960 indicates developing Asia’s dynamic transition since the 1960s. 
The income classification is based on 2011 US dollars adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP) using Penn World Tables 9.0 and covers 
107 economies from 1960 to 2014, of which 15 are in developing Asia.1
Figure 2.1.1 shows that income distribution across the world 
gradually shifted over the decades from being largely low or middle 
income to one dominated by either middle or high income. While there 
were 56 low-income economies in 1960, constituting about half of all 
countries with data, their number dropped to 24 by 2014, only about 
a fifth of the total. The number of high-income economies—defined as 
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those that surpassed US per capita income in 1960—increased 
remarkably from only 2 to 40 during the period.
In 1960, fully 10 of the 15 large economies in developing 
Asia were considered either extremely low or low income, 
while the rest were lower-middle income. By 1980, slightly 
over half of Asian economies had reached middle-income 
status. Toward the end of the 1980s, three economies 
had already achieved high per capita income: Singapore, 
Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China. The ROK, the fourth 
NIE, later joined their ranks in the mid-1990s. By 2014, 
however, 9 of the 10 low-income economies in developing 
Asia economies had moved out of that income group, while 
5 economies—the NIEs and Malaysia—had transitioned to 
high income (Figure 2.1.2).
Standard income classification from the World Bank 
shows a similar dynamic shift in the region and the world 
in more recent years (Figure 2.1.3). While the World Bank 
database covers more economies and is updated to 2015, 
income classification starts only in the late 1980s (Box 2.1.1). 
Based on the World Bank classification, 49.3% of all 
economies in the world today are middle income. Only 14.2% 
are low income, and 36.5% are high income.2
Developing Asia now has a much greater proportion of 
middle-income economies than does the world, comparing 
aggregate data. While only half of world economies are 
considered middle income, counting large states and small, 80% of 
economies in developing Asia are so classified, for the highest proportion 
among developing regions. Viewed by population, the favorable 
transition of Asia’s most populous economies—India, Indonesia, and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—means that more than 95% of 
Asia’s population now lives in middle-income economies. Only 2 of the 
45 developing Asia economies in the sample remain low income, while 7 
have already achieved high-income status.
2.1.2 GDP per capita at 2011 PPP$
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2.1.3  World Bank’s classification of economies, 1991 and 2015
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2.1.1 Comparing income groupings from Penn World Tables 9.0 and World Bank datasets
In examining Asia’s transformation over the past several 
decades, two sets of data are used: Penn World Tables 9.0 
(PWT 9.0) and the World Bank. Income classification 
constructed from PWT 9.0 ranks economies based on 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at constant 2011 
dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP). The groups are as 
follows: (i) low income at less than $2,586, (ii) lower-middle 
income from $2,586 to $5,351, (iii) upper-middle income 
from $5,352 to $17,600, and (iv) high income above $17,600. 
Following Han and Wei (2015), cutoff lines are derived by 
making PWT 9.0 GDP per capita data in 2011 PPP dollars 
compatible with the World Bank thresholds for income 
groupings that are in gross national income (GNI) per capita 
denominated in US dollars, having converted from local 
currency using the World Bank Atlas method.a Adjustments 
are made to make US per capita GDP in 1960 the threshold 
for classifying high-income economies. In addition, the 
thresholds for lower-middle and upper-middle income 
are calibrated so that there are about the same number of 
countries in both categories in 1960.
The World Bank classifies economies based on GNI per 
capita in US dollars into four income groups: low, lower 
middle, upper middle, and high. Economies are grouped 
on 1 July each year using estimates of their GNI per capita 
in the previous calendar year. The World Bank recognizes 
that while GNI per capita does not completely summarize 
a country’s level of development, it is considered an easily 
available indicator that is closely related with nonmonetary 
measures of the quality of life such as life expectancy 
at birth, child mortality, and school enrolment rates. 
The thresholds are revised annually with an adjustment 
for inflation based on the change in the special drawing 
rights (SDR) deflator, compiled from inflation measures 
for the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
US. In July 2016, the World Bank released its income 
classification for 2015 as follows: (i) low income less than 
$1,026, (ii) lower middle income from $1,026 to $4,035, (iii) 
upper middle income from $4,036 to $12,475, and (iv) high 
income above $12,475. Because these thresholds are applied 
only to current GNI per capita in 2015, and other years have 
their own thresholds, they are not directly comparable with 
the PWT thresholds that are applied on GDP per capita at 
constant 2011 PPP dollars across all years. The World Bank 
has data since 1987, but at least 20% of the 218 economies in 
its sample were not classified annually before 1990.
Relative to World Bank data, PWT covers more years 
but fewer economies. PWT allows comparison of income 
status since 1960, though only 107 of its 182 economies can 
be tracked beginning in 1960. The World Bank covers 218 
economies but has data starting only in 1987, with close to 
90% of the sample classified annually beginning only 1991. 
Some economies are classified differently under the 
two data sets. For example, a middle-income economy that 
graduated to high income in PWT may still be classified 
as middle income in the World Bank data. Malaysia is one 
case. In PWT, its per capita GDP exceeded from 2007 
constant 1960 US per capita GDP in PPP and thus could be 
considered high income by this measure beginning in 2007. 
However, in the World Bank data, it remains middle income. 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are two other Asian 
economies that are classified as high income by PWT data 
but not by World Bank data. Despite the differences, both 
data sets show developing Asia’s dynamic transition from 
primarily low income to largely middle income.
a The ratios of the average GNI per capita to GDP per capita 
in constant PPP per income group were applied to the 
thresholds in GNI per capita to get the equivalent thresholds in 
GDP per capita in PPP.
The high-income hurdle
Developing Asia’s transition from low income to middle income has 
been swift and smooth, but does this necessarily guarantee a similar 
transition from middle income to high income? Some clues to answer 
this question can be drawn from international historical experience and 
the economics literature. The evidence from both indicates that such a 
transition is within Asia’s reach, but achieving it will require the region 
to confront a different set of challenges. 
Time in middle income
Past research suggests that it may take some time for an economy 
to reach high income even though it has successfully grown out of 
low income. Grouping economies as low, lower-middle, upper-middle, 
and high income by applying World Bank income classifications to 
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long time series data from Maddison (2010), Felipe et al. (2017) found 
the transition to be quite lengthy—about 64 years for economies on 
average that had reached lower-middle income before World War II. 
The Netherlands, for example, was the first economy to break out of 
low income in the study, reaching the lower-middle threshold in 1827 
and remaining there for 128 years until 1955. 
While similar marathons of 80 years or more at lower-middle income 
are common historically, the pace of transition accelerated markedly 
in the postwar period as the median number of years in lower-middle 
income declined to 28 years, largely the result of the fast transition 
experienced by East Asian economies, without which the median is 
52 years. The shift from upper-middle to high income was much faster 
both before and after 1950, usually 15–20 years.
In some ways, the postwar Asian experience raises expectations of 
rapid transition to high income for today’s middle-income economies. 
Japan’s reconstruction and recovery propelled it into upper-middle 
income in 1968 and into high income in 1977. Japan was quickly followed 
by the NIEs: Hong Kong, China graduating to high income in 1983; 
Singapore in 1988; Taipei,China in 1993; and the ROK in 1995. The NIEs 
completed the full transition from low income to high in 3 decades on 
average. The high-income Latin American economies, in contrast, had 
transition speeds closer to the global average. Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay were already lower-middle-income economies before 1900 
but had to wait until the first decade of the 21st century to become 
high income.
Replicating the approach of Felipe et al. (2017) using 2011 PPP data 
from PWT 9.0 for the period 1960–2014 yields similar results across 
regions. The rapid transition of the NIEs is evident: the ROK made a 
swift 23-year transition from low income to high, while Taipei,China 
managed it in 27 years (Figure 2.1.4). Singapore and Hong Kong, China, 
which both began the period as lower-middle income, broke into high 
income in the 1980s. By contrast, the Latin American economies—even 
those that today are high income—spent much of the period of analysis 
as middle income. Brazil and Colombia have been upper-middle income 
since 1960 but have yet to reach high income, after 54 years for Brazil 
and 55 years for Colombia. 
In general, the shifts in income classification proceeded more 
quickly in Asia than in the rest of the world, whether the transition 
was from lower-middle to upper-middle income or from upper-middle 
income to high income. Differentials in regional growth rates account 
for the different transition speeds. Middle-income Asian economies 
grew by an average annual rate of 4.8% during 1960–2014, almost double 
2.6% growth in middle-income Latin America. What is not yet clear 
is what lies behind the higher growth rates of rapidly transitioning 
economies. 
The middle income challenge: a brief literature review
In response to the failure of many middle-income economies to move 
smoothly to high income, a large and growing literature has sprung 
up to examine whether economic growth slows at middle income. 
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2.1.4  Years as middle income, 1960–2014
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A number of studies have confirmed that growth does indeed slow at 
that point. More specifically, these studies find that growth typically 
slows when economies reach upper-middle income. Spence (2011) 
used the term “middle-income transition” to specify the phase in the 
growth process when an economy’s per capita income enters the range 
of $5,000–$10,000. Agénor, Canuto, and Jelenic (2012) argued that 
economic growth is likely to slow tangibly when an economy’s income 
reaches around $15,000–$16,000. Income variance across economies 
is often attributed to a “middle-income trap” characterized by sharp 
deceleration in gross domestic product (GDP) and productivity growth.
Eichengreen et al. (2012) examined the eventual slowdown of fast-
growing economies. The research showed that such economies slow 
considerably when their per capita income reaches about $17,000 in 
2005 constant international prices. It found growth slowdowns to be 
positively associated with rapid growth in the preceding period, a high 
dependency ratio of senior citizens, and very high investment rates. 
Extending the earlier study, Eichengreen et al. (2014) analyze 
the incidence of growth stagnation in middle-income economies. 
Their evidence suggests that many economies experience slowdowns 
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in two ranges of per capita income: one is $10,000–$11,000 and the 
other is $15,000–$16,000. They find that slowdowns are less likely in 
economies where the share of population with secondary and tertiary 
education is relatively high. However, this was not true for education 
in general, suggesting that high quality human capital matters more for 
avoiding growth slowdown. They point out that advanced education is 
vital for middle-income countries seeking to shift production toward 
technologically sophisticated products and services. In addition, 
slowdowns are also less likely to occur where high-technology accounts 
for a relatively large share of exports, indicating the importance of 
moving up the technology ladder to avoid a middle-income slowdown.
The findings of Eichengreen et al. (2014) are consistent with the 
conceptual framework of the middle-income challenge put forth by 
Aghion and Bircan (forthcoming). According to this framework—which 
is ultimately based on Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction 
as new technologies and products drive out old technologies 
and products—graduating to high income requires a shift from 
investment-led growth to innovation-led growth as an economy 
approaches the global technology frontier. Innovation-led growth 
is rooted in innovative entrepreneurship, in which dynamic new 
businesses and startups bristle with fresh ideas and different ways of 
doing things. Institutions and policies must evolve to lubricate the shift 
toward a more innovative economy. 
While the studies cited above support the notion of a middle-
income trap, other studies do not. For example, Barro (2016), Im and 
Rosenblatt (2015), Han and Wei (2015), and Bulman et al. (2014) found 
that moving from middle income to high income is not very different 
from moving from low income to middle income. Barro (2016) argued 
that there have been no special patterns or trends of dispersion 
regarding GDP growth since 1870 in the 25 economies studied. 
No evidence was found in this study that the second transition, moving 
from middle to high income, is more difficult than the transition from 
low to middle income. Im and Rosenblatt (2015) similarly found no 
difference. Likewise, Han and Wei (2015) found that middle-income 
economies are no more likely to be stuck in the same income group 
than low-income or high-income economies. According to these studies, 
the growth patterns of middle-income economies do not present any 
distinctive pattern that can be easily categorized as a “trap.” 
In sum, evidence of a supposed middle-income trap is mixed. 
Some studies found evidence that economies are more likely to slow 
down at middle income than at high or low income, but others did 
not. The much more pertinent question, however, is what factors 
enable middle-income economies to sustain rapid growth and reach 
high income relatively quickly? This is the central question examined in 
the balance of this chapter.
A need for a new growth model?
One way that middle-income economies are structurally different 
from their low-income counterparts is that they have more human and 
physical capital. This suggests that productivity—the efficiency with 
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which an economy uses capital, labor, and all other inputs to produce 
output—is likely to become a more significant driver of growth. The data 
indicate that this is indeed the case. Meanwhile, productivity growth 
seems to be the litmus test of an economy’s ability to make the final 
jump. Fostering productivity growth must therefore be an integral 
component of any growth model that will successfully guide Asia 
toward high income. 
Different structures at middle income
The economic structure of middle-income economies differs 
fundamentally from low-income economies, indicating room 
for catchup growth to reach high income. The box whisker 
plots3 in Figure 2.1.5a show the heterogeneity of demographic 
structures among different income groups, as well as 
variations within each income group. Low-income economies 
tend to have a lower proportion of elderly, with a median 
of about 3.0%, than do middle-income economies, at 4.8%. 
Although middle-income economies may still have some 
demographic dividend to reap compared with high-income 
economies, which have a median 11.9% share of elderly 
population, this needs to be complemented by other critical 
factors that can boost growth. 
While demographic structures tend to be less favorable 
at higher incomes, human capital tends to improve. 
The median number years of schooling is 6.1 for middle-
income economies, more than double 2.5 years for low 
income economies, though still considerably lower than 
the 9.7 median for high-income economies (Figure 2.1.5b). 
Given the important contribution of human capital to growth, 
low-income and middle-income economies need to close gaps 
in years of schooling. As shown in the section on human 
capital below, narrowing differences in educational quality is 
even more critical in boosting growth.
Physical capital is considered important to driving 
productivity growth. As with human capital, middle-income 
economies tend to have accumulated more physical capital 
than have low-income economies but not as much as have 
high-income economies. Middle-income economies on average 
have more capital per capita, $31,260 in 2011 PPP terms 
compared with $4,374 in 2011 PPP terms for low income.4 One 
finds the same pattern using direct measures of infrastructure 
development suggested by Calderon et al. (2014). The median 
length of paved roads in middle-income economies is only 
3.2 kilometers per thousand workers, substantially shorter 
than 21.3 kilometers in high-income economies but only 
somewhat better than the case of low-income economies, 
for which the paved road median is less than 1.0 kilometer 
(Figure 2.1.5c). Electricity generating capacity in gigawatts per 
thousand workers and total length of rail in kilometers per 
thousand workers show the same wide gaps. 
2.1.5a Demographic structures by income group
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2.1.5b Human capital indicators by income group
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The financial sector in middle-income economies, while more 
developed than in low-income economies, also lags behind high-
income economies in terms of depth and efficiency. Domestic credit 
to the private sector has a median of 26.4% of GDP in middle-
income economies, far lower than 78.5% in high-income economies. 
In low-income economies, the corresponding figure is 13.3%. Considered 
a measure of financial sector efficiency, the bank lending–deposits 
spread is 6.5% for middle income, which lies between 4.2% for high 
income and 8.3% for low income.
Structural differences suggest that closing gaps with the high-
income group through the accumulation of physical and human 
capital remains important in driving growth. However, middle-income 
economies already have a larger stock of both types of capital relative 
to the low-income group. This suggests a bigger role for total factor 
productivity, or growth in production not accounted for by greater input 
use, in enabling growth in middle-income economies and the transition 
to high income. 
Role of productivity growth in the economic growth 
of middle-income economies
In growth accounting, total factor productivity (TFP) is the residual 
that captures the share of GDP growth that cannot be explained by the 
observable factors of production: physical capital stock, human capital 
stock, and labor. It is at best a broad, first-order measure of productivity, 
but nevertheless is widely used in empirical studies and serves as a proxy 
for the efficiency with which the inputs are combined to produce output. 
Table 2.1.1 reports growth accounting for aggregate GDP in 
economies of different income class. TFP is calculated in PWT 9.0 
using labor hours, not number of employees, as the measure of labor 
2.1.5c Infrastructure indicators by income group
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input.5 Economies are categorized based on per capita income at the 
beginning of each decade and if they moved to another category over 
the remainder of that decade. Of special interest are middle-income 
economies that remained middle income and those that graduated to 
high-income status. However, the results for other economies—those 
that remain low income and those that move from low to middle 
income—are also reported for reference (Tables 2.1.1a, 2.1.1b, and 2.1.1c).6
Growth accounting can be useful in that it provides clues on 
whether some components of GDP growth are more important 
than others in enabling economies to move up the income ladder. 
The figures reveal that middle-income economies able to transition 
to high income experience positive TFP growth in every decade 
(Table 2.1.1e). Human capital input also rises quite strongly in these 
economies, probably reflecting relatively heavy investment in education. 
Physical capital stock likewise tends to grow rapidly in successful 
middle-income economies.
Some interesting patterns emerge when comparing the results for 
middle-income economies that successfully rise to high income with 
results for those unable to do so (Table 2.1.1d). Physical capital and 
human capital play a similar role in the growth of both groups, but 
labor plays a visibly smaller role in the growth of graduating economies. 
More importantly, TFP growth appears visibly slower in economies 
that remain at middle income and accounts for a much lower share of 
GDP growth. More precisely, TFP contributed 1.2 percentage points 
(TFP share times GDP growth) to the 4.3% growth recorded for the 
entire sample period in economies able to transition to high income. 
In contrast, it contributed only 0.4 percentage points to 4.1% growth in 
economies unable to move out of middle income. 
The decompositions suggest that economies that successfully achieve 
high-income status exploit multiple advantages, including relatively 
rapid growth in TFP and human capital, and relatively high fixed 
investment. The clear difference between middle-income economies 
that graduate to high income and those that do not is the larger TFP 
growth in the former, in both absolute and relative terms. It is therefore 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the determinants of TFP growth in 
the next section.
The growth accounting exercise above suggests that, although 
investment in physical and human capital will continue to matter 
as middle-income economies grow richer, productivity growth will 
become more important as a driver of economic growth. For middle-
income economies to graduate to high income, they need to achieve 
rapid productivity growth. Georgiev et al. (forthcoming), for example, 
pointed out that emerging Europe experienced relatively rapid income 
convergence fueled primarily by rapid TFP growth in individual 
economies. Failure to achieve productivity growth, on the other hand, 
can doom economies to a long stay in middle income (See Box 2.1.2). 
In sum, productivity growth appears to be pivotal to the transition.
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2.1.1 Growth accounting for aggregate GDP by income class
a. All economies
 Observations
Aggregate output 
growth (%)
% contributions to output growth
Capital Labor Human capital Total factor productivity
1960s  69 5.39 39.4 14.4  8.5  37.6
1970s  81 4.77 58.4 22.0 10.9   8.8
1980s  92 2.87 58.9 39.7 20.9 –19.5
1990s 105 2.65 61.3 33.8 18.8 –13.9
2000s 114 3.96 48.4 16.4  9.8  25.4
2010–2014 113 3.38 60.1 22.8 11.5   5.6
Total 630 3.90 51.5 22.1 11.5  14.9
b. Low-income economies that stay low income in the ensuing decade
 Observations
Aggregate output 
growth (%)
% contributions to output growth
Capital Labor Human capital Total factor productivity
1960s  17 4.71 30.7 21.2  7.2  40.9
1970s  15 4.02 50.5 35.1  8.5   6.0
1980s  21 2.85 42.0 54.2 19.9 –16.1
1990s  20 2.61 46.2 62.6 22.5 –31.3
2000s  14 5.09 32.6 26.1  8.3  33.0
2010–2014  12 5.29 58.8 32.7 11.7  –3.2
Total  99 3.91 42.6 36.9 12.3   8.2
c. Low-income economies that rise to middle or high income in the ensuing decade
 Observations
Aggregate output 
growth (%)
% contributions to output growth
Capital Labor Human capital Total factor productivity
1960s   6 6.60 37.3 16.7  7.3  38.8
1970s   7 6.71 53.7 23.7  9.7  13.0
1980s   5 6.23 49.4 29.4 17.2   4.0
1990s   3 5.14 50.8 27.2 15.8   6.2
2000s   9 5.77 40.6 10.7  8.0  40.7
2010–2014   3 4.79 51.1 30.5 –5.6  24.0
Total  33 6.04 46.0 20.5  9.3  24.2
d. Middle-income economies that stay middle income in the ensuing decade
 Observations
Aggregate output 
growth (%)
% contributions to output growth
Capital Labor Human capital Total factor productivity
1960s  40 5.63 43.0 10.8 8.5  37.7
1970s  34 5.35 60.2 20.4 9.7   9.7
1980s  38 2.75 67.9 44.5 24.8 –37.2
1990s  42 2.68 69.8 34.3 20.1 –24.3
2000s  43 4.17 48.6 15.6 10.3  25.5
2010–2014  46 4.04 57.3 23.1 11.9   7.7
Total 243 4.07 55.5 21.9 12.8   9.8
e. Middle-income economies that rise to high income in the ensuing decade
 Observations
Aggregate output 
growth (%)
% contributions to output growth
Capital Labor Human capital Total factor productivity
1960s   5 4.51 37.7 21.5 15.1  25.7
1970s  14 4.04 57.4  2.7 13.4  26.5
1980s   4 5.57 49.8 12.9 10.8  26.5
1990s   9 3.83 56.7 15.7 12.0  15.7
2000s  11 4.22 36.5  5.5  9.5  48.6
2010–2014   7 4.44 58.8 14.6  7.9  18.7
Total  50 4.27 50.0 10.3 11.4  28.3
Note: Growth accounting is based on data collected from Penn World Table 9.0.
Source: Eichengreen, Park, and Shin, forthcoming.
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2.1.2 The middle-income trap in Latin America and the Caribbean: The vital role of productivity growth
Very few economies in Latin America and the Caribbean 
have managed to move from middle income to high income.a 
Why has the middle-income trap been so pernicious for 
that region? What were the main challenges and how have 
policy makers managed to address them?
One fundamental reason for the middle-income 
trap for Latin America and the Caribbean has been low 
productivity growth. While the 1980s is referred to as the 
lost decade in terms of growth, it was even worse in terms 
of productivity, with the region never fully recovering 
ground in its debt crisis. 
The poor performance of the region in the 1980s is 
evident in the box figure, which plots global shares of per 
capita GDP. Although the 1990s featured a strong reform 
agenda that saw trade and capital accounts liberalized in 
many economies and widespread privatization, the results 
were mixed. Growth spurts in some economies ending in 
financial crises, an outcome arguably related to volatile 
global capital flows and the opening of capital accounts 
even while financial systems remained relatively weak. 
The 2000s saw some progress as commodity exporters were 
aided by a boom in commodity prices and many economies 
enjoyed a demographic bonus from fast growth in the 
working-age population.b
The relatively low growth of productivity in 
Latin America and the Caribbean has several facets. 
Estimates indicate significant inefficiency in the allocation 
of resources, including the expansion of low-productivity 
services and the presence of very small and often informal 
firms that drag down measures of economic efficiency. 
In the formal sector, there appear to be inefficiencies even 
in manufacturing for lack of large and highly productive 
companies and the persistence of less efficient smaller firms. 
Some sectors have seen relatively high productivity growth, 
however, notably agriculture.c
a The World Bank counts high-income economies are those 
with a gross national income per capita of $12,476 or more 
in 2015. By this classification, Chile and Uruguay are the two 
countries among the 26 that borrow from the Inter-American 
Development Bank that transitioned from upper-middle to 
high income in recent years.
b A growth accounting exercise is presented in Inter-American 
Development Bank. 2014. Latin American and Caribbean 
Macroeconomic Report, Appendix A. http://www.iadb.org/en/
research-and-data/publication-details,3169.html?pub_id=IDB 
-AR-109 
c A general review of productivity in Latin American and the 
Caribbean is available in Inter-American Development Bank. 
2010. The Age of Productivity: Transforming Economies from the 
Bottom Up. http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/ 
dia-development-in-the-americas-idb-flagship-publication,3185 
.html?id=2010
Source
Inter-American Development Bank using data from International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 2016. 
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Setting a course for high income
The preceding analysis points to productivity growth as key to paving 
developing Asia’s pathway to high income. While economic growth is 
intrinsically multidimensional and country-specific, the vital role of 
productivity growth in middle-income growth suggests that innovation, 
human capital, and infrastructure may be especially important for 
economic growth. 
All three factors contribute to TFP improvement. Innovation fosters 
technological progress, which improves the productivity of capital 
and labor. As an economy becomes richer, innovation becomes a more 
important driver of productivity growth as other sources, such as the 
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reallocation of labor from agriculture to manufacturing and services, 
are gradually exhausted. Human capital contributes directly to higher 
output and higher productivity, with skilled workers better equipped 
to use advanced technology and create new technology. Infrastructure 
adds directly to a country’s stock of physical capital while improving the 
productivity of capital, labor, and all other inputs. Road improvement, 
for instance, reduces economy-wide transportation costs, while the internet 
reduces economy-wide information and communication costs. 
Innovation, human capital, and infrastructure are no doubt closely 
related. This helps explain why middle-income economies able to graduate 
to high income, such as Asia’s NIEs, tend to be strong on these points. 
It is no accident that successful economies tend to perform well in all 
three areas. Human capital in particular is an indispensable component of 
innovation. Quality human capital accumulation and adaptive education 
policies enabled the ROK to shift to more innovation-based growth. 
Infrastructure investment can boost growth by promoting both innovation 
and human capital. Knowledge reinforces both innovation and human 
capital, while certain types of advanced infrastructure such as mobile 
telephone and broadband networks are vital for creating and disseminating 
knowledge. 
Several studies document the positive and significant effect of 
innovation, human capital, and infrastructure on TFP growth. For example, 
in a review of the literature on the determinants of TFP growth, UNIDO 
(2007) found that the most significant factors are education, health, 
and infrastructure. Human capital enhances the capacity to absorb 
new technology, which fosters technological progress and innovation. 
Development at the technology frontier also strongly drives TFP growth, 
implying an important role for innovation. Mc Morrow, Roger, and Turrini 
(2010), for example, found that industries with higher expenditures on 
research and development (R&D) and adoption rates for information and 
communication technology (ICT) experience the fastest TFP growth. 
Similarly, Cardarelli and Lusinyan (2015), a study of TFP growth in the US, 
observed how states with higher educational attainment and greater 
investment in R&D often lie closer to the production frontier. 
In a comprehensive, sector-level empirical analysis, Dabla-Norris et al. 
(2015) studied the role of innovation, human capital, and infrastructure in 
TFP growth and document how the intensive use of high-skilled labor and 
ICT capital inputs, and higher spending on R&D, tend to be associated with 
higher productivity growth. 
Econometric analysis clarifies the relationship between TFP growth 
on the one hand and innovation, human capital, and infrastructure on 
the other (Box 2.1.3). While the results are far from definitive and leave 
wide scope for further research, they provide empirical support about the 
positive contribution these three factors make to productivity. 
The successful middle-income growth model clearly emphasizes 
productivity. Innovation becomes more important after economies fully 
reap the benefits of using existing resources efficiently. Even in the 
accumulation of physical and human capital, the focus shifts to areas with 
positive productivity spillover such as advanced infrastructure and higher 
education. All of this must be underpinned, of course, by a supportive 
policy environment and a stable macroeconomy. 
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2.1.3 The links between education, infrastructure, and innovation and TFP growth: An econometric analysis
In a comprehensive study, Bosworth and Collins (2003) 
attempted to synthesize the findings of the large and 
growing literature on growth regressions and growth 
accounting. Constructing a consistent series of growth 
accounts for a wide set of economies, they adopted a growth 
regression framework to examine the different correlates 
of TFP growth. Using cross-sectional data for 84 advanced 
and developing economies during 1960–2000, they found 
average TFP growth to be negatively associated with per 
capita income (the convergence effect) and positively 
associated with health as measured by life expectancy, 
population size, and institutional quality as measured by 
a composite of indicators from the International Country 
Risk Guide.a Other factors, such as trade openness, inflation, 
and government budget balance were not found to be 
significantly associated with TFP growth.
This box extends the Bosworth and Collins (2003) 
regressions, adding the three variables of interest—
human capital, infrastructure and innovation—to 
examine their role as potential correlates of TFP growth. 
Human capital is measured using average total years of 
schooling in the population, with series obtained from 
the dataset of Barro and Lee (2013). Infrastructure is 
represented by a composite index, constructed as the first 
principal component of five different types of indicators 
of infrastructure provision, taken from Calderón, Moral-
Benito, and Servén (2014). Innovation is denoted by 
growth in the per capita capital stock in R&D using data 
obtained from Kim and Park (forthcoming). Additional 
controls include per capita income relative to the US, life 
expectancy relative to the US, population size, and trade 
openness defined as exports and imports as a share of GDP. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel covering 64 economies 
from 1975 to 2014.b
The following regression is estimated, with results 
summarized in the box table:
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The results confirm that human capital, infrastructure, 
and R&D growth are significantly associated with TFP 
growth. Interpreting the coefficients, for an economy 
with average educational attainment, an additional year of 
schooling is associated with a 0.3% increase in TFP growth. 
Raising physical infrastructure from the level of Indonesia, 
which is close to the 25th percentile by this indicator, 
to that of the ROK, which is near the 75th percentile, is 
associated with a 0.5% increase in TFP growth. Finally, a 5 
percentage point increase in the growth rate of R&D capital 
stock is associated with a 0.13% increase in TFP growth. 
a The PRS Group. International Country Risk Guide. http://www 
.prsgroup.com/about-us/our-two-methodologies/icrg
b To focus on the fundamental drivers of TFP growth and 
abstract from fluctuations at the business cycle frequency, 
and because the variables of interest are slow-moving, 10-year 
non-overlapping averages are used. The slow-moving nature 
of the variables of interest implies that most of the variation 
is cross-sectional or between economies, rather than within a 
single economy. For this reason, ordinary least squares were 
applied, rather than a fixed-effects specification.
Correlates of total factor productivity, 10-year average growth
Variables Coefficient
Human capital, 10-year average 0.0180*** (0.0046)
Infrastructure (composite), 10-year average 0.0022*** (0.0008)
Research and development capital stock per 
worker growth, 10-year average
0.0254* (0.0134)
Log of per capita GDP relative to the 
United States, initial year
–0.0070*** (0.0025)
Life expectancy relative to the United States, 
initial year
–0.0081 (0.0185)
Population, initial year –0.0007 (0.0008)
Openness, 10-year average 0.0000 (0.0000)
Constant –0.0444*** (0.0104)
Observations 145
R-squared 0.220
Note:  *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Kim and Park, forthcoming.
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Innovation for diversifying 
and upgrading production
As other sources of productivity gains are exhausted—such as the shift 
of labor from agriculture to manufacturing—innovation inevitably 
plays a bigger role in generating productivity growth, especially for 
middle-income economies hoping to rise to high income. As economies 
move closer to the technology frontier, productivity growth becomes 
driven largely by this key element of productivity, implying a need for 
economies to switch from investment-led to innovation-based growth. 
In this scenario, it becomes increasingly useful to understand the 
nexus between innovation and entrepreneurship, which is crucial for 
promoting the entry of firms with new ideas or technology. Ultimately, 
middle-income economies aspiring to reach high income need to 
diversify and upgrade their production structure, a goal that can be 
facilitated by government policies promoting innovation. 
The previous section showed how successful middle-income 
economies, those that eventually graduate to high income, tend to 
have relatively fast TFP growth. The importance of innovation in 
productivity growth naturally implies that successful middle-income 
economies will be innovative economies. The data seem to bear out 
this prediction. Examining R&D behavior in middle-income economies, 
with the sample divided into lower-middle income and upper-middle 
income, Kim and Park (forthcoming) found that those able to cross to a 
higher income group typically performed better on standard indicators 
of innovation intensity: R&D stock per worker, ratio of R&D investment 
to GDP, and patent applications per million persons (Figure 2.2.1). 
R&D investment measures inputs to the innovation process, while patent 
applications measure outcomes of innovative activities. 
2.2.1 Innovative intensity in middle-income economies
0 50 100 150 2000 0.3 0.6 0.9
Per labor
R&D stock R&D investment
Ratio to GDP
0 0.003 0.006 0.009
Patent application (resident)
Per million persons
Lower-middle income staying there
Lower-middle rising to upper-middle income
Upper-middle income staying there
Upper-middle income rising to high
R&D = research and development.
Source: Kim and Park, forthcoming.
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Interestingly, the difference in innovation intensity between 
transitioning economies and those remaining in the income category is 
much larger for the transitions from upper-middle to high than for the 
transition from lower-middle to upper-middle. Upper middle-income 
economies that eventually graduate to high income have more than 2.5 
times the R&D stock per worker than their peers. This suggests that 
innovation is a critical ingredient of the final income transition. 
From investment-led growth to innovation-led 
growth: a selective literature review
A brief literature review on the shift from investment-led growth 
to innovation-led growth provides a better understanding of 
the central role of innovation in the transition to high income. 
Improved understanding leads in turn to a better conceptual 
understanding of the challenges facing middle-income economies in 
their quest to become innovative, high-income economies.
Growth through creative destruction
In his classic theory of economic growth, Joseph Schumpeter proposed 
three main ideas (Schumpeter 1942). 
First, innovation plays a central role in long-run growth. It is the 
natural counterpart of the conclusion in Solow (1956) that long-run 
growth requires sustained technological progress. 
Second, risk-taking entrepreneurs are central to the fostering 
of innovation, and these individuals respond to incentives that are 
influenced by economic policies and institutions. In particular, those 
incentives influence entrepreneurial investments in R&D, training, 
and computer purchases that foster innovation. In contrast, an 
unfavorable environment that suffer poor protection of property rights 
or hyperinflation, for example, can discourage innovation-based growth 
by damaging the profitability of innovation. Using country–industry 
panel data obtained from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), Aghion, Howitt, and Prantl (2013) found 
evidence supporting the complementary roles of patent protection and 
competition policy in encouraging R&D investment and innovation. 
Third, according to the notion of creative destruction, new products 
and technologies constantly replace old products and technologies. 
Creative destruction is essentially a competitive process between 
the old and the new. Incumbent firms and interests try to prevent 
or delay the entry of new competitors into their industry, while new 
firms and interests try to enter the industry and expand their market 
share. The efforts of incumbents to hinder new competitors require 
assistance from governments and therefore become factors in the 
political economy. 
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Productivity, innovation, and competition 
In most sectors of an economy, one can think of essentially 
two types of firms (Aghion and Bircan, forthcoming). 
First are “frontier firms” that lie close to the current 
technological frontier. Second are “laggard firms,” which lie 
far below. Faced with greater competition, frontier firms will 
innovate more to escape competition, while laggard firms will 
be discouraged by increased product market competition and 
thus innovate less. Figure 2.2.2 summarizes the relationship 
between competition and enterprise growth for these two 
groups of firms.
Acemoglu et al. (2006) suggested that, as economies get 
closer to the technology frontier, cutting-edge innovation 
replaces capital accumulation and technological catchup 
as the main engine of growth. It further showed that low 
trade openness and high entry barriers become increasingly 
detrimental to growth as the country approaches the frontier. 
According to Aghion and Bircan (forthcoming), many middle-
income economies fail to achieve fast growth because their institutions 
and policies failed to evolve in tandem with their stage of economic 
development. 
This scenario is best captured by the concept of a non-convergence 
trap in Schumpeter’s growth theory. Specifically, the concept refers to 
the level of development, or distance to the technology frontier, at which 
an economy fails to switch from an investment-based growth strategy 
to an innovation-based growth strategy even though the threshold for 
switching has been reached. An economy that is trapped in this sense 
stops converging to the frontier (Acemoglu et al. 2006). 
As shown in Figure 2.2.3, economies often grow at rapid 
rates and converge toward the technology frontier through 
investment-based strategies when they are between points A 
and B. However, between points B and C they must switch to 
an innovation-based strategy to continue their productivity 
convergence. Developing Asia as a whole has experienced 
a relatively smooth and rapid transition from A to B. Going 
forward, the question looming for the region is how to 
strengthen innovation and move from B to C.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is perhaps a good 
example of an economy that has been growing at a very 
high rate for a long time but is now slowing down and fears 
getting stuck as it approaches the technological frontier. 
For many decades, the PRC growth model has used high rates 
of investment and net exports that are mostly funded and 
enabled by the state. GDP per capita in the PRC increased 
from the equivalent of 5% of US GDP per capita in 1980 to almost 25% 
in 2015. However, PRC convergence has started to slow in the past 
5 years. The next stage of development will likely have to come from 
innovation-led growth, which will require policies and institutions that 
are quite different from the ones that were so successful in helping the 
PRC move out of low-income status.
2.2.2 Growth and competition, frontier versus laggard firms
Firm growth
Competition
Laggard firms
Frontier firms
Source: Aghion and Bircan, forthcoming.
2.2.3 Innovation versus investment-led growth
Innovation-led growth
Investment-led growth
TFP(t)/TFP frontier(t)
TFP(t–1)/
TFP frontier(t–1)
TFP = total factor productivity.
Source: Aghion and Bircan, forthcoming.
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Implications for developing Asia
What can emerging economies in Asia do to innovate their way out of 
middle income? The literature suggests a few priorities going forward. 
First, the process of technological diffusion, or spillover, is an important 
factor behind convergence across economies. While imitation of 
existing technologies drives technological diffusion at lower stages 
of development, economies need more cutting-edge technology and 
frontier innovation as their income rises to sustain knowledge diffusion. 
Hence, greater investment in human capital and R&D becomes essential 
for middle-income economies. The rising stock of patents and other 
innovative activity in Asia, particularly in the PRC, is a promising sign 
in this regard. 
Second, in light of the importance of state-of-the-art technology, 
economies need to ensure that more productive enterprises can engage 
in and reap the benefits of the latest innovations. One step in this 
regard is better protection of intellectual property rights, which should 
extend to reducing the scope of expropriating successful entrepreneurs. 
Another is a level playing field for access to finance. If innovations can 
be funded only by the retained earnings of producers or cheap credit 
through the state, R&D and patenting are unlikely to be allocated to 
the most efficient enterprises. Developing Asia still has a long way to go 
both in terms of protecting intellectual property rights and efficiently 
allocating R&D.
Finally, policy must allow innovative enterprises to grow to an 
efficient scale. Innovative entrepreneurs should be encouraged to start 
up and grow, and less productive entrepreneurs should be allowed to 
fail. This relates to the political economy dimension of Schumpeter’s 
growth theory. Institutions and policies that favor large incumbent 
firms at the expense of new entrepreneurial firms and startups should 
be dismantled. Creative destruction is possible only with enabling 
institutions, which play more important roles as an economy approaches 
the technology frontier. In practical terms, this means that middle-
income economies in Asia should encourage the creation of new 
businesses by lowering barriers to entry and strengthening the rule 
of law. Stronger competition policies can help to level the playing field 
for new entrants as well and contribute in this way to competition 
and innovation.
Role of entrepreneurship in innovation
The concept of creative destruction holds the entry of new enterprises 
central to innovation, and there is ample empirical evidence to 
support this. Akcigit and Kerr (2010), for instance, found that new 
firms tend to seek more radical innovations to expand their production, 
while incumbent firms seem content to pursue incremental innovations 
that rely largely on existing products and processes. Lentz and 
Mortensen (2008) echoed this result and showed how more than half 
of total factor productivity (TFP) growth at the industry level can be 
attributed to the entry of new firms. Aghion et al. (2009) extended the 
analysis and argued that incumbent firms may innovate more when in 
competition with new firms, especially in high-technology industries.
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These findings have initiated further research on the impact 
of firm entry on productivity growth and the different channels of 
impact. However, studies typically assume that new firms are a single 
homogeneous group when looking at their contribution to innovation. 
Analysis differentiating the motivations behind entrepreneurship 
and innovation attributes across income groups remains very 
limited. But such differentiation may be important. As seen in the 
theme chapter of the International Monetary Fund Fiscal Monitor 
published in April 2016, necessity-driven entrepreneurship tends 
to negatively correlate with GDP per capita, while opportunity-
driven entrepreneurship tends to positively correlate. Necessity-
driven entrepreneurship is propelled by economic need when work 
opportunities are scarce, while opportunity-driven entrepreneurship 
involves the development of new ideas or technology. Put simply, street 
vendors are examples of necessity-driven entrepreneurship, fueled by 
the need for survival, but tech startups exemplify opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurship fueled by potential profits from innovation. 
The following pages argue that emerging markets and developing 
economies need to increase the share of opportunity-driven entry and 
make it a development goal. Along these lines, analysis considers whether 
middle-income and high-income economies differ in the extent to which 
innovation motivates entrepreneurship. This investigation uses two 
relevant indicators—one called the entrepreneurship motivational index 
and the other being the innovation type of early-stage entrepreneurship.
The first measure, the entrepreneurship motivational index comes 
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset. The index surveys 
early-stage entrepreneurs, defined as 18–64 years old and either nascent 
entrepreneurs or owner-managers of new businesses. The percentage of 
individuals who are seeking improvement-driven opportunities is divided 
by the percentage who are motivated by a basic need to be employed. 
A ratio greater than one means that there are more opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs than necessity-driven entrepreneurs in a population.
What does it mean? A higher entrepreneurship motivational index 
may indicate that more new firm owners are driven by the prospect 
of developing new ideas or technology than by a lack of job options. 
This reflects opportunity-driven initiatives where an entrepreneur 
has a new creation or invention that cannot hit the market unless the 
entrepreneur starts a business to take advantage of the opportunity. 
A lower reading, on the other hand, implies greater necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship, which may indicate that there are no other job options 
available to the entrepreneur, who has to start a new business to find 
employment. 
Charting this index across economy income status reveals a distinctly 
positive relationship for economies that already enjoy high incomes. 
As the left panel of Figure 2.2.4 shows, high-income economies have 
a relatively high ratio of opportunity-driven to necessity-driven early-
stage entrepreneurship, nearly double that of middle-income economies. 
The ratio shows that, in high-income economies, startups driven by new 
opportunities are 3.4 times as numerous as those driven by necessity. 
In middle-income economies, they are little more than half as prevalent, 
at 1.8 times as numerous. 
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The second measure, which captures the innovation type of early-
stage entrepreneurship, is calculated as the percentage of early-stage 
entrepreneurs who indicate that their product or service is new to 
at least some customers and that few or no existing business offer the 
same product or service. As shown in the right panel of Figure 2.2.4, 
high-income economies clearly enjoy a higher share of early-stage 
innovators. On average, 28% of early-stage entrepreneurs in high-income 
economies indicate that their business belongs to the innovation type 
whereas only 21.8% of early-stage entrepreneurs in middle-income 
economies do so. Again, the clear implication is that the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and innovation is demonstratively stronger 
in high-income economies.
To achieve high-income status, middle-income economies may 
therefore be well advised to nurture and promote entrepreneurs who 
engage in new businesses to pursue opportunities based on new ideas, 
especially startups that aim to provide innovative products or services 
that do not yet exist on the market. Such a policy would naturally be in 
addition to the more traditional goal of fostering a macro-environment 
that does not force individuals into entrepreneurship for lack of other 
employment options. 
Economy and product complexity 
versus innovation
Another way to understand how innovation can help an economy 
graduate to high income is through the notion of structural 
transformation. As suggested by the development economics literature, 
this entails changing what an economy produces and exports by 
diversifying and upgrading its product mix. 
2.2.4 Innovation-related entrepreneurship and income status
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motivated by necessity. The innovation type of early-stage entrepreneurship is the percentage of the set who indicated that their product or service is new to at least some customers 
and that few or no other businesses offer the same product.
Sources: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor; ADB estimates.
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In this vein, Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) explained economic 
development as a process of learning how to produce and export more 
complex products. Complexity is a characteristic of both products and 
of economies. Product complexity refers to the capabilities required 
for producing a product. Economy complexity refers to the capabilities 
available in it. Development requires acquiring new sets of capabilities 
to move toward new activities associated with higher productivity. 
These capabilities include the human and physical capital, legal 
system, institutions, and other factors needed to produce a product; 
the know-how or working practices held collectively by the group of 
individuals comprising a firm; and the organizational abilities that 
provide the capacity to form, manage, and operate activities involving 
large numbers of people. 
To calculate measures of product and country complexity, 
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) devised the method of reflections, which 
looks at trade data as a network connecting two mutually exclusive 
sets: the set of economies and the set of products they export with 
revealed comparative advantage.7 To make this method operational, 
diversification is defined as the number of products that a country 
exports with revealed comparative advantage, and ubiquity as the 
number of economies that export the product with such an advantage. 
Diversification is the simplest measure of complexity in an economy, and 
ubiquity the simplest measure of lack of complexity in a product. 
According to these definitions, an economy that exports more goods 
with revealed comparative advantage, and so is more diversified, is 
more complex than an economy that exports fewer goods with revealed 
comparative advantage, or is less diversified. Meanwhile, a product 
exported by fewer economies with revealed comparative advantage, and 
so is less ubiquitous, is more complex than a product that is exported 
with revealed comparative advantage by more economies (more 
ubiquitous). The intuition behind these interpretations is simple. An 
economy can export a certain product only if it possesses the necessary 
capabilities in terms of labor skills, institutions, machinery, public 
inputs, and tradable inputs. An economy with more capabilities is more 
complex. Similarly, a product that is less ubiquitous is more complex in 
terms of requiring more exclusive capabilities. 
To sum, complexity is associated with the set of capabilities required 
by a product (product complexity) or with the set of capabilities that 
are available to an economy (economy complexity). The implication for 
middle-income economies is that upgrading export structures toward 
more diversified and complex products is critical to foster rapid growth 
and eventually reach high income. 
Recent data from the Atlas of Economic Complexity, a research 
initiative of the Center for International Development at Harvard 
University, indicate that in 2014 the top 10 economies by economic 
complexity were Japan, Germany, Switzerland, the ROK, Sweden, 
Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and the United 
Kingdom. Among economies in developing Asia, only the ROK made 
the top 10. 
While not in the top 10, other economies in developing Asia have 
improved their ranking from 1995 to 2014. The PRC was ranked 19 
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in 2014, well up from its 1995 ranking of 48. Other Asian 
economies have seen their ranking improve over the period, 
though not as much as the PRC. Malaysia rose from 44 to 28, 
and Indonesia moved up from 78 to 56 (Figure 2.2.5). 
Looking now at product complexity, Table 2.2.1 shows the 
10 most complex products and the 10 least complex products, 
ranked from a total of 1,240 products. It also shows the major 
exporters and their share of world exports of the product. 
The table indicates that the most complex products are 
chemicals, machinery, and metals, and the major exporters 
of these products are the advanced economies. The exception 
is the PRC, which has become a major exporter of some of 
the most complex products. The right-hand side of the table 
shows the 10 least complex products such as textiles and 
agricultural products. Their major exporters are developing 
economies, some of them from Asia.
Product complexity likewise appears to correlate well 
with economy income. For instance, Felipe et al. (2012) 
showed that the top exporters of the most complex product 
are all high-income economies: Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the US.8 By contrast, 
the top exporters of the least complex products include Cameroon, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Malaysia. Further, the 100 most 
complex products accounted for 8%–10% of all exports from Germany 
and Japan, the two top economies in terms of economic complexity. 
The corresponding shares in many middle-income economies in the 
region such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam were 
all less than 1%.
Table 2.2.2 summarizes the top five products that the PRC, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia export. The products exported by the PRC in 1995 
exhibited low complexity, such as toys and footwear, but the composition 
of its top exports had dramatically changed by 2014. The top five exports 
by then were largely much more complex machinery and electronics. 
Indonesia did not change the composition of its top five exports much, 
consisting mainly of much less complex petroleum and other natural 
resource products. Although Malaysia improved its index of complexity 
standing from 1995 to 2014, the composition of its top five exports shifted 
from largely machinery to predominantly oil products. 
Although many Asian economies have managed to improve their 
economic complexity ranking, the progression of the PRC is remarkable 
as it has acquired the capabilities necessary to produce a more varied 
and sophisticated range of products. Acquiring the necessary set of 
capabilities to produce more complex products apparently enabled it to 
achieve faster growth than other economies in the region.
Analysis suggests that, to reach high income, middle-income 
economies need to manufacture the most complex products. This 
inference seems to be backed by empirical evidence. Felipe et al. (2012), 
for example, divided 5,107 products into six groups by product complexity 
and found a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
export share in the four product groups 1–4 (the more complex 
products) and income per capita, and a negative and statistically 
2.2.5 Index of economic complexity
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2.2.1 The 10 most complex and 10 least complex products and their top exporters, 2014
10 most complex products 10 least complex products
HS4 classification
Top exporters  
(export share of product)
GDP per capita, 
2011 PPP $ HS4 classification
Top exporters  
(export share of product)
GDP per Capita, 
2011 PPP $
(7805) Lead tubes, 
pipes, and fittings
Japan (96.7) 35,359 (5303) Jute and other 
textile fibers
Bangladesh (62.7) 2,885
ROK (2.9) 35,104 Tanzania (16.6) 2,213
PRC (0.4) 12,473 India (10.3) 5,224
(8444) Machines 
to extrude, cut 
manmade textile 
fibers
Germany (48.9) 45,961 Belgium (1.9) 43,668
Japan (24.1) 35,359 PRC (1.2) 12,473
PRC (10.5) 12,473 (1801) Cocoa beans, 
whole
Cote d'Ivoire (37.5) na
Switzerland (3.3.) 58,469 Ghana (24.0) 3,570
Italy (2.9) 35,807 Cameroon (6.2) 2,682
(9204) Accordions and 
similar instruments
Germany (78.5) 45,961 Nigeria (6.7) 5,501
PRC (10.3) 12,473 Ecuador (6.1) 10,968
United States (6.3) 52,292 (2615) Niobium 
(columbium), 
tantalum, vanadium, 
or zirconium ores
Australia (30.9) 43,071
Barbados (4.8) 14,220 South Africa (20.9) 12,128
(8457) Machining 
centers for 
working metal
Japan (45.6) 35,359 Rwanda (11.3) 1,565
Germany (19.1) 45,961 Brazil (3.7) 14,871
Hong Kong, China (5.9) 51,808 Russian Federation (2.9) 24,039
ROK (4.6) 35,104 (714) Manioc 
(cassava)
Thailand (56.5) 13,967
United States (4.2) 52,292 Viet Nam (13.5) 5,353
(8113) Cermets 
(composites of 
ceramic and metal)
Germany (25.4) 45,961 United States (5.1) 52,292
Austria (17.1) 47,745 Costa Rica (3.5) 14,186
PRC (15.7) 12,473 Cambodia (3.0) 2,995
United States (8.9) 52,292 (2609) Tin ores Myanmar (38.0) 5,344
Japan (7.3) 35,359 Rwanda (15.3) 1,565
(7507) Nickel tubes, 
pipes, and tube or 
pipe fittings 
Japan (25.2) 35,359 Australia (14.0) 43,071
United States (16.2) 52,292 Dem. Rep. of Congo (6.5) 1,217
France (10.4) 39,374 Nigeria (4.4) 5,501
Germany (10.2) 45,961 (5310) Woven fabrics 
of jute or of other 
textile bast fibers
India (49.3) 5,224
Italy (9.8) 35,807 Bangladesh (25.0) 2,885
(2812) Halides and 
halide oxides of 
nonmetals
Germany (28.6) 45,961 PRC (8.3) 12,473
Japan (16.6) 35,359 Nepal (6.8) 2,173
United States (11.4) 52,292 Germany (1.4) 45,961
ROK (11.9) 35,104 (6704) Wigs PRC (77.7) 12,473
PRC (11.5) 12,473 Indonesia (8.6) 9,707
(3705) Photographic 
plates and film, 
exposed and 
developed, not 
motion-picture film
Japan (23.6) 35,359 United States (1.3) 52,292
ROK (12.3) 35,104 Philippines (1.1) 6,659
United Kingdom (9.4) 40,242 Bangladesh (1.0) 2,885
Belgium (8.3) 43,668 (4106) Tanned skins of 
animals (other than 
furskins)
India (33.7) 5,224
PRC (8.3) 12,473 Pakistan (12.3) 4,646
(9027) Instruments 
and apparatuses for 
physical or chemical 
analysis
United States (23.2) 52,292 Italy (11.5) 35,807
Germany (16.9) 45,961 Nigeria (10.9) 5,501
Japan (13.0) 35,359 Kenya (3.1) 2,769
PRC (6.5) 12,473 (801) Coconuts, 
Brazil nuts, and 
cashew nuts
Viet Nam (25.5) 5,353
Singapore (5.5) 72,583 India (17.9) 5,224
(9022) Apparatuses 
based on the use of 
x-rays or of alpha, 
beta, or gamma 
radiations
Germany (23.7) 45,961 Cote d'Ivoire (13.2) na
United States (19.9) 52,292 Indonesia (6.4) 9,707
Japan (9.5) 35,359 Philippines (5.6) 6,659
PRC (7.5) 12,473 (2709) Petroleum oils, 
crude 
Saudi Arabia (16.8) 48,025
Netherlands (7.3) 47,240 Russian Federation (13.5) 24,039
United Arab Emirates (6.2) 64,398
Canada (5.7) 42,352
Iraq (5.3) 12,096
na = data not available, PRC = People’s Republic of China, ROK = Republic of Korea.
Source: Center for International Development. The Atlas of Economic Complexity. http://www.atlas.cid.harvard.edu (accessed 31 January 2017).
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2.2.2 Top five exports of selected Asian economies, 1995 and 2014
PRC, top five export products, 1995 $ billion
Share  
(%) PRC, top five export products, 2014 $ billion
Share  
(%)
Total exports 219.0 100.0 Total exports 2,340.0 100.0
Toys, scale models, puzzles   8.5   3.9 Automatic data processing machines 193.0   8.2
Trunks or cases of any kind   7.6   3.5 Transmission apparatus for radio, telephone, and TV 150.0   6.4
Footwear, with leather body   6.7   3.0 Telephones 103.0   4.4
Reception apparatus for radio broadcasting   6.3   2.9 Parts and accessories for office machines 45.1   1.9
Other footwear of rubber or plastics   5.6   2.6 Electrical transformers 31.3   1.3
Indonesia, top five exports, 1995 Indonesia, top five exports, 2014
Total exports  48.1 100.0 Total exports 189 100.0
Petroleum oils, crude   4.8  10.0 Coal, briquettes 19.9  10.5
Petroleum gases   4.4   9.1 Palm oil, crude 17   9.0
Plywood, veneered panels, and similar laminated wood   3.4   7.0 Petroleum gases 14.2   7.5
Natural rubber   2.0   4.2 Petroleum oils, crude 9.46   5.0
Gold content   1.4   2.9 Natural rubber 5.17   2.7
Malaysia, top five exports, 1995 Malaysia, top five exports, 2014
Total exports  78.6 100.0 Total exports 284.0 100.0
Electronic integrated circuits  10.4  13.2 Electronic integrated circuits 53.7  18.9
Automatic data processing machines   5.6   7.1 Petroleum oils, refined 25.8   9.1
Reception apparatus for radio broadcasting   4.3   5.5 Petroleum gases 18.1   6.4
Palm oil, crude   3.5   4.4 Palm oil, crude 12.7   4.5
Parts and accessories for office machines   2.9   3.7 Petroleum oils, crude 12.0   4.2
Source: Center for International Development. The Atlas of Economic Complexity. http://www.atlas.cid.harvard.edu (accessed 31 January 2017).
significant relationship regarding the least complex products in group 6. 
These significant relationships when considering the top and bottom 
product groups are clear in Figure 2.2.6.
The conclusion of this analysis is that to move up the development 
ladder, Asia’s middle-income economies need to change their production 
and export structures, diversifying and upgrading their product lines 
to make their structures more complex. Developing Asia has made 
significant progress in this regard, and the experience of the PRC since 
the mid-1990s is exceptionally successful. Economies need to study 
what they produce and export and situate their basket in the product 
complexity ranking accordingly, deciding judiciously how far up they 
can go in terms of structural change.
The important question is how an economy diversifies and upgrades 
its economic structure. It cannot simply leapfrog into more complex 
products. Diversification and upgrading are path-dependent processes 
in which history matters greatly. Economies upgrade to products 
that require capabilities similar to those they already possess, by 
learning and doing. They do not switch to products utterly alien to 
their capabilities. History shows that today’s advanced economies did 
not simply follow their comparative advantage, though, in the sense 
of letting the market decide, when making decisions to diversify and 
upgrade their production structures. Instead, active governments 
facilitated and induced this process through industrial policy.
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This has also been the case of Asia’s most advanced economies. 
Although it is virtually impossible to use the same policy tools today 
that these economies used decades ago, governments in today’s 
middle-income economies can still play a significant role in advancing 
and supporting structural transformation. For successful structural 
transformation, two fruitful strategies are innovation, particularly in 
R&D, and education.
In a discussion of how the governments of modern middle-income 
countries can think about how to move into more complex products 
and sectors through innovation, Felipe and Rhee (2014a, 2014b) posited 
that these economies will have to increase their R&D spending, both 
public and private. However, the structure of R&D in these economies 
reflects a model not conducive to commercial success, either because 
the private sector plays only a limited role in knowledge generation, or 
because market-driven demand for technology is weak, as evidenced by 
low R&D spending. For this reason, middle-income economies typically 
do not have many high-technology sectors. Meanwhile, the public sector 
is ill-equipped to lead R&D efforts because it lacks the private sector’s 
incentive to commercialize R&D outcomes. However, initiating R&D 
consortiums with the private sector in targeted industries can be an 
effective strategy by which governments jumpstart R&D investment. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a particularly important element 
in industrial diversification, as many middle-income economies rely 
on it to acquire advanced business skills and technology. However, 
if not managed properly, preferential treatment and R&D incentives 
given to multinational corporations can disproportionately increase 
the profitability of their operations without effecting the transfer of 
2.2.6 Shares of the most and least complex exports
−4
−2
0
2
4
Share of most complex exports (log)
6 7 8 9 10 11
Income per capita (log)
0
1
2
3
4
5
Share of least complex exports (log)
6 7 8 9 10 11
Income per capita (log)
Notes:  
1.  The equation for the share of most complex exports is as follows:   Export share = –12.707 + 1.026 GDP per capita (log) 
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Source: ADB estimates based on data in Felipe et al. (2012).
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technology to domestic firms. Policy should thus focus more on the 
acquisition of advanced technology through strategic FDI. Sometimes 
simply buying technology and paying royalties may be the most effective 
approach to developing domestic technology bases.
Besides innovation, education is another area that appears especially 
relevant to middle-income economies looking to climb into high income. 
These economies often suffer from shortage of skilled professionals, 
particularly professional managers. Without a steady supply of high-
skilled labor, upgrading an economy’s industrial structure is impossible. 
Education that endows high school graduates with strong cognitive 
skills, especially in math and science, can be more important for 
development through export diversification than simply increasing the 
quantity of education available. As the next section will further show, 
economies committed to growth through human capital accumulation 
need to refocus their efforts on improving education quality. 
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Human capital for emerging 
marketplace needs
A skilled workforce is indispensable for creating new 
knowledge and technology. It can be considered the core 
of an innovative economy. Skilled workers are better able 
to learn, use, and adapt advanced technology. Given the 
wide gap in human capital between developing Asia and 
advanced economies, there remains wide scope for expanding 
human capital investment in the region. This not only helps 
boost the region’s growth but can also improve economic 
equity. That Asian populations are aging further strengthens 
the case for investing in human capital.
As seen in the previous section, middle-income economies 
that graduate to high income are more innovative than 
other middle-income economies. As human capital is an 
indispensable ingredient of innovation, it is reasonable 
to expect them to have superior human capital as well. 
Indeed, the data show that middle-income economies that 
reach high income invest more in human capital than their 
peers (Figure 2.3.1). The difference is more pronounced for 
the transition from upper-middle income to high income 
than from lower-middle income to upper-middle income. 
And, significantly, it is more pronounced for secondary and 
tertiary education than for primary education. This suggests 
that education, particularly post-primary education, is 
especially important for upper middle income economies 
seeking to reach high income.
Human capital spending, inequality, 
and growth
Spending on human capital development raises productivity 
and may play a pivotal role in promoting growth, as 
the experience of the Asian NIEs has shown. The ROK, 
Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China all enjoyed 
exceptionally high growth rates from the mid-1960s to 
the 1990s, allowing them to achieve high income within 
the period. This feat is partly attributed to an environment that 
fostered human capital accumulation, especially of knowledge capital, 
and the efficient allocation of these resources (e.g., Mankiw, Romer, 
and Weil 1992, Barro 2001, Aghion and Howitt 2009, Hanushek 
and Woessmann 2016). Human capital accumulation also promised 
to help mitigate income inequality and promote equity, which has 
become a growing concern worldwide, including in developing Asia. 
Public investment in human capital could be a potent way to improve 
incomes in the region, provided it does not harm public finances.
2.3.1  Average schooling in middle-income economies
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Impact of human capital spending: an empirical analysis
Recent empirical research has focused on how the demographic 
transition can affect the aggregate economy. Highlighting the role of 
greater investment in children, specifically in their human capital, 
Lee and Mason (2010) and Mason, Lee, and Jiang (2016), for example, 
found that fertility decline that is accompanied by an increase in 
human capital spending can substantially boost economic growth. 
A change in an economy’s population age structure can have two 
effects on growth. The first demographic dividend is a very direct 
quantitative effect on income and consumption from a decline in 
fertility. Over the past half century, a secular fertility decline in Asia 
and in the rest of the world has caused radical and important changes in 
the population age distribution. In the medium term, economies in the 
early stage of the transition have benefited from an increasing share of 
the working-age population relative to the young and elderly (Bloom and 
Williamson 1998, Kelley and Schmidt 2001, Mason 2001, Mason and 
Lee 2007). The same demographic forces may also have improved fiscal 
health in developing Asia (Lee, Kim, and Park 2016).9
The second demographic dividend, likewise owing to fertility 
decline, stems from a scaling up of human capital investment and is 
often associated with three main effects: higher consumption growth, 
greater physical capital per worker, and augmented human capital. 
Mason et al. (2016) estimated these effects and found human 
capital to be a highly significant channel of this demographic 
dividend. 
To gain better understanding of the issues, the following 
pages empirically examine the impact of human capital 
investment on productivity, inequality, and fiscal health in 
developing Asia. The data and empirical methodology are 
described in Box 2.3.1. Human capital can change as fertility 
changes, but the observed outcomes are also influenced by 
education policy, parental investment in children, nature of 
the job market, and other socioeconomic factors. The goal of 
the exercise is not to estimate the effect of a fertility decline 
on human capital, though, but to compare the different 
scenarios in the absence of fertility changes. 
The main channel of the economic impact of demographic 
transition is an increase in labor income because of 
higher human capital spending. With expanding incomes, 
governments may directly benefit in turn from expansion 
of their tax base as more income can be taxed and it can be 
taxed at higher rates. 
Impact of human capital investments on growth 
and equity: simulation results
Figure 2.3.2 plots lifetime public and private human capital 
investments in developing Asia and in other economies 
where NTA estimates are available. For comparability across 
economies, values are normalized relative to the average 
labor income of people aged 30–49 to control for national 
2.3.2  Public versus private human capital spending 
in developing Asia
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Source: Abrigo, Lee, and Park, forthcoming.
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2.3.1 Data and model for estimating the impact of human capital
This box attempts to simulate the impact of human 
capital on the economy in a manner similar to Lee and 
Mason (2010). The major source of data is the National 
Transfer Accounts (NTA) (www.ntaccounts.org). The NTA 
is an accounting framework to document economic flows 
across populations of different ages in a manner consistent 
with the United Nations System of National Accounts 
(United Nations 2013). 
Economic life cycles are estimated from household 
surveys and government administrative data and are 
scaled to match aggregate controls compiled using the 
United Nations System of National Accounts. The NTA 
provides a detailed measure by age of how much people 
consume and produce, and how the gap in their 
consumption and production is funded through other 
sources, namely transfers and asset-based reallocations. 
Data on human capital spending and labor income 
are based on NTA life-cycle estimates in 12 Asian 
economies along the whole range of incomes: Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, 
the Philippines, the ROK, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and 
Viet Nam. Human capital investments are measured 
based on NTA estimates of public and private education 
and health expenditures by single year of age. The NTA 
measure on human capital expenditure contains some useful 
information about the quality of human capital, which is an 
important dimension of it. It also allows an examination of 
both public and private human capital investment. 
Following Lee and Mason (2010), education expenditures 
for people aged 0–26 are included in the analysis. 
Health care expenditure for those aged 0–17 meanwhile 
excludes spending related to reproductive health. It is 
important to note that the NTA estimate of human capital 
spending captures only those goods and services available 
from the market and does not include the opportunity 
cost of students’ time or the value of services provided by 
parents and other family members, which also contribute to 
human capital.
Analyzing fiscal impacts necessarily requires estimates 
of tax profiles. The NTA distinguishes public transfer flows 
to and from households by purpose, such as education 
or pension, and by source, such as labor income tax, 
consumption tax, and so on. These estimates are not 
available, however, for many Asian economies in the sample. 
As an alternative, country-specific tax schedules levied on 
personal income are used and applied to labor income. 
The economy is modeled as a human capital-augmented 
Cobb-Douglas production function. Human capital 
investments can be made by either government or 
households. Public and private human capital investments 
are initially assumed to be equally effective. The analysis 
then looks at how the results vary when public human 
capital investment becomes more effective relative to 
private investment. The model also introduces heterogeneity 
among economies and among individuals within them. 
Heterogeneity permits analysis of the distributional 
impacts of targeted human capital spending interventions. 
The simulated method of moments is used to simulate 
the impact of increasing human capital investment on 
inequality, productivity, and the fiscal health of Asian 
economies. Abrigo, Lee, and Park (forthcoming) explained 
the methodology in detail. 
differences, including the labor costs that are prominent in the delivery 
of education services (Mason et al. 2016). Estimates below the 45-degree 
line indicate a greater share for the private sector in financing human 
capital spending, while values above it indicate a greater share for the 
public sector. Estimates that are closer to the origin at the bottom left 
signify smaller human capital spending in total.
Human capital spending in developing Asia varies greatly 
from economy to economy both by amount and financing source. 
Thailand, for instance, invests on average about 5 years of prime-age 
labor income on human capital for each person. In Bangladesh, by 
contrast, average lifetime human capital spending per person is only 
1.4 years of prime-age labor income. Viet Nam and Timor-Leste spend 
about 2.3 years of labor income on human capital per person, but 
Viet Nam relies largely on private rather than government spending. 
These variations are determined to some extent by each economy’s stage 
of economic development.
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2.3.3 Human capital spending and GDP per capita
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Figure 2.3.3 plots each economy’s average lifetime human capital 
spending against its per capita GDP. Two observations are apparent. 
First, higher-income economies invest more on human capital per person 
(Panel A). The importance of investing in human capital to promote 
economic growth is well emphasized in the literature. While most 
regional economies in the sample invest the average amount for their 
income, if not more, some economies, such as Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Timor-Leste, spend substantially less. 
Second, the public sector contribution to human capital spending 
intensifies as economies develop (Panel B). While there is wide variation 
in the government’s share in human capital spending among developing 
economies, an upward trend is clear as per capita GDP increases. 
This shift toward an larger role for governments in financing human 
capital investment has also been observed recently in health-care 
spending (e.g., Fan and Savedoff 2014) and much earlier in financing 
general consumption in general (e.g., Peacock and Wiseman 1961). 
Figure 2.3.4 presents the simulated impacts of a universal 20% 
increase in human capital spending per capita on labor productivity 
growth (Panel A) and income inequality (Panel B) in 13 developing and 
industrialized Asian economies. These economies were selected for the 
availability of data needed to estimate the structural model presented in 
the previous section. The simulated increase in human capital spending 
per person roughly equals the magnitude of the projected drop in 
average births per woman in developing Asia over the next 3 decades. 
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The projected impact in different economies shows some interesting 
patterns. Lower-income economies seem likely to benefit more from 
increased human capital spending. Labor productivity in economies 
with lower incomes, such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Nepal, is 
projected to increase by up to 3.1% as a result of a 20% expansion of 
human capital spending per person. In more developed economies 
such as Malaysia and Thailand, the projected impact is more modest. 
It is quite interesting that in economies at similar economic stages, 
such as Bangladesh and India, the projected impact of human capital 
spending per capita on labor productivity can differ quite substantially, 
reflecting the peculiarities of their age profiles and resulting 
productivity. On the other hand, the simulated impact on productivity 
growth in the ROK and Nepal are about the same, despite the large 
development disparity between them. This suggests that expanding 
human capital spending may also benefit higher-income economies 
despite the usual downward trend in impact as per capita income rises.
Greater human capital spending significantly narrows inequality. 
Again, the impact is greater in lower-income economies than in 
more developed ones. In Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal, and Viet 
Nam, increased human capital spending per capita is projected to 
bring down income Gini coefficients by 3%–5% from baseline values. 
In more developed economies like Thailand and Malaysia, the decline is 
smaller at 1%–2%.
2.3.4 Simulated impact of increased human capital spending per capita
A.  Labor productivity growth B.  Income inequality
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The welfare effects of increased human capital spending may 
be traced to its greater impact on poorer households, especially in 
lower-income economies (Table 2.3.1). In Bangladesh and Cambodia, 
for instance, labor productivity among households in the poorest 
income quintile is projected to increase by 7%–8% because of greater 
investment in human capital. The impact on higher-income households 
is substantial as well, but less so.
Impact of public human capital investment on public finances
Higher worker productivity can directly benefit the government. 
The fiscal impact of greater human capital spending depends as much on 
tax structure as on government involvement in boosting human capital 
spending and on the impact on productivity. Personal income taxes 
per capita in Cambodia and Timor-Leste, for example, are projected 
to increase by at least 3%. In other economies, the projected impact on 
government revenues may be insignificant despite large gains in labor 
productivity. 
There are many different ways governments can intervene to 
increase human capital spending aside from a universal increase in 
government provisions. Governments may increase human capital 
spending for targeted vulnerable groups while maintaining current 
amounts for the mainstream. An alternative strategy is to improve the 
efficiency with which public spending is translated to human capital 
without increasing appropriations. These strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, but may be combined to create more targeted strategies.
To further investigate the issue, this subsection considers three 
types of targeted strategies. Strategy 1 assumes that governments 
increase human capital spending by 20% per person for each age group. 
2.3.1 Simulated impact of human capital spending on productivity growth and inequality, selected Asian economies
Country
% Change in inequality Productivity growth rate (%) by income quintile
Human capital Labor income
Q1 
(poorest) Q2 Q3 Q4
Q5 
(richest) All groups
Middle income
Bangladesh –6.7 –4.1  7.5 5.7 4.0 2.4 0.6 2.7
Cambodia –7.2 –4.5  7.4 6.1 4.6 2.8 0.8 3.1
India –3.7 –2.1  3.4 3.3 2.8 2.0 0.3 1.6
Indonesia –2.3 –1.3  2.3 2.2 1.9 1.3 0.2 1.0
Malaysia –0.3 –0.2  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
Mongolia –5.8 –3.5  5.7 4.9 3.9 2.5 0.6 2.4
Philippines –4.3 –2.6  4.7 4.2 3.3 2.1 0.4 1.9
Thailand –2.9 –1.7  2.6 2.6 2.5 1.9 0.3 1.3
Timor-Leste –4.5 –2.4  3.5 3.5 3.3 2.8 0.6 2.0
Viet Nam –4.1 –2.5  4.7 3.9 2.9 1.7 0.3 1.7
Others
Nepal (low income) –5.1 –3.1  4.7 4.3 3.5 2.4 0.5 2.2
ROK (high income) –5.1 –3.1  4.9 4.3 3.5 2.3 0.5 2.1
ROK = Republic of Korea.
Source: Abrigo, Lee, and Park, forthcoming.
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This strategy assumes no change in spending efficiency. Strategy 2 
assumes a 20% improvement in the efficiency of translating public 
spending inputs to human capital, while the amount of public spending 
is kept at the baseline value. Strategy 3 considers both a 20% increase 
in government human capital spending and a 20% improvement in 
efficiency. These three scenarios are combined with three different 
government targeting schemes—a universal program where every 
household benefits from the public interventions on human capital, 
a targeted program that is available only to households belonging to the 
lower 40% by income, and a targeted program available only to those in 
the lower 60% by household income.10
In all the strategies considered, government revenues are projected 
to increase with expansion of the tax base, with labor income per 
capita growing by as much as 3%–5% in some scenarios in certain 
economies. Increasing both the efficiency and amount of public 
human capital spending seems to increase in tax collection per capita 
more than the interventions implemented separately if they could be 
added together. There is only a modest decline in effective tax rates, 
indicating household labor income will grow faster than the amount the 
government collects from these households in taxes. 
The fiscal impact of public spending on human capital per capita 
depends on the government strategy employed to raise human capital. 
In general, strategies that improve efficiency without increasing inputs 
have little or no positive effect on the fiscal rate of return from public 
human capital spending. Increasing public spending is projected to 
lower fiscal rate of return, though rates remain positive in all scenarios.
In summary, simulations in individual economies using the NTA 
database show that increasing human capital spending promotes 
inclusive growth by improving labor productivity and narrowing 
income inequality. Government-led human capital investment appears 
to be more inclusive than human capital accumulation led by the 
private sector.11 Lower-income economies and poorer households within 
economies tend to benefit more from increased human capital spending, 
which argues for early investment. Interestingly, investing in human 
capital not only promotes growth and equity but may also improve 
government budgets in developing Asia in the long run.
This outcome is not guaranteed, as it depends partly on how human 
capital spending is transformed to actual productive labor in each 
economy. Other government policies and the economic environment 
are also important. Moreover, the government interventions on human 
capital spending that the simulation exercise considered—either a 
universal increase in human capital spending, a targeted increase 
only for vulnerable groups, and improved efficiency in human capital 
spending—are not mutually exclusive and can be combined to create 
more targeted strategies. 
The aging of Asia’s population further strengthens the case for 
human capital accumulation and puts a spotlight on quality of education. 
Intuitively, more productive workers can offset the negative economic 
impact of having fewer workers. The share of the elderly population is 
rising across developing Asia as a whole, though the speed and current 
status of population aging varies a lot across the region. Populations in 
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India and the Philippines are still relatively young, while 
the PRC and Thailand have significantly older populations. 
Richer economies such as the ROK and Singapore, 
meanwhile, are at an advanced stage of demographic 
transition. Notwithstanding such heterogeneity, there is a 
clear regional trend toward older populations, and even in 
many younger Asian populations, demographic dividends 
associated with relatively large working-age cohorts are set 
to decline in the foreseeable future (ADB 2011).
The pace of demographic transition is very rapid in 
some Asian economies, especially in East Asia. A transition 
that took rich Western economies more than a century 
is occurring in these economies in just a few decades. 
For example, from 2000 to 2050, the old-age dependency 
ratio will increase by a factor of 6 in the ROK and by a factor 
of 4 in the PRC. According to Ha and Lee (forthcoming), 
in the absence of significant human capital investments, 
many aging middle-income Asian economies may see their 
growth rates fall sharply. At a minimum, deteriorating 
demographics should add a sense of urgency to improving 
Asia’s human capital.
Prioritizing educational quality
A study by ADB (2015) showed that education can promote 
growth effectively only if it is sufficiently high quality to 
significantly raise cognitive skills, the thinking skills that 
enable individuals to learn, solve problems, and create new 
knowledge. Increasing the average years of schooling can 
boost economic growth, but this also requires that schooling 
builds cognitive skills. 
The ADB study indicated that the additional growth 
obtained from raising the average years of schooling 
to 11.6, the OECD average, would be relatively low 
(scenario 1 in Figure 2.3.5). Growth would be more rapid 
if economies focused on achieving basic cognitive skills 
that are comparable with the average in OECD economies. 
In Figure 2.3.5, this is shown as scenario 2, in which 85% 
of students score at least 400 on international tests of 
cognitive skills for mathematics and science.12 Scores around 
400 indicate that a student has reasoning skills and can 
do simple mathematical or science procedures. Economies 
with higher cognitive skills, in which 85% of students 
achieve at least 400 and 15% achieve at least 600 in the tests 
(scenario 3 in Figure 2.3.5), achieve even faster growth when 
compared with growth obtained from raising basic skills. 
These economies are considered to have a critical mass of 
students who possess top-level skills and demonstrate the 
ability to solve complex problems, reason, and strategize, and 
thus would likely become innovators. 
2.3.5  Growth projections from 2015 to 2045 under different 
education and skills scenarios
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Source: ADB. 2015. A Smarter Future: Skills, Education, and Growth in Asia. 
In Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2015.
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If education systems that build cognitive skills offer higher growth 
prospects, the question becomes what features of education systems can 
deliver better cognitive skills? Evidence suggests three important ones. 
First is having information systems that conduct quality data collection 
and provide relevant, timely, and credible data on schooling inputs and 
skills outcomes. These systems enable governments to reach evidence-
based policy decisions and hold schools and teachers accountable 
for learning outcomes. Further, providing information to parents on 
student and school performance can empower families to demand better 
educational quality. Second is curriculum content that matches student 
capabilities and fosters the development of critical skills, in particular 
problem-solving and non-cognitive skills emphasizing basic digital and 
financial skills. Basic education curricula, especially at the secondary 
level, ideally focus on developing skills that are highly transferable. 
Third is value placed on early childhood education, as this can foster 
substantial improvement in skills outcomes. Evidence shows that early 
childhood education is associated with higher cognitive skills and 
educational attainment, which facilitate other positive outcomes.
Key to middle-income economies’ achievement of faster economic 
growth and movement up to high income is a greater emphasis on the 
quality of education, to ensure that education systems deliver more skills 
that are relevant in the labor market. It is fundamentally the quality and 
not just the quantity of education that delivers more rapid growth. 
Related to this—and as suggested at the outset of 
this section—higher education built on a foundation of 
sound primary education may become more important as 
an economy approaches the global technology frontier. 
Evidence from the US indicates that, in states close to the 
technology frontier, returns on education that features 
research are higher than returns to 2-year college education. 
In stark contrast, as Figure 2.3.6 shows, the returns on 
basic education exceed the returns to research education 
in states that are distant from the frontier. The lesson 
for middle-income Asian economies is that they ought to 
increase their investment in research-type education as they 
grow richer and catch up. 
Closing the education gaps
The profitability of investing in education is indisputable, 
and supporting evidence continues to grow. The long history 
of estimating returns on education in all regions of the 
world and almost all economies has shown that the size 
of the return on education rivals and often exceeds that 
of investment in most forms of physical capital. A dollar 
invested in increasing education by 1 year, especially for girls, generates 
an increase in earnings and other benefits, such as in health, of $4 
in lower-middle income economies and as high as $10 in low-income 
economies (Jamison and Schäferhoff 2016). Understanding the pattern of 
returns on education in different settings can inform understanding of 
the relative benefits of investing in different levels of education.13
2.3.6  Long-term growth effects of spending $1,000 
per person on higher education, US states
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Until the 1980s, intuition, as well as evidence based on thousands of 
estimates of rates of return,14 pointed to higher returns for low-income 
economies than for high-income economies and higher returns for 
primary than for tertiary education, especially in low- and middle-
income economies. However, since the 1990s, there has been mounting 
evidence of significantly higher returns to post-primary and especially 
tertiary education from studies spanning most parts of the world, 
including low- and middle-income economies in Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa.15 This pattern reversal is hardly a surprise for two reasons. 
One is the widespread expansion of primary education across the world, 
including in low- and middle-income economies, thus increasing the 
supply of low-skilled workers. The other is skill-biased technological 
change that reduces demand for low-skilled labor. 
These findings naturally alter the policy implications of public 
spending on education for poverty reduction. Subsidies to tertiary 
education need not to be very large or universal, as those who can afford 
higher education will pay as needed. Governments can focus instead on 
correcting credit market failures to ensure that the poor have access to 
education (Colclough, Kingdon, and Patrinos 2009). Meanwhile, efforts 
to make primary education universal need to be continued to build a 
strong foundation for tertiary education.
Although bridging the gap in post-secondary education completion 
rates between high-income and low- and middle-income economies is 
necessary (Figure 2.3.7), precedence arguably goes to bridging another 
gap, in education quality rather than quantity. Successful education 
systems provide quality education and equip graduates with marketable 
skills. Working with panels of international test scores, Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2008) found strong evidence that it is skills relevant to the 
labor market, such as numeracy, literacy, problem solving, etc., that have 
the strongest association with high individual earnings, high economic 
growth, and equitable distribution of income. 
2.3.7 Average schooling years by income group
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Yet, international surveys such as the Programme 
for International Student Assessment and Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study continue to 
reveal stark differences in the quality of learning between 
students in most low- and middle-income economies and 
economies that are more economically and educationally 
advanced. While substantial educational attainment 
differences persist, especially in the proportion of tertiary 
education graduates (Figure 2.3.8), the gap in educational 
performance, indicating quality of education, is spectacular 
(Figure 2.3.9). The average proportion of 15-year-old students 
in OECD economies who score high on mathematics and 
science tests is 4 to 5 times greater than in middle-income 
economies, and the proportion of low performers in middle-
income economies on the same subjects is more than 2 times 
the OECD average. In developing Asia, an exception like Viet Nam, 
which ranks at 8 among the 72 economies covered, tends to indicate that 
the gap can be closed with sound education policies.
2.3.8  Educational attainment, middle income versus 
advanced economies
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2.3.9  Performance on standardized math and science tests, middle income versus OECD economies
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Building successful education systems, ones that enable better 
student learning, remains a challenge. Such systems do, however, share 
certain characteristics. One is an effective assessment system that 
frequently measures student learning and provides timely information 
to students, teachers, and policy makers. Another is accountability and 
effective oversight that requires schools to take responsibility for the 
performance of the school and of individual student. Yet schools need a 
degree of autonomy in planning and the management of school budgets 
and personnel.
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Infrastructure investment for 
facilitating structural change
Infrastructure typically refers to the basic structures that facilitate and 
support economic activity. Here, the term is used to denote network 
infrastructure—transport by road and rail, electricity, water supply 
and sanitation, and telecommunications by landline, mobile phones, 
and internet systems. By providing essential services and connecting 
markets, infrastructure is essential for the smooth functioning of the 
economy. It is highly complementary to labor and other types of capital, 
and as such its contribution to output gains is potentially large.
Infrastructure differs from other types of capital in a few important 
ways. Infrastructure projects are often big and capital intensive, 
making them natural monopolies. They have large upfront costs, but 
benefits accumulate over very long periods. Infrastructure also tends 
to generate positive externalities as social returns often exceed private 
gains. Because of these peculiarities, which make the private financing 
and provision of infrastructure hard, infrastructure is still commonly 
provided by governments. Given the budget constraints faced by many 
low- and middle-income economies, infrastructure often remains 
underprovided no matter how badly it is needed.
 By helping to boost output, infrastructure investment can play 
a critical role in sustaining growth in middle-income economies, 
including in developing Asia. ADB reported in 2017 that Asia will 
need to invest $1.7 trillion per year in infrastructure to maintain its 
growth momentum.16 The type of investment undertaken is important 
as an economy’s infrastructure needs change as it develops. While 
the transition from low to middle income corresponds to a basic shift 
from sectors with low to higher productivity, most commonly from 
agriculture to manufacturing, the transition to high income is more 
complex, requiring economies to diversify into a wider set of products, 
innovate rather than just imitate, and upgrade to more complex products 
with higher value added.
The empirical literature to date is sparse on whether infrastructure 
plays a special part in overcoming the development challenges faced by 
middle-income economies. To understand the issue, this section first 
investigates whether an economy’s infrastructure needs alter across 
its stages of development. It then explores whether infrastructure 
investment has a causal impact on output and whether this differs for 
middle-income economies. 
On the whole, the analysis reveals a clear pattern in the sectoral 
provision of infrastructure across development stages, with basic 
infrastructure such as for transport and for water supply and 
sanitation more important in the early stages and more advanced 
infrastructure such as for electric power generation and information 
and communication technology (ICT) becoming more important in 
later stages. Faster-growing middle-income economies invest more in 
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infrastructure and tend to have a greater share of infrastructure in ICT 
than their slower-growing peers. The causal analysis finds as well a 
strong and sustained impact from public infrastructure investment on 
output growth in middle-income economies, which further underscores 
the possible benefits of an infrastructure push for this income group.
Infrastructure: evolving needs  
and some stylized facts
In thinking about the role of infrastructure at different stages of 
economic development, it is useful to provide a sketch of how an 
economy transitions from one income group to another. In a standard 
dualistic development model, low-income economies are able to reach 
middle-income status through sectoral shifts—primarily by moving 
workers out of low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity 
manufacturing—and by adopting or imitating foreign technology. 
These sources of high growth tend to peter out, however, once upper-
middle income is reached, as the pool of underemployed labor shrinks, 
causing wages to rise and competitiveness to decline.
Maintaining growth becomes increasingly difficult at middle income 
unless an economy finds other ways to raise productivity. This would 
require, for instance, strong investment in innovation that generates 
new ideas, processes, and technologies and a shift to industries with 
ever higher value added. Infrastructure may be central to this process. 
Agenor and Canuto (2015) argued that sufficiently large investments 
in advanced infrastructure such as high-speed communication 
networks promote innovation and encourage additional human capital 
accumulation, which helps a developing economy to escape a middle-
income slowdown.
One can draw from this a few hypotheses about the role of 
infrastructure in development. One is that the infrastructure required 
would evolve as the economy progresses, with more rudimentary 
infrastructure such as for transport and for water supply and sanitation 
critical during the earlier stages of development and more sophisticated 
infrastructure required for industrialization and subsequently 
innovation, such as reliable power supply and ICT, likely to be important 
in the later stages, particularly when an economy reaches middle 
income.17 Another hypothesis is that economies that are better at 
providing the necessary infrastructure tend to perform better.
This subsection documents stylized facts regarding infrastructure 
provision in the various income groups to allow a comparison of middle-
income economies with others.18 All country-year observations in the 
sample are initially classified in three income groups: low income, lower-
middle income, and upper-middle income. As mentioned above, these 
income groups are based on income thresholds set by the World Bank 
and are applied to GDP data from the Penn World Table 9.0. 
Within each income group, the economies are further classified 
based on geometric mean per capita GDP growth within a particular 
income group, with “top25” representing the fastest-growing quartile, 
“mid50” the middle 50%, and “low25” the slowest-growing quartile. 
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This is done to see if differences in infrastructure provision are associated 
with differences in growth performance within each income group.
Figure 2.4.1 shows a strong positive correlation between an economy’s 
stage of development and physical measures of infrastructure. This is not 
surprising and has been documented elsewhere (e.g., IMF 2014). The more 
novel finding is that economies that grow faster than their peers in the 
same income group tend to have more of certain types of infrastructure. 
This is true of transport and ICT. For electricity, water supply, and 
sanitation, however, there seems to be little or no association between 
growth performance and infrastructure provision. 
While all types of infrastructure tend to increase as economies 
develop, their relative importance changes, as measured by their share in 
the overall stock of infrastructure. To explore this conjecture, different 
types of infrastructure are aggregated using unit costs of production 
drawn from Fay and Yepes (2003). Examining the patterns of provision 
of the different infrastructure types, it is evident that, as hypothesized, 
middle-income economies tend to switch their focus away from 
basic infrastructure such as for transport and toward more advanced 
infrastructure such as for ICT. 
2.4.1 Infrastructure, income, and growth performance
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Note: Horizontal bars show median infrastructure stock in each quartile of each income group. Vertical lines show median infrastructure stock for a whole income group.
Source: Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy, forthcoming.
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Figure 2.4.2 shows that, as income improves, the share 
of transport in total infrastructure stock declines while that 
of energy and ICT rises. The latter trend is particularly true 
for the fastest-growing middle-income economies (top25). 
The figure also shows that the share of water supply and 
sanitation drops as an economy reaches the upper middle-
income phase. This is not surprising, as providing water and 
sanitation is a top priority when economies are starting to 
develop. As Figure 2.4.1 shows, by the time economies reach 
middle income, access to water is already high. The share 
of electric power supply climbs steadily as an economy 
progresses. This may reflect industrialization, as industry 
uses more power than agriculture, but it may also reflect 
higher energy consumption in homes. The results indicate 
that the power requirements of an economy remain relatively 
large even at higher income. 
Figure 2.4.3 summarizes infrastructure stock by income 
group and mobility. It shows that economies moving 
successfully up the income ladder tend to have more 
infrastructure than their peers, just as they invest more in 
innovative activities and human capital. They have more 
of different types of infrastructure: telephone fixed lines, 
mobile telephones, internet, electricity, roads, railroads, 
water supply, and sanitation. Further, the differences between 
graduating economies and their peers are statistically significant 
in most cases (Table 2.4.1).
2.4.2 Shares of different types of infrastructure in total infrastructure stock
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Source: Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy, forthcoming.
2.4.1  Group mean t-test for differences in infrastructure  
across income-transition country groups
Infrastructure indicator
Lower-middle 
income staying 
there versus 
lower middle 
rising to upper-
middle income
Upper-middle 
income staying 
there versus 
upper-middle 
income rising 
to high
Telephone mainlines 
per 100 people
* **
Mobile phone subscriptions 
per 100 people
** **
Internet users  
per 100 people
 **
Total roads per sq km * **
Total rails per sq km ** **
Electricity generating 
capacity per 100 people
** **
Water access  
(% of population)
 **
Sanitation access  
(% of population)
 **
** = group mean t-test significant at 5%, * = group mean t-test significant 
at 10% level, sq km = square kilometer.
Source: ADB estimates.
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2.4.3 Infrastructure by income group and mobility, middle-income subgroups
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To examine differences in infrastructure investment, 
a measure of total infrastructure investment is computed 
that sums the ratios of public investment and private 
infrastructure investment as a share of GDP.19 From this 
overall measure of infrastructure investment, it is evident 
that infrastructure spending does not differ substantially 
across income groups (Figure 2.4.4). Interestingly, though, 
faster-growing economies invest more in their infrastructure. 
Examining the breakdown of overall infrastructure 
investment into public and private components, one can 
see that the public component is larger in fast-growing 
economies. Higher infrastructure investment is not driven 
by higher incomes, as the compared economies are in the 
same income group. There are two possible explanations 
for the positive association between infrastructure 
investment and growth performance. It could be that 
infrastructure investment enables or causes higher growth, 
or infrastructure investment could be simply responding to 
higher growth. The issue of causality is investigated more 
systematically below. 
Infrastructure provision: going deeper
While highly informative about the empirical regularities regarding 
infrastructure provision across income groups, the analytical approach 
used to this point does not take into account the role of other factors, 
nor does it make any formal inferences about the observed empirical 
relationships. To deal with these shortcomings, more rigorous methods 
2.4.4 Total infrastructure investment
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Note: Horizontal bars show median infrastructure investment in each quartile 
of each income group. Vertical lines show median infrastructure investment for 
a whole income group.
Source: Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy, forthcoming.
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are adopted in this subsection to better examine the relationship 
between infrastructure, stage of development, and growth performance. 
The methodology is outlined in Box 2.4.1.
What do the results of this exercise reveal? The regressions confirm 
that lower-middle-income economies tend to have greater infrastructure 
stock than low-income economies, and that upper middle-income 
economies tend to have higher infrastructure stock than both groups 
(Table 2.4.2). This is true for most types of infrastructure. 
A few results stand out that add nuance to the previous observations 
on infrastructure provision across development stages. One is the 
continued accumulation of mobile, internet, and energy infrastructure 
throughout and beyond the middle-income stage, as evidenced by the 
increasing size of the country income dummy coefficients.20 The other, 
also based on these coefficients, is the tendency for telephone line, 
transport, and water supply and sanitation provision to level off 
following a run-up during the upper middle-income phase. 
Regarding roads, a possible explanation is that during early stages 
of development, the focus is on expanding the road network, or building 
new roads where none existed. At later stages of development, however, 
the focus shifts to improving the quality and capacity of existing roads 
by widening and by converting provincial into national roads then into 
limited-access highways. This is not captured in the indicator, which 
measures only the length of the road network. Access to water supply 
and sanitation also tends to rise during early middle-income stages, and 
expansion in these services naturally tapers as access becomes nearly 
universal by the time an economy reaches high income or even upper-
middle income.
2.4.1 Determinants of infrastructure, empirical methodology
Panel regressions can control for factors other than level of 
development that may influence infrastructure provision in 
an economy. In the various specifications, the dependent 
variables are the different types of infrastructure stock. 
The key explanatory variables enter the regressions as 
dummy variables, representing income groups (with low-
income economies serving as the omitted group) and 
growth performance (with the slowest-growing economies 
serving as the omitted group).a Following papers on the 
determinants of infrastructure provision such as Fay and 
Yepes (2003) and Ruiz-Nuñez and Wei (2015), the following 
equation is estimated (inclusive of a standard set of 
controls):
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 5 ,50 25i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tI LMIC UMIC HIC mid top A P U D D                      
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 5 ,50 25i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i tI LMIC UMIC HIC mid top A P U D D                      
In this specification, Ii,t is the log of the level of 
infrastructure stock in country i at time t (except for water 
and sanitation access, which are in percent of population); 
LMICi,t, UMICi,t, and HICi,t which are the income group 
dummies corresponding to lower-middle income, upper-
middle income, and high income, respectively; mid50i,t and 
top25i,t are the growth performance dummies; Ai,t is the 
percent share of agriculture in GDP; Pi,t is log of population 
density, defined as population per square kilometer of 
land area; Ui,t is the degree of urbanization, defined as 
urban population as a percent of total population; and 
Di and Dt are respectively the economy and time fixed 
effects.b Measures of economic structure (percent share 
of agriculture in GDP), population density, and degree of 
urbanization are included as more industrialized, more 
densely populated, and more urbanized economies can 
be expected to have more infrastructure. Country and 
time fixed effects are included to control for systematic 
unobserved heterogeneity across economies and over time.
a For completeness, dummies for high-income economies 
with GDP per capita in 2011 in PPP terms ≥ $17,600 are also 
introduced. Results are similar when regressions are estimated 
on a sample that excludes high-income economies. 
b The results are similar when GDP per capita and its square are 
used in place of income group dummies. See Abiad, Debuque-
Gonzales, and Sy (forthcoming) for details. 
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2.4.2 Sectoral infrastructure regressions using income group dummies
Variables
Telephone 
mainlines 
(1)
Mobile 
phones 
(2)
Internet 
users 
(3)
Total 
roads 
(4)
Rails 
(5)
Electricity 
(6)
Water 
access 
(7)
Sanitation 
access 
(8)
Lower-middle income 0.518*** 0.892*** 0.760*** 0.300*** –0.013 0.327*** 3.540*** 5.007***
(0.049) (0.125) (0.162) (0.023) (0.016) (0.031) (1.363) (0.798)
Upper-middle income 0.900*** 1.390*** 1.602*** 0.339*** 0.067** 0.485*** 4.917*** 7.665***
(0.064) (0.164) (0.213) (0.042) (0.027) (0.046) (1.753) (0.885)
High income 0.817*** 1.845*** 1.880*** 0.277*** 0.069** 0.600*** 4.027* 6.390***
(0.072) (0.244) (0.268) (0.046) (0.031) (0.054) (2.163) (1.011)
Mid 50% for growth 0.030 0.017 0.336*** –0.037* 0.033* –0.079*** 1.994 1.498**
(0.039) (0.129) (0.124) (0.020) (0.017) (0.026) (1.470) (0.684)
Top 25% for growth 0.231*** 0.500*** 0.268* –0.138*** –0.011 –0.081** 3.861** 1.953***
(0.053) (0.184) (0.161) (0.033) (0.020) (0.040) (1.578) (0.632)
Agriculture, share of GDP –0.033*** –0.081*** –0.071*** –0.011*** 0.000 –0.012*** –0.095 –0.148***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0020) (0.081) (0.027)
Population density 0.164** 6.941*** 5.482*** 0.274*** 0.045 –0.302*** 21.519*** 6.401***
(0.076) (0.515) (0.447) (0.042) (0.038) (0.049) (3.094) (1.017)
Urbanization 0.027*** –0.003 0.044*** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.020*** 0.308*** 0.440***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.102) (0.043)
Constant –1.161*** –35.147*** –32.377*** –2.219*** –4.120*** 3.009*** –24.508* 31.082***
(0.320) (2.480) (2.166) (0.198) (0.127) (0.270) (13.818) (4.790)
Observations 3,249 2,016 1,779 3,291 3,225 3,713 525 2,045
R-squared 0.968 0.915 0.931 0.978 0.981 0.978 0.965 0.993
Formal test of differences in coefficients:
Upper middle > Lower middle Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
High income > Upper middle No Yes Yes No No Yes No No
Top 25% > Mid 50% Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1. 
Note: All regressions include economy and year fixed effects.
Source: Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy, forthcoming.
The regressions confirm the positive association between growth 
performance and certain types of infrastructure stock. Most notably, 
better performers in the top 25% tend to have more ICT infrastructure. 
Economies in the top quartile for growth tend to have 25%–50% more 
telephone mainlines, mobile subscriptions, and internet usage than 
those in the bottom quartile. Fast-growing economies also seem to 
have 2%–4% more access to water supply and sanitation. Exceptions to 
the positive relationship are rail provision, which seems unrelated to 
growth performance, and energy and roads, where fast-growers seem 
to have 8%–14% less provision. Coefficients on the control variables 
generally hold the correct signs in both sets of regressions, with higher 
population density and higher degree of urbanization associated with 
significantly more infrastructure and greater share of agriculture with 
significantly less. 
To see which set of economies is responsible for the relationship 
between good growth performance and the accumulation of certain 
types of infrastructure, a similar set of regressions is estimated using 
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subsamples representing the different income groups.21 Consistent 
with the earlier assumed facts, the relationship appears to be primarily 
driven by the faster-growing middle-income economies in the case 
of ICT (Table 2.4.3). This group of economies also seems to be largely 
behind the positive association between growth performance and access 
to water supply and sanitation. 
All things considered, the stylized facts and regression results 
suggest a hierarchy of needs where economies are more likely to invest 
in basic infrastructure such as water supply and sanitation, roads, 
power, and telephone mainlines during early stages of development. 
Economies then seem to turn their attention to advanced infrastructure 
such as mobile and internet connections when they reach the upper-
middle income, with power continuing to be a priority. Fast-growing 
economies within each income group tend to have higher infrastructure 
stock than their slower-growing counterparts for certain types of 
infrastructure, notably ICT.
The macroeconomics effects  
of public investment
Discussions above have established an association between 
infrastructure provision and investment, on the one hand, and 
stage of development and growth performance on the other. But the 
bivariate charts and multivariate regressions cannot shed light on the 
direction of causality. The positive relationship could arise from output 
responding to infrastructure investment as the latter boosts demand 
in the short term or the productivity of existing factors of production 
in the long term. It could arise as well from infrastructure responding 
to output, either because higher output makes it easier to pay for 
infrastructure or because expectations of higher growth induce greater 
investment in infrastructure. This is a problem that has long plagued the 
literature on the macroeconomic effects of infrastructure investment. 
2.4.3 Sectoral infrastructure regressions for the middle-income subsample
Variables 
Telephone 
mainlines
(1)
Mobile 
phones
(2)
Internet 
users
(3)
Total roads
(4)
Rails
(5)
Electricity 
(6)
Water 
access
(7)
Sanitation 
access
(8)
Lagged GDP per capita  0.599*** 0.125 0.761** –0.151*** –0.012 0.234*** 3.242 0.912
 (0.063) (0.253) (0.307) (0.047) (0.027) (0.048) (2.398) (0.946)
Mid 50% for growth 0.244*** 0.353** 0.745*** 0.081** 0.038 0.119*** 1.031 2.505***
 (0.056) (0.162) (0.220) (0.033) (0.024) (0.039) (2.294) (0.675)
Top 25% for growth 0.491*** 0.810*** 0.953*** –0.414*** –0.134*** 0.026 3.765* 3.901***
 (0.094) (0.226) (0.209) (0.130) (0.036) (0.071) (2.160) (0.749)
Observations 1,351 860 755 1,314 1,327 1,496 218 863
R-squared 0.943 0.954 0.938 0.966 0.969 0.947 0.928 0.987
*** = p < 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1.
Note: All regressions include economy and year fixed effects. Control variables not reported above are share of agriculture, population, and urbanization.
Source: Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy, forthcoming.
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The challenge is to identify changes in infrastructure investment 
that are not driven by contemporaneous or lagged output, nor by 
expectations of future output growth. To tackle this issue, the following 
pages adopt the empirical strategy of Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012), 
which relies on the idea that significant parts of government spending 
are likely to be determined by past information and cannot easily 
respond to current economic conditions. Based on this assumption, 
one can estimate a fiscal policy rule for public investment and from 
this obtain a series of exogenous shocks to public investment.22 
The estimated policy shocks can then be used to trace the dynamic 
effects of public investment on output.
In principle, the assumption that public investment cannot easily 
respond to current economic conditions may not hold for two reasons. 
First, public spending can automatically respond to cyclical conditions. 
This should not pose a problem for public investment, however, because 
automatic stabilizers work mostly through revenues and social spending. 
Second, discretionary public investment spending can occur in response 
to output conditions. As discussed in Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012), 
the relevance of this concern relates to the precise definition of 
contemporaneous feedback effects. Although it is typically assumed in 
the literature that government spending does not react to changes in 
economic activity within a given quarter (Blanchard and Perotti 2002), 
whether it may respond in a period longer than a quarter is an open 
question. Recent evidence for advanced economies (Beetsma, Giuliodori, 
and Klaassen 2009, Born and Müller 2012) suggests that the 
restriction that government spending does not respond to economic 
conditions within a year cannot be rejected. Box 2.4.2 describes the 
empirical methodology for estimating the macroeconomic impact of 
infrastructure.
The results suggest that public investment has a positive and 
persistent impact on output in developing economies (Figure 2.4.5, 
Panel A). The contemporaneous effect of an increase in public investment 
equal to 1% of GDP is a 0.3% increase in output. This gradually increases 
to 1.2% in the 7th year after the shock, with an impact significantly 
different from zero in both the short and the long run. 
2.4.5 Effect of public investment on output
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Source: Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy, forthcoming.
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2.4.2 Impact of infrastructure on output, empirical methodology
A two-step regression is involved in this approach. In the 
first step, an annual time series of public investment shocks 
is estimated using a fiscal policy rule that assumes public 
investment as a share of GDP to be related to its own lag, 
past indebtedness and output growth, stage of development, 
growth performance, and expectations about current 
economic activity, according to the equation:
, , 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 , , 1 , ,50 25 ( )i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ti i d g LMIC UMIC HIC mid top E g e                        
where ii,t refers to public investment as a share of GDP, i 
and t are respectively the economy and time fixed effects, 
is the debt-to-GDP ratio, g denotes output growth, E(g) is 
the expectation about current economic activity (proxied by 
the World Economic Outlook growth forecasts as of October 
in the previous year), and e represents the measure of public 
investment shocks.
In the second step, following the “local projections” 
approach proposed by Jordà (2005) in estimating impulse 
response functions, the impact of public investment 
innovations ,ˆ( )i te  on output is estimated through the 
equation
, , ,
k k k k
i t k i t i t i t iy y PUBINV        
where y is the log of output, i and t are respectively the 
country and time fixed effects, and PUBINV represents 
the shocks ,ˆ( )i te  derived from the fiscal policy rule in the 
first step. This equation is estimated for each k (= 1, 0, 2, 3, 
..., 7) representing the time horizon after a shock. Impulse 
response functions are computed using the estimated 
coefficients k, and the confidence bands associated with 
the impulse response functions are generated using the 
estimated standard coefficients of k based on clustered 
robust standard errors.
This approach is applied to explore the macroeconomic 
effects of infrastructure investment in developing economies 
and, more specifically, to examine whether macroeconomic 
effects are different in middle-income economies relative to 
low-income economies.a The dataset is an unbalanced panel 
that covers 72 developing economies from 1991 to 2014. 
To compare the country income groups, impulse response 
functions are generated for each income group separately. 
a Abiad et al. (2016) examine the macroeconomic effects of public 
investment using a more precise measure of shocks to public 
investment, namely forecast errors in public investment from 
OECD economic reports. This approach is not feasible for 
this investigation of developing economies for lack of similar 
forecast data. 
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When splitting the developing economy sample into low-income and 
middle-income economies, one sees a difference in effects (Figure 2.4.5, 
Panel B versus Panel C). In low-income economies, public investment 
shocks do not raise output immediately. There is an increase in 
long-term output of 1.1% after 7 years, but with increasing size of the 
standard error as time passes after the shock, the estimated impact 
is not significantly different from zero. In middle-income economies, 
public investment shocks raise output by 0.6% immediately, and 
the effect is significantly different from zero. Over time, the impact 
increases to 1.1% in the 7th year after the shock, and this long-run effect 
is also significantly different from zero. Although the patterns in the 
middle-income and low-income subsamples are noticeably different, 
given the large error bands around the estimated effects, one cannot 
reject that the impact in both types of economies is the same. 
The somewhat weaker impact of public investment in low-income 
economies may seem counterintuitive but is consistent with evidence 
from studies, such as Warner (2014) and Kraay (2012). This is an 
important point: infrastructure investment can have a wide range 
of outcomes, and even though the positive association between 
infrastructure provision and development is clear, positive causal effects 
from infrastructure investment to output require the right conditions. 
Failure of public investment to lead to sustained output growth is often 
attributed to poor investment efficiency that inhibits the conversion 
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of dollar spending into productive capital stock. Another cited reason 
for weak output gains is the limited absorptive capacity of certain 
economies, with marginal returns likely to decline as investment outlays 
are scaled up (Presbitero 2016). One can reasonably expect absorptive 
capacity constraints, which occur during a rapid acceleration and 
ratcheting up of public investment, to be more severe in low-income 
economies. Governments also tend to focus on basic infrastructure 
such as water supply and sanitation in earlier development stages. 
Such investments, while vital, may not be particularly growth-
enhancing and are therefore unlikely to catalyze substantial output 
gains. A final explanation is that the marginal productivity of 
infrastructure investment may not be higher in low-income economies 
despite the more acute shortage of infrastructure there, because 
complementary factors of production—human capital, private capital, 
and the right institutions—are in similarly short supply.
Conclusion
What role does infrastructure play in middle-income economies? 
The analysis uncovered several noteworthy results. Looking at the 
stylized facts, one finds that the stock of infrastructure tends to rise 
with income, and with growth performance. Infrastructure type 
systematically varies with an economy’s stage of development, reflecting 
a clear hierarchy of requirements. Transport, basic communications, 
water supply, and sanitation are more important at early stages of 
development, while reliable electricity supply and ICT become more 
important as economies advance. 
Better-performing economies, especially among middle-income 
economies, differ from others in their income group in two important 
ways. Faster-growing economies tend to have more of certain types 
of infrastructure—especially ICT—than their peers. They also invest a 
bigger share of GDP in infrastructure. The strong positive association 
of certain types of infrastructure with growth at different stages of 
development suggests a potential policy lever for governments grappling 
with the middle-income challenge of sustaining growth. It is not enough 
to simply raise the amount of infrastructure investment, economies 
also need to invest in the right types of infrastructure, which depend 
on their current stage of development. While it may be beneficial for a 
low-income economy to focus initially on basic infrastructure such as 
water supply and sanitation, for instance, analysis finds that they 
should shift attention to more advanced infrastructure such as ICT 
during their middle-income stage, and especially during their upper 
middle-income stages.
The experience of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is illustrative. 
The ROK was on the cusp of transitioning to high income in the 
mid-1990s, and by some measures it crossed the threshold in 1995. 
But shortly thereafter, it was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis, 
imperiling its newfound status as a high-income economy. Several 
studies, including Lee (2003), Oh and Larson (2011), Bae (2011), Yeo et al. 
(2014), and Lee (2015), document how the ROK government deliberately 
targeted the development of ICT infrastructure in the late 1990s. 
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Even though broadband services were first launched in the ROK only in 
1998, by the early 2000s, the broadband penetration rate in the ROK was 
the highest in the world (Bae 2011). As a result, Oh and Larson (2011) 
noted: “In 1997 the ICT sector contributed only about 12 percent to 
the nation’s GDP growth. By 2003, that percentage had risen to about 
40 percent and it remained substantial through 2009.” The world-
leading ICT infrastructure of the ROK likely contributes to the economy 
being ranked the most innovative in the world (Bloomberg 2015). 
A positive association between infrastructure and growth 
performance in middle-income economies cannot be the basis for policy, 
as causality can run either way—or both. The additional analysis in 
this section moves in this direction, by showing how exogenous shocks 
to public investment have significant positive and persistent effects 
on output, particularly in middle-income economies. This provides 
reassurance that at least part of the causality between infrastructure 
provision and development runs from infrastructure to national 
output and income. The slightly bigger and more sustained impact 
of infrastructure investment on output in middle-income economies 
indicates the potentially strong benefits of increased infrastructure 
investment in them. That said, further research is needed to determine 
the precise relationship between infrastructure and economic growth. 
Better data on ICT infrastructure investment, in particular, would help 
researchers definitively identify the benefits of that particular type of 
investment.
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Reaching toward high income
Decades of rapid economic growth transformed developing Asia from 
a low-income region to a middle-income region. The vast majority of 
the population now lives in middle-income economies. The region 
continues to grow at a healthy pace, and its NIEs have reached high 
income in record time. However, the experience of many middle-income 
economies in Latin America and elsewhere suggests that graduation 
from middle income to high income can be challenging. Further, middle-
income economies are structurally different from low income-economies, 
and the transition from low to middle income differs in important ways 
from the transition from middle to high income. This is a good time to 
take stock of the challenges facing the middle-income region as it seeks to 
build on its past success.
An examination of middle-income challenges reveals that while 
the accumulation of physical and human capital continues to matter 
a lot for sustaining healthy growth, productivity comes to the fore. 
Total factor productivity (TFP), the growth in production not accounted 
for by increased use of inputs, plays a bigger role in middle-income 
economies’ growth, particularly those successfully reaching high income. 
The successful middle-income growth model emphasizes productivity 
and innovation. Innovation becomes more important after economies 
fully reap the benefits of using existing resources efficiently. Even in the 
further accumulation of physical and human capital, the focus shifts to 
areas with positive productivity spillovers like advanced infrastructure 
and higher education. Finally, all of this must be underpinned by a 
supportive policy environment and stable macroeconomy.
Stepping up innovation requires a skilled workforce capable of 
creating new knowledge and technology. Middle-income economies 
should increase human capital investment, which not only fuels growth 
but also promotes equity. When building human capital, the focus should 
be on educational quality to enhance cognitive skills, in particular 
science and math capabilities, which enhances the chances of students 
becoming innovators.
Advanced infrastructure is an important investment to foster 
innovation and human capital accumulation. As middle-income economies 
develop, their infrastructure needs evolve from basic infrastructure to 
advanced infrastructure. The combination of advanced infrastructure, a 
skilled workforce, and innovation can help sustain productivity growth 
and pave the way for a steady transition to high income.
Sound policies and institutions
Sound policies and institutions will play a vital role in the broad 
transition from middle to high income, as it did in Asia’s transition 
from low to middle income. The role of the government will necessarily 
evolve as economies progress. The development of the private sector in 
particular demands a more nuanced economic role for the government. 
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More generally, the government must provide an environment 
conducive to innovative entrepreneurship by promoting investment 
in education and infrastructure. The quality of education and higher 
education becomes more important as economies grow richer, as does 
advanced infrastructure such as ICT. The experience of Asia’s newly 
industrialized economies highlights the role of innovation, human 
capital, and infrastructure in sustaining TFP growth at middle income. 
In terms of innovation, middle-income economies must prioritize 
institutions and policies that level the playing field for the new firms 
that play major roles in innovation. Strong intellectual property rights 
ensure that new entrepreneurs can capitalize on commercially useful 
new ideas, products, or technologies without fear of expropriation by 
large incumbent firms or other parties. This gives them the confidence 
to invest their time and effort in innovative activities. Access to finance 
on reasonable terms enables entrepreneurs to transform new ideas 
into novel products and services. Effective competition laws, and 
more broadly strong rule of law, limit the scope for large incumbents to 
abuse their market power toward hindering the entry and expansion of 
innovative newcomers.
With respect to human capital, analysis indicates that, as an 
economy converges on the global technology frontier, the quality of 
education increasingly takes precedence over the quantity of education. 
Education policy and reform should be geared toward producing 
technically competent workers who are capable of absorbing and using 
new knowledge. Augmenting the pool of cognitive skills such as math 
and science is key to upgrading the workforce to one that is capable of 
creating the new technology and knowledge that are the cornerstones 
of innovation-led growth. There is also a case for investing more in 
higher education that features research, built on a solid foundation of 
basic education.
Analysis also indicates that infrastructure investment will be 
no less important during developing Asia’s transition from middle to 
high income than during its past success in moving up from low to 
middle income. The region should therefore continue to prioritize 
investment in infrastructure of all types, from roads to electricity. 
Since energy and advanced infrastructure such as ICT seem to be 
especially important for the final transition, economies should expand 
investments in these areas as they approach high income.
 The case can be made for more direct government intervention in 
a selective and targeted way to foster a more diverse and sophisticated 
output mix, as shown in Peru’s successful experience with industry–
government coordination (Box 2.5.1). The case for intervention is 
stronger when the government has adequate institutional capacity, as 
Berglof and Cable (forthcoming) and Bruszt and Campos (forthcoming) 
emphasize. Within the region, Thailand’s success in becoming Southeast 
Asia’s hub for automobile manufacturing is revealing. Instead of trying 
to foster a national champion, Thai policy makers pursued a more 
nuanced, market-oriented strategy of attracting foreign auto firms. 
Extensive dialogue between government and industry was vital to 
fostering a critical mass of local auto parts suppliers, an indispensable 
pillar of any auto industry (Hill and Kohpaiboon 2017). 
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2.5.1 Product diversification through industry–government coordination in Peru
The Peruvian government embarked in 2014 on a 
coordinated industrial policy to facilitate the emergence 
of a more diversified economy with the aim of boosting 
Peru’s growth exports and growth potential. Peru has 
comparative advantages in natural resources, so activity 
naturally concentrated in fishing, cotton, and mining, which 
together account for some 43% of exports. This left Peru’s 
economy exposed to exogenous shocks, as prices for these 
commodities are volatile. 
The government realized that productive diversification 
could bring Peru closer to the world technology frontier. 
In early 2014, the Ministry of Production started to 
introduce measures to nurture productive diversification. 
Progress was made in three key areas: expanding across 
sectors the scope of such public goods as access to 
affordable finance, higher quality standards, and improved 
infrastructure; providing ample public goods to selected 
sectors to boost their productivity; and subsidizing activities 
with positive externalities such as R&D investment, training, 
and technology transfer. The set of industrial policies 
buoyed innovation by identifying sectors with high growth 
potential, promoting coordination between stakeholders 
in the public and private spheres, facilitating access to 
financing, investing in training and tertiary education, and 
fostering technological transfer. 
Implementation targeted a few selected sectors with 
great economic potential, emphasizing an agile and 
interactive approach. Sectorial working groups were created 
to help remove growth barriers in five industries: forestry, 
aquaculture, textiles, food and beverages, and creative 
industries. Public–private coordination was introduced 
in the form of temporary public–private executive boards 
that seek to boost productivity by eliminating bottlenecks, 
whether they were sector specific or affected multiple 
sector, such as logistics. These boards coordinate agents 
in the public and private sectors, combining their limited 
expertise to assemble enough knowhow to clear bottlenecks 
affecting their industries. 
This practice helps identify promising economic sectors, 
list relevant stakeholders, analyze the major challenges 
they face, and provide possible solutions and action plans. 
Forestry, for example, has great potential in terms of area 
available for plantations, conditions for quick tree growth, 
and export prospects. Compared with Chile, whose forestry 
exports are worth $5.5 billion, Peru exports much less, only 
$150 million, but has potential to generate $10 billion in 
exports and create 1 million jobs—and this with plantation 
trees reaching maturity in half the time. To achieve this 
potential, the forestry board passed new legislation to foster 
investment in the sector and comply with environmental 
standards. This dramatically reduced the time required 
to register privately owned land that was appropriate for 
plantations and to get extraction permits, shortening it to 
a few days from what had been up to 12 months. Finance 
was improved with adaptions appropriate for the sector, 
adjusting payment timing to align it with forestry business 
cash flows and not requiring firms to use their land 
as collateral because ill-defined property rights makes 
this impossible. With these hurdles overcome, loans for 
forestry projects rose to stand today at $60 million. Such a 
surgical approach effectively activates the potential of 
underperforming sectors, achieving results rapidly at 
relatively low cost. 
Importance of macroeconomic stability
One vital element of a growth-conducive environment is macroeconomic 
stability. Evidence has emerged since the global financial crisis of 
2008–2009 that growth in individual economies has become more 
dependent on such global factors as global growth, oil prices, and 
financial volatility (Aizenman, Jinjarak, Estrada, and Tian, forthcoming). 
This indicates that the region may be more vulnerable to external shocks.
Empirical evidence indicates that when an economy reaches middle 
income, its growth rate is more vulnerable to indicators affecting 
macroeconomic stability—such as whether it faces a banking or currency 
crisis, the extent of capital inflows other than foreign direct investment, 
and government debt as a share of GDP. Exploring the determinants of 
growth in a global dataset from 1960 to 2014, Eichengreen, Park, and 
Shin (forthcoming) confirmed the importance of a number of variables: 
initial income, years of schooling, investment share, demographic 
characteristics, infrastructure, financial development indicators, and 
governance. The study also included variables related to macroeconomic 
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stability: flows of foreign direct investment, the occurrence of banking or 
currency crises, and government debt.
Interestingly, the study found that the economic factors associated 
with per capita income growth do in fact differ between middle-income 
and other economies. The critical distinction is between low and middle 
income. For example, in middle-income economies, the lending–deposit 
rate spread matters less than in low-income economies. This suggests that 
inefficiencies in the financial system matter less in relation to other factors 
as economies move up the income scale. Similarly, the gender ratio is no 
longer as important as before, suggesting the diminishing importance of 
demographic determinants with graduation to middle-income status. 
So what are the factors that come to the fore when an economy 
reaches middle income? The study found that growth in middle income 
is more vulnerable to indicators affecting macroeconomic stability. 
More specifically, in middle-income economies a banking or currency 
crisis can significantly hinder growth, as can capital inflows other than 
foreign direct investment and high government debt as a share of GDP. 
The region should therefore stay vigilant about protecting macroeconomic 
stability, as it has done in the past through sound fiscal and monetary 
policies. The brief reversion of the ROK from high income to middle 
income during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 serves as a stark 
reminder of the high cost of macroeconomic instability.
The evidence in this chapter indicates that sustaining rapid growth 
will not be easy, but it is within the reach of middle-income Asia. 
Many factors that served the region well at low income, such as 
macroeconomic stability and high investment, still serve it well at 
middle income. At the same time, the pattern of growth will have to 
evolve if Asia is to sustain rapid growth and eventually reach high income. 
In particular, innovation, human capital, and infrastructure will have to 
play vital roles. The region’s dynamic track record and the transition of the 
region’s most advanced economies provide some cause for optimism about 
sustaining rapid growth at middle income.
Learning from regional success stories
One group of Asian economies that was able to shift from investment-led 
growth to innovation-based growth is the newly industrialized economies 
(NIEs): the ROK, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China. 
The output mix of these economies became more diverse and sophisticated 
as they graduated from middle to high income, having initially 
specialized in labor-intensive products during the early stages of their 
industrialization but gradually shifting to a wide range of products 
requiring advanced skills and technology.
In 1960, Singapore and Hong Kong, China were both lower-middle 
income, while the ROK and Taipei,China were both low income. From that 
year, Hong Kong, China labored for 24 years and Singapore for nearly 30 
years in middle income before reaching high income. Taipei,China took 
27 years to transition from middle to high income, 10 years ranked as 
lower-middle income and 17 years as upper-middle income. For the ROK, 
the road to high income spanned 23 years, including 10 years in lower-
middle income and 13 years in upper-middle income. The record of the 
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NIEs shows that innovation, human capital, and infrastructure all played 
vital roles in their remarkable transition from middle to high income. 
Technological progress spurred by innovation 
and infrastructure development
An important factor that enabled NIEs to achieve high and steady 
growth is the innovation that drove their rapid technological progress. 
Both the ROK and Taipei,China sustained productivity increases through 
local firms’ development of new technologies (Cherif and 
Hasanov 2015, Agenor, Canuto, and Jelenic 2012). The drive 
toward innovation was supported by strong protection 
of intellectual property rights. In 1990, or 5 years before 
the ROK graduated to high income, its number of patent 
applications was already comparable to that of Germany and 
the US (Figure 2.5.1). 
Direct government support played a key role in spurring 
innovation among NIEs. In Taipei,China, the authorities had 
a direct hand in creating innovative firms. The government 
helped foster close and long-term relationships between 
small and medium-sized enterprises and multinational 
corporations, enabled public and quasi-public research 
institutes to spin off firms and create new technologies, and 
invested heavily to train engineers overseas. In the ROK, the 
government pushed several conglomerates to enter several 
industries simultaneously and export almost immediately to 
create global brands. State support included access to credit 
that was conditional on explicit and quantifiable export 
targets, pushing companies such as Hyundai to accelerate its 
R&D and technological upgrading (Cherif and Hasanov 2015).
In addition to innovation, advanced infrastructure 
networks facilitated NIEs’ rapid transition. Setting up high-
speed communications and broadband technology was aided 
by the liberalization of telecommunication networks and regulatory 
reform. A strong drive toward global competitiveness in communication 
technology catalyzed in the ROK and Taipei,China the emergence of 
robust broadband and multimedia industries in their own domestic 
markets. In Singapore and Hong Kong, China, advanced infrastructure 
networks supported their use as regional headquarters for large foreign 
multimedia companies (Agenor, Canuto, and Jelenic 2012).
Human capital and transformation  
into knowledge-based economies 
Human capital accumulation facilitated innovation among NIEs 
and enabled them to transform into knowledge-based economies. 
The shifting to a knowledge economy requires a development approach 
that emphasizes the quality of education and includes R&D investments 
in science and technology. Figure 2.5.2 illustrates how NIEs in general 
have a stronger position in research and knowledge creation than middle-
income economies. 
2.5.1  Patent applications in selected economies,  
1990 and 2014
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online database.  
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed 4 October 2016).
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The NIE experience shows that combining R&D and human 
capital investments can shift an economy from investment-led growth 
to innovation-led growth, provided there is a sound institutional 
environment that provides incentives for the efficient use of knowledge. 
One good example of such a transformation is the ROK, which 
moved to high income on the basis of innovation, human capital, and 
infrastructure.
Government support for human capital accumulation through 
education reform played a critical role in the ROK transition to a 
knowledge-based economy. During the 1960s and 1970s, secondary 
education was made universal, and vocational and technical schools 
were established to meet skills demand from manufacturing industries. 
The ROK also established science and technology institutes, adopting 
US-style graduate education and research system. In the early 1980s, 
the ROK further expanded tertiary education to prepare for the 
transition into advanced industry. Alongside education reform, the 
ROK strengthened R&D capacity to boost human capital. During the 
transition to upper middle income, knowledge production in the ROK 
increased tremendously, with the number of scientific and technical 
journal articles multiplying sixfold in the decade to 1994, from 424 
to 2,931. 
In the 1980s, the government encouraged the private sector to 
participate in R&D through incentives like tax subsidies. Even small and 
medium-sized enterprises were actively involved in R&D, with some 
allocating as much as 10% of sales income to R&D. The transformation 
of the ROK into a knowledge-based economy enabled it to move toward 
the production of high-technology goods. From 1988 to 1994, its ratio 
of high-technology exports to all manufactured exports increased from 
15.9% to 22.7%. This feat was achieved before the ROK graduated to 
high income in the mid-1990s.
2.5.2  Knowledge production, selected Asian economies
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Solid foundation built on strong basic infrastructure
While heavy investment in advanced infrastructure contributed to the 
more recent success of the NIEs, no less important was their earlier 
heavy investment in basic infrastructure, which provided the quartet 
with a solid foundation for economic takeoff. The NIEs invested more 
in basic infrastructure than did other middle-income economies 
(Figure 2.5.3). The NIEs had 3 times as many telephone mainlines 
per 100 people than other middle-income economies, for example, and 
40% more electricity generating capacity per capita. Significantly, the 
NIEs’ provision of basic infrastructure was already virtually universal 
even when they were middle income. By contrast, today in other 
middle-income economies, almost a quarter of the population still lacks 
basic sanitation.
Behind this higher rate of infrastructure provision lay higher 
infrastructure investment rates. Public investment in the NIEs when 
they were middle income was substantially higher, equaling nearly 8% of 
GDP, than in their peers, at 4% of GDP. Public investment was probably 
more efficient in these economies as well. In the ROK infrastructure 
investment was an explicit priority beginning with the First Five-Year 
Plan, 1962–1966, and infrastructure was geared toward developing 
the ROK as an export-oriented economy. New power plants were built 
to supply electricity for manufacturing, and new expressways and 
expanded ports provided good logistics at low cost. 
Clearing the final hurdle
Having been transformed from a low-income region to a middle-income 
region quickly, developing Asia now faces the final transition, from 
middle to high income. Just as the transition from low to middle income 
required rapid growth sustained over decades, the transition from 
middle to high income will also require that rapid growth is sustained. 
Sustaining rapid growth will not be easy, but is within the reach 
of middle-income Asia. Many factors that served the region well at 
low income, such as macroeconomic stability and high investment, 
will serve it well at middle income. Some key ingredients of economic 
growth will persist.
2.5.3  Infrastructure provision in newly industrialized economies
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At the same time, the pattern of growth will have to evolve if 
Asia is to sustain rapid growth and eventually reach high income. 
The structures of middle-income economies are different from those 
of low-income economies—with, for example, higher stocks of human 
and physical capital—so it is only natural that the contours of growth 
will be somewhat different. In particular, the analysis indicates that 
productivity growth will have to play a larger role in the transition. 
Productivity growth rests in turn on the three pillars of innovation, 
human capital, and infrastructure. Therefore, the central mandate of 
Asian policy makers must be to foster more innovative economies by 
strengthening education and investing in infrastructure.
The region’s dynamic track record gives cause for optimism that 
the authorities can adapt their growth models to overcome the middle-
income challenge. While completing the journey to high income is far 
from guaranteed, there is every reason to believe that good institutions 
and policies can lift developing Asia to high income.
Endnotes
1 Bangladesh; the People’s Republic of China; Fiji; Hong Kong, China; 
India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Nepal; Pakistan; 
the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Taipei,China; and Thailand.
2 The shares are based on 219 economies, of which 218 are from the 
World Bank database. Data on one economy, the Cook Islands, come 
from the Asian Development Outlook database.
3 The middle line of the box indicates the median value, while the 
lower and upper borders of the box indicate the first and third 
quartile of the values, respectively. The top and bottom lines 
represent the maximum and minimum of the values.
4 Capital per capita is calculated for each economy for 2014 based on 
the PWT 9.0 database, which divides capital stock at current PPP by 
population size. 
5 For economies that do not report labor hours, it is assumed that 
average labor hours change the same way as in the US over the 
period.
6 See Eichengreen, Park and Shin (forthcoming) for results for other 
subgroups, such as high-income economies that remain high income.
7 An economy exports a product with revealed comparative advantage 
if the share of the product in its total exports is larger than the share 
of the product on the world market.
8 Felipe et al. (2012) documented that, by category, the most complex 
products are machinery, chemicals, and metals, while the least 
complex products are raw materials and commodities, wood, 
textiles, and agricultural products.
9 Over the longer term, however, older populations will place 
significant strain on finances in Asia, not only in countries with 
especially generous public support systems for the elderly but also 
in those that rely heavily on labor income taxes to finance public 
consumption.
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10 The study of Abrigo, Lee, and Park (forthcoming) has quantitative 
estimates of the fiscal impact of different public investments in 
human capital in the 12 economies in developing Asia.
11 This analysis leaves for a future study a deeper probe into how 
effectively human capital spending boosts productivity growth from 
the government versus from the private sector.
12 These were the Programme for International Student Assessment 
and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.
13 This section is based on material contributed by Christos Sakellariou.
14 Largely credited to George Psacharopoulos. For a recent update: 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004, Montenegro and Patrinos 2014.
15 Schultz 2004, Kingdon, Patrinos, Sakellariou and Soderbom 2008, 
Patrinos, Ridao-Cano, and Sakellariou 2006, Riboud, Savchenko, and 
Tan 2006.
16 Asian Development Bank. 2017. Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs.
17 Because of congestion, pollution, and other problems associated 
with the urbanization that occurs in the middle-income phase, 
certain urban infrastructure also becomes more important for 
middle-income economies. However, lack of comprehensive data 
across economies on urban infrastructure such as mass transit 
prevents further analysis here.
18 The complete list of data sources used in this section can be found in 
Abiad, Debuque-Gonzales, and Sy (forthcoming). The sample period 
of the data starts in 1960 but is subject to data availability.
19 Data on public investment is from the Investment and Capital 
Stock Dataset of the International Monetary Fund Fiscal Affairs 
Department, and private infrastructure investment is from the 
World Bank Private Provision of Infrastructure Database. In the 
absence of more direct measures, public investment often proxies 
for government infrastructure spending. Public investment can 
include investment in non-infrastructure items such as machinery 
and equipment, inventories, valuables, and land. More disaggregated 
data on public infrastructure investment is available only for OECD 
countries. The Private Provision of Infrastructure Database covers 
infrastructure investment by firms at least 20% privately owned.
20 Formal tests of differences in coefficients support these conclusions.
21 To save space, only the table for the middle-income subsample is 
presented. 
22  This identification strategy is very similar to the structure 
embedded in fiscal policy vector autoregressions. The fiscal policy 
rule links the change in government spending to its lags, lagged 
growth, current and lagged public indebtedness, and expectations of 
growth next year. 
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Armenia
Weak domestic demand and the onset of deflation slowed growth to 0.2% in 2016 despite a 
higher fiscal deficit and a narrower trade deficit. With demand likely to remain weak and no room 
for fiscal stimulus, projections for 2017 and 2018 are for modest growth, low inflation, and further 
balancing in the current account. Policy should promote export-oriented industries and innovation. 
Economic performance 
The economy grew by a mere 0.2% in 2016 following growth at 3.0% 
in the previous year. On the supply side, declines in agriculture and 
construction were the main causes for the slowdown, while services 
and industry excluding construction expanded (Figure 3.1.1). 
Bad weather caused agriculture to contract by 5.8% in 2016, 
reversing double-digit growth in 2015. Industry excluding construction 
expanded by 5.1%, mainly on higher output in mining and in food, 
beverages, and tobacco. Construction contracted by 11.3%, recording 
a fourth consecutive year of decline as organizations and households 
continued to pull back. Services, which account for more than half 
of GDP, contributed the most to growth, expanding by 4.0% after no 
growth in 2015. Much of the expansion was in recreation, transport, 
finance, and insurance. 
On the demand side, growth came mainly from a modest rise in 
total consumption and a halving of the deficit in net exports of goods 
and services to an estimated 6.0% of GDP in 2016 from 12.2% a year 
earlier. Growth in private consumption was a lackluster 0.3%, reflecting 
weak household spending, though public consumption grew by an 
estimated 6.0% as expansionary fiscal policy aimed to stimulate the 
economy. Gross fixed capital formation contracted by 6.2% because of 
sluggish public and private investment. 
Monetary policy was accommodative throughout the year. 
Considering weakened growth prospects and a deflationary 
environment, the Central Bank of Armenia gradually relaxed its 
policy rate from 8.75% in December 2015 to 6.00% in February 2017. 
Despite this monetary easing, weak aggregate demand and lower 
commodity prices caused consumer prices to decline. Reversing 
average inflation of 3.7% in 2015, deflation averaged 1.4% in 2016 and 
stood in December at 1.1% year on year (Figure 3.1.2). Falling prices 
for goods, which account for two-thirds of the consumer basket, 
outweighed higher prices for services. The central bank inflation target 
is 2.5%–5.5%.
3.1.1 Supply-side contributions to growth
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3.1.2 Inflation
%
Overall
–6
–3
0
3
6
9
Jul JulJan
2015
Jan
2016
Services
Other goods
Goods
Source: National Statistical Service of the Republic of 
Armenia. http://www.armstat.am (accessed 3 March 2017).
116  Asian Development Outlook 2017
The slack economy, deflation, and expansionary fiscal policy all 
undermined the government budget in 2016, causing the deficit to widen 
to 5.4% of GDP from 4.8% in 2015 (Figure 3.1.3). As tax revenue declined 
by 4.4%, total budget revenue fell 2.6% short of its target, slipping 
to the equivalent of 22.8% of GDP from 23.2% in 2015, while budget 
expenditure was below the planned amount by 3.7%, equal to 28.2% 
of GDP. 
The higher budget deficit pushed public debt to 56.7% of GDP at the 
end of 2016 from 48.8% a year earlier. External public debt increased to 
45.9% of GDP from 41.5% in 2015, while domestic debt rose to 10.9%, up 
by 3.5 percentage points (Figure 3.1.4). The ratio of public debt to the 
previous year’s GDP stood at 57.1% at the end of 2016, breaching the 50% 
ceiling in the Public Debt Law for the first time. 
The current account deficit narrowed marginally to an estimated 
2.6% of GDP in 2016 from 2.7% in 2015 (Figure 3.1.5). Rising exports and 
declining imports that reflected weak domestic demand reduced the 
trade deficit to an estimated 8.8% of GDP in 2016 from 11.3% in 2015. 
An expanding deficit in investment income and further shrinkage of 
surpluses in personal transfers and employee compensation from abroad 
were the main reasons why the overall income surplus narrowed. 
Remittances, measured as net inflow of private noncommercial transfers 
through banks, declined by 17.8% to $716 million in 2016, the third 
consecutive year of contraction (Figure 3.1.6).
Higher government borrowing helped keep international reserves at 
acceptable levels. Gross international reserves at the end of 2016 stood at 
$2.2 billion, equal to 6.2 months of estimated imports (Figure 3.1.7). 
Strong export performance and large inflows of foreign financing 
caused the Armenian dram to appreciate in nominal effective terms 
against a basket of major currencies by 3.1% month on month in 
December 2016. Meanwhile, domestic deflation and inflation in 
Armenia’s main trading partners caused the dram to depreciate in real 
effective terms by 0.5%. 
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is projected at 2.2% in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018 (Figure 3.1.8). 
External risks to the forecast arise mainly from developments in the 
Russian Federation, with which Armenia has strong economic links. 
The forecast assumes some recovery there and a resulting rebound 
in remittances. Domestic risks to the economic outlook reflect low 
fiscal and external buffers and subdued investor enthusiasm ahead 
of parliamentary elections due in April 2017. On the positive side, 
tariff reductions in early 2017 for gas and electricity—with especially 
steep decreases for certain vulnerable households and, regarding gas, 
for food processing firms and greenhouses—should support growth. 
The expected rise in demand could, however, spur inflation. 
On the supply side, all sectors are seen growing moderately in 2017 
and 2018. Industry excluding construction is projected to expand by 
6.2% and somewhat more in 2018, again mainly on expansion in mining 
and in food, beverages, and tobacco. Announced government initiatives—
such as renewed efforts to spur export and innovative industries 
3.1.3 Fiscal indicators 
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through new mechanisms and tools, the creation of a free-trade zone on 
the border with Iran, and the establishment of a joint investment fund 
with the Russian Federation for fi nancing Armenia’s priority economic 
sectors—are considered essential to promote industrial expansion. 
Copper production could support growth if the price remains relatively 
high. However, construction is projected to contract by a further 6.4% 
in 2017 in view of a signifi cant decline in capital spending in the 
2017 state budget and slackening construction funded by remittances. 
The rate of contraction will likely moderate again in 2018. 
With normal weather, agriculture is projected to recover by 8.6% 
in 2017 and possibly more in 2018. Additional support could come from 
the government’s eff orts to foster the construction and expansion 
of greenhouses, through the favorable gas prices for greenhouses 
beginning this year. Services are expected to grow by only 2.4% in 2017 
and slightly more in 2018, constrained by sluggishness in remittance-
supported trade. 
On the demand side, the main drivers of growth will probably be 
further narrowing of the defi cit in net exports of goods and services 
(though less than in 2016) and a slight rebound in private consumption. 
Monetary policy is likely to remain accommodative. With moderate 
output growth, weak domestic demand, and only modest infl ationary 
pressures expected from abroad, average annual infl ation is projected 
to turn positive but remain low at 1.2% in 2017 before edging up to 1.8% 
in 2018.
Signifi cant and sustained fi scal consolidation will be crucial over the 
medium term. To reduce debt-related vulnerability and contain fi scal 
risk, the 2017 budget envisages halving the budget defi cit to 2.8% of GDP 
in 2017, mainly through cuts in capital spending and measures to contain 
public wages and pensions. The adoption of a new tax code in 2016, its 
provisions to be introduced gradually during 2017–2021, should facilitate 
fi scal consolidation by strengthening tax administration and broadening 
the tax base.
Provided the decline in income and transfers abates, the current 
account defi cit is projected to narrow further to 2.3% in 2017 and 
2.0% in 2018 as domestic demand remains sluggish and exports of 
goods and services outpace imports (Figure 3.1.9). To attract foreign 
direct investment, the government has undertaken several initiatives. 
These include establishing a strategic initiatives center, introducing 
a single platform for investment proposals, and revising business 
regulation. Successful implementation of these measures should raise 
inward foreign direct investment, thereby helping to strengthen the 
current account.
The trade defi cit is expected to narrow further. Exports are forecast 
to expand by 6.5% in 2017 and a further 5.0% in 2018, underpinned by 
rising exports of agricultural products, nonferrous metals, and precious 
stones and metals. Constrained by only moderate recovery in domestic 
demand, imports are projected to grow modestly by 2.5% in both 2017 
and 2018. The services account will remain relatively balanced.
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Policy challenge—export diversifi cation
Accelerating reform that promotes exports and diversifi es domestic 
output is essential to make economic growth broad based and more 
inclusive and, ultimately, to alleviate macroeconomic imbalances, 
in particular the budget defi cit and public debt, both of which are 
relatively high and have worsened since late 2015. Despite a marked 
narrowing of the trade defi cit, exports remain a small share of GDP, 
estimated at 17% in 2016, and highly concentrated in terms of both 
content and destination. 
The government’s strategy to pursue export-led industrial 
development, approved in 2011, targets 11 subsectors with export 
potential. It has played an important role in setting long-term 
objectives and framing dialogue between the public and private sectors. 
The strategy has triggered some dynamism in manufacturing, though 
much of the progress has been in high-input food processing, rather 
than in precision engineering, textiles, footwear, or other areas able to 
capitalize on skills and innovation. 
Activities to encourage investments that improve productivity 
could catalyze export diversifi cation by fostering innovation. 
The government’s initiative to collect business proposals on a single 
platform for presentation to investors is a way to mobilize much-needed 
resources for the structural transformation of the economy. The many 
proposals collected from private fi rms and local communities across 
the country are expected to be fi nanced from various sources including 
the state budget, local community budgets, and the private sector. 
Even partial implementation of these investments would help channel 
knowhow and innovation into production processes, expand the variety 
of exports, and add value to existing products—ultimately creating new, 
highly productive jobs. 
The other initiatives under way include, as mentioned above, 
the further improvement of institutional and regulatory frameworks 
for export promotion, introduction of new instruments for export 
promotion and export insurance, establishment of the joint investment 
fund with the Russian Federation, and creation of the free-trade zone on 
the Iranian border.
Support for innovation and technology is another way to transform 
Armenia into a knowledge-based economy and add value to production. 
During the past decade, eff ective public–private collaboration has 
brought sustained growth in information technology. The creation of 
technology parks and incubators, after-school learning centers, and 
engineering laboratories in pilot schools has, along with the entry of 
international companies, signifi cantly improved educational resources 
for specialist training. Armenia can boost its total factor productivity 
and enhance economic growth by scaling up these existing initiatives 
and orienting them toward industries that produce technologically 
sophisticated products, thereby leveraging its competitive advantage 
in highly skilled and low-cost labor in such fi elds as engineering and 
computer science. 
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Azerbaijan
Continued weak oil prices helped cause GDP to contract by 3.8% in 2016 and the current account 
to fall into deficit. Meanwhile, inflation accelerated to 12.4%. GDP is forecast to decline by a 
further 1.1% in 2017 and then recover by 1.2% in 2018, and higher oil prices should return the 
current account to surplus. Combatting unemployment is a major challenge.
Economic performance 
GDP contracted by 3.8% last year following 1.1% growth in 2015 
(Figure 3.2.1). The decline reflected weak oil prices and lower oil 
production, but also a falloff in domestic demand, including less public 
investment, that caused the economy outside of the large oil sector to 
shrink by 5.4%. 
On the supply side, industry contracted by 7.1%, much more than the 
1.9% decline in 2015, mainly because construction plummeted by 27.6% 
as the government slashed public investment in response to plunging 
revenues. Manufacturing declined by 1.4%, reversing 7.7% growth in 
2015 as the production of construction materials fell by 10.6% and of 
petrochemicals by 9.1%. Oil output edged down by 1.3% in 2016, but gas 
extraction rose by the same percentage, albeit from a much smaller base. 
Slowing transport and financial services caused services to contract by 
0.7% after a 4.5% increase in 2015. Meanwhile, agriculture expanded 
by 2.6% on growth at 2.8% in livestock and 2.5% in key crops, though 
managing less than half of the 6.6% pace achieved in 2015.
On the demand side, growth in consumption slowed with 
depreciation of the Azerbaijan manat and reduced consumer lending. 
Net exports fell by more than 50%, following a 72% decline in 2015, 
as lower hydrocarbon output reduced export volume. 
The inflation rate tripled to 12.4% from 4.0% in 2015 as the impact 
of currency depreciation in 2015 lingered (Figure 3.2.2). Prices for food 
rose by 14.7%, other goods by 16.7%, and services by 5.8%. 
Fiscal policy tightened in 2016 as the state budget deficit narrowed 
to the equivalent of 0.4% of GDP from 1.2% in 2015. Revenue equaled 
29.2%, down from 31.5% in 2015, as transfers from the sovereign 
wealth fund were reduced by 6.3% to conserve assets and lessen the 
budget’s dependence on oil income. In February 2016, the authorities 
revised the budget, cutting expenditure to ensure long-term fiscal 
sustainability. Outlays fell to 29.6% of GDP from 32.7% in 2015 as 
lower capital spending offset a sharp rise in interest payments due to 
earlier devaluations and 10% increases for public wages, pensions, and 
social protection. Public and publicly guaranteed debt rose to equal 
20.4% of GDP at the end of 2016 from 19.8% a year earlier. 
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Monetary and financial policy in 2016 aimed to limit inflation 
and restructure the banking system in the wake of steep currency 
depreciation in 2015. In response to high inflation, the central bank 
raised the policy interest rate in four steps to 15.0% in September 2016 
from 3.0% in September 2015. Broad money shrank by 4.9%, four times 
the 1.1% contraction in 2015 (Figure 3.2.3), and central bank international 
reserves declined by 20.8% (Figure 3.2.4). Moreover, deposits fell by 
10.0%, contributing to a 19.6% falloff in loans to borrowers outside of 
the government. After the central bank adopted a floating exchange 
rate regime at the end of 2015, the manat depreciated by a further 
12.0% against the US dollar in 2016, aggravating balance sheet and 
liquidity risks (Figure 3.2.5). To restore confidence in the local currency, 
the authorities provided in March 2016 full deposit insurance that 
guarantees repayment of local currency deposits at an interest rate of 
15%, versus 3% for foreign currency deposits. Dollarization nevertheless 
remained high with 75.2% of deposits in foreign currency at the end 
of 2016, albeit down from 81.6% a year earlier. 
In 2016, the current account registered a deficit equal to 2.1% of GDP, 
higher than the deficit of 0.4% in 2015. Lower oil prices and output cut 
exports by a further 15.8% on top of the 44.8% decline a year earlier. 
Imports declined by 12.7%, reversing a 4.7% pickup a year earlier, 
mainly because of lower imports of cars, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals. 
The services deficit narrowed by 28.4%, as receipts from tourism 
improved by 22.8% and imports of construction services declined.
Economic prospects 
GDP is projected to contract by 1.1% in 2017 with a further decline in 
oil production. Tightened fiscal policy will limit public investment. 
However, GDP is forecast to turn up by 1.2% in 2018 with the onset of 
production from the Shah Deniz gas field and some recovery anticipated 
among private firms (Figure 3.2.6). 
On the supply side, industry is forecast to contract by 0.5% in 2017 
as oil production, which accounts for 65% of total industry, declines 
further. However, gas condensate from new Shah Deniz gas field 
will help industry expand by 1.0% in 2018. Construction is projected 
to fall by a further 10.0% in 2017, reflecting planned cuts in public 
investment, and then expand by 1.0% in 2018 as the economy recovers 
and the government accelerates the implementation of its social housing 
program. Government efforts to stimulate non-oil exports, in particular 
through its Made in Azerbaijan promotion, should catalyze growth in 
agriculture at 3.0% in 2017 and 4.0% in 2018. Services are projected to 
show little change in 2017 as retail trade and transportation decline, 
then expand by 1.0% in 2018 as transportation recovers and tourism 
improves. 
On the demand side, private consumption is predicted to 
contract in 2017 in response to higher inflation and remain subdued 
in 2018. Investment is expected to fall in 2017 as tightened fiscal 
and monetary policy curb both private and public investment. 
Net exports are forecast to improve in 2017 and particularly in 2018 as 
gas production increases. 
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Infl ation is projected to moderate to 9.0% in 2017 with less currency 
depreciation, despite tariff  increases for electricity and gas, then slow 
further to 8.0% in 2018 barring further adjustment to utility prices 
or resurgent depreciation (Figure 3.2.7). Infl ation will remain a key 
challenge over the forecast period, and containing it will require 
coordinated eff orts from monetary and fi scal authorities. 
Fiscal policy will aim to limit defi cits in the next 2 years. 
Including transfers from the sovereign wealth fund, the government 
anticipates state budget defi cits equal to 1.0% of GDP in 2017 and 0.9% 
in 2018 (Figure 3.2.8). Constrained imports will limit revenue from 
custom duties, while slow economic activity holds down domestic tax 
receipts. Expenditure will be restrained to contain the defi cit. With real 
GDP declining in 2017 and growing little in 2018, revenue is forecast 
at 25.2% of GDP in 2017 and 25.6% in 2018. Expenditure is projected at 
26.2% of GDP in 2017, refl ecting higher current outlays and a further 
41.1% cut in capital spending, and at 26.4% in 2018. Public and publicly 
guaranteed debt is expected to increase in 2017 and 2018 to allow the 
government to complete the expansion of the Shah Deniz gas fi eld and 
to improve agriculture.
Monetary policy will likely focus on curbing infl ation. As the 
central bank continues to tighten policy, private credit growth will 
slow. In addition, growing demand for foreign currency may further 
weaken the manat unless the central bank intervenes. Dollarization 
in banking will remain high, limiting liquidity in the local currency. 
Manat depreciation will crimp borrowers’ repayment capacity, possibly 
pushing the share of nonperforming loans above 10%. The combined 
impact of continued currency depreciation, tightened monetary policy, 
and a stagnant private sector is expected to create serious risks for 
domestic banks.
The current account balance is forecast to record surpluses equal 
to 5.9% of GDP in 2017 and 11.4% in 2018 as the trade surplus in goods 
widens and the services defi cit narrows (Figure 3.2.9). Total exports 
are projected to grow by 22.6% in 2017 with the projected improvement 
in oil prices and expand by a further 15.0% in 2018 as the Shah Deniz 
gas fi eld starts producing. Imports are expected to contract by 6.2% 
in 2017 because of further manat depreciation and a temporary ban on 
government imports, then expand by 12.5% in 2018 as the ban is lifted. 
The services defi cit is forecast to expand by 15.6% in 2017, refl ecting 
payment for construction, and then narrow by 20.0% in 2018 on gains 
from transportation and tourism. Remittances, an important source of 
income for the rural population, are forecast to rise in 2017 and 2018 
as the Russian Federation recovers. Gross reserves including assets in 
the sovereign wealth fund are projected at $30.1 billion in 2017 and 
$31.5 billion in 2018. 
Policy challenge—reducing unemployment
Recession has weakened Azerbaijan’s labor market. As lower turnover 
caused many state and private enterprises to lay off  workers, the 
number of unemployed rose by 2.5% in 2015 and 14.5% in 2016, after 
falling by an average of 2.0% annually from 2010 to 2014 (Figure 3.2.10). 
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More fundamentally, joblessness refl ects low labor productivity and a 
shortage of marketable skills. Currently, agriculture employs 36.3% of 
workers to produce only 6.2% of GDP, while industry employs only 6.9% 
of workers to produce 47.0% of GDP. 
To date, the government has relied mainly on regional 
socioeconomic development programs to combat joblessness. 
These programs helped cut the unemployment rate from 7.2% in 2005 
to 4.9% in 2014, though many of the jobs created were temporary. 
The unemployment rate subsequently rose to 5.6% at the end of 2016. 
To ease the impact of the recession and minimize social discontent, 
the government took further measures in 2016 to promote employment 
and hired 35,000 workers on a temporary basis. In addition, to address 
shortages in technical qualifi cations and gaps in professional retraining, 
it established an agency to coordinate technical and vocational 
education. To support rural employment, a new project was launched 
to help family fi rms produce goods and deliver them to markets. 
In addition, a social housing program was launched with the goal of 
creating 10,000 jobs by 2020. To strengthen agriculture and agro-
processing, farmers were given 179,000 hectares of arable land for 
additional cotton, hazelnut, and tea production, which should provide 
more rural jobs and limit migration to urban areas. Through the 
National Entrepreneurship Support Fund, the state budget provided 
$100 million to expand small and medium-sized enterprises and create 
an additional 12,600 jobs. In December 2016, the government adopted a 
roadmap program that prioritizes 11 sectors, emphasizes the provision 
of sustainable employment, and sets an ambitious goal of creating 
450,000 jobs by 2025.
To augment these measures, the authorities should pay more 
attention to job promotion for younger workers, as the youth 
unemployment rate has risen especially rapidly. They could consider 
additional measures to better link vocational education with the 
labor market, develop the job skills needed to raise productivity in 
the private sector, provide small and medium-sized enterprises with 
more aff ordable fi nancing, and open centers to provide agricultural 
support services. The privatization of inactive state-owned enterprises, 
which should lead to a resumption of their activity, will also help to 
create jobs.
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Georgia 
External factors held growth at 2.7% in 2016, but higher capital spending and corporate tax reform 
should permit growth to reach 3.8% in 2017 and 4.5% in 2018. Inflation, low in 2016, will likely rise 
to 4.2% in 2017 under currency depreciation and an excise tax increase. Skills mismatch in the 
labor market is an important constraint on long-term growth. 
Economic performance 
Continued shocks from trade partners limited growth in 2016 to 
an estimated 2.7% despite fiscal stimulus. On the supply side, 8.0% 
expansion in construction and 4.8% in manufacturing drove growth 
in industry as increases of 9.9% in tourism and 9.2% in finance lifted 
services (Figure 3.3.1). On the expenditure side, growth came mainly 
from a 17.1% surge in consumption, led by the government, and a 3.5% 
rise in investment, notably in public infrastructure to promote trade 
and tourism.
Inflation averaged 2.1% in 2016, driven by 13.1% higher prices for such 
excisable goods as tobacco and alcoholic beverages, though low import 
prices limited overall inflation (Figure 3.3.2). Lower fuel costs kept the 
rise in transport prices to 2.2%. However, in anticipation of an increase 
in the fuel tax effective on 1 January 2017, fuel prices started rising 
in December 2016, and in January 2017 monthly inflation reached its 
highest rate since the end of 2015. Despite pressure on the Georgian lari, 
the National Bank of Georgia, the central bank, cut the policy interest 
rate gradually from 8.00% at the end of 2015 to 6.50% in September 2016 
before restoring it to 6.8% in early 2017 in response to rising inflation 
expectations (Figure 3.3.3). The average interest rate on loans fell in 2016 
by 1.6 percentage points to 12.7%, and for deposits by 0.8 points to 4.5%, 
as the central bank pursued a more accommodative monetary policy.
Currency in circulation grew by 19.8%, following near-zero 
growth in 2015, to contribute to a 20.2% rise in broad money, which 
put downward pressure on the lari but helped lift inflation toward 
the central bank’s 2016 target of 5.0%. Beginning in October, credit 
growth accelerated to 22.3% from 19.4% in 2015 (Figure 3.3.4). 
Nonperforming loans remained modest at less than 4%, and bank profits 
rose by 26.4%. However, the percentage of deposits in foreign currency 
rose by 2 percentage points to 70%, well above the 57% prevailing in 
October 2014, before the start of significant currency depreciation. 
The fiscal deficit rose to 4.5% of GDP in 2016 from 3.8% in 2015 
(Figure 3.3.5) with a planned large increase in expenditure, although 
tax collections and total revenue exceeded targets. Total revenue rose by 
7.9% to equal 28.5% of GDP, up from 28.2% in 2015. External public debt, 
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accounting for 78% of total public debt, rose from 32.9% of GDP in 2015 
to 33.9%, while total public debt grew from 41.4% of GDP in 2015 
to 43.0%. 
The current account deficit widened to an estimated 13.1% of GDP 
in 2016, up from 11.9% a year earlier, largely because of recession in 
the Russian Federation and slow growth in other trading partners. 
These effects appeared to wane toward year-end as tourism, remittances, 
and exports started to recover. Exports of goods fell by about 4.0%, 
mainly because of lower prices. Imports excluding medication financed 
by grants decreased by about 1.0%, reflecting a weaker lari and lower 
oil prices. Remittances rose by 6.6%, as higher inflows from Europe and 
the United States—up by 11.2% from Italy, 5.8% from Greece, and 27.6% 
from the US—countered an 8.8% decline from the Russian Federation. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) rose by 5.2% in 2016, with a significant 
rise in reinvested FDI (from 9.3% in 2015 to 31.6% in 2016), going mostly 
to construction, energy, manufacturing, and especially transport and 
communication, to supply an expansion of the South Caucasus Pipeline. 
The lari depreciated in 2016 by 10.5% against the US dollar and 7.2% 
against the euro (Figure 3.3.6). The depreciation reflected Georgia’s large 
current account deficit and the outflow of foreign exchange to pay for 
imports. Meanwhile, the lari strengthened in nominal terms against the 
currencies of some key trading partners, notably Turkey and Azerbaijan, 
though the real exchange rate was stable, preserving Georgia’s 
competitiveness. Central bank net sales of foreign exchange were about 
zero as foreign exchange sales in the second half of the year offset 
purchases in the first half. Gross international reserves at the end of the 
year amounted to $2.8 billion, cover for 2.9 months of imports.
Economic prospects 
Increased capital outlays are expected to push growth to 3.8% in 2017 
and 4.5% in 2018, when the impact of infrastructure spending is expected 
to be greatest (Figure 3.3.7). Higher domestic consumption and a modest 
recovery in exports will contribute to growth and employment in 2017. 
The government estimates that corporate tax reform could add as much 
as 1.5 percentage points to growth in the next 2 years, especially in 2017 
but also in 2018, by encouraging higher private investment (Box 3.3.1). 
Two pacts with European countries—the Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area and the European Free Trade Association—and the 
expected ratification by mid-2017 of a free trade agreement with the 
People’s Republic of China should expand Georgia’s access to markets 
engaged in a third of world trade, thereby bolstering its export potential 
along established routes.
Inflation is expected to reach 4.2% in 2017 and 4.5% in 2018 
(Figure 3.3.8). Higher oil prices, currency depreciation, and heightened 
inflationary expectations will kindle inflation on the supply side. 
Moreover, a higher fuel excise tax from January 2017 is projected to 
add some 0.8 percentage points to the inflation this year, and higher 
inflation will render a lower policy interest rate unlikely before 
next year. Monetary policy is expected to move toward a more neutral 
stance in 2018, once the effect of the fuel excise increase on prices has 
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dissipated and the central bank has moved to increase lending in lari. 
Relatively low infl ation should support the lari in the medium term as 
the economic impact of external shocks dissipates. Broad money (M3) is 
expected to grow by 15% in 2017 and 19% in 2018.
On the fi scal side, the introduction of an Estonian-type corporate 
income tax is projected to reduce revenue by the equivalent of 1.5% of 
GDP a year in 2017 and 2018. To compensate for the revenue loss, excise 
taxes on fuel, tobacco, and automobiles were raised on 1 January 2017, 
current spending was trimmed, and one-time measures such as 
collecting certain taxes earlier were implemented. With these off sets, 
revenue is projected to equal 29.7% of GDP in 2017 and 29.1% in 2018. 
Although capital spending is set to increase by 24.5% because of new 
infrastructure projects, the government aims to reduce the budget defi cit 
to 4.1% of GDP in 2017 and 4.0% in 2018. Achieving this will require 
every component of the government strategy to work as intended, with 
expenditure kept to 33.8% of GDP in 2017 and 33.1% in 2018. The defi cit 
could prove higher if other elements of the program are not achieved, or 
if growth turns out slower than envisaged. Because of depreciation, the 
ratio of public debt to GDP is projected to reach 44.0% in 2017 and 2018, 
with some shift to a higher share of domestic debt (Figure 3.3.9).
The current account defi cit is projected to narrow to 12.0% of 
GDP in 2017 and 11.5% in 2018, to be fi nanced mainly through FDI 
(Figure 3.3.10). Exports of goods and services are expected to rise by 
8.9% in 2017 and 9.8% in 2018 on higher service exports. Imports of 
goods and services are forecast to grow by 4.8% and then 5.8% with 
higher service imports in particular and modest rises in energy prices. 
Remittances are also expected to increase slightly by 4.2% in 2017 and 
4.8% in 2018.
The main risks to growth are continuing sluggishness in external 
demand and further lari depreciation. Continued regional instability 
and weak economic activity in Georgia’s key trading partners would 
hurt exports, remittances, and GDP growth. The ambitious nature 
of government plans creates a downside risk that some of its goals 
may not all be achieved, notably the anticipated rise in private 
investment in response to the Estonian-type corporate income tax. 
However, prudent monetary and fi scal policies should support economic 
growth while fostering more lending, investment, and consumption. 
Stronger FDI and other foreign infl ows could boost business confi dence 
and augment growth.
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3.3.1  Reforms implemented since late 2016
The new government that took offi  ce following the October 2016 
parliamentary elections has introduced wide-ranging reforms. It signifi cantly 
accelerated infrastructure spending fi nanced by excise tax increases. 
It introduced from 1 January 2017 the Estonian corporate income tax model, 
which gives resident companies tax exemption for retained or reinvested 
earnings. A de-dollarization strategy allows borrowers with income in 
Georgian lari to convert outstanding US dollar-denominated loans of up to 
$100,000 that were issued before 1 January 2015 into lari-denominated loans 
at a preferential exchange rate.
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Policy challenge—addressing the mismatch 
in labor supply and demand 
Despite wide-ranging reforms undertaken by the recently installed 
government, important challenges remain. One is a shortage of well-
trained labor, even as growth occurs mainly in skills-intensive services 
rather than in manufacturing (Figure 3.3.11). The mismatch between 
labor demand and labor supply limits productivity while raising 
business costs. Addressing the mismatch would help Georgia diversify 
its economy away from low-yield subsistence activities by enabling the 
reallocation of labor to more productive enterprise.
The government has taken a number of steps to address this 
challenge, in particular by reforming vocational education. In 2013, 
the government adopted a vocational education strategy for 2013–2020 
along with an action plan for 2013–2017 to implement it. Reform aims to 
improve the ability of stakeholders to develop and carry out vocational 
education, thereby ensuring the quality of vocational education 
programs and their relevance to labor market requirements. It focuses 
on quality assurance and occupational standards to meet the changing 
needs of employers and includes a counselling system to support 
students in transition to employment. It enhances students’ facility 
with information and communication technology through modular 
coursework applied in concert with workplace learning and company-
based practice. It includes professional and skills development for 
teachers and new education standards. The vocational education 
and training curricula and related materials have been reviewed for 
compliance with certain minimum standards. 
In addition to these measures, the government has launched a 
labor market information portal. Assessment of demand for various 
skills and improved labor market facilities that use this assessment 
can help remedy the mismatch between workforce skills and market 
demand. Further, the government has established a framework for 
professional competence in line with market trends and demand for 
professional qualifi cations. 
More could be done, however, to develop skills and alleviate 
labor shortages: giving fi rms fi nancial and tax incentives, expanding 
training, and promoting certain career pathways. Doing so would 
involve introducing or rethinking unemployment insurance or targeted 
subsidies in the labor market to encourage job seekers to seek further 
training rather than accept jobs for which they are poorly trained. 
The government could encourage fi rms to support e-learning programs 
for skills development and to adopt more advanced technology that 
would productively use the skills of newly trained workers.
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Kazakhstan
Low revenues from oil exports cut growth to 1.0% in 2016 and widened the current account 
deficit, while the lagged effect of depreciation in 2015 pushed average inflation to 14.6%. As oil 
price recovery boosts development spending, growth is forecast at 2.4% in 2017 and 2.2% in 
2018. The current account is expected to improve and inflation to fall in 2017 and 2018. The 
banking system needs strengthening.
Economic performance 
Growth slowed to 1.0% in 2016, the third consecutive year of 
deceleration largely because of weak prices for oil, the economy’s main 
export. Heavy government spending kept growth from falling more.
On the supply side, industry contracted by 1.1% with a continued 
decline in mining, though less than the 1.4% drop registered in 2015. 
Services expanded by 0.8%, less than the 3.1% rise in 2015, as declines 
in communications and trade weighed on gains in transport and other 
services. Construction is estimated to have expanded by 7.9%, up from 
4.4% in 2015, thanks to sizable government outlays. Agriculture reversed 
contraction of 3.5% in 2015 to grow by an estimated 5.5% on increases of 
7.8% for crops and 2.7% for livestock.
On the demand side, for which data are available only for the first 9 
months, consumption rose by 1.4%, slower than the 2.4% increase in the 
same period of 2015. Private consumption rose by only 1.0%, constrained 
by currency depreciation, but higher government spending boosted 
public consumption by 2.7%, more than the 2.5% gain in 2015. Fixed 
investment expanded by 4.0%, up from 3.1% in 2015, as higher public 
investment offset a slowdown in private investment. Net exports fell by 
21.3% as reduced exports of oil and gas condensate caused total exports 
to fall more than imports (Figure 3.4.1).
Average inflation jumped to 14.6% from 6.6% in 2015, reflecting 
currency depreciation in the last quarter of 2015. However, year-on-
year inflation eased in December to 8.5% from 13.6% in 2015 with the 
stabilization of the exchange rate. Prices rose by 9.7% for food, 9.5% for 
other goods, and 6.1% for services (Figure 3.4.2).
The state budget balance recorded a deficit equal to 1.6% of GDP, 
down from 2.2% in 2015. Revenue rose to 20.4% of GDP from 18.7% 
in 2015, while expenditure, including net lending and financial asset 
transactions, came to 22.0% of GDP, up from 20.9% in the previous year 
(Figure 3.4.3). The revenue increase reflected the impact of currency 
depreciation on import duties and earnings from the oil sector, as well 
as inflation, but also improved tax administration. Expenditure was 
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higher because of increased current outlays and spending for anti-crisis 
programs and development projects.
The National Bank of Kazakhstan, the central bank, continued to 
target interest rates with the goal of cutting inflation to 6%–8% in the 
medium term and 3%–4% in the long term. It nevertheless lowered 
the base interest rate from 17% in February 2016 to 12% in November 
and 11% in February 2017 to maintain growth. Broad money in local 
currency (M2) rose dramatically by 46.4% during the year, versus 7.9% 
in 2015 (Figure 3.4.4). Total broad money including foreign currency 
deposits grew more slowly, by 15.7% versus 34.3% in 2015, as policy 
measures to address dollarization made holding Kazakh tenge more 
attractive and expectations of further depreciation abated, reducing the 
share of deposits in foreign currency to 54.6% from 69.0% a year earlier 
(Figure 3.4.5).
Credit to nonfinancial entities in the private sector grew by 1.2% in 
2016, down from 4.6% in 2015, with short-term loans growing faster than 
long-term credits to reach 62.6% of all loans at the end of the year. Foreign 
currency loans rose by 10.0%, while local currency loans rose by only 
4.0% despite the adoption of measures, including interest rate subsidies, 
to encourage lending in tenge. Average rates for commercial bank loans to 
companies rose by 1.5 percentage points to 17.2% for loans in tenge and by 
0.3 percentage points to 7.6% for loans in foreign currency.
The current account deficit is estimated to have doubled to 6.1% of 
GDP from 3.0% in 2015. Exports fell by 20.0%, reflecting weak oil prices, 
while imports declined by 17.6% as lower incomes and tenge depreciation 
curtailed household purchasing power and demand for imported goods 
and services. The estimated trade surplus fell by 25.5% to $9.4 billion. 
The services deficit narrowed by 6.4%, but the deficit in the income 
account widened by 9.1% on larger net profit outflows. Since late January 
2016, the exchange rate against the US dollar has stabilized, and oil 
prices trended upward, albeit with fluctuations, through the end of 2016.
Total international assets decreased by 0.6% in 2016 to $90.7 billion, 
of which $61.0 billion comprised sovereign wealth fund assets (Figure 
3.4.6). Using end-of-period exchange rates, external debt including 
intercompany loans equaled 120.7% of GDP at the end of September 
2016, down from 128.0% in December 2015, as the tenge strengthened 
during the period. Excluding intercompany loans, external debt equaled 
54.7% of GDP at the end of September 2016, down from 59.7% at the end 
of 2015 (Figure 3.4.7).
Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast to rise to 2.4% in 2017 and slow slightly to 2.2% in 
2018 with a smaller fiscal deficit. Domestic demand is expected to be 
the main source of growth, reflecting continued fiscal spending for 
consumption and investment and higher earnings from oil exports.
On the supply side, industry is forecast to expand by 2.4% in 2017 
and 2.2% in 2018 with higher infrastructure spending and increased 
production of oil and gas condensate (Figure 3.4.8). Oil production in 
2017 is expected to rise by 3.8% to 81 million tons, with 5 million tons 
likely to be produced at the Kashagan oil field. In addition, a $36.8 
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billion expansion of the Tengiz oil field planned since 2016 is projected 
to raise crude oil production by 260,000 barrels per day. Agriculture 
is expected to grow by 3.5% in 2017 and 4.0% in 2018, reflecting a new 
state support program that should boost wheat and livestock production. 
Services are projected to rise by 1.9% in 2017 and 1.8% in 2018 with 
higher outlays for social programs and growth in wholesale and retail 
trade forecast at 1.7% in 2017 and 1.5% in 2018.
On the demand side, a slight improvement in household consumption 
and higher public spending are projected to raise overall consumption, 
while expanded infrastructure outlays should boost investment. With 
total exports of goods and services expected to increase faster than 
imports, net exports should add to growth.
Average annual inflation is projected at 8.0% in 2017 and 7.0% in 
2018 (Figure 3.4.9), within the government’s target range of 6%–8%, 
as the authorities adjust the policy rate, use open market operations to 
control monetary growth, and maintain price controls. Imports other 
than food are expected to remain the chief source of inflation. 
Fiscal policy is expected to remain expansionary. The state budget 
is projected to record a deficit equal to 2.9% of GDP in 2017, with plans 
to reduce it to 1.2% in 2018. Revenue is expected to rise to 22.6% of 
GDP in 2017 and then decline to 18.2% with smaller transfers from the 
sovereign wealth fund. The government’s plan is to reduce the share 
of receipts from the sovereign wealth fund to 29.2% of total revenue by 
2019. Expenditure including net lending and financial asset transactions 
is forecast at the equivalent of 25.7% of GDP in 2017 and 19.3% in 2018, 
including planned spending for countercyclical measures. Public and 
publicly guaranteed debt should remain below 27% of GDP at the end of 
2017. Kazakhstan is planning to introduce ceilings on the combined debt 
of the government and state-owned companies, which by 2020 should 
not exceed 25% of GDP.
The authorities are expected to maintain the current floating 
exchange rate regime. Monetary policy is anticipated to focus on 
containing inflation while retaining some flexibility to support growth 
in the event of a slowdown and protect the tenge against serious 
depreciation. Growth in local currency broad money is projected to 
remain high in 2017 at 43.8% and slow somewhat to 42.4% in 2018. This 
will likely contribute to continued inflationary pressures.
The current account is projected to record deficits equal to 3.4% of 
GDP in 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 as some improvement in oil prices boosts 
exports (Figure 3.4.10). Exports are forecast to grow by 15.2% in 2017 
with oil prices above $50 per barrel and oil production as planned. A 
further increase of 4.8% is projected for 2018 with the expectation of an 
additional rise in oil prices. Imports are projected to increase by 5.0% 
in 2017 and 3.0% in 2018. Import demand will likely come mostly from 
public infrastructure spending and anti-crisis measures, as well as oil and 
gas development projects. The estimated value of the sovereign wealth 
fund is forecast to exceed $65 billion at the end of 2017 and $66 billion at 
the end of 2018, as higher petroleum exports help to replenish it.
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Policy challenge—strengthening the
banking sector
Kazakhstan’s economic slowdown has brought renewed attention to 
its troubled banking sector, which has yet to recover from the global 
fi nancial crisis of 2008–2009. The central bank reported nonperforming 
loans (NPLs) at only 6.7% of all loans as of 1 January 2017. However, 
this fi gure simply aggregates NPLs reported by individual banks, which 
may diff er in how they identify and report impaired loans. Banks need 
not report NPLs on a consolidated basis, and some have moved troubled 
loans off  their balance sheets. Further, NPL counts exclude loans 
restructured by “evergreening,” or adding unpaid principal and interest 
to loan balances rather than declaring the loans delinquent. 
The central bank and the government increasingly recognize that 
a signifi cant share of the massive total of restructured loans may be 
unrecoverable. In 2016, Moody’s estimated NPLs including restructured 
loans at 37%, and Standard & Poor’s estimated them in the range of 
25%–30%. Moreover, poor portfolio quality has undermined banks’ 
profi tability and liquidity. In 2016, the central bank provided more than 
$1 billion in liquidity support to Kazkommerzbank (KKB), the country’s 
largest bank in asset terms, to facilitate its acquisition of Bank Turan 
Alem, 90% of whose assets are troubled. 
The government has supported the banking sector through 
subsidized loans from the budget, Kazakhstan’s Problem Loans Fund 
(PLF), and a national pension fund, as well as by placing government 
and public enterprise deposits in selected fi nancial institutions at low 
interest rates. It also provided more than $5 billion from the sovereign 
wealth fund during 2009–2015 to purchase bank shares, refi nance 
mortgage loans, and provide loans to the private sector.
The central bank postponed until 2017 introducing more stringent 
capital adequacy requirements because of the deteriorating business 
environment for banks and the slowdown in the economy. Though 
average capitalization in the banking sector in terms of core capital (Tier 
I) stood at 14.3% in 2016, some banks are expected to fall below current 
capital adequacy requirements if needed to write off  NPLs. The central 
bank also eased its timetable for adopting Basel III regulatory standards, 
moving the deadline for full compliance from 2019 to 2021. Thus, banks 
were not required in 2016 to increase capital adequacy ratios or meet 
international standards for consolidated bank reporting.
Unresolved asset quality problems prompted the authorities in 
February 2017 to inject $3.4 billion into the PLF, expanding the 2017 
republican budget by 24%. The transfer is expected to enable the 
restructuring of KKB by allowing the PLF to purchase the NPLs held 
by the KKB subsidiary Bank Turan Alem, which has most of the NPLs 
in the banking system. The PLF’s acquisition of these NPLs would 
enable Halyk Bank, Kazakhstan’s second-largest bank, to purchase the 
remaining KKB assets and become the country’s largest bank. Separately, 
Tsesna Bank, Kazakhstan’s third-largest fi nancial institution, aims to 
purchase an estimated 41.8% of Bank CenterCredit, Kazakhstan’s fi fth-
largest bank, from Kookmin Bank of the Republic of Korea. In sum, 
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proposed acquisitions would leave Kazakhstan’s top three banks holding 
about 53% of bank assets in the country.
Early in 2017, the central bank moved to undertake asset quality 
reviews of systemically important banks through an international firm 
using international standards, and then to enforce measures to either 
restore banks’ solvency or proceed with their liquidation. Moreover, 
the central bank is expected to begin stress-testing this year, using the 
exercise to identify which banks need additional capital and how much, 
as well as to inform an assessment of their handling of impaired loans 
and provisioning practices, and ultimately improve it.
Although the government has spent significant amounts on 
resolving problem loans and bank recapitalization, many banks remain 
undercapitalized. Moreover, further accumulation of NPLs can be 
expected in view of the weak economy. The high share of real estate loans 
in NPLs is a problem because collateral is not regularly revalued and is 
often overstated. In addition, banks are not allowed to transfer NPLs 
collateralized with real estate, the usual collateral, to the PLF. Broadening 
the PLF mandate to include such assets is therefore important.
On top of the measures already taken, the authorities would do 
well to relax bank secrecy rules on loans to allow more precise loan 
appraisals and better assessment of the likelihood of future loan 
difficulties, and to use international standards when conducting asset 
quality reviews. Also helpful would be greater clarity about regulatory 
plans as part of a broader effort to strengthen monetary policy by 
improving central bank transparency and communication with the 
public and financial markets.
Kyrgyz Republic
Strong performance in gold mining and trade overcame an early slump to bring 3.8% expansion 
in 2016. Currency appreciation and higher remittances curbed inflation and the current account 
deficit. Growth is projected to slow to 3.0% in 2017 before recovering to 3.5% in 2018 with faster 
regional growth. Higher inflation and a wider current account deficit are likely. Eurasian Economic 
Union membership poses both challenges and opportunities. 
Economic performance 
Growth slowed marginally to 3.8% in 2016 from 3.9% in 2015 as 
strong performance in gold mining and trade offset a slowdown 
in manufacturing, as well as spillover from recession in the 
Russian Federation and slower growth in Kazakhstan (Figure 3.5.1). 
Growth in industry jumped to 5.9% from 2.9% in 2015 as gold 
production more than doubled, offsetting declines in textiles, apparel, 
and electricity generation. Agriculture increased by 3.0% thanks to 
gains in crops and livestock, though well below the 6.2% expansion 
in 2015. Services growth slowed to 3.0% from 3.7% in 2015 although 
trade growth increased to 7.6% from 7.1%. Construction rose by 7.4%, 
down from 16.3% in 2015, as growth in capital investment slowed even 
more to 3.8% from 14.0%. 
On the demand side, a 22.0% rise in remittances boosted private 
consumption.
Average inflation plunged to 0.4% in 2016 from 6.5% the previous 
year as consumer prices fell by 0.5% from December 2015 to 
December 2016 (Figure 3.5.2). This resulted from currency appreciation 
by 9.6% against the US dollar, a 5.0% decline in food prices, and 
unexpectedly small price adjustments following the country’s accession 
to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Prices for other goods rose by 
1.6% and for services by 5.2%.
Despite a shortfall in tax revenues, the government managed to limit 
the fiscal deficit to the equivalent of 4.6% of GDP, albeit up from 1.5% 
in 2015, by underspending on goods and services. Revenue slipped to 
equal 28.5% of GDP, compared with 29.8% in 2015, while expenditure 
rose to 33.1% of GDP from 31.3% in 2015. However, external government 
debt eased with currency appreciation. 
With inflation low as the Kyrgyz som appreciated to Som69.23 to the 
US dollar by year-end from Som75.89 on 1 January (Figure 3.5.3), the 
central bank reduced the policy interest rate in several steps from 10.0% 
at the start of 2016 to 5.5% as of February 2017. The policy rate will 
likely rise if inflation accelerates, but monetary policy has limited impact 
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under extensive dollarization, with 44.5% of loans and 53.4% of deposits 
in foreign currency at the end of 2016. The average deposit interest rate 
declined by 0.2 percentage points to 4.5%, while the average lending 
rate fell by half a percent to 18.3%. Deposits rose by 5.0%, and credit 
fell by 0.5%, while broad money grew by 14.6%, slightly less than the 
14.9% in 2015. The nonperforming loan rate worsened to 8.8% at the 
end of 2016 from 7.1% a year earlier.
The current account deficit is estimated to have narrowed to the 
equivalent of 10.0% of GDP from 15.2% in 2015, reflecting a somewhat 
better external environment. Imports declined by 3.7%, mainly 
reflecting lower imports of vehicles and machinery, while exports 
increased by 5.1% on higher exports of gold, as well as increased 
exports of agricultural products to the Russian Federation, and despite 
falling exports of textiles and apparel. Accession to the EEU and better 
treatment accorded to migrants under the treaty boosted remittances 
from the Russian Federation by 22.0% despite recession there and 
ruble depreciation (Figure 3.5.4). At the end of 2016, international 
reserves reached $2.0 billion, cover for 4.6 months of imports, up from 
$1.8 billion at the end of 2015. 
With currency appreciation, external debt as a percentage of GDP 
is estimated to have fallen slightly to 59% from 63% at the end of 2015, 
all of it public or government guaranteed. The ratio could rise again, 
however, if the local currency weakens more (Figure 3.5.5).
Economic prospects 
Growth is projected to slow to 3.0% in 2017 because of a high base 
in 2016 and an expected decline in output from Kumtor, the main gold 
mine. It is expected to recover to 3.5% in 2018 with some improvement 
in the domestic economy and higher growth in the country’s main 
regional partners, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation (Figure 3.5.6). 
On the supply side, gains in agro-processing, light industry, and 
construction should sustain growth. On the demand side, higher 
remittances may further raise household incomes and private 
consumption, particularly in 2017. 
Inflation is forecast to return to 5.0% in 2017 because import tariffs 
must rise to EEU mandates, and then ease to 4.0% in 2018 with limited 
additional adjustment in tariffs. Inflation could be higher if further 
depreciation of the Kazakh and Russian Federation currencies causes 
the som to weaken. 
If prices rise as projected, the central bank will likely raise interest 
rates over the next few years. It will likely maintain a flexible exchange 
rate policy, intervening less often to smooth exchange rate volatility. 
The fiscal deficit is projected to narrow to the equivalent of 
3.0% of GDP in 2017 and 2.5% in 2018 as the government strives to 
restrain expenditure, despite a presidential election in November 2017, 
and to boost revenue by reforming tax policy and administration. 
Tax receipts could be higher if EEU accession yields more customs 
revenue than now forecast.
The current account deficit is forecast to widen to 13.0% in 2017 and 
13.5% in 2018, reflecting some improvement in trade with the EEU and 
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signifi cantly lower exports to countries outside the EEU, notably the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Figure 3.5.7). Exports are forecast to 
grow by 6.0% in 2017 and 5.5% in 2018, mainly from gains in agriculture 
and textiles. However, weak demand in 2017 within the EEU could 
worsen the trade outlook, as could the failure of Kyrgyz products 
to comply with EEU veterinary and phytosanitary standards. Using 
$1 billion from a joint development fund with the Russian Federation, 
the government is working to restructure the economy by supporting 
export-oriented industries and taking other measures to smooth entry 
into the EEU. 
Imports are expected to grow by 10.0% in 2017 and 5.5% in 2018 
to meet the needs of planned infrastructure projects. Remittances will 
likely rise by another 20%–25% in 2017, refl ecting some recovery in the 
Russian Federation and the favorable conditions for the Kyrgyz labor 
migrants under the EEU treaty. 
The Kyrgyz Republic is very close to being rated at high risk of debt 
distress. External public debt, propelled by heavy public investment, 
could surpass 63% of GDP during the next 2 years if the currency 
depreciates, though debt will likely decline in subsequent years. 
International reserves are forecast to be kept at around $2.0 billion in 
2017 and 2018. 
Policy challenge—opportunities and challenges 
under the Eurasian Economic Union 
The Kyrgyz Republic became a full member of the EEU in August 2015, 
expecting membership to boost external trade, allocate labor and 
capital more effi  ciently, and reduce nontariff  trade barriers over the 
long term (Box 3.5.1). In the short term, however, accession has fueled 
uncertainty and shown that adjusting to EEU membership will take the 
Kyrgyz Republic several years. 
The main benefi ts from accession thus far have been higher labor 
remittances from other EEU members, mainly the Russian Federation, 
and loans to local fi rms from a $1 billion joint development fund 
with the Russian Federation. By the end of 2016, about $200 million 
in loans had been disbursed, mainly for agriculture, textiles, other 
manufacturing, mining and metals, infrastructure development, 
tourism, and medicine. Trade benefi ts in 2016 were negligible, 
however, because demand for Kyrgyz exports languished as regional 
currencies weakened and recession persisted along with low oil prices. 
This compounded the eff ect of lower demand from the PRC and other 
trading partners outside the EEU. 
The main challenge facing the Kyrgyz Republic is its poor 
compliance with EEU veterinary and phytosanitary standards. 
Veterinary checkpoints have been placed along the Kyrgyz–Kazakh 
border pending the release of data on possible epidemics and the 
introduction of an electronic identifi cation system for Kyrgyz livestock. 
The government response so far has been an eff ort to improve 
outdated laboratory equipment and the poor quality of cross-border 
trade statistics. 
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In 2017, the Kyrgyz Republic became head of the EEU Board. While 
serving as chair, the government aims to deepen economic integration 
with other EEU members and remove barriers to cross-border trade 
among them. Also this year, negotiations for free trade agreements are 
planned with India, Iran, the Republic of Korea, the PRC, some Arab 
countries, and Europe through its Generalized System of Preferences. 
As the EEU Board chair, the government will lead the start of 
negotiations to harmonize member countries’ obligations under the 
EEU and World Trade Organization agreements. To stimulate exports, 
discussions are exploring ways to encourage joint ventures between 
small and medium-sized enterprises across the EEU countries and in 
the PRC. In addition, negotiations will start on revising the EEU treaty 
to reflect newly arising issues, both regional and global. 
The government is receiving advisory technical assistance to smooth 
its adaptation to EEU membership, realize the opportunities offered, and 
address the risks. Over the long term, the country is expected to benefit 
from customs cooperation and the development of a common EEU 
market for industry, agriculture and agro-processing, energy, finance, 
information technology, and other services. 
3.5.1 History and goals of the Eurasian Economic Union
The treaty establishing the EEU was signed on 29 May 2014 by the 
presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation and 
came into force on 1 January 2015 with the signing of the EEU customs 
union agreement. Armenia became an EEU member on 2 January 2015. 
The Kyrgyz Republic joined the same year on 29 March, and its accession 
took effect on 12 August 2015, opening its borders with Kazakhstan. 
The fundamental goals of the EEU are to promote economic integration 
among its member countries and enable them to become more competitive, 
accelerating trade and growth. The EEU presents economic opportunities to 
the Kyrgyz Republic in the form of a larger market embracing a combined 
population of 185 million and guaranteeing the free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and labor, as well as the eventual elimination of customs 
controls and nontrade barriers. In particular, EEU accession should ease 
restrictions faced by migrant workers in EEU countries. Over the longer 
term, benefits should come from significantly lower nontariff trade barriers.
Tajikistan
Strong public investment enabled growth to reach 6.9% despite weak remittances, low private 
investment, and other shortfalls. Troubled banks and continued weak remittances are projected 
to moderate growth to 4.8% in 2017 despite better performance in the Russian Federation and 
other regional partners, followed by recovery to 5.5% in 2018. Healthier banks would boost credit 
growth and enhance private investment.
Economic performance
Growth reportedly accelerated to 6.9% in 2016 from 6.0% a year earlier 
thanks to higher public investment (Figure 3.6.1). Growth would have 
been higher if not for weakening private investment, budget shortfalls, 
lower prices for aluminum and cotton exports, and 13% depreciation of 
the Tajik somoni. The continued recession in the Russian Federation 
made 2016 the third consecutive year with a decline in the number of 
Tajik migrants working there (Figure 3.6.2), causing a 13.1% drop in 
remittances.
On the supply side, industry expanded by 16.0%, up from 11.2% 
in 2015 as value added in mining more than doubled and growth in 
manufacturing reached 12.8%. Electricity generation and exports grew 
by 3.7% and higher crop yields boosted agriculture growth to 5.2% 
from 3.2% in 2015. Meanwhile, services contracted by 0.3% as lower 
remittances curbed consumer spending, following 7.1% contraction 
in 2015.
On the demand side, a 17.4% rise in capital investment attributable 
to public spending was the main source of growth, partly offset by lower 
private consumption resulting from weak remittances and currency 
depreciation.
Inflation accelerated to 6.1% from 5.1% in 2015 (Figure 3.6.3). 
This reflected the lagged impact of currency depreciation in 2015 and 
early 2016 on import prices despite lower global prices for petroleum 
and wheat (Figure 3.6.4). Prices rose by 6.8% for food, 5.7% for other 
goods, and 4.5% for services. Public sector wage increases of 10%–20% 
in July 2016 and then a 16.5% hike in average electricity tariffs in 
November also fueled inflation. 
The government budget recorded a deficit equal to 1.7% of GDP, 
less than the 2.3% in 2015 (Figure 3.6.5). Shortfalls in revenue, reflecting 
weak collection of domestic taxes and customs duties, forced the 
authorities to cut spending in June 2016, though the budget was able to 
accommodate higher salaries and pension payments. Still, total revenues 
reached 32.1% of GDP, up from 30.1% in 2015, as firms felt more pressure 
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to pay taxes and tax administration improved. Expenditure rose to 
33.8% of GDP from 32.4% in 2015 as the government maintained social 
programs and used foreign financing to expand capital investment. 
Public and publicly guaranteed debt climbed to 32.7% of GDP from 
27.8% a year earlier, owing to external borrowing and currency 
depreciation that raised external liabilities in local currency terms. 
Monetary policy aimed to maintain currency stability and combat 
inflation. To limit depreciation, the National Bank of Tajikistan, the 
central bank, required from February 2016 that all remittances in rubles 
be converted to somoni and that banks immediately sell to it half of the 
rubles converted. Together with tightened foreign exchange controls, 
these measures helped stabilize the exchange rate for the rest of the 
year and reduce the share of deposits in foreign currency from 71.5% at 
the end of 2015 to 62.5% a year later. 
To combat inflation, the central bank raised the refinancing rate in 
four steps, from 8.0% to 9.0% in March 2016, then to 11.0% in July, to 
12.5% in February 2017, and finally to 16.0% in March 2017. In addition, 
in March 2017, it increased reserve requirements. The central bank also 
increased the interest rate for liquidity support loans to 2 percentage 
points above the interbank rate and introduced overnight financing, 
a short-term refinancing tool, at the refinancing rate plus 2 percentage 
points. Further, it increased its sales of central bank securities and 
Treasury bills of the Ministry of Finance to sterilize the impact of 
the ruble conversion requirement on liquidity, selling in 2016 the 
equivalent of 7.9% of GDP, double the 3.7% of GDP sold in 2015. 
As banks bought more of these securities, they reduced credit to the 
private sector. In February 2017, all Tajiks were required to register 
their foreign accounts.
Despite these moves and a 13% drop in the stock of credit to the 
private sector, which also reflected weak demand and problems in the 
financial sector, broad money grew by 27.9%, up from 18.7% in 2015, 
as higher international reserves and a sharp rise in demand for local 
currency raised reserve money (currency in circulation plus banks’ 
reserves) by 36.8%, more than double the rise in 2015 (Figure 3.6.6). 
Further efforts to consolidate microfinance organizations by raising 
their minimum capital requirements thinned their numbers by 15% 
through mergers and license withdrawal. In addition, the share of loans 
classified as nonperforming rose sharply from 29.9% at the end of 2015 
to 54.7% at the end of September 2016, prompting bank recapitalization 
(Figure 3.6.7).
The current account deficit narrowed to an estimated 4.8% of GDP 
from 5.9% in 2015 despite a further decline in remittance inflows. 
Exports rose by 0.9% mainly on higher domestic output and despite 
lower world prices for the country’s main exports. Imports fell by 11.8% 
because of lower private consumption and subdued global food prices. 
External debt rose to the equivalent of 32.7% of GDP at year-end from 
27.8% at the end of 2015, reflecting depreciation and higher borrowing 
for capital spending. Gross international reserves rose in the first 
9 months of 2016 by 50% as a result of the purchase of domestically 
produced gold, higher gold prices, and the conversion of private savings 
from foreign to local currency (Figure 3.6.8). 
3.6.3 Sources of inflation
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3.6.5  Fiscal balance and public debt
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Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to moderate to 4.8% in 2017 as high loan losses limit 
bank lending and weak remittances curb consumption, despite some 
recovery in the Russian Federation and slightly better performance in 
other regional partners. Greater pressure on firms to meet tax collection 
targets will limit growth. Additional tightening of monetary policy and 
foreign exchange controls could inhibit lending and private investment, 
further constraining expansion. Growth is expected to recover to 5.5% 
in 2018 with higher externally financed public investment.
On the supply side, industry is forecast to expand in 2017 as 
construction on the Rogun Hydropower Plant picks up and accelerate 
in 2018 with gains in mining and manufacturing and the opening of 
the Tajikistan segment of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to the 
People’s Republic of China. Agriculture is expected to rise modestly 
as some migrants return to the land. Some growth in remittances is 
projected to boost services moderately. 
On the demand side, growth will depend on higher public investment 
because low foreign exchange earnings and likely further depreciation of 
the currency will constrain private consumption and investment. 
Inflation is projected to accelerate to 8.0% in 2017 and then slow 
to 7.0% in 2018 (Figure 3.6.9). The rise will reflect higher liquidity as 
troubled banks are recapitalized, as well as a 16.5% rise in electricity 
tariffs from November 2016, a 25% rise in the cost of other public 
services from January 2017, the lingering impact of the July 2016 public 
salary hike, and continued currency depreciation. Inflation could be 
even higher if depreciation exceeds expectations or the authorities 
institute a more freely floating exchange rate regime. 
Over the next 2 years, fiscal policy is expected to be expansionary 
in view of plans for infrastructure spending. The budget deficit is 
projected to remain at 2.5% of GDP in 2017 and 2018 as weak imports 
limit customs receipts. The deficit could be higher with faster currency 
depreciation or a requirement that the government clear arrears at 
state-owned enterprises. Revenues are forecast at 30.3% of GDP in 
2017 and 30.8% in 2018, and expenditures at 32.8% in 2017 and 33.3% 
in 2018, as the government strives to improve tax administration and 
continues to maintain social expenditure and raise capital outlays. 
Public and publicly guaranteed domestic and external debt are projected 
to exceed their respective legal ceilings of 7% and 40% of GDP with 
bank recapitalization, additional foreign-financed public investment, 
and currency depreciation. Higher public debt may impair Tajikistan’s 
long-term development plans (Box 3.6.1).
Monetary policy will likely strive to contain inflation and limit 
depreciation while preventing a downturn. Money growth could 
accelerate further in 2017 and 2018 with reserve accumulation, higher 
foreign exchange deposits, and further liquidity support to underpin 
local currency loans, though weak demand will limit the rise in private 
credit. The central bank may make further changes in the refinancing 
rate if needed to contain inflation.
The current account deficit is forecast to expand to the equivalent 
of 5.5% of GDP in 2017 and 6.0% in 2018 (Figure 3.6.10) as higher 
infrastructure spending sharply increases outflows of net income. 
3.6.6  Monetary indicators
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Exports are projected to grow by 5% in 2017 and 10% in 2018 as 
depreciation boosts competitiveness and industrial output rises. 
Imports are expected to contract a further 5% in 2017 and stabilize 
in 2018. The decline will refl ect lower demand and import substitution, 
and will come despite higher capital spending and some growth in 
remittances with recovery in the Russian Federation (Figure 3.6.11).
Policy challenge—strengthening banks 
through fi nance reform 
A banking sector that eff ectively channels savings into investment is 
crucial to private sector development, but Tajikistan has a poor record 
of providing fi rms access to fi nance. In its Global Competitiveness Report 
2016–2017, the World Economic Forum ranks Tajikistan at 105 among 
138 economies for fi nancial market development. In Doing Business 2017, 
the World Bank ranks it at 118 among 190 for getting credit, down 
from 109 in 2016.
Over the past 3 years, Tajikistan’s banking system has recorded 
losses and a sharp rise in nonperforming loans has reduced bank capital. 
The rise in toxic assets has multiple causes: weak corporate governance, 
poor risk management, cronyism in lending to companies and individuals, 
a high concentration of loans in risky sectors such as construction and 
agriculture, large transaction costs, and a lack of diversity in banking 
products. Several large banks have suff ered from inadequate provisioning 
and a fall in the value of collateral. Bank weakness has made it hard for 
households to access deposits and withdraw money from payroll accounts. 
In addition, fi rms have had trouble meeting contract obligations, paying 
taxes, and borrowing at reasonable rates. High interest rates and short loan 
maturities have kept many fi rms from undertaking productive investment. 
3.6.9 Inflation
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3.6.1 Tajikistan’s long–term development goals
Tajikistan attained lower-middle-income status in 2014 with gross national income per capita estimated under the 
Atlas method at $1,080. However, growth has come with high economic vulnerability to international commodity prices and 
developments in the Russian Federation. Tajikistan’s goal in the medium-to-long term is to catch up with its neighbors and 
reach upper-middle-income status. Convergence will be diffi  cult, however, because of fi scal constraints and the economy’s 
narrow base, with production limited in quantity and restricted to products with little value added, highly concentrated 
exports, low private investment, and dependence on remittances and other external factors. 
The government’s National Development Strategy to 2030 has ambitious targets to achieve average real GDP 
growth of 8%–9% annually, which would raise real GDP by 250% to around $24.2 billion measured in 2016 prices. 
Economic diversifi cation and a sharp increase in exports of goods and services are identifi ed as the main avenues for 
attaining this goal. Gross domestic savings are to rise from 8.5% to 30.0% of GDP, and the private investment share of 
GDP is to soar eightfold from 3.0% to 25.0%. Industrialization is to raise the GDP share of industry from 12.3% to 22.0%, 
thereby expanding output and exports. The GDP share of services is to remain unchanged, but services are to become 
more sophisticated. Moreover, the index of export concentration in the three largest items is to fall from 83% to 58%. 
Attaining these goals would help expand the middle class, defi ned as households with per capita spending for monthly 
consumption at TJS230–TJS294, from less than a quarter of the population to half. The cost of fi nancing the programs 
needed to attain these objectives is estimated at $118.1 billion.
Independent analysis suggests that, given average population growth of 2.3%, attaining by 2030 the targeted GDP per capita 
of $7,000 (at purchasing power parity in current US dollars) from the 2015 estimate of $2,970 would require an annual growth 
rate of at least 8.8%, well above the 6.9% recorded in 2016. If growth averaged 7.5%, the target would be reached in 2035.
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Moreover, with more than 70% of loans denominated in foreign currency, 
fi rms bear the risk of currency mismatch. These problems contributed to 
the 13% drop in the stock of credit to the private sector in 2016. 
The government took several steps to address the problem in 2016: 
recapitalizing four troubled banks (Box 3.6.2), strengthening bank 
supervision, and tightening foreign exchange controls. In addition, it 
eased reserve requirements applicable to both local and foreign currency 
deposits for fi nancial institutions that met capital adequacy standards. 
It worked to facilitate cashless transactions and increase deposit 
insurance coverage. An entrepreneurial support fund was established to 
provide local currency loans at concessional rates to borrowers in remote 
areas. Finally, the authorities introduced a law on Islamic banking and 
facilitated the creation of two credit information bureaus. 
Beyond the measures already undertaken, several other reforms 
could help Tajikistan improve fi rms’ access to fi nance in the short run. 
They include obtaining a sovereign country rating to promote foreign 
infl ows, strengthening bank supervision, preventing cronyism in lending, 
enhancing the aff ordability and accessibility of fi nancial services, and 
helping eligible fi nancial institutions provide fi nancing to farmers and 
rural food processors in local currency to reduce their exposure to 
foreign exchange risk.
Over the medium term, further regulatory measures are needed: 
raising the capital adequacy ratio to enhance confi dence in the banking 
system, establishing credit insurance and guarantee schemes to facilitate 
export fi nancing, introducing more convenient and up-to-date banking 
facilities, and requiring banks to disclose their ownership and fi nancial 
results. In addition, the authorities should develop an eff ective stress-
testing framework, introduce long-term foreign exchange risk hedging, 
and take steps to establish infl ation targeting that could support the 
currency over the medium-to-long term.
3.6.2 Recapitalization of four Tajik banks in 2016
On top of a business slowdown, the depreciation of the 
Tajik somoni by nearly 50% since the beginning of 2015 
has brought a sharp rise in nonperforming loans, from 
29.9% of Tajikistan’s sector total at the end of 2015 to 
54.7% at the end of September 2016. Moreover, the 
average ratio of bank capital to risk-weighted assets fell 
to 5.4%, less than half the required 12.0%. Four banks 
faced possible insolvency, limiting access to deposits 
and preventing the timely settlement of payments and 
tax liabilities. To maintain confi dence in the banking 
system, the government recapitalized the four banks 
in December 2016 at a cost of nearly $500 million, 
equal to 7.1% of GDP. Five-year Treasury bills with a 
concessional 2% interest rate were issued to the four 
banks in exchange for selected bank assets. The banks 
could use these securities to obtain liquidity from the central bank for new lending (box fi gure). To prevent currency 
pressures and limit infl ation, the resources of certain state budget organizations that the Ministry of Finance previously 
placed in the troubled banks, notably those of the agency that handles social insurance and pensions, must be returned to the 
Central Treasury at the ministry.
3.6.10 Current account balance
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Turkmenistan
Growth moderated to 6.2% in 2016. While inflation also declined slightly, the current account 
deficit was wider, driven by higher service imports and lower hydrocarbon exports. Growth is 
projected to return to 6.5% in 2017 and accelerate to 7.0% in 2018, with some rise in inflation and 
a narrower current account deficit as prices for hydrocarbons improve. Private sector development 
is key to diversifying growth.
Economic performance 
The government reported GDP growth at 6.2% in 2016, slightly below 
the 6.5% recorded a year earlier (Figure 3.7.1). The slowdown reflected 
lower global energy prices, weaker demand for hydrocarbons from 
trade partners, decreasing terms of trade, and a slowing of investment.
On the supply side, Turkmenistan’s large hydrocarbon economy 
expanded by 2.8%, the same as in 2015. Growth came from the 
non-hydrocarbon economy, which expanded in 2016 by 6.6%. This 
was less than last year’s 8.5% as industry, traditionally the country’s 
key growth driver, expanded by only 1.2%, down from 3.1% in 2015 
and 11.4% in 2014 as the contraction in hydrocarbons reduced sector 
growth. Services grew by 11.0%, improving on last year’s 10.0% with 
increases of 14.2% in trade, 10.4% in transport and communications, 
4.4% in construction services, and 9.7% in other services. Agriculture 
reportedly grew by 12.0% as the strategic crops cotton and wheat met 
production targets. 
On the demand side, investment drove growth. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated gross investment equal to 39% 
of GDP in 2016, of which 13 percentage points was foreign direct 
investment (FDI), mainly for gas, oil, and chemical processing. 
Growth in consumption, particularly private consumption, was less 
robust as inflation and currency depreciation weakened household real 
incomes despite a 10% rise in salaries, pensions, and stipends. 
No official estimate of inflation in 2016 is available. An IMF estimate 
in October 2016 put inflation at 6.4% in 2015 and 5.5% in 2016, though 
it may have slowed only to 6.0% (Figure 3.7.2). Sustaining inflation 
were depreciation pressure on the Turkmen manat last year against 
the US dollar factored in domestic prices, higher utility tariffs as public 
utility subsidies are being phased out, and rising prices for imported 
consumer goods because of higher import duties. To keep inflation 
within projections, the government continued to administer price 
controls and support import substitution, aiming to ensure that supplies 
of locally produced consumer goods were sufficient and affordable. 
In addition, the Central Bank of Turkmenistan kept strict control 
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of cash in circulation by limiting foreign exchange conversion and 
by promoting noncash payments through debit cards, the Milli card 
denominated in manat, and the Visa card in dollars. Tighter monetary 
policy, reduced bank lending, and more stringent financial operations 
helped slash broad money growth to 7.2% from 16.1% in 2015.
The state budget is estimated to have incurred a small deficit equal 
to 0.8% of GDP in 2016, similar to the 0.7% deficit in 2015 (Figure 3.7.3). 
Revenue, estimated at 15.1% of GDP, was in line with the state budget, 
while expenditure was reported at 15.9% of GDP, which was 13.5% less 
than planned. Over 80% of spending went to social programs and a 
10% rise in salaries, pensions, and stipends. Outlays for investment rose 
by 1.2% in 2016, much less than the 7.8% in 2015, as the government 
rationalized capital spending and prioritized large investment programs. 
(This does not take into account quasi-fiscal operations, which are 
believed to be large.) As industry outside of hydrocarbons improved 
its performance, the fiscal deficit derived from the non-hydrocarbon 
sector gradually shrank from 11.2% of non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2014 to 
8.2% in 2015 and 6.8% last year. The Stabilization Fund helped smooth 
revenue volatility and offset contraction from lower energy exports. 
The current account deficit is estimated to have widened to 18.5% 
of GDP as higher FDI-related imports of services and factor income 
payments combined with lower hydrocarbon exports, which account 
for 85% of all exports. Exports of goods fell by 15.4% while imports of 
goods contracted by 16.7% (Figure 3.7.4). According to estimates from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the stock 
of FDI rose to $32.1 billion in 2015 from $13.4 billion in 2010, when last 
reported. FDI inflows reached $4.3 billion in 2015, up from $3.6 billion 
in 2010 (Figure 3.7.5). This made Turkmenistan the largest FDI 
recipient among landlocked economies in transition. Most FDI went to 
boost processing and value added in oil, gas, and chemical production. 
External debt, all of it public, remained low at 23.2% of GDP, and an 
IMF debt-sustainability assessment characterized debt as “resilient 
to most shocks.” According to figures from the Bank for International 
Settlements, foreign exchange reserves remained at a comfortable 
30 months of import cover. 
Economic prospects 
Growth is projected to rise slightly to 6.5% in 2017 and 7.0% in 2018, 
led by government investment, strong FDI, and consumption, both 
public and private. An expected recovery in global energy prices should 
boost income and fiscal revenue.
On the supply side, a recovery in hydrocarbons is projected to help 
industry expand by 4.0%–5.0%, supported by growth in food processing, 
agro-industry, light industry, construction materials, and chemicals—all 
targets for import substitution. With extensive government support for 
farmers, agriculture is expected to grow by 10.0% in both 2017 and 2018. 
Demand for services is projected to grow by more than 10.0% in both 
years thanks to a boost from the Fifth Asian Indoor and Martial Arts 
Games, which are expected to attract participants from 62 countries 
in Asia and Oceania to the capital Ashgabat in September 2017.
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The authorities aim to limit infl ation by maintaining a tight monetary 
policy that includes a fi xed exchange rate, price controls, and strict 
foreign exchange regulations. However, directed lending will remain 
signifi cant to support import substitution and agriculture. Infl ation is 
projected at 6.0% in 2017 and 2018, assuming no further currency 
depreciation. Broad money growth is projected to reaccelerate to 8.2% 
in 2017, refl ecting credit expansion for the private sector (Figure 3.7.6).
The state budget projects a defi cit of 0.4% of GDP in 2017 and a 
surplus of 0.5% in 2018 as higher energy prices and expansion in the 
non-hydrocarbon economy raise revenue (Figure 3.7.7). The government 
plans to continue supporting social programs and build industrial 
infrastructure in the regions to create jobs and raise incomes in 
rural areas, thereby smoothing urban–rural disparities. 
With some recovery in global energy prices, exports are forecast to 
rise by 12.0%, outpacing import growth of 10.3%. Despite the assumption 
of large FDI-related service imports and factor income payments, the 
current account defi cit is expected to narrow to 15.0% of GDP in 2017 
and 13.0% in 2018. External debt is projected to rise slightly to 23.4% of 
GDP in 2017 and then decline to 18.0% in 2018 with the repayment of 
some debt for hydrocarbon investment. 
Policy challenge—diversifying growth through 
private sector development
The government’s growth model uses hydrocarbon revenue to fi nance 
public investment for development. This model has generated strong 
growth, averaging 12% in the past decade, which enabled the country 
to reach upper-middle-income status in 2012. However, the decline 
in energy prices since late 2014 requires rethinking this approach 
and seeking alternative sources of growth through diversifi cation 
(Figure 3.7.8). Developing the private sector is particularly important as 
a way to diversify the economy, attract investment, and support incomes 
through job creation.
The National Program of Socio-Economic Development, 2011–2030 
aims to raise the private sector share of the non-hydrocarbon economy 
to as much as 70% by 2020 from 56% in 2012. The program stipulates 
a three-phase privatization program to 2020 that uses FDI to privatize 
construction, energy, transport, and communications. 
Developing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is an eff ective 
way to expand the private sector. The government has initiated a number 
of measures to speed SME development through job creation, import 
substitution, and export promotion. To this end, legislation was revised 
to provide SMEs with stronger legal, fi nancial, and capacity-building 
support (Box 3.7.1). According to the government, the private sector share 
of non-hydrocarbon GDP surpassed 65% in 2016. 
Further improvement of the business climate beyond current 
programs would facilitate economic transformation and diversifi cation. 
The Transition Report 2016–17 from the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development surveyed progress away from central planning toward 
an industrialized market economy and found it limited, evident in only 
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2 of 15 sectors. The report noted development gaps in the business 
environment, business skills, and the financial sector, including bank 
financing, the related legal framework, and nonbank financing.
In addition, tremendous potential exists for gains from modernizing 
education. Private entrepreneurs need to enhance their skills in 
innovation and entrepreneurship to produce and export competitive and 
sophisticated products that benefit from Turkmenistan’s comparative 
advantage. This calls for more investment in education and professional 
programs that are higher quality and more relevant, as training for 
workers and students must improve to meet international standards and 
the demands of the labor market. More support for science, research, 
and technology would foster collaboration between academia and 
industry to find innovative ways to diversify the economy, promote 
long-term competitiveness, and create better-paying jobs.
3.7.1  Support for small and medium-sized enterprises
Since 2011, the government has taken several steps to support SME development. One was a new law that simplified SME 
registration and provided to SMEs favorable taxation, special financing programs, capacity building, and other support. 
As a consequence, the tax code introduced a single tax rate of 2% on the incomes of entrepreneurs, streamlined the 
paperwork required from firms, and simplified tax reporting and payments. 
The State Development Bank was created in 2011 to direct to public projects the central budget surpluses that had 
accumulated in the Stabilization Fund. The bank was authorized to make concessional loans to enterprises and private 
entrepreneurs that implement projects to develop and modernize production facilities and create jobs. In the same year, 
the government established the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. In 2012, it created the country’s first private bank, 
Rysgal, which received a 10-year interest-free loan equal to $100 million to pass on as soft loans to SMEs. 
Government support helped increase the number of legal entities with private ownership by 40% from 2011 to 2016. 
In addition, the private sector share of non-hydrocarbon GDP grew by 60% from 2010. Sectors with expanding private 
participation include agriculture, agro-industries, transport, construction, food and other light industry, textiles, construction 
materials, and tourism. 
3.7.8 GDP growth and energy prices
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Uzbekistan
Reported growth slowed to 7.8% in 2016 from 8.0% the previous year. Inflation was marginally 
lower at 8.4% and the current account recorded a small surplus. Growth is projected at 7.0% in 
2017 and 7.3% in 2018, with some improvement in the current account. Currency depreciation 
and government spending are forecast to raise inflation to 9.5% in 2017 and 10.0% in 2018. 
The  financial sector needs reform.
Economic performance 
The government reported GDP growth sustained by investment at 
7.8% in 2016, albeit down from 8.0% in 2015 (Figure 3.8.1). Growth was 
expected to be lower in view of protracted economic weakness in 
Uzbekistan’s key trading partners. Industry and agriculture each grew 
in 2016 by 6.6%, down from 8.0% and 6.8%, respectively, mainly because 
of the weak external environment. Services expanded by 10.7%, up from 
9.8% in 2015, reflecting buoyant finance, trade, and telecommunications. 
Public investment in infrastructure and housing contributed to a 12.8% 
rise in construction. 
On the demand side, investment was the main source of growth. 
According to government statistics, gross fixed capital formation 
expanded by 9.4%, slightly below the 9.9% rise in 2015. This likely 
reflected less financing from commercial banks and the Fund for 
Reconstruction and Development, the sovereign wealth fund, as more 
investment in modernization by state-owned enterprises and private 
firms offset a 20% decline in investment financed by state-run 
specialized funds, which focus mainly on roads and social projects. 
The share of foreign funding in total investment rose to 21.9% in 2016 
from 20.4% in 2015 as the government secured investor participation, 
mainly from Asia and the Russian Federation, in energy and 
petrochemicals. 
The government reported the fiscal budget with a surplus of 0.1% 
of GDP in 2016 (Figure 3.8.2). It used national reporting standards 
without making public any detailed breakdown of revenues and 
expenditures. Using the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approach 
to government finance statistics, the budget is estimated to have been 
in deficit equal to 1.0% of GDP, similar to the estimated deficit of 0.9% 
for 2015. Factoring in the balance of the sovereign wealth fund, the 
augmented budget is estimated to have recorded a surplus of 0.2% of 
GDP, unchanged from 2015. Consolidated budget revenue declined from 
the equivalent of 33.3% of GDP in 2015 to an estimated 32.9% in 2016, 
presumably reflecting smaller inflows to the sovereign wealth fund from 
This chapter was written by Iskandar Gulamov of the Uzbekistan Resident Mission, ADB, 
Tashkent.
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exports of key commodities and thus smaller transfers to the budget. 
Consolidated budget expenditure including outlays for net lending also 
declined, from 34.2% of GDP in 2015 to an estimated 33.9%, as public 
sector wages and pensions rose by the equivalent of 3.4% annually, less 
than the nominal increase in GDP. Government debt, all of it external, 
rose to 13% of GDP in 2016 from 11% in 2015 as foreign borrowing 
increased to finance infrastructure development. 
The government reported average inflation at 5.7% in 2016, well 
within the monetary authority’s target range. Using the same data 
but a different methodology, the IMF estimated inflation at 8.4% 
(Figure 3.8.3). Despite public wage and pension increases, tariff hikes, 
and faster depreciation of the Uzbek sum against the US dollar, inflation 
slowed in 2016 largely because of global food price deflation and lower 
import costs. Growth in broad money also slowed, to 14.9% in 2016 from 
20.7% in 2015. 
The latest exchange rate developments point to less currency 
depreciation against the US dollar on both the official and the parallel 
market. The sum depreciated in official terms by 15% in 2016, slightly 
less than the 16% depreciation in 2015 (Figure 3.8.4). The pace of 
depreciation on the parallel market appeared to slow far more, to 19% 
in 2016 from 60% in 2015. 
The current account surplus narrowed to the equivalent of 0.1% 
of GDP from 0.3% in 2015 (Figure 3.8.5). Excluding services, the trade 
balance recorded a deficit of $2.0 billion, up from $1.7 billion in 2015. 
Exports of goods and services fell by 2.4% in 2016, mainly because of 
a sharp 48% decline for energy and a 19% drop for food. Exports of 
natural gas, the country’s largest export, suffered from lower global 
prices and decreased demand from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
and the Russian Federation. Limited data make it hard to explain the 
decline in food exports. 
Imports of goods also declined by 1.2%. Imports of food dropped 
by 9.2% and of energy by 18.8%, mainly from tighter import controls 
and lower import costs. Machinery and equipment remained the largest 
import category, representing 44% of all imports. Service imports fell by 
7.2% as weak external trade reduced demand for imported logistics and 
cargo services. 
The slowdown in the PRC and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan’s main 
trading partners, continued to affect the domestic economy in 2016. 
Exports of goods and services to the PRC fell by 28%, and to Kazakhstan 
by 46%, reflecting lower exports of natural gas and consumer goods. 
The weak economic situation in the Russian Federation reduced labor 
demand in that country’s construction and logistics sectors, the main 
employers of Uzbek migrants, depressing remittances to Uzbekistan. 
Remittance inflows in the first 9 months of 2016, the latest for which 
data are available, amounted to $1.8 billion, down from $2.0 billion in 
the comparable period of 2015 and $4.0 billion a year earlier.
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Economic prospects 
Growth is forecast at 7.0% in 2017 and 7.3% in 2018, driven by 
an improving external outlook and higher investment, including 
infrastructure (Figure 3.8.6). On the supply side, investment-led 
industry is expected to remain a key driver of growth, with higher 
external demand for the country’s main export commodities providing 
additional impetus for annual expansion in industry by 6.0% in 2017 
and 6.4% in 2018. Planned wage and pension increases that outpace 
infl ation should sustain private consumption, supporting growth in 
services at 8.8% in 2017 and 9.1% in 2018. However, remittance infl ows 
are projected to remain considerably below historical amounts, limiting 
the potential for increased household consumption. Agriculture is 
expected to expand by 6.8% in 2017 and 7.1% in 2018, refl ecting 
higher production of fruit and vegetables from major horticulture and 
agro-processing development programs initiated in 2017. 
Infl ation is forecast at 9.5% in 2017 and 10.0% in 2018 (Figure 3.8.7). 
Infl ationary pressures will come mainly from higher government 
spending and continued depreciation of the currency against the 
US dollar. The government has announced that it intends in the near 
future to liberalize the exchange rate, most likely establishing a 
managed fl oating regime, and to ensure the market-based allocation 
of foreign exchange. Pending further information, forecasts project 
annual depreciation at about 15% against the US dollar in 2017 and 2018. 
Rising global food prices and potentially higher import costs will add 
to infl ationary pressures. Managing infl ation will therefore remain 
a key policy challenge, requiring close coordination of monetary and 
fi scal policies. 
Broad money is projected to grow by 17.5% in 2017 and 18.6% in 2018 
in line with the rising net foreign assets of the monetary authority. 
Capital accumulation in commercial banks and their relatively high net 
interest margins should encourage growth in credit extended to the 
economy. The Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan is expected 
to expand its sterilization activities to limit growth in the monetary 
base, but its policy (or refi nancing) rate is expected to remain at 9.0%.
The government projects a consolidated budget defi cit equal to 
0.9% of GDP in 2017 and 1.0% in 2018 to support economic expansion. 
Including expected surpluses in the sovereign wealth fund, the 
augmented budget is projected to be in balance in 2017 and to post a 
small defi cit of 0.2% of GDP in 2018. Consolidated budget revenues 
are set to decline modestly, refl ecting greater exemptions for the 
private sector, to the equivalent of 32.5% of GDP in 2017 and 32.2% 
in 2018. The government is expected to raise expenditure to support a 
new national development strategy (Box 3.8.1), which includes higher 
spending for health, education, and social security. This increase 
will likely be off set by savings elsewhere in the public sector. 
Consolidated budget outlays are forecast at 33.5% in 2017 and 33.2% 
in 2018.
The current account surplus is forecast to widen to the 
equivalent of 0.2% of GDP in 2017 and 0.4% in 2018 (Figure 3.8.8). 
Recovering global trade and a gradually improving economic situation 
in the Russian Federation and the PRC should promote bilateral trade 
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and transfers. Merchandise exports are projected to rise by 2.0% 
in 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 as merchandise imports rise by 3.0% and 
then 4.0% (Figure 3.8.9). Import demand will come mostly from ongoing 
infrastructure spending and the industrial modernization program, 
as well as from the purchase of capital goods for the recently approved 
agriculture diversifi cation program. Given the large external borrowing 
component of these programs, external debt is set to increase to 18% of 
GDP in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 3.8.10).
Policy challenge—reforming the fi nancial sector
Stability in Uzbekistan’s fi nancial sector is closely linked to the country’s 
macroeconomic performance and sovereign fi nance. The fi nancial 
system is dominated by banks, which control over 95% of sector assets. 
In 2015, eight state-owned banks controlled 75% of banking assets and 
provided most credit to state-owned entities. These banks prioritize 
large export-oriented and manufacturing fi rms—a refl ection of active 
public spending channeled through public banks. Smaller private banks 
lend mainly to small and micro enterprises. The government also plays a 
signifi cant role in fi nancial sector liquidity. It provides about 20% of all 
deposits, second only to corporate deposits amounting to 40%, of which 
a portion comes from state-owned enterprises. 
The sector fails to provide suffi  cient fi nancing to the economy, in 
particular to small and medium-sized enterprises. At the same time, 
the prolonged market dominance of state-owned banks poses a major 
vulnerability. Serious concerns include the concentration of banking 
assets, their questionable quality, and banks’ continued receipt of 
public funding. While the sector’s exposure to global risks is limited, 
it remains largely ineff ective at promoting fi nancial intermediation. 
The rate of fi nancial intermediation, measured as the monetization ratio 
3.8.1  New development strategy for 2017–2021
In February 2017, following Uzbekistan’s fi rst change in 
leadership in 25 years, the government adopted a 5-year 
national development strategy for 2017–2021. It sets 
fi ve priority areas for reform: (i) governance and public 
administration, (ii) the rule of law and the judicial system, 
(iii) economic development and liberalization, (iv) social 
development, and (v) security, tolerance, and foreign policy. 
The strategy identifi es inclusive growth and continued 
economic diversifi cation as key to its reform objectives.
Under this strategic framework, during the next 5 years 
the government envisages undertaking business-conducive 
policy measures that provide aff ordable fi nancing for fi rms, 
address insolvency, enhance legal mechanisms to enforce 
contractual obligations, improve access to electricity, simplify 
procedures for obtaining construction permits, and ease 
business registration. On 9 February 2017, the government 
approved a new, streamlined system for registering new 
businesses, introducing registration at a single window. 
From 1 April 2017, business owners will be able to register 
online and receive approval within 30 minutes. To ensure 
full coverage, the government will establish 194 physical 
single-window centers across the country. These measures 
are expected to promote the development of micro and 
small enterprises. 
Another initiative promotes agricultural diversifi cation 
and the development of high-value horticulture through 
farm mechanization, improved infrastructure, and 
more productive use of land and water. More market-
oriented agricultural policies and the development of 
agribusiness promise to make farms more fi nancially stable. 
The government has prepared a sector development plan 
through 2020 that envisages further reductions in cotton and 
wheat production and their replacement with more varied 
horticulture crops. The strategy aims to improve logistics 
and processing and enable more exports.
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of broad money to GDP, is estimated at 23% of GDP. This is far below 
the ratio of 54% in Honduras, 79% in India, or 138% in Viet Nam, all 
economies with per capita income similar to Uzbekistan’s. Exacerbating 
this problem is an underdeveloped capital market. According to the IMF, 
total activity in 2014 was only $7.6 million, of which only 2.8% involved 
individual investors.
The government has stated its intention to strengthen private sector 
access to fi nance and fi nancial services. It has identifi ed small business 
development as a priority and aims to improve legislation to facilitate 
the establishment and operation of small businesses by reducing taxes 
and simplifying registration, licensing, and reporting requirements. 
The government’s medium-term strategy for developing the fi nancial 
sector anticipates that lending to small fi rms will increase by 120% from 
2015 to 2020, though infl ation will mean a smaller real increase.
In December 2015, the authorities announced plans to sell at least a 
15% stake in some state-owned banks to foreign investors. Progress to 
date has been mixed. International rating agencies have noted possible 
understatement of nonperforming loans, offi  cially reported at less than 
1% of all loans though Moody’s has estimated them at 6%. In addition, 
foreign investors have voiced concern about inadequate access to foreign 
exchange, as many fi rms have reported diffi  culty in obtaining hard 
currency for current international transactions, with delays extending 
up to 12 months. The central bank has noted the concerns of rating 
agencies and is working with commercial banks to address the situation. 
To improve sector capitalization and liquidity, the central bank plans 
to introduce Basel III standards and recommendations gradually but in 
full by 2019. In 2017, the government announced its intention to improve 
access to hard currency by developing the domestic foreign exchange 
market and adopting a market-based exchange rate policy. 
While the government has taken major initiatives, more is needed to 
promote fi nancial sector development. The main challenges are to relax, 
if not eliminate, restrictions on cash and foreign exchange transactions 
and to stop channeling loans to specifi c borrowers and sectors. 
Current regulations prohibit the use of cash to buy raw materials and 
other inputs and delay cash withdrawal from bank accounts. Small 
businesses often fail to meet requirements for bank credit because of 
inadequate fi nancial documentation, limited fi xed assets, and high 
reliance on cash fl ow revenue. Further, limited trust in the formal 
fi nancial system has prompted the holding of substantial savings in cash 
or real estate, constricting the fi nancial sector’s role in intermediation. 
At the end of 2016, bank deposits equaled only 23.6% of GDP, one of 
the lowest ratios in Central Asia. Reform to address these impediments 
is thus essential to allow other measures—including improvements in 
supervision, risk management, credit infrastructure, credit information 
systems, and nonbank fi nancial institutions—to bring about fi nancial 
inclusion and broad-based economic development.
3.8.9  Growth in exports and 
imports of goods
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Growth in this restructuring economy continued to decelerate in 2016, but the government 
ensured stability through targeted fiscal and monetary support. Inflation started to rise, and the 
current account surplus narrowed but remained sizeable. These trends will continue in 2017 and 
2018. Structural reform needs to be accelerated to boost productivity and sustain growth as 
outlined in the current 5-year plan.
Economic performance
GDP growth slowed further from 6.9% in 2015 to 6.7% in 2016, 
continuing a trend since 2010 as the economy of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) changes its growth model toward one driven mainly 
by consumption and services (Figure 3.9.1). The government continued 
to provide strong monetary and fiscal support to smooth structural 
transformation and ensure economic, financial, and social stability. This 
boosted investment in infrastructure and real estate, spilled over into 
other parts of the economy, and kept growth higher than the average of 
6.5% called for in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, 2016–2020.
On the supply side, services remained the main growth driver as 
real estate services boomed and other services registered strong growth, 
though growth in the whole sector slowed to 7.8% from 8.2% in 2015. The 
share of services in GDP further increased from 50.2% in 2015 to 51.6%, 
or 11.8 percentage points above that of industry. Industry expanded by 
6.1% in 2016, a rate close to 2015, as growth in manufacturing picked 
up due to spillover from invigorated real estate activity, a jump in car 
production stimulated by a cut in the sales tax, and robust construction 
that lifted demand for heavy industry and energy. Energy consumption 
per unit of GDP nevertheless fell by 5.0%, cumulatively easing energy 
intensity by more than 37% since it peaked in 2005. Agriculture grew 
by only 3.3%, down from 3.9% in 2015 because of adverse weather and 
despite heavy investment. The contribution of services to GDP growth 
increased to 3.9 percentage points while that of industry fell to 2.5 points 
and agriculture’s contribution remained 0.3 points (Figure 3.9.2). 
Heavy industry continued to report job losses, but the labor market 
remained stable nationwide with the creation of 13.1 million new urban 
jobs—many more jobs than the estimated 800,000 lost in the steel and 
coal industries. During the fourth quarter of 2016, the ratio of urban job 
openings to job seekers rose to its highest since 2014. This maintained 
some pressure on wages, but migrant workers, a particularly vulnerable 
segment of the workforce, saw wage growth decelerate to 6.4% in 2016 
from 9.5% in 2015. 
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On the demand side, the contribution of consumption to growth 
increased to 4.3 percentage points, that of investment fell to 2.8 
percentage points as the economy became less investment driven in line 
with government objectives, and that of net exports declined further to 
subtract 0.5 percentage points (Figure 3.9.3). As can be expected in an 
urbanizing country with rising incomes, strengthening social insurance, 
and an aging population, the household savings rate continued to fall. 
Thus, consumption outpaced GDP despite real disposable income growth 
slipping to 6.3% from 7.4% in 2015 and below the GDP growth rate. 
In contrast, total industrial investment plummeted in response 
to excess capacity in heavy industry and mining, high corporate 
debt, and an uncertain business outlook. This retreat was almost 
fully compensated, however, by rising infrastructure and real estate 
investment, as well as large outlays by emerging high-value technology 
firms. Infrastructure investment was supported off budget through 
policy banks and public–private partnerships, imposing further 
contingent liabilities on the government. Real estate investment 
expanded strongly from a low base as easier mortgage interest rates 
and down-payment requirements fueled housing sales and provided 
incentives for new investment by reducing floor space awaiting sale, 
particularly in larger cities (Figure 3.9.4). When some local property 
markets overheated, purchase restrictions returned in many larger cities 
since September 2016 and moral suasion on banks tightened access to 
mortgages. These restrictions have dampened sales growth but not yet 
housing investment. 
Consumer price inflation averaged 2.0% in 2016, up from 1.4% in 
2015 but still below the government ceiling of 3.0% (Figure 3.9.5). This 
increase mainly reflected higher food, service, and administered prices. 
Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, remained stable at 1.6%. 
Real estate prices rose by an average of 6.4% in the largest 70 cities, 
though the restrictions introduced in September helped to moderate 
price increases and in some cases reverse them. Average producer price 
deflation moderated from 5.2% in 2015 to 1.3% in 2016 as industrial input 
costs—heavily weighted in the PRC producer price index—increased 
with rising global commodity prices and cuts to domestic capacity in 
upstream industries. This boosted corporate profit and ability to service 
debt. Producer price inflation continued to trend upward in early 2017, 
but consumer price inflation remained moderate.
Budgetary stimulus came mainly through tax cuts. Consolidated 
revenue collected by the central and local governments grew less rapidly 
at 4.8% in 2016, down from 8.5% in 2015 and 3.4 percentage points 
below nominal GDP growth. However, as growth in budget expenditure 
plummeted from 15.9% in 2015 to 6.9% in 2016, growth in the budget 
deficit was contained at 3.8% of GDP, only marginally up from 3.4% in 
2015. Expenditure data do not include off-budget spending, for which 
timely data are unavailable. It has been sizeable in the past. 
Responding mainly to the loss of liquidity caused by capital outflows, 
the authorities cut reserve requirements in March 2016 and injected 
liquidity through open market operations and refinancing facilities for 
selected banks. Interbank market rates remained low for most of 2016 
(Figure 3.9.6). Broad money grew by an average of 12.0% year on year, 
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down from 12.3% in 2015. Credit growth substantially exceeded nominal 
GDP growth in 2016 (Figure 3.9.7), and debt and associated risks 
therefore continued to mount. The stock of total social financing, which 
includes bank credit and financing from nonbank financial institutions 
and capital markets to households and enterprises, expanded by an 
estimated 13.4%, faster than broad money but down from 14.3% in 
2015. The share of capital market financing through bond and equity 
issuance in total social financing increased in 2016 while that of loans 
provided by banks and nonbank financial institutions declined. In 
early 2017, the share of nonbank financing again increased following 
government efforts to curb bank credit (Figure 3.9.8). Local government 
bond issuance—introduced in 2015 to reduce funding costs and lengthen 
maturities—increased strongly in 2016 at the expense of borrowing 
by local government financing vehicles. The former is not included 
in the total social financing, while the latter is. Therefore, with local 
government bond issuance factored in, financing expanded even faster 
than total social financing suggests. 
To counter financial vulnerability arising from high credit growth, 
the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, reduced net injection 
of liquidity through open market operations in September, edging 
interbank rates higher and tamping down credit growth. Other reasons 
to act were rising price pressures in the housing market and capital 
outflows, as well as confidence by September that the growth target 
for 2016 would be met. An increase in rates for two medium-term and 
several short-term lending facilities in January, February, and again in 
March 2017 confirmed that the rate-easing cycle had ended in the PRC 
and signaled that the authorities are prepared to hike rates to contain 
credit growth and support the renminbi, at least as long as growth 
remains sufficiently strong.
Preliminary balance-of-payments data indicate that the current 
account deteriorated in 2016. Exports of goods fell by 7.2% year on 
year. However, real export growth was stronger than US dollar figures 
suggest, given the weakness of other invoicing currencies. Imports 
declined by 4.6% even as prices for commodity imports stabilized or 
increased. The merchandise trade surplus thus fell from $567.0 billion 
in 2015 (5.1% of GDP) to $485.2 billion in 2016 (4.3%). As the services 
deficit further widened, mainly on $341.2 billion spent by outbound 
tourists, the current account surplus narrowed to equal 1.9% of GDP, 
down from 3.0% in 2015 (Figure 3.9.9). The deficit on the capital and 
financial account remained sizeable in 2016. Persistent drivers of 
capital outflow were renminbi depreciation, easy credit, residents’ 
desire to diversify their portfolios internationally, and a continued 
surge in outbound direct investment. 
Indeed, net foreign direct investment flows turned negative in 
2016 for the first time in the recent history of the PRC. Under the 
government’s opening-up policy, which deregulates investment abroad 
and provides credit support, outbound direct investment more than 
tripled from $65.0 billion in 2012 to $211.2 billion in 2016. By contrast, 
inflows of foreign direct investment plummeted from $241.2 billion 
to $152.7 billion over the same period as the business environment 
deteriorated for foreign companies in the PRC. 
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The smaller current account surplus and sizable net capital outfl ows 
drained offi  cial reserves in 2016 by $443.6 billion (excluding valuation 
changes) but nevertheless left $3.1 trillion by year-end. As the decline in 
reserves was overcompensated by an increase in other claims on foreign 
countries, total foreign assets increased from $6.2 trillion in 2015 to 
$6.5 trillion in September 2016. Deducting liabilities, net foreign assets 
increased from $1.6 to $1.8 trillion over the same period. The PRC thus 
remained the world’s largest creditor nation.
Since late 2015, the authorities have managed renminbi exchange 
rates with reference to a number of indicators including the renminbi–
US dollar closing rate of the previous day, and changes in the renminbi’s 
real eff ective exchange rate. Amid increased volatility, the renminbi 
depreciated against the US dollar in 2016 by 6.8% on average and by 
over 4% in both nominal eff ective (trade-weighted) and real eff ective 
(infl ation-adjusted) terms (Figure 3.9.10). The renewed strengthening 
of the US dollar since October 2016 and the resulting weakening of the 
renminbi triggered capital outfl ow that risked fueling expectation of 
further depreciation. The authorities swiftly stabilized the situation 
through tightened capital controls, open market operations, and a 
clampdown on renminbi provided through various lending facilities. As 
a result, the renminbi appreciated again in early 2017.
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is expected to moderate further in line with the controlled 
deceleration of the past couple of years to 6.5% in 2017 and 6.2% in 2018 
(Figure 3.9.11). The offi  cial growth target for 2017 is “about 6.5%.” The 
government has clarifi ed that growth could be lower if eff orts to achieve 
the target would entail excessive risk to the economy or the fi nancial 
sector. Nevertheless, it is likely that suffi  cient monetary and fi scal 
support will be provided to keep growth at or even above 6.5% until the 
Nineteenth Party Congress scheduled for autumn 2017. 
The forecast assumes that the government may allow growth to slip 
below 6.5% in 2018, which would widen its scope for tackling credit 
growth and accelerating structural reform, in particular to roll up 
highly indebted enterprises and further cut excess industrial capacity. 
However, the government will certainly continue to provide selective 
policy support to ensure that adjustments remain socially acceptable. 
Fiscal support for infrastructure investment will play a key role here, 
provided mainly through policy banks and public–private partnership.  
On the demand side, consumption will remain the main driver of 
growth over the forecast period. Support comes from continued wage 
growth that results from a solidly growing economy with a stagnant or 
shrinking workforce and therefore a tight labor market despite layoff s in 
industries with excess capacity. Consumption will be further bolstered 
by more generous social spending on health, education, and pensions 
as the government addresses income inequality and improves access to 
social services nationwide. Overall income growth will likely continue to 
moderate slightly in line with the trend in recent years, but this should 
be countered by a falling savings rate as consumer confi dence remains 
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strong and, according to central bank surveys, the propensity to spend 
strengthens.
Several factors indicate that investment will likely be less robust 
in the forecast period than in 2016 and that its share of GDP will 
continue to shrink. A strong rebound in housing investment peaked 
in May 2016, stocks of unsold housing in many smaller cities remain 
high, access to mortgages has tightened, and purchase restrictions have 
been reintroduced in larger cities. It is thus unlikely that real estate 
will contribute as much to growth in 2017 as it did in 2016. Investment 
in manufacturing and services stabilized in mid-2016 but remains 
weak. Again, there is no reason to believe that 2017 will bring major 
improvement as the business outlook for export-oriented industries 
remains uncertain and credit growth is decelerating. Further, newly 
emerging industries with growth potential are generally less capital 
intensive than the old declining industries where investment remains 
constrained by persistent excess capacity despite some progress in 
reducing steel and coal production capacity in 2016. 
The government will continue to mitigate the drag on growth 
from economic restructuring by investing in infrastructure, which in 
any case is urgently needed to support rapid urbanization. However, 
infrastructure accounts for only one-fi fth of total investment and cannot 
fully compensate for the falloff  in investment elsewhere. Investment 
growth overall will thus lag GDP growth over the forecast period. This 
is in line with the objectives of changing the country’s growth model, 
reducing fi nancial vulnerability, and ensuring sustainable long-term 
growth. 
The forecasts for 2017 and 2018 have to take into account likely 
developments in international trade relations, which are currently 
highly unpredictable. Stronger growth is expected globally and should 
be a boon for PRC exporters, but optimism must be tempered by the 
rising specter of protectionism, which can only spell trouble for the 
world’s biggest exporter. On balance, net exports are expected to detract 
slightly from growth over the forecast period, and the falling trend in 
the share of exports in GDP, from a peak above 32% in 2006 to 18% in 
2016, will continue.
On the supply side, services will remain the key driver despite 
a weaker contribution from real estate services. The economy’s 
service sector is diverse, and subsectors such as health, education, 
entertainment, tourism, and industrial support services have huge 
growth potential, which will be slowly realized as the government 
further deregulates and opens more of the service sector to private and 
foreign investment. Industry—burdened by excess capacity, slowing real 
estate investment, and high debt—will grow more slowly than in 2016, 
continuing a trend since 2010, though consumer-oriented manufacturing 
will continue to do well.
Consumer price infl ation is forecast to accelerate to 2.4% in 2017 
and 2.8% in 2018, coming closer to the government ceiling of 3.0%, now 
reconfi rmed for 2017 (Figure 3.9.12). Key drivers are strong consumer 
demand, higher wages, continued price deregulation, some spillover 
from the weaker renminbi, and global commodity price increases. To 
keep funding costs stable in an environment of rising infl ation, the 
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authorities will have to further increase policy interest rates over the 
forecast period. This is necessary as well to keep the gap between 
domestic and US interest rates from widening too much, which could 
trigger additional capital outflow, and to slow credit growth and thus 
contain financial risk.   
If looming tensions in trade relations can be contained, the PRC 
trade surplus should remain broadly unchanged as the share of exports 
with higher value added continues to grow. The current account surplus 
will remain sizeable but fall below the 2016 surplus with a widening 
deficit in the services balance. The overall balance of payments will 
likely remain in deficit because of net capital outflow, dragging official 
reserves to below $3 trillion in 2017. This amount will likely be adequate 
for an economy with an increasingly flexible exchange rate regime and 
persisting capital controls.  
The downside risks to the outlook include, from the external 
perspective, heightened protectionism and increasing capital outflow. 
Although the PRC enjoys adequate international reserve buffers to 
mitigate the impact of any risks that may materialize within the forecast 
period, the authorities may consider containing the outflow to protect 
reserves, especially if it approaches the $100 billion/month drain seen 
in late 2015 and early 2016 (Figure 3.9.13). In that case, they would likely 
opt for further tightening of capital controls before considering hiking 
interest rates or floating the currency. Hiking interest rates substantially 
would constrain growth but cannot be ruled out if capital controls 
prove to be less effective than in the past, or if US rates rise faster than 
expected. Floating the currency risks creating a vicious cycle of further 
depreciation expectations and additional outflow, destabilizing the 
foreign exchange market. It would also contravene the government’s 
stated goal of keeping the renminbi basically stable in 2017 relative to a 
basket of currencies. 
A fully flexible exchange rate has been a government strategic 
objective for years, consistent with its desire to further open up 
the economy and advance renminbi internationalization, but these 
priorities have been in retreat since mid-2015. The share of foreign trade 
settlements denominated in renminbi peaked above 30% in September 
2015 but has since halved to below 15% with concerns over the exchange 
rate outlook and tighter capital controls. Renminbi deposits abroad and 
their role in foreign exchange transactions have been eroding for the 
same reason. To reverse these trends, further exchange rate liberalization 
remains a possibility over the forecast period, particularly if foreign 
exchange markets and the balance of payments become more stable.
The principal domestic risk is peril to the asset quality of banks 
and nonbank financial institutions posed by persistently rapid credit 
expansion, including credit to inefficient firms, in an environment 
of decelerating economic growth. Troubled loans classified as 
nonperforming or with overdue interest payments already occupy almost 
7.0% of banks’ loan portfolio, and strong credit growth may mask more 
serious repayment problems, potentially undermining financial stability 
and investor confidence. Tackling credit expansion is thus essential but 
itself poses risks as the failure of individual financial institutions could 
quickly spread across the system, especially as intermediation channels 
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between banks and nonbank financial institutions are opaque and poorly 
understood, and if liquidity shortages are not swiftly addressed. The 
government’s Financial Sector Work Conference, which is held every 
5 years and due in 2017, will likely mitigate this risk by deciding how 
sector regulators can better work together to head off incidents and 
contain their fallout.
Policy challenge—raising investment 
productivity
The PRC investment rate, or gross fixed capital formation over GDP, 
jumped from 40% in 2008 to 45% in 2009 and stayed at this elevated 
level until 2013 (Figure 3.9.14). This was the result of the debt-financed 
and investment-oriented stimulus deployed to support economic growth 
during the global financial crisis. Until 2008, the PRC investment 
rate aligned with East Asian and Western norms and was thus not 
unusually high. However, the 5 percentage point jump has created 
inefficiency and distortion in resource allocation and vulnerability in 
the financial system. Against this background, the authorities have 
embarked on rebalancing the economy toward consumption. As a result, 
the investment contribution to GDP growth has gradually declined as 
the consumption contribution returned to its long-run level of about 
two-thirds. 
From a supply-side perspective, the contribution to economic 
growth from declining investment volume can be maintained only 
with productivity gains. Only 5% of investment today is undertaken by 
enterprises or administrative units subordinate to central government 
ministries, offices, or companies. Local government investment 
accounts for less than one-third of the remaining 95%. Improving the 
productivity of investment thus poses three challenges. 
The first challenge is to improve the efficiency of the one-third 
of total investment that is still undertaken by government agencies. 
This includes most investment in public utilities, construction, 
transportation, information technology, finance, environmental 
facilities, education, health, and culture. Reforms to public–private 
partnership and mixed ownership are already under way for that 
purpose, but outright privatization should also be considered, especially 
where local government enterprises engage in commercial activities. No 
modern market economy, and no high-income economy in particular, 
has state-owned enterprises as dominant as they are in the PRC.  
The government’s policy goals include structural changes to 
investment that boost private investors’ involvement in the provision 
of services and replace industry with services as the main driver of 
growth. The service sector share of investment declined from 62.2% in 
2003 to 54.6% in 2008 and then gradually recovered to 58.0% in 2016 
(Figure 3.9.15). Further opening of sectors dominated by state-owned 
enterprises such as transport, telecommunication, and finance to private 
investors, as announced by the government, will support this trend over 
the forecast period and reduce the state’s share in overall investment.
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Second, the government has to further improve conditions for 
the two-thirds of investment that is not directly subordinated to a 
government agency but rather undertaken by private enterprises 
(corporate and individual), companies with mixed ownership, and 
foreign-funded companies (Figure 3.9.16). Ensuring that these 
enterprises are fully market driven requires, among other things, 
continued financial reform to attract savings to the most productive 
investment projects, encouraging investment in innovation and 
movement toward the higher-technology end of the production chain, 
and alleviating constraints on skilled labor supply. The government 
is indeed attempting to push investment toward innovation and 
technology-driven production, as outlined in the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan and other strategies by providing fiscal, financial, and regulatory 
incentives to selected high-tech industries to turn the PRC into a 
“manufacturing superpower.”
Cross-sector analysis confirms that profitability and market 
demand are major determinants of investment, but other factors can 
be obstructive in individual industries. These factors include formal 
and informal industry-specific policies and/or constraints imposed by 
local governments to protect privileged enterprises in their jurisdiction, 
notably through discriminatory nontariff barriers and price setting, 
prohibitions on the sale of nonlocal goods and services, government 
procurement and compulsory trading that favor local enterprises, and 
compulsory takeovers and collusive cartels. Strengthening competition 
policies and their enforcement through strong institutions is crucial to 
overcoming such constraints, as are industrial policies that are market 
friendly and implemented without discrimination, and that allow weak 
companies to fail.  
Although the share of the private sector in total investment has 
been on the rise, reaching 51% in 2016 from 40% in 2008, the share of 
foreign investment (including from Taipei,China and Hong Kong, China) 
in total investment has dropped from 11% to less than 4%, and foreign 
investment has become concentrated in very few sectors. This pattern 
may reflect a newly found ability of domestic enterprises to invest and 
innovate across all sectors, but it suggests as well that the current 
foreign investment regime hampers innovation and economic growth. 
To address this issue, the government announced in January 2017 that 
the environment for foreign investments will be liberalized to align with 
that for domestic investment.
The third challenge is to ensure that investment stimulus provided 
to stabilize economic growth does not compromise efforts to make 
investment more productive. Measures should thus be designed to 
focus on regions where support is most needed and on sectors that are 
new growth drivers. Further, stronger private sector involvement in 
investment would empower market forces to enhance the outcomes of 
stabilization efforts.
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Hong Kong, China
Growth moderated in 2016 for a third year in a row but will recover modestly in 2017 and 2018, 
helped by a stable labor market, durable incomes, and fiscal support. Inflation will moderate 
further, and the current account surplus will remain stable. Sharp increases in US interest rates 
could, if instituted, derail economic recovery, with the property market particularly at risk.
Economic performance 
GDP growth slowed to 1.9% in 2016 from 2.4% in 2015, though growth 
in the fourth quarter reached 3.1% year on year. Resilient domestic 
demand underpinned the expansion in 2016. Supported by steady real 
incomes, low inflation, and a stable labor market, private consumption 
grew by 1.6% and contributed 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth, 
while government consumption added another 0.3 percentage points 
(Figure 3.10.1). Investment rebounded in the second half of 2016 on 
strong inventory restocking and resilient construction outlays to 
contribute 1.1 percentage points to GDP growth. Trade benefitted 
from improving regional trade flows in the latter part of the year, 
with exports growing year on year by 0.9% and imports by 1.2% 
(Figure 3.10.2). Net exports staged a turnaround in the last quarter of 
2016 but still ended up shaving 0.5 percentage points off overall growth. 
Construction and services were the primary drivers from the supply 
side. Construction grew by 2.4% in 2016, while services expanded by 
2.3%, despite a lackluster performance by retail trade owing mainly to a 
decline in tourist arrivals.
The current account surplus widened to equal 4.5% of GDP in 2016. 
A narrower merchandise trade deficit reflected in part a fall in retained 
imports in the first half of the year and partly a pickup in the value of 
goods exports in the latter part of the year. An increase in the net inflow 
of primary income offset shrinkage in net service receipts as exports 
of travel services declined more steeply. With net outflow of portfolio 
capital, the overall balance of payments surplus in 2016 equaled 0.4% 
of GDP. Gross official reserves rose to $386.2 billion at the end of 2016, 
or cover for 7.8 months of imports. 
Consumer price inflation slowed to 2.4% (Figure 3.10.3). External 
price pressures remained benign with subdued international prices 
for food and other commodities and a weak renminbi holding down 
imported inflation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Steady labor costs and subdued rent increases helped contain domestic 
costs. Residential property prices fell by 11% year on year in late 2015 
and early 2016, but they rebounded and by December 2016 were slightly 
above their September 2015 peak (Figure 3.10.4). 
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The government revised the estimate of the budget surplus for 
FY2016 (ended 31 March 2017) to the equivalent of 3.7% of GDP from 
an initial budget forecast of 0.5% (Figure 3.10.5). The higher revised 
surplus resulted from additional receipts of HK$81.5 billion, equal to 
3.3% of GDP and mainly revenues from land sales and stamp duties 
from a buoyant property market. Government expenditure continued to 
increase modestly, primarily on higher provision for social welfare and 
capital works projects, but is likely to be lower than initially budgeted. 
Fiscal reserves on 31 March 2017 were expected to stand a tad higher at 
37.6% of GDP.
Monetary conditions remained accommodative, though the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) adjusted its benchmark 
base rate twice in December 2016 and March 2017, cumulatively from 
0.75% to 1.25% in tandem with increases in the US federal funds 
rate. Domestic credit grew by 7.3%, and growth in broad money (M2) 
supply accelerated to 7.7%. The local equity market staged a rebound 
after the sharp correction in early 2016, falling to a 4-year low in 
February but ending the year 0.5% higher than in 2015 (Figure 3.10.6). 
Hong Kong, China remained in 2016 the top market for initial public 
offerings even though the total funds raised dropped to a recent low. 
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is projected to pick up to 2.0% in 2017 and recover 
further to 2.1% in 2018 (Figure 3.10.7). Domestic demand supported 
by building and construction will remain the engine of growth. 
Private consumption will benefit as well from continued stable 
employment and strong incomes. Large public infrastructure projects 
will lift overall investment, but private investment will remain sluggish. 
Business sentiment remains fragile, weighed down by moderation 
in the PRC, developments in the euro area, and the normalization 
of US interest rates. The purchasing managers’ index slipped back 
into contraction in the first 2 months of 2017 after finally and briefly 
breaching in December 2016 the threshold at 50 indicating expansion. 
Business surveys in the first quarter of 2017 showed pessimism still 
entrenched, particularly in retailing and construction (Figure 3.10.8). 
On the supply side, growth will come from construction and services, 
in particular financial and professional services, the latter benefitting 
especially from strengthening ties with financial markets in the 
PRC and opportunities arising from the Belt and Road development 
initiative.
Inflation will moderate this year and next to about 2.0%. A strong 
local dollar will dampen imported inflation, while local cost increases 
will be contained by a negative output gap and moderate economic 
growth. Together, these factors will dampen upward pressure from 
rising global prices for oil and other commodities.
The FY2017 budget includes a package of pro-growth fiscal measures 
equal to 1.3% of GDP that the government forecasts will prop up 2017 
GDP by 1.1%. The package includes one-off tax reductions for households 
and firms, waivers of rates, and extra social security allowances and, 
more permanently, recurrent social benefits and a tax reduction for 
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home loan interest. When compared with the revised estimate of 
FY2016, the budget further includes a 0.7% increase of capital outlays. 
On balance, budgetary revenues are estimated to fall by 9.3% and 
expenditures to rise by 5.3%, shrinking the FY2017 fi scal surplus to the 
equivalent of 0.6% of GDP. This is a step in the right direction given 
the negative output gap and the need to counter monetary tightening 
resulting from expected US interest rate hikes.
The stabilization of global demand and growing demand in the PRC 
for high tech products, especially semiconductors, should off er some 
support to exports of goods and services in 2017. However, further 
strengthening of the US dollar, to which the local dollar is tied, could 
limit export gains. Imports are likely to return to growth as the decline 
in investment continues to moderate and a depreciating renminbi 
lifts import demand. The resulting trade defi cit will be off set by an 
improving surplus in the services account as tourist numbers begin 
to revive and demand for professional and fi nancial services grows. 
On balance, the current account surplus is forecast to remain stable 
at 3.1% this year and next.
Despite the recent decline in off shore renminbi activity in response 
to prevailing expectations of renminbi depreciation, the role of 
Hong Kong, China as the premier center for off shore renminbi trading 
remains secure. Trading will most likely be further strengthened by the 
December 2016 launch of a cross-boundary investment channel with the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the PRC, following the launch in 2014 of a 
similar channel with the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
The main risks to the outlook are negative spillover from monetary 
tightening in the US, given the currency link between the two 
economies, and the potential impact of changes in US trade policy, 
which could hurt exports and undermine Hong Kong, China as a 
regional trading hub. Deepening integration with the PRC is benefi cial 
on the whole, but it renders Hong Kong, China more vulnerable to 
adverse economic developments in the PRC. However, if any of these 
risks materialize, the government has ample fi scal and macroprudential 
tools to limit the buildup of systemic vulnerabilities. 
Policy challenge—responding to rising 
US interest rates
Because of the linked exchange rate system by which the local dollar 
is pegged to the US dollar yet freely exchangeable, monetary policy 
in Hong Kong, China must track that of the US. When the US Federal 
Reserve raises its interest rates, the HKMA has to follow suit soon 
thereafter to avoid pressure on the peg. Banks may not immediately 
raise their rates in response, as long as there is ample liquidity available 
in the local banking system for lending, but they will have to raise 
rates eventually if there is less liquidity as a result, for example, of fund 
outfl ows from Hong Kong, China. A gradual rate increase, as currently 
anticipated, would have only limited eff ect on the economy, with mild 
movements of interbank and bilateral exchange rates that should prove 
easily manageable. The local property sector would feel the impact, 
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but large upward adjustments in mortgage rates are unlikely as long as 
the banking system retains sufficient liquidity to continue offering 
low-interest mortgages. 
However, if the Fed were to enact this year more than the expected 
two or three increases of 25 basis points each, local interest rates would 
have to climb higher, hurting domestic demand. A feedback effect 
on consumption from resulting negative wealth effects could force 
down asset prices, especially for property. Further, if higher interest 
rates strengthen the US and local dollars, this would undercut export 
competitiveness and create headwinds for tourism, thus compounding 
the damage to economic growth, at least to the extent that price 
flexibility in the service sector cannot mitigate the effect.
Local banks are well capitalized and have prudently managed 
mortgage financing risks by applying prudent loan-to-value ratios 
and assessing individual borrowers’ repayment ability (Figure 3.10.9). 
The HKMA also conducts stress testing regularly to assess resilience in 
the banking sector. However, the International Monetary Fund noted 
that an increase in the ratio of nonfinancial corporate debt to GDP 
might make companies more vulnerable in the event of a sharp interest 
rate hike.
Hong Kong, China has a strong policy framework and ample 
buffers in place to navigate shocks. Fiscal reserves equal to 37% of GDP 
allow additional fiscal stimulus if needed, and the crises-tested linked 
exchange rate system continues to be a credible anchor for the local 
economy and financial system. Meanwhile, progress is being made in 
reform to improve transparency and mitigate counterparty risks in 
the over-the-counter derivatives market, in which mandatory clearing 
began in September 2016. With sound fundamentals and policies in 
place, the main task will be the continued exercise of risk management 
and countercyclical prudential policy to contain any adverse impacts 
from wide fluctuations in financial markets. Policy measures include 
ensuring that banks maintain adequate liquidity and countercyclical 
capital buffers in line with Basel III rules, respect the caps on loan-
to-value ratios and debt-servicing ratios that measure the ability of 
mortgage holders to service their debt, and comply with requirements 
limiting concentration of exposure to single borrowers, industries, 
and sectors.
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Republic of Korea
Strong private consumption early in the year and robust private investment sustained growth in 2016 
despite lackluster exports. Growth will likely slow a little in 2017 but pick up in 2018 as political 
uncertainties recede and exports recover. The current account surplus will shrink in 2017 and 2018, 
but inflation will pick up moderately. Strategies exist to counter emergent trade policy uncertainty.
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Economic performance 
Economic growth accelerated marginally to 2.7% in 2016 from 2.6% in 
2015, driven by strong expansion in consumption expenditure (Figure 
3.11.1). Consumption increased by 2.8% and contributed 1.8 percentage 
points to growth, mostly reflecting faster growth in private expenditure. 
Stimulus measures including tax discounts for car purchases helped lift 
consumer spending in the first half. Then, undermined by a political 
crisis and subdued employment prospects, consumer sentiment plunged 
to a 7-year low in November, causing growth in consumer spending 
to soften in the second half (Figure 3.11.2). The unemployment rate 
rose to 3.7% from 3.6% in 2015 with the first falloff in manufacturing 
employment since 2009 and further job losses as the shipping and 
shipbuilding industries endured corporate restructuring. 
Investment expanded by 5.4% in 2016 and contributed 1.6 percentage 
points to GDP growth (Figure 3.11.3). Investment growth accelerated 
in the second half as lower interest rates pushed up private investment, 
which provided 79.7% of gross capital formation. Construction 
investment expanded by 11.0%, accounting for over 90% of investment 
growth and outweighing a 2.4% decline in investment in machinery and 
transport equipment. External demand, by contrast, remained subdued. 
Net exports subtracted from growth again in 2016 as export growth 
was less than half of import growth in real terms, at 1.4% versus 3.0% 
(Figure 3.11.4).
On the supply side, services growth accelerated to 3.6% from 2.8% 
in 2015, owing mainly to expansion in wholesale trade, restaurants and 
hotels, and health and social services, contributing 1.4 percentage points 
to GDP growth. Growth in manufacturing improved more slowly, to 
1.7% from 1.3% in 2015, held back by lingering weakness in exports and 
the impact of corporate restructuring, as well as by production cuts 
following the recall of the Samsung Note 7.
Average consumer price inflation rose to 1.0% in 2016, picking up 
in the second half along with higher food and global oil prices (Figure 
3.11.5). In contrast, core inflation, which excludes agricultural and 
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3.11.3 Demand-side contributions to growth
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petroleum products, slowed to 1.6% from 2.2% in 2015. Reflecting the 
mild inflation environment, monetary policy was accommodative, 
especially toward the second half of 2016 when the Bank of Korea, 
the central bank, cut its policy rate to a record low of 1.25% in June 
to support economic activity. With interest rates low, household debt 
continued to rise, equaling 82.8% of GDP at the end of 2016. Home 
mortgages accounted for 41.8% of debt. 
Fiscal policy was likewise expansionary in 2016 to support growth. 
In September, the government approved a $10 billion supplementary 
budget to counter the impact of tepid external demand and support 
provincial economies hit by corporate restructuring. Nevertheless, the 
fiscal deficit including the supplementary budget amounted to only 2.4% 
of GDP, unchanged from 2015. Government debt recorded a small uptick.
 Customs data indicate that exports continued to contract in US 
dollar terms last year but less quickly. Total exports dropped by 5.9% in 
2016 as exports to all major partners declined. Exports to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), which took one-fourth of the total, fell by 9.3% 
in 2016, even more steeply than in 2015, and exports to the US fell by 
4.8%, compared with only a 0.6% drop in 2015. Shipments declined as 
well to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which accounts for 
14.7% of all exports, and to the European Union, another key market, 
but by less than in 2015. Imports also sank in US dollar terms but by 
only 6.9%, much less than the 16.9% drop in 2015. With the merchandise 
trade surplus shrinking to the equivalent of 8.7% of GDP and the 
services deficit unchanged at 1.1%, the current account surplus shrank to 
7.1% of GDP. 
Despite global capital shifting out of emerging markets, the net 
capital position of the Republic of Korea (ROK) improved as net outflows 
abated owing to a recovery in foreign equity investment and an increase 
in inward foreign direct investment. The  current account surplus 
contracted but remained large, and foreign exchange reserves rose by 
$3.2 billion to reach $361.7 billion at the end of 2016. The ROK won, 
which had been appreciating against the US dollar until early August, 
reversed course with heightened capital outflow in the fourth quarter. 
By December, it was 3.0% weaker against the dollar than at the end of 
2015. In real effective terms, it appreciated by 0.6% during the year, just 
as it did the previous year.
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is expected to slow from 2.7% in 2016 to 2.5% in 2017, the 
lowest since 2012 (Figure 3.11.6). Domestic demand will soften with 
weaker private consumption, but a recovery in exports can be expected 
to support growth. In 2018, growth is likely to bounce back to 2.7% 
as the impact of the political crisis fades and improved consumer and 
business sentiment boosts domestic demand.
Growth in private consumption will slow in 2017, tamped down 
by rising household debt and unfavorable consumer sentiment (Figure 
3.11.7). However, fiscal measures to support job creation—such as 
subsidies to support new business establishment, larger budgetary 
allocations to promote job creation in information technology, and 
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higher fi nancial support to companies that retain employees after 
maternity leave—may counterbalance these eff ects to allow a 2% 
increase in private consumption.
Growth in investment will be held down by decelerating 
construction investment in 2017, as indicated by recent weakness in 
leading indicators such as construction starts and orders. Tighter 
property market restrictions introduced in August and November last 
year to manage household debt have kicked in to contain growth in 
residential construction. Further, the planned cut in the government 
budget for social overhead capital, which funds infrastructure such as 
bridges and roads, will curb civil engineering investment. However, 
deceleration in investment growth will likely be countered by recovery 
in machinery and transport equipment investment induced by the 
expected rise in external demand.
The planned fi scal impulse will be smaller than in 2016, but to 
counter prevailing uncertainty the government plans to frontload 
budgetary outlays this year such that over 30% of spending is in 
the fi rst quarter, targeting job creation and the completion of public 
infrastructure projects. Government expenditures are projected to 
increase by 3.7% as revenues grow by 6.0%, so the fi scal defi cit is 
projected to shrink to 1.7% of GDP in 2017 from 2.4% in 2016. Given 
ample fi scal resources, authorities are likely to draw a supplementary 
budget if economic conditions deteriorate in the second half of the year. 
The rise in consumer infl ation above 2.0% in January 2017 for the 
fi rst time in 51 months indicates that infl ation will be higher this year. It 
is forecast to average 1.7% as global commodity prices rise and 1.8% next 
year as domestic demand recovers. As a huge importer of oil, however, 
the ROK is vulnerable to unexpected movements in global oil prices, as 
is this forecast. 
An expansionary monetary policy will likely continue despite rising 
concerns about high household debt (Figure 3.11.8). Benign infl ation 
is allowing the central bank to maintain low interest rates, thereby 
supporting mortgage and property markets and borrowers’ capacity to 
meet repayments. 
Higher exports are forecast for the coming 2 years. After contracting 
in all but 1 of 21 months running, exports to the PRC began to rise in 
November 2016, and total exports grew by double digits in January 
and February 2017. These trends and expected higher growth in the 
advanced economies—especially the US, the second largest trading 
partner after the PRC—indicate that recent export momentum is likely 
to be sustained. As with exports, imports have started to pick up after 
an extended period of decline, partly refl ecting higher oil prices, and are 
expected to rise further as growth improves. On balance, the current 
account surplus is forecast to narrow to the equivalent of 5.8% of GDP in 
2017 and 5.3% in 2018.
The forecast faces a number of downside risks. First, the continued 
appreciation of the won, which rose by 6.7% against the US dollar in 
the fi rst 2 months of 2017, will be bad news for exporters on top of 
growing trade policy uncertainty in the US. Second, upward price 
pressures are building and may push infl ation beyond the forecast rate 
at a time when, according to some estimates, actual output appears to 
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be trailing potential output by a widening margin, raising the specter of 
stagflation (Figure 3.11.9). Third, persistent political uncertainty could 
undercut growth. A unanimous court verdict in March 2017 to remove 
the President could pave the way for political stability to return, but the 
resulting snap election could be highly contentious, delaying its return 
until a new government is formed. While policy paralysis is unlikely, 
an unsettled political situation would dent business and consumer 
confidence. Further, geopolitical risks arise with provocations from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which test fired ballistic missiles 
in February and March 2017. 
An upside risk to the forecast is export recovery that is more 
robust than forecast, especially if growth gains momentum globally 
and in particular in the US. On the ROK domestic front, a smooth and 
orderly resolution of the political crisis would likely improve business 
and consumer confidence, strengthening domestic demand more 
than forecast. The balance of risks tilts to the downside with growth 
underperforming, but the government has ample fiscal resources to 
respond.
Policy challenge—coping with the risk of rising 
uncertainty in the US trade policy
As the US is an important export market, taking 13.4% of ROK exports 
in 2016, a more restrictive trade policy there could have major adverse 
implications (Figure 3.11.10). The number of US trade measures recently 
targeting ROK exporters totaled 2,025 before the latest US election, so 
any hint of further US policy change heightens concerns for the ROK 
economy (Figure 3.11.11).
The most immediate and direct impact of US policy change would 
be felt through lower exports to the US. However, ROK firms may be 
hurt indirectly by new US policy change against other countries. Most 
crucially, trade friction between the US and the PRC would crimp 
ROK exports to the latter, which are mostly intermediate goods used 
in products that the PRC assembles and exports to the US. Further, the 
impending renegotiation of North American Free Trade Area agreement 
with Canada and Mexico could restrict or increase the cost of access to 
the US markets for goods originating in Mexico, causing losses for ROK 
firms that invested in Mexico for its easy access to the US market. These 
investments grew to $5.5 billion annually in 2015.
The persistent ROK trade surplus with the US, which has exceeded 
$20 billion every year since 2013, could place the KORUS Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), concluded between the US and the ROK in 2012, 
among those targeted for renegotiation. The FTA eliminated 95% of the 
tariffs between the two markets and created additional protections for 
financial and other service firms. The KORUS FTA is the largest FTA 
the US has in Asia and one of the two largest for the ROK, the other 
being with the European Union. Given substantial opposition to the FTA 
before it was agreed—not only from US firms but also on the ROK side, 
notably from farmers—renegotiation could spell the end of it. 
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A preliminary empirical analysis found that annual ROK exports to 
the US would fall by as much as $13 billion in 2017–2020, at the cost of 
127,000 jobs in the ROK, if the KORUS FTA collapsed (Table 3.11.2). The 
average yearly export loss of $3.3 billion equals 5% of ROK exports to 
the US in 2016. Further, a 10% drop in the PRC exports to the US would 
cause a 1.5% drop in ROK exports to the PRC. The combined impact of 
restrictive policies targeting the ROK and the PRC would lower ROK 
export proceeds by $5.2 billion, or 1% of the total in 2016.
Effectively meeting the potential challenge of US policy uncertainty 
requires three sets of policies. First, government and industry can 
take preventive action together to reduce trade friction and prepare 
for any policy change that nevertheless materializes. To this end, the 
government announced in late January plans to expand imports from 
the US. However, industries that are likely to be hit hard by annulment 
of the KORUS FTA, such as autos, electronics, and machinery, should 
prepare strategic contingency plans to comply with possible new trade 
regulations and develop new export markets. 
Second, policy makers should closely monitor domestic financial 
market instability associated with mounting uncertainty regarding US 
trade and other economic policies. In light of the highly open capital 
account in the ROK, potentially volatile foreign capital flows are of 
particular interest. The ROK has adequate buffers to mitigate the impact 
of large capital outflows, but the authorities must be prepared to act 
promptly to dispel any concerns about the balance of payments. 
Third, ROK policy makers can actively explore ways to extend the 
two countries’ robust security alliance into the economic arena. An 
effective approach to defusing trade frictions would be to negotiate 
a broad economic partnership that brings together the government, 
industry, and other stakeholders in both countries. This task would be 
enormously complicated, but achieving such a partnership would be well 
worth the effort.
3.11.2  Projected export and employment 
losses with KORUS FTA annulment
Decline in 
exports to the 
US ($ billion)
Decline in 
employment
(1,000)
2017 3.09 30
2018 3.20 31
2019 3.31 32
2020 3.42 33
Total 13.01 127
Average 3.25 32
KORUS FTA = free trade agreement between the 
Republic of Korea and the United States.
Note: The projections are based on empirical analysis 
that assumes that United States tariffs on goods 
from the Republic of Korea revert to levels before the 
KORUS FTA.
Source: Hyundai Research Institute. 
Mongolia
Growth will accelerate this year on large mining investments, then moderate in 2018 as coal 
production reaches full capacity. Inflation will rise in both years, and the current account will 
remain in deficit on the surge of imports for mining works. Cooperation with the international 
community is key to addressing financing gaps and preserving economic and social stability. 
Strengthening the management of natural resources revenue remains a major challenge.
Economic performance 
The economy slowed to 1.0% growth in 2016 from 2.4% in 2015 with a 
sharp fall in construction and declining household consumption. GDP 
growth fell by 6.2% in the third quarter, but the economy recovered 
in the fourth quarter as an unexpected hike in coal prices prompted a 
steep increase in coal production. This lifted growth in transportation 
and storage services, raising the service sector contribution to growth to 
0.8 percentage points (Figure 3.12.1). Agriculture added 0.6 percentage 
points as livestock herds grew despite a harsh winter. However, 
continued decline in construction by 15.9%—the result of oversupply 
caused by lending subsidized by the Bank of Mongolia, the central 
bank—dragged down industrial output, subtracting 0.4 percentage 
points from GDP growth. 
External demand was the driver of growth in 2016. Exports rose 
by 14.7% as coal and gold exports surged (Figure 3.12.2). With imports 
rising more slowly, net exports grew, adding 1.3 percentage points to 
GDP growth (Figure 3.12.3). Meanwhile, domestic demand dragged on 
growth. Consumption contracted by 5.5%, subtracting 3.9 percentage 
points from growth, as household spending slumped because of lower 
agricultural incomes as meat prices fell, and because of lower wages 
and salaries with downsizing in construction and transport, which 
together provide 10.6% of employment. Meanwhile, gross capital 
formation reversed the falling trend of the previous 2 years to increase 
by 14.3% as restocking of inventories surged, adding 3.6 percentage 
points to growth. 
Average consumer price inflation fell to 1.1% in 2016 as meat prices 
dropped by 8.2% on higher supply resulting from the accelerated culling 
of cattle. The Mongolian togrog depreciated by 24.8% against US the 
dollar, mostly in the second half of 2016, but the pass-through to prices 
started to emerge only this year, with inflation rising by 2.1% year on 
year in February (Figure 3.12.4).
Fiscal policy remained expansionary. Budgetary expenditure rose 
by 33.4% to equal 39.9% of GDP as capital expenditure surged before 
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the election in June and large off-budget spending was consolidated 
into the budget by the newly-elected government. Revenue meanwhile 
slid by 2.2% on lower income tax receipts to equal 24.5% of GDP. The 
fiscal deficit widened to 15.4% of GDP. However, including off-budget 
government expenditure financed by loans from the Development Bank 
of Mongolia, the deficit soared to 17.7% of GDP. Interest payment on 
government bonds accounted for more than 10% of total expenditure 
in 2016, a jump from 1% in 2010. Total public debt including the central 
bank’s foreign liabilities reached the equivalent of 111% of GDP (Figure 
3.12.5). As debt rose, the Fiscal Stability Law was amended again in 2016 
to lift the government debt ceiling from 55% of GDP to 88%, with the 
requirement that it should be gradually lowered to 60% by 2021. 
 The togrog depreciated sharply in the face of balance-of-payment 
pressures, prompting the central bank to terminate all off-budget 
activities except for the subsidized mortgage program and to raise the 
policy rate by 450 basis points to 15% in August (since then reduced to 
14%). Nevertheless, net domestic credit increased by 15.0% in 2016. In 
addition, through its practice of purchasing gold from the local mining 
companies, the central bank added to domestic liquidity. Broad money 
(M2) rose by 10.4% in the year. 
Rapid credit growth without strict bank supervision or adequate 
reserve provisioning has eroded the quality of bank assets, undermining 
their soundness. The nonperforming loan rate has doubled since 2014, 
reaching 7% of all loans outstanding at the end of 2016 (Figure 3.12.6).
The current account deficit narrowed to 4.0% of GDP by the end 
of the year as the merchandise trade balance improved. Foreign 
borrowing at high cost staved off the risk of a crisis in the balance of 
payments, but it added to the problem of long-term debt sustainability. 
The current account deficit has been financed increasingly by external 
borrowing owing to capital flight and plummeting foreign direct 
investment. Thus, net foreign assets declined by 19.5% to a liability 
of $3.2 billion. However, gross international reserves remained 
unchanged at $1.3 billion at the end of 2016, supported by external 
borrowing.
Economic prospects
The outlook is for improvement enabled by higher commodity prices, 
the successful refinancing of a $580 million bond in March 2017, and the 
expected approval of an economic adjustment program supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international community 
at large. Continued efforts by the new government to preserve economic 
and social stability remain key. Growth is forecast to accelerate to 2.5% 
this year but moderate slightly to 2.0% in 2018 on the base effect of the 
surge in coal production in 2017 (Figure 3.12.7). The forecast assumes 
that investment in the second phase of the Oyu Tolgoi mine will rise 
from $200 million last year to $1.0 billion in 2017 and $1.2 billion in 
2018. However, large household debt and income contraction will 
depress household consumption, and fiscal consolidation will drastically 
reduce public capital expenditure and some transfers. Net exports will 
add to growth in 2017 as strong momentum in coal exports continues 
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before subtracting from it in 2018 as coal exports level off  and imports 
rise on capital-intensive investment in Oyu Tolgoi.  
On the supply side, agriculture and services are expected to support 
growth modestly during the forecast period. Steady growth in livestock 
will be the major driver of growth in agriculture, while services will 
benefi t from higher demand for transport and storage from rising coal 
exports and imports for Oyu Tolgoi. Construction will likely remain 
fl at as the increase in mining-related construction off sets an expected 
reduction in subsidized mortgage lending, following the reformulation 
of the program by the new government. As coal production reaches 
full capacity in 2017, growth in 2018 will be solely driven by steady 
expansion of agriculture and service sectors, and a pickup in 
construction activity. 
Average infl ation will rise to 3.5% in 2017 and 3.9% in 2018 as prices 
for imported goods increase when converted into a weaker currency 
(Figure 3.12.8). Fuel prices will edge higher as excise taxes are raised, 
but meat prices are expected to remain stable on the combined eff ect of 
improved supply and the depletion of government reserves.
Fiscal policy will be less expansionary during the forecast period. 
The budget under the proposed revision targets a defi cit equal to 8.8% 
of GDP in 2017. Monetary policy will also be less expansionary this year 
and the next. Money supply growth must halve in 2017 from 2016 to 
remain consistent with macroeconomic objectives agreed under the IMF 
program.
The current account defi cit will narrow to 2.1% of GDP in 2017 
on strong coal exports but widen again to 6.3% in 2018 as imports 
continue to expand while exports stabilize. The expected larger infl ows 
evidenced from a pickup in foreign direct investment at the end of 2016 
will ease pressure on the balance of payments.
Downside risks to the outlook derive from uncertainty regarding 
macroeconomic management. Borrowing options will narrow, and 
costs will rise, if debt obligations are not met, or in the absence of a 
fi rm commitment to policy reform or agreement on the IMF program, 
or if there is slippage in program implementation. Any of these risks 
would necessitate additional fi scal retrenchment and weaken growth. 
The proliferation of nonperforming loans presents another risk to the 
outlook as it can threaten fi nancial stability. There is also a risk that the 
Oyu Tolgoi investments may be delayed, undercutting economic activity.
Policy challenge—enhancing the management of 
natural resources revenue
Mongolia’s abundant natural resources include 10% of known coal 
reserves globally and the world’s fourth-largest copper reserves. 
They are expected to last at least 100 years, but their eventual 
depletion raises intergenerational equity issues. At the same time, the 
economy is subject to the boom-and-bust cycles that commonly aff ect 
commodity-dependent economies. Designing appropriate policies and 
institutions that respond to these constraints is a major challenge for 
the government.
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Most resource-rich countries establish sovereign wealth funds, 
but Mongolia’s two earlier attempts to do so did not succeed for lack 
of resources commensurate with mandated obligations and because of 
pro-cyclical fi scal policies. Indeed, revenue management has not brought 
wealth accumulation but rather rising public debt. In a new eff ort, the 
government established the Fiscal Stability Fund in 2010 to manage 
commodity boom-and-bust cycles and the Future Heritage Fund in 2017 
to set aside funds for future generations. 
For this new eff ort to succeed, the extractive sector must yield more 
fi scal revenues. These revenues, which include mainly royalty payments 
and exploration and permit fees, have averaged over the past 5 years less 
than 3% of GDP or 10% of revenue (Figure 3.12.9). By comparison, other 
resource-rich economies in the region such as Malaysia and Kazakhstan 
collect almost 10% of GDP. Receipts from taxes on mining company 
profi ts are likely to increase as commodity prices trend up during the 
forecast period. However, sizeable increases in mineral-related fi scal 
revenues require both changes in arrangements for the royalties, fees, 
and taxes, which may be politically diffi  cult to adopt, and improved 
effi  ciency in tax collection and the elimination of tax avoidance. Further 
resources can be raised for the two funds by allocating to them a portion 
of fi scal revenues unconnected with mining, which are well above 
25% of GDP in Mongolia, or more than double the usual percentage in 
countries with similar income.
It is crucial to avoid pro-cyclical fi scal policies. Studies show that 
commodity exporters are prone to pro-cyclical policies especially if 
booms are caused by high world commodity prices. The Fiscal Stability 
Law was expected to discourage pro-cyclical policies by limiting the 
budget’s structural defi cit to the equivalent of 2% of GDP. However, the 
rule has not been enforced, and off -budget spending has provided a way 
around it. 
Future Heritage Fund resources including accumulated profi t and 
interest should be considered a substitute for natural resources as 
they become depleted. They should be used in the meantime only in 
extreme emergencies. The current requirement that 10% of fund profi ts 
be automatically transferred to the budget creates a loophole for their 
depletion, as does the use of fund resources for social transfers. Both 
practices should be avoided. Regarding the Fiscal Stability Fund, clear 
rules are needed to govern its use to smooth expenditures over boom and 
bust years. Transfers to the budget should be allowed only if budgetary 
resources prove inadequate to meet nondiscretionary expenditure. 
The overarching condition required for the successful management 
of these funds is a budgeting process with assured integrity. This 
requires, most crucially, that the annual budget include all government 
payment obligations and be prepared taking into account medium-term 
macroeconomic objectives. Further, Fiscal Stability Law ceilings must be 
respected and off -budget expenditure avoided.
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Taipei,China
Economic growth accelerated in 2016, inflation rose, and the current account surplus narrowed. 
Growth will likely accelerate further in 2017 and 2018 on higher government and private 
expenditure. Inflation will trend downward on lower food prices, and the current account surplus 
will narrow further on rising imports. A well-designed incentive scheme is needed to attract 
innovative enterprises with strong potential for job creation.
Economic performance
GDP growth doubled to 1.5% in 2016 as domestic spending grew 
(Figure 3.13.1). Private consumption remained the main driver of 
growth, rising by 2.1% mainly on higher fuel and car purchases to 
contribute 1.2 percentage points to GDP. Government consumption 
added another 0.4 percentage points to growth, as did total investment 
(Figure 3.13.2). Exports declined in the first half of the year owing 
to tepid external demand but rebounded in the second half to record 
2.1% annual growth as semiconductor market conditions improved 
and international prices for agricultural and raw materials increased. 
However, as imports expanded more rapidly, net exports subtracted 
0.7 percentage points from GDP growth.
On the supply side, industry and services drove growth. Rising 
manufacturing output propelled growth in industry to 1.9%, adding 
0.7 percentage points to GDP growth. Semiconductor production rose 
significantly on higher demand for use in smart technology products and 
as technological advances in Taipei,China made its semiconductors more 
competitive. Services grew by 1.3% on rising tourist arrivals, adding 
0.8 percentage points to growth. The year nevertheless saw growth in 
tourist arrivals slow by more than half from 2015, with a drop in visitors 
from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) only partly compensated by 
higher arrivals from Japan, Southeast Asia, and the US (Figure 3.13.3). 
Agriculture contracted by 6.9% because of unfavorable weather, 
subtracting 0.1 percentage points from growth.
The consumer price index rose by 1.4% year on year in 2016, pushed 
up by food price inflation as agriculture stagnated (Figure 3.13.4). 
Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, rose to 0.6%, but 
wholesale price deflation persisted until late in the year. Responding to 
tame inflation and slow growth, the central bank cut the discount rate in 
two steps from 1.625% in February to 1.375% in July. The money supply 
(M2) grew by 3.6%, and credit to the private sector rose by 4.3%. 
Despite anemic growth, fiscal policy was hardly expansionary, the 
budget deficit equal to 0.3% of GDP. Central government revenue grew 
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by 0.8% as tax revenue exceeding the budgeted amount by 4.7% of total 
revenue, while expenditure rose by 2.8%. Since 2014, the government 
has pursued expenditure and revenue reform to raise tax revenue, 
reduce the ratio of the deficit to GDP, and ensure that debt does not 
grow faster than the average GDP growth rate over the previous 3 years. 
Reflecting these policies, the ratio of outstanding government debt to 
nominal GDP decreased from 34.1% in 2012 to 31.5% in 2016. 
The current account surplus narrowed to 13.4% of GDP in 2016 
from 14.3% in the previous year owing to slippage in the trade surplus 
and lower net service receipts (Figure 3.13.5). This, together with 
contraction in the capital and financial account, narrowed the overall 
balance of payments surplus. Gross reserves decreased by 29% to 
$10.7 billion. The NT dollar depreciated by 1.3% against the US dollar 
but appreciated by 10.0% against the renminbi, partly because of capital 
repatriated from the PRC by investors in Taipei,China. In real effective 
terms, the NT dollar appreciated by 1.8%. 
Economic prospects
GDP growth is forecast to accelerate to 1.8% in 2017 and 2.2% in 2018 
on major public infrastructure investments, robust private consumption, 
and rising private investment. The National Development Council is 
preparing what it calls a “forward-looking infrastructure investment 
program” with private sector participation. Even including planned 
spending under this multiyear NT$1 trillion program, the budget deficit 
will rise to only 0.8% of GDP in 2017. Government debt at a sound 31.5% 
of GDP leaves substantial finances for higher expenditure to further 
boost the economy.
The implementation of the government’s proposed new industrial 
policy is expected to energize private investment. Under this policy, 
seven major innovative industries have been selected as the core 
group to lead growth through innovation and high technology. 
The programs for the defense and recycling industries have yet 
to be finalized, but those for the smart machinery industry and the 
Asian Silicon Valley that aspires to turn the island into an innovative 
startup destination for young Asians—has been prepared, as have 
the programs for green energy technology, the biotech industry, and 
industrial agriculture, which aims to boost value added to agricultural 
products and services. The plans include measures to create an enabling 
environment, especially through appropriate regulation, and to attract 
international talent.
Encouraged by the industrial policy initiative, private investment 
will remain robust in 2017 and 2018. The manufacturing purchasing 
managers’ index for January 2017 signaled strong future expansion. 
Investment in the airline and semiconductor industries will be especially 
strong, the latter driven by the sharp increase in semiconductor exports. 
New investments in innovative financial technology are expected from 
major foreign banks. Private consumption expenditure should rise 
in 2017 and 2018, benefiting from optimism about government policies 
and ongoing consumer subsidy programs, such as a car-purchase and 
trade-in program running at least until the end of 2017. 
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Exports are expected to increase this year and next on strong 
demand for semiconductor components, especially for PRC branded 
mobile phones (Figure 3.13.6). Rising commodity prices and low base year 
effects are other factors. Ongoing substitution in the PRC of imports with 
high value added, replacing them with alternatives produced in the PRC, 
may moderate growth in Taipei,China exports in 2018. 
Imports by export-oriented industries and the airline industry will 
show a corresponding increase in both years, while terms of trade are 
likely to deteriorate as prices for imports recover from sharp declines 
since 2015. The trade surplus is thus likely to trend downward, and 
net exports to make only a small contribution to GDP growth in both 
years. The current account surplus will likely shrink because exports 
of services are not expected to compensate for the lower surplus in 
goods trade.
Inflation is forecast to trend slightly lower to 1.3% in 2017 and 1.2% 
in 2018. Food price pressures caused by bad weather and the low base 
effect for the oil price will diminish, tamping down the impact of rising 
domestic spending supported by mildly expansionary fiscal policy and 
low interest rates. The NT dollar is expected to remain stable against 
the US dollar but appreciate slightly against the renminbi during the 
forecast period. 
External risks to the outlook are a surprisingly steep slowdown 
in the PRC, trade tensions caused by rising protectionism, and strong 
NT dollar appreciation, particularly against the renminbi. To mitigate 
the risk of protectionism, Taipei,China intends to diversify its economic 
ties. The government has announced its New Southbound Policy, 
aiming to foster with neighboring economies closer economic and trade 
relations, scientific and technological cooperation, and the sharing of 
resources, talent, and markets. The main domestic risk to the forecast 
is the possible effect on consumption if forthcoming pension reform 
generates short-term uncertainty about benefits. The reform program, 
to be presented to the legislature in May 2017, aims to unify 13 pension 
schemes into a single plan that introduces portable accounts to improve 
job mobility.
Policy challenge—encouraging innovative 
entrepreneurship
Relatively low GDP growth rates, at 0.7% in 2015 and 1.5% last year, 
indicate that Taipei,China needs to raise productivity to boost growth. 
This is what the government’s new industrial policy intends to do. 
The policy aligns with the findings of several studies indicating that 
productivity can be improved by encouraging innovative entrepreneurs 
(Transcending the Middle-Income Challenge on page 47). The entry of 
new enterprises encourages innovation through so-called “creative 
destruction.” New firms have been found to engage in radical innovation 
to boost growth in total factor productivity. Further, older firms, 
especially in high-technology industries, innovate more intensively 
when facing competition from new firms.
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Research has documented that high-income economies experience 
more innovative entrepreneurship than do lower-income economies. 
That is, high-income economies such as Taipei,China tend to have a 
higher ratio of opportunity-driven entrepreneurs who believe their 
products or services are new to the market. However, the same 
relationship does not necessarily exist when income differentials are 
replaced by growth rates. Some evidence to this effect is provided by 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset, a global survey of adults 
aged 18–64. This dataset does not show significant correlation between 
the proportion of the cohort population who are entrepreneurs or 
owners of new businesses and the growth rate. However, it does find 
positive correlation between the proportion of entrepreneurs who 
expect to create six or more jobs within 5 years and the growth rate. 
Thus, in analyzing innovative entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs should 
not be treated as a homogeneous group but differentiated according to 
their motivations or expectations regarding job creation. 
These data are presented in Figure 3.13.7. The plot groups middle- 
and high-income economies into low-growth and high-growth 
categories. The four groups are plotted against the percentage of 
entrepreneurs who expect to create six or more jobs in 5 years, or job 
creator share (JCS). Each box and whiskers plot indicates the range 
of JCS in each category of economy. The plot shows that high-income 
economies tend to have a higher JCS and that, in the high-income group, 
the high-growth group has a higher JCS than the low-growth group. 
Also, there is a much narrower job-creation gap between high- and 
low-growth economies in the middle-income group than between the 
high- and low-growth economies in the high-income group, implying 
a lower correlation between JCS and growth rates in middle-income 
economies.
While this correlation analysis does not indicate the direction 
of causality—that is, whether higher income or higher growth leads 
to a higher JCS, or the other way around—these results provide 
some indication that nurturing new firms that have concrete plans 
for creating jobs is a promising means of improving productivity. 
Thus, in implementing its new industrial policy, Taipei,China should 
give priority to providing incentives for those start-ups that have 
concrete and realistic plans to create jobs.
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This chapter was written by Rehman Gul of the Afghanistan Resident Mission, ADB, Kabul.
Afghanistan 
Growth rose to 2% in 2016 on recovery in agriculture as industry and services slowed. Daunting 
challenges weigh on public confidence: an increasingly aggressive insurgency, a fragile political 
environment, and weak institutions. The year saw progress in strengthening public finances, 
and development partners reaffirmed their financial support. The outlook is for modest growth 
improvement even as an expected surge of refugees brings new difficulties.
Economic performance 
A challenging political and security environment continued to aff ect 
economic activity in 2016. Growth is estimated to have accelerated 
from 0.8% in 2015 to 2.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.14.1). After falling by 5.7% 
in 2015, agriculture recovered and contributed to the revival in GDP 
growth. Growth in industry and services slowed because of pessimism 
across investors, the business community, and the general public. On 
the demand side, there was no improvement in private investment in 
2016. Public investment grew slightly as the government struggled to 
improve its execution of a larger development budget. Weak investor and 
consumer confi dence refl ects an increasingly diffi  cult security situation 
and protracted uncertainty in the political environment. Other major 
constraints retarding investment and business development are an 
inadequate business regulatory framework, lack of basic infrastructure, 
and limited access to fi nancial services and utilities. 
According to a survey conducted by the United Nations Offi  ce on 
Drugs and Crime, the area under opium cultivation increased by 10% 
in 2016. Most cultivation took place in the southeast and west as opium 
production rose to 4,800 tons in 2016, up by 45.5% from 3,300 tons in 
2015. Opium prices also rose and, with higher production, increased the 
farm value of production in 2016 by 58% to $900 million, equal to 5% of 
GDP, from $570 million in 2015.
Infl ation increased sharply from January to December 2016, mainly 
refl ecting some recovery in global commodity prices. Headline consumer 
infl ation increased in December 2016 to 4.5% year on year from 1.1% 
in December 2015 (Figure 3.14.2). Food prices increased by 5.8% in 
2016, accelerating from 0.8% in 2015 on higher prices for meat, spices, 
vegetables, sugar, and sweets. Nonfood infl ation rose to 3.4% from 1.4% 
in 2015, primarily on higher prices for tobacco, clothing, household 
goods and furnishings, education, and health services. Average infl ation 
was 4.5%, reversing 1.5% defl ation in 2015, when global prices for oil and 
other commodities plunged. 
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Revenue collection was a success story in 2016. Domestic collection 
grew by 24% to AF151.7 billion, 15% above the target agreed with 
International Monetary Fund under its extended credit facility 
arrangement (Figure 3.14.3). Development budget execution remained 
weak, however, as only 55% of the 2016 appropriation was spent, 
unchanged from that in 2015. Expenditure nevertheless increased in 
2016 by AF10.1 billion to AF93.0 billion. The overall budget showed a 
modest surplus equal to 1.6% of GDP as offi  cial grants funded 63% of 
expenditure, up from 56% in 2015. 
Broad money (M2) expanded by 7.5% in 2016, and reserve money 
by 10.0%. The expansions refl ected an increase in net foreign assets 
acquired through a strong current account surplus. Monetary policy 
was accommodative and credit to the private sector increased  by  10%  
despite the weak economy and a prevailing lack of confi dence. 
The current account including current transfers is estimated to 
have sustained a surplus equal to 4.4% of GDP as high offi  cial transfers 
continued to generate sales of goods and services (Figure 3.14.4). Gross 
international reserves increased to $7.5 billion from $7.0 billion in 2015 
(Figure 3.14.5). The afghani was broadly stable against the US dollar 
in 2016, appreciating by about 1% during the year following a 17% fall 
in 2015, when gross reserves fell by $300 million on strong demand for 
foreign currency from people wishing to emigrate (Figure 3.14.6). 
Economic prospects
The economy is projected to grow by 2.5% in 2017 and 3.0% in 2018. 
The growth projections are based on favorable weather, a modest 
recovery for industry and services, continued improvement in domestic 
revenue collection and support from development partners, structural 
reform under the International Monetary Fund extended credit 
facility program, and other reforms to improve governance and public 
administration and fi ght corruption. Poverty will persist, however, 
because of low labor demand, the many people internally displaced by 
insurgent activity, and a rapidly growing number of returning refugees—
mainly from Pakistan but also Iran and, to a much lesser extent, 
those who sought to emigrate to Europe. Because refugee numbers 
are projected to increase signifi cantly in 2017, the United Nations has 
appealed for $240 million in humanitarian assistance to help them.
To restore investor confi dence, business regulation must be 
improved, especially for extractive industries. While growth in 
agriculture is expected to be slight because of capacity limits, growth in 
industry and services is projected to strengthen steadily. Afghanistan’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization in July 2016 and the 
implementation of national and regional infrastructure projects such as 
Salma Dam in Herat Province and Chabahar Port in Iran are expected 
to contribute to growth and expand trade through better connectivity. 
Fiscal policy will continue to pursue improved revenue collection 
and budget execution to improve development expenditure. Total budget 
expenditure is projected to increase with high security spending and 
larger expenditure to deliver public services to an enlarging population. 
Government fi nances including grants will likely remain balanced in 
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the next 2 years as development partners continue to fund 62% of both 
recurrent and development expenditures. The ratio of domestic revenue 
to recurrent spending, an indicator of fiscal sustainability, is projected 
to slow slightly to 55.0% by 2018 from 58.3% in 2016. However, fiscal 
outcomes in the medium-term will depend on inflows from development 
partners.
Headline inflation is forecast at 5.5% in 2017 and 5.8% in 2018 as 
global commodity prices rise gradually and demand increases with 
returning refugees. The forecast assumes prudent monetary and 
exchange rate policies and favorable harvests. The government will 
maintain its managed float of the afghani to keep prices reasonable and 
prevent undue afghani volatility  as the uncertain political and security 
situation exerts downward pressure on the currency. 
The current account surplus including transfers is projected to 
shrink to the equivalent of 1.4% of GDP in 2017 and swing to a deficit of 
0.2% in 2018. This reflects some reduction in current transfers that will 
reduce domestic demand and opportunities for employment, as well as 
business sales of goods and services.
Policy challenge—better execution of the 
development budget
Afghanistan has struggled to execute its development budget since 
development partners returned after the fall of Taliban control in 
2001. The development budget covers spending on physical, economic, 
and social infrastructure. Infrastructure and natural resources 
occupy 55% of the development budget, followed by agriculture and 
rural development with a 16% share in 2016. Budget execution rates 
have varied from 30% to 60% in recent years and differed widely for 
various components. In 2016, health utilization was, at 73%, the highest 
accomplished rate among budget sector allocations larger than 2% 
(Figure 3.14.7). Infrastructure and natural resources recorded the lowest 
execution rate, at 44%, because poor utilization of development budget 
allocations has been a policy issue of long standing. 
Development expenditure for infrastructure and natural resources 
in particular feeds directly into economic growth, job creation, and 
poverty reduction. Hence, improving the rate of development spending 
is critical. More rapid development of infrastructure would enable 
greater private investment, support growth, and boost employment.
The economic impact of increased capital expenditure would be 
high. The approved development budget was $2.6 billion in FY2016, 
equal to 14.2% of GDP, but the 54% execution rate diminished spending 
to $1.4 billion, or 7.1% of GDP. An execution rate approaching 100% 
would certainly accelerate growth and bring forward project assistance 
pledged by development partners to speed development. 
Besides insecurity, the key impediment to better development 
expenditure execution is low capacity—in project identification and 
design, project costing, financial planning, procurement planning and 
contracting, and managing the implementation of large projects and 
their complex procurement contracts. 
3.14.6 Nominal exchange rate
 55
 60
 65
 70
 75
        Jan 
      2015
Jul    Jan
 2016
Jul Dec
AF/ $
Sources: Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank of Afghanistan). 
http://www.centralbank.gov.af/ (accessed 20 March 2017); 
ADB estimates.
3.14.5 International reserves
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
 $ billion 
Sources: Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank of Afghanistan). 
http://www.centralbank.gov.af/ (accessed 20 March 2017); 
ADB estimates.
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: South Asia Afghanistan  181
Other hurdles include failure of responsibility, accountability, 
and delegation of authority; a long procurement review and approval 
process; bureaucratic rigidity involving lengthy administrative processes; 
problems with finance controllers in line ministries; weak governance 
and corruption; development partner earmarking of project financing; 
a lack of appropriate decision-making powers; the inclusion of poorly 
designed projects in the national budget; and unrealistic spending 
plans for multiyear development projects, which leads to large unspent 
allotments being carried over into subsequent fiscal years. These issues 
are not limited to implementing agencies. Technical barriers exist within 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and more efficient coordination with 
development partners in some instances could improve execution rates.
The past decade has seen noteworthy reforms in budget management 
but not of substance with respect to development projects in 
implementing agencies. In consultation with development partners, the 
government needs to shift resources from low-priority, poorly performing 
projects to higher-priority projects that perform well. Slow economic 
growth desperately demands higher development expenditure achieved 
through comprehensive reforms, with more attention paid to precise 
costing, project planning, procurement, and contract management for 
multiyear projects. 
The government is developing policy actions to improve development 
budget execution. 
A database for development projects will be established by the MOF, 
which will cover large projects to track information on total project cost, 
yearly costing and funding, sources of funds, incurred expenditures, and 
implementation status with milestones. It will help monitor development 
budget performance and inform a medium-term financial framework 
designed to facilitate forward-looking budgets that ensure appropriate 
future allocations for multiyear projects and help identify financial 
resources available for new projects. Database estimates will facilitate 
recurrent budget allocations for the operation and maintenance of the 
new capital assets built. 
The MOF will not include any projects in the national budget unless 
it is fully prepared and ready for implementation. Administrative 
processes will be streamlined. Capacity in implementing ministries will 
be strengthened, and development partners will be consulted on how 
to make funding more flexible. Consultation with provincial authorities 
will seek to improve development budget execution. Finally, the 
Ministry of Finance will endeavor to work more closely with the seven 
ministries responsible for 80% of development projects.
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Bangladesh
Despite global headwinds that crimped remittances, GDP recorded robust growth in FY2016 on 
higher private investment and exports. The current account surplus expanded, and inflation slowed. 
Continued high growth will require a rebound in remittances and higher exports. Productive jobs 
are needed in manufacturing and modern services for the large number of new entrants to the 
labor force and surplus farm labor and to boost female workforce participation.
Economic performance
Higher private investment, exports, and wages underpinned GDP 
growth acceleration to 7.1% in FY2016 (ended 30 June 2016) from 6.6% 
in the previous year (Figure 3.15.1). Other contributors to growth were 
continued political calm, improved power supply, and higher growth in 
credit to the private sector. 
On the supply side, growth was driven by expansion in industry at 
11.1%, up from 9.7% in FY2015, that mainly reflected a pickup in medium- 
and large-scale manufacturing aided by steady expansion in electricity 
generation, mining and quarrying, and construction. Supported by 
industry expansion, services growth accelerated to 6.2% from 5.8% in 
FY2015. Growth in agriculture slowed further, however, to 2.8% from 
3.3% as input costs rose but farm prices remained depressed.
On the demand side, private investment was the main source of 
growth as public investment was constrained by low implementation 
capacity in line agencies. Total investment equaled 29.7% of GDP, up from 
28.9%. At $2.0 billion, foreign direct investment was still less than 1% of 
GDP. A decline in remittance inflows curtailed consumer spending but 
was partly offset by higher wages in both the public and the private sector. 
Net exports contributed to growth with higher volumes of exports and 
lower imports, mainly reduced quantities of food grain and fertilizer.
Average annual inflation eased to 5.9% in FY2016 from 6.4% in 
the previous year, largely in response to lower global commodity 
prices, steady domestic supply, and a stable exchange rate between the 
Bangladesh taka and the US dollar that translated into taka appreciation 
against the currencies of most of Bangladesh’s trade partners. Year-on-
year inflation declined to 5.5% in June 2016 from 6.3% a year earlier 
(Figure 3.15.2). Food inflation slowed sharply to 4.2% from 6.3%, and 
nonfood inflation rose to 7.5% from 6.2%, stoked by increased prices for 
natural gas and electricity and higher wages.
Driven by accelerating growth in private credit, expansion in the 
money supply rose to 16.3% in FY2016, exceeding the target of 15.0% 
(Figure 3.15.3). Private investment and consumer lending pushed up 
private credit growth to 16.8%, exceeding the 14.8% target as political 
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stability prevailed. While foreign financing of the fiscal deficit was lower 
than budgeted, growth in net bank credit to the government increased 
by only 3.6% in FY2016 and subsequently abated in the first months 
of FY2017. This trend mirrors the increased mobilization of nonbank 
financing in the past 2 years. Expansion in net foreign assets has stayed 
strong, accelerating to 23.2% in FY2016 from 18.2% a year earlier, mainly 
reflecting the larger surplus in the current account. 
As inflation slowed, Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, lowered 
its repo and reverse repo rates by 50 basis points in January 2016 
(Figure 3.15.4). Ample liquidity in the banking system, especially as 
central bank foreign exchange purchases were not fully sterilized, caused 
further interest rate declines. The weighted average yield on 91-day 
Treasury bills fell to 4.0% in June 2016 from 5.4% a year earlier. Banks’ 
weighted average lending rate slipped to 10.3% from 11.7% in the same 
period. The deposit rate also declined, to 5.4% from 6.7%, narrowing 
banks’ interest rate spread marginally by 0.1 percentage points to 4.9. 
The ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to all bank loans rose to 10.1% 
at the end of June 2016 from 9.7% a year earlier. High NPLs remain a 
concern, especially with those at state-owned banks standing at 25.7%. 
Tax collection by the National Board of Revenue grew by 14.6% in 
FY2016 but fell short of the ambitious budget target. Nontax revenues 
also missed the target, mainly because of lower contributions from 
Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission profits and 
the Bangladesh Bank dividend. Spending was lower than budgeted as 
the implementation of the annual development program continued to 
underperform and because current spending on subsidies was lower than 
anticipated, as were interest payments. As a share of GDP, revenue rose 
to 9.9% from 9.6% a year earlier, while spending declined to 13.0% 
from 13.5%, curtailing the budget deficit to 3.1% of GDP (Figure 3.15.5). 
Domestic financing, mostly from nonbank sources, met 90% of the deficit.
Exports grew by 8.9% in FY2016, up from 3.1% a year earlier, spurred 
by a shift to garments with higher value added, and enabled by political 
stability. Garment exports, accounting for over 80% of exports, grew 
briskly at 10.2%, up from 4.1% in FY2015. Import payments rose by 
5.5% in FY2016, nearly double the 3.0% growth in FY2015, on higher 
imports of petroleum products, yarn and other intermediate goods 
for the garment industry, capital machinery, and edible oil. Even with 
growth in overseas employment booming at 48.2%, remittances from 
workers abroad fell by 2.5% to $14.9 billion in FY2016. Lower global oil 
prices have forced budget consolidation in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
economies that host most Bangladeshi migrant workers, undermining 
wages and job security. Weaker currencies, higher living costs, and 
new taxes further squeeze the earnings left for remittance.
The current account surplus nonetheless rose to $3.7 billion in 
FY2016, equal to 1.7% of GDP, from $2.9 billion in FY2015, aided by 
lower deficits in the trade, services, and primary income accounts 
(Figure 3.15.6). With net inflows in the capital and financial accounts 
little changed from a year earlier, the higher current account surplus 
pushed the overall balance to a $5.0 billion surplus. Central bank gross 
foreign exchange reserves rose sharply to $30.2 billion at the end 
of June 2016, or cover for 7.9 months of imports, reflecting its large 
purchases of foreign exchange from commercial banks (Figure 3.15.7). 
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The higher current account surplus in FY2016 helped keep the taka 
broadly stable against the US dollar in nominal terms, depreciating by 
only 0.8% from a year earlier. Central bank exchange rate policy aims to 
build reserves and avoid excessive volatility in the nominal market rate, 
which protects garment firms whose contract pricing is denominated 
in foreign currencies. Bangladesh has nevertheless suffered some loss 
in export competitiveness, especially for minor exports, as US dollar 
strength against the currencies of Bangladesh’s trade partners has, 
combined with the higher domestic inflation, brought trend appreciation 
in real effective exchange rate, up by 5.8% in FY2016 (Figure 3.15.8). 
The Dhaka Stock Exchange broad price index stood at 4,507.6 in 
June 2016, registering a marginal decline of 1.6% from a year earlier 
(Figure 3.15.9). The market price–earnings ratio declined to 14.6 from 
15.9 in the same period, while market capitalization fell by 1.9%, with 
only four new companies listed in FY2016. Prices then moved higher in 
the first half of FY2017 and appear to be broadly in line with the upward 
trends in other markets, both emerging and industrial. 
Economic prospects 
Forecasts for FY2017 and FY2018 rest on several assumptions: Political 
calm will continue and thus support consumer and investor confidence. 
The central bank will be generally mindful about keeping inflation in 
check while allowing ample private credit growth to support economic 
activity. Tax authorities will focus attention on administrative reform 
to boost collections and expand the tax base, and foreign financing will 
be available as expected for planned public investment. The government 
will further raise electricity and natural gas prices to cut subsidies and 
keep current spending in check. Finally, the weather will be normal.
GDP growth is expected to moderate to 6.9% in FY2017 as domestic 
demand rises more slowly and the slide in workers’ remittances deepens 
(Figure 3.15.10). Slower export growth caused by weaker consumer 
demand in the euro area and the United Kingdom is expected in part 
because the currencies of these destination markets have depreciated 
against the dollar. Increases in wages and continued access to credit will 
help to sustain private consumption. Private investment will rise only 
slightly as investors turn cautious ahead of national elections in 2018. 
Public investment is expected to strengthen through fiscal expansion as 
the authorities speed up their implementation of infrastructure projects. 
Growth in FY2018 is expected to remain unchanged at 6.9% as the 
broad momentum in the previous year continues. 
Agriculture is expected to slow further to 2.4% growth in FY2017 
and 2.3% in FY2018, mainly because of limits on area expansion and 
productivity improvement. Industry growth is expected to decelerate to 
10.6% in FY2017 in tandem with domestic demand. With reinvigorated 
domestic demand resulting from higher export income and a more 
moderate decline in remittances, industry growth will edge back up to 
10.7% in FY2018. Services growth is expected to slow to 6.0% in FY2017, 
reflecting slower growth in agriculture and industry, and remain 
unchanged in FY2018.
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Infl ation is projected to pick up in FY2017 to average 6.1% 
(Figure 3.15.11). It moderated from October to December 2016 as the 
arrival of winter vegetables and the aman rice crop lowered food 
prices. Nonfood infl ation also slowed in this period, refl ecting favorable 
international prices. Infl ation is expected to rebound in the second 
half of FY2017, however, with likely higher global prices for oil and 
other commodities, upward adjustments to natural gas and electricity 
prices as the government continues to align prices with production 
costs, and further implementation of salary hikes introduced in FY2016 
for government staff  and private educational institutions to adjust for 
infl ation and improve living standards. Infl ation is expected to edge up 
further to 6.3% in FY2018 as global fuel prices continue to rise and a 
new value-added tax comes into eff ect at the start of the year.
The monetary policy statement for the second half of FY2017 
(January–June 2017) supports growth while mitigating infl ation risks. 
The central bank kept policy rates unchanged at 6.75% for the repo 
rate and 4.75% for reverse repo because infl ation expectations remain 
elevated, including for global commodity prices. It kept the July 2016 
monetary policy statement growth targets to June 2017 at 15.5% for 
broad money and 16.5% for private credit. Considering current buoyancy 
in stock exchange prices, it tightened monitoring to ensure that banks 
abided by statutory limits on market exposure to avoid a repetition of 
the 2010 market run-up and collapse. 
Exports grew by 4.4% in the fi rst 7 months of FY2017, down 
from 8.3% in the year-earlier period. Growth in readymade garment 
exports was 4.1%, down from 9.1%. Export growth is expected to 
strengthen in the second half of FY2017 on higher projected growth in 
the industrial economies, but exports for the full year are expected to 
slow to 6.0% from 8.9% in FY2016 (Figure 3.15.12). Export growth in 
FY2018 is projected to edge up to 7.0% on steady external demand and 
improvement in the Bangladesh market share. Export forecasts assume 
that policy uncertainty in the US, United Kingdom, and euro area is 
resolved in ways not inimical to expansion in global trade fl ows and that 
the garment industry continues to improve worker safety and welfare. 
Import payments rose by 8.2% in July–December 2016 with higher 
imports of wheat, petroleum products, capital goods, and iron, steel, and 
other base metals, though imports of crude oil, fertilizer, and raw cotton 
declined. Imports are expected to grow by 9.0% in FY2017 and 10.0% in 
FY2018 on broadly stable domestic demand and some pickup in global 
prices for commodities, especially oil. 
Remittance infl ows dipped by 17.6% to $6.2 billion in the fi rst 
half of FY2017 as economic tightening continued in Gulf Cooperation 
Council economies and newly constrained infl ows from the US and 
the United Kingdom appeared to refl ect political uncertainties there 
(Figure 3.15.13). Despite the 23.5% rise in jobs abroad for Bangladeshi 
workers in the fi rst 6 months of FY2017, remittances are expected to 
sink further by 7.0% in FY2017 and 4.0% in FY2018. 
Falling remittances and a larger trade defi cit are expected to 
push the FY2017 current account into a defi cit equal to 1.0% of GDP 
(Figure 3.15.14). The defi cit is projected to shrink to 0.7% in FY2018. 
Capital and fi nancial infl ows will likely be suffi  cient to preclude any 
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loss of exchange reserves. The taka will likely depreciate marginally in 
nominal terms in FY2017 on the larger trade defi cit and the continued 
decline in remittances. 
The FY2017 budget assumes 36.8% growth in revenue, attained 
by raising the ratio of revenue to GDP to 12.4% from 9.9% in the 
previous year. Achieving this high target will be a challenge, considering 
that collection in the fi rst 4 months grew by only 17.1%. Revenue from 
customs duties will be lower with rate cuts on several items. The 
collection of direct taxes could also fall short of its target in light of 
sluggish trends in income tax receipts from commercial banks. 
Public spending was slated to grow by 28.7% to equal 17.4% of GDP 
in FY2017, up from 13.0% the year before. Current spending is expected 
to rise to 9.6% of GDP from 7.8% in FY2016, and the annual development 
program to 5.6% from 3.9% in FY2016. Achieving the planned large 
increases will demand concerted eff orts. The fi scal defi cit is expected 
to be contained within 5.0% of GDP as planned, three-fi fths of it 
fi nanced by domestic sources, mostly nonbanks. Implementing the new 
value-added tax in FY2018 will be crucial to advancing tax reform and 
fi nancing higher infrastructure spending to foster growth.
As a net oil importer, Bangladesh continues to enjoy windfall gains 
from low global oil prices. The authorities are expected to cut retail fuel 
prices in FY2017 but leave enough cushion for the Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation to earn an operating profi t and recoup past losses. Since the 
beginning of low global oil prices in 2014, the government has cut prices 
only once, in FY2016, as policy focused on eliminating large subsidies. 
Debt indicators are generally favorable. Public debt declined 
to the equivalent of 27.2% of GDP in FY2016 from 27.4% in FY2015 
(Figure 3.15.15). External debt declined to 11.7% of GDP from 12.2%, with 
a debt service ratio of only 2.0% thanks to the government’s preference 
for concessional external borrowing. Domestic debt rose to 15.5% of GDP 
in FY2016 from 15.2% in FY2015 as the government met shortfalls in 
revenue collection largely by selling national savings certifi cates to the 
public. Interest payments were 13.8% of budget expenditure.
These projections depend on the following: Revenues need to 
rise quickly if the government’s sizeable infrastructure development 
program is to be implemented. The exchange rate should be managed 
fl exibly to off set lower remittance infl ows and encourage exports. 
Institutional and regulatory reform needs to be accelerated, and 
infrastructure defi cits amended, to improve the investment climate. 
Political stability must be maintained and security strengthened to boost 
investor confi dence. 
Policy challenge—promoting productive jobs
Bangladesh faces an employment challenge. Productive, well-paid jobs 
need to be created for the 1.4 million workers who join the workforce 
each year. Female workforce participation is still low despite sizeable 
employment in the garment industry, minimizing women’s contribution 
to economic development. Productive jobs in manufacturing and modern 
services are needed for surplus labor currently in low-productivity 
agriculture (Table 3.15.2).
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3.15.2 Labor force participation rate, education level and sector-productivity (2013) 
Male Female Total
Labor force prticipation rate (age 15 years and above)(%) 81.7 33.5 57.1
Education of the employed labor force (%)
 None 21.3 21.4 21.3
 Primary (class I–V)) 26.3 34.7 28.7
 Secondary (class VI–X) 31.1 29.3 30.6
 Higher secondary (class XI–XII) 13.8 10.4 12.8
 Tertiary (all degrees or diplomas)  7.0  3.9  6.1
 Others (unknown)  0.5  0.4  0.4
Agriculture Industry Services
Sector productivitya 0.36 1.33 1.64
Number of employed (million) 26.2 12.1 19.8
a Ratio of sector’s shares in GDP and employment.
Sources: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). 2015. Labour Force Survey 2013; BBS. 2016. National 
Accounts Statistics. June; ADB estimates.
The government seeks to tackle the employment challenge by 
promoting high growth led by manufacturing and by accelerating 
regional development and the rural transformation.
Under the Seventh Five-Year Plan, FY2016–FY2020, the government 
is implementing measures to diversify the manufacturing base and 
identify new sources of growth and jobs. In addition to readymade 
garments, which supply 40% of manufacturing value added and 60% of 
manufacturing jobs, the government is focusing its eff orts on products 
with high labor intensity and export potential such as footwear and 
leather products, jute and other agro-processed goods, electrical 
and electronic goods, light engineering, information technology 
services, medium-sized shipbuilding, ceramics, and pharmaceuticals. 
It is extending the duty-free import facility for raw materials and 
intermediate inputs used in agro-processing and shipbuilding, as well as 
revamping the duty-drawback system to guarantee to exporting fi rms 
world prices for imported inputs. The central bank is expanding its 
refi nancing window to support labor-intensive small and medium-sized 
enterprises. 
The government is reviewing import tariff s to mitigate any bias 
against exports, aiming to weaken eff ective protection for domestic 
manufacturers and thereby encourage them to enhance their 
productivity and competiveness. It has stepped up eff orts to gain greater 
access to untraditional export markets such as the People’s Republic 
of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey.
A government program of investment in skills for employment aims 
to make the skills development system more market oriented and so 
improve employability and productivity. 
The government has decided to allow public and private entities alike 
to set up special economic zones toward catalyzing private investment, 
integrating into global value chains, and diversifying exports to create 
jobs. To attract private capital, these zones will provide one-stop services 
188  Asian Development Outlook 2017
to set up factories to produce garments and other goods and to simplify 
compliance with regulatory requirements, and they will be able to source 
raw materials readily from domestic supply chains. Several of these zones 
are attracting domestic and foreign investment interest and are expected 
to become operational in the next couple of years.
Under the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the government set a high priority 
on job creation in rural areas through skills training and strengthening 
producer and marketer cooperatives. The government is strengthening 
information and communication technology infrastructure in rural 
areas to disseminate modern techniques in agriculture, fisheries, and 
livestock. It emphasizes the development of agriculture value chains 
through private investment by encouraging the commercialization of 
agriculture, promoting a shift to high-value crops, and streamlining 
market access. 
The government is developing rural areas by upgrading rural 
roads to reduce user costs, facilitating connectivity with railways and 
waterways to promote multimodal transport systems and improve 
logistics, and developing growth centers. It is allocating more resources 
to transport infrastructure and power supply improvement in the 
country’s lagging regions in the northwest and south, with a view to 
promoting manufacturing and small and medium-sized enterprises 
through tax incentives, low-interest loans, and special economic 
zones. A government priority is to complete the Dhaka–Chittagong 
Expressway, which will substantially shorten travel time between the 
capital and the main port city. 
The government merged the Board of Investment and the 
Privatization Commission into the new Bangladesh Investment 
Development Authority (BIDA). In addition to encouraging domestic 
and foreign private investment, it assists in setting up industries and 
provides other services to investors. 
To attract investment, foster rapid manufacturing-led growth, and 
create jobs, Bangladesh needs to reduce the cost of doing business. 
Most cost indicators surveyed by the World Bank—for enforcing 
contracts, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, and 
paying taxes—rank Bangladesh in the bottom 10% of the countries 
covered (Figure 3.15.16). As a priority initiative, BIDA is coordinating 
agencies’ efforts to reduce the costs of doing business in Bangladesh. 
To improve access to electricity, the government is investing 
heavily in power generation. In 2017, it expects to add another 1,840 
megawatts to the current 15,350 megawatts of generating capacity. 
Transmission and distribution lines are being expanded and prepaid 
meters introduced to reduce system losses and improve management. 
Bangladesh is expecting to import another 500 megawatts of electricity 
from India by 2018. Regulations on electricity transmission and 
distribution tariffs announced in 2016 allow utilities to approach the 
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission periodically for tariff review 
and revision to cover costs. 
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Bhutan 
Growth quickened in FY2016 on higher construction and investment. Inflation fell to a new low, 
and foreign exchange reserves strengthened. The outlook is for marked growth acceleration on 
expanded investment in hydropower for export, the economic mainstay, and added capacity in 
electricity generation. The government keenly focuses on inclusive growth. Policies to foster more 
adequate urban housing in the face of very rapid urbanization are a challenge.
Economic performance
The economy grew by 6.4% in FY2016 (ended 30 June 2016), slightly 
higher than the 6.1% a year earlier, driven mainly by accelerated 
construction on three major hydropower projects (Figure 3.16.1). 
On the supply side, industry was the main driver of higher growth, 
expanding by 7.3% from 6.0% a year earlier. Construction picked 
up, boosting demand for construction goods and so strengthening 
manufacturing. Even with the Dagachhu hydropower plant going into 
full production, electricity generation and export earnings from it 
declined because of weak water flows. Expansion in services slipped to 
7.1% from 8.3% in FY2015. This reflected in part a 9% decline in dollar 
earnings from tourism, which usually contributes about 4% of GDP, 
as some visitors shunned the Himalayas after devastating earthquakes 
in Nepal in April and May 2015. Growth in agriculture improved to 4.0% 
from 3.5% owing to government initiatives promoting self-sufficiency 
and import substitution. 
Consumption expanded by 5.6% in FY2016 from 1.6% a year 
earlier and remained the largest demand-side component of GDP 
(Figure 3.16.2). The acceleration was driven by higher household 
incomes and falling prices, as well as increased public spending, 
particularly on education. Investment growth edged up to 20.9% from 
20.0%, primarily because of steadily expanding work on hydropower 
projects. Consumption and investment growth offset deterioration in 
net exports as export volume suffered a slight decline, while imports of 
construction materials and machinery increased.
Average inflation halved to 3.3% in FY2016. Prices in Bhutan broadly 
follow market prices in India because most imports come from there. 
The Indian wholesale price index dropped into deflation in January 2015 
and returned to positive territory only in March 2016, suppressing 
inflation in Bhutan (Figure 3.16.3). Domestic food inflation was moderate 
in May 2016 but spiked higher in December because of destructive rains 
that peaked in July 2016, while there was a rise in imported food prices 
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in the last quarter of 2016 mainly because of disruption to border trade 
when India demonetized most of its currency. Nonfood prices trended 
lower, benefi tting from lower transport costs with weak global oil prices. 
However, they moved higher in the last quarter of 2016, mainly on a 
jump in rental housing costs, as did overall infl ation. 
Fiscal policy continued to be progressive. As FY2016 was the middle 
of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, program implementation was at its 
highest. With increased capital spending, government expenditure 
grew sharply by 36.3% to the equivalent of 35.4% of GDP (Figure 3.16.4). 
Despite an increase in total revenue by only 1.8%, budget resources 
grew by 20.7% because of a 70.6% increase in grants, mainly from the 
Government of India, to fi nance infrastructure, agriculture, health, and 
education projects. The overall budget balance fell into a defi cit equal to 
3.0% of GDP, which was within the limits set by the fi ve-year plan and 
the medium-term national budget framework. 
Outstanding external debt rose in FY2016 to $2.3 billion, equal to 
109.5% of GDP, with new loans to expand investment in hydropower 
projects (Figure 3.16.5). Two-thirds of external debt is for hydropower 
development fi nanced by the Government of India and linked to 
long-term electricity purchase contracts and explicit guarantees that 
cover fi nancial and construction risks. Given this—and that the balance 
of external debt is largely on concessional terms—the International 
Monetary Fund assesses Bhutan’s risk of external debt distress to be 
moderate.
Monetary policy aims to manage credit to avoid overheating and 
ensure the stability of the parity exchange rate peg to the Indian rupee. 
Broad money grew by 15.8% in FY2016, slightly higher than the annual 
average of 14.5% over the past decade (Figure 3.16.6). Growth in broad 
money is attributed to a 16.4% increase in net foreign assets and 
14.7% expansion in credit to the private sector, little changed from 
a year earlier. The Royal Monetary Authority guarantees suffi  cient 
Indian rupee reserves available on demand to meet payments. 
Gross international reserves rose by 16.7% to $1.1 billion, cover for 
11.3 months of imports, higher than the traditional rule of thumb of 
3 months (Figure 3.16.7). The increase primarily refl ects Indian rupee 
reserves expanding enough to cover 3.8 months of imports from India. 
The current account defi cit is high, rising even higher to 29.4% of 
GDP in FY2016 from 28.3% a year earlier (Figure 3.16.8). This largely 
refl ects a widened trade defi cit, in particular with India, mostly from 
expanded imports of capital goods and intermediates for industry. 
The services defi cit improved slightly because of lower transport 
costs and a marked increase in Indian tourist arrivals, which helped 
compensate for the fall in tourists paying with convertible currency and 
larger payments for construction services. The defi cit in the primary 
income account worsened as interest payments on hydropower debt 
grew, while the surplus in secondary income improved markedly 
because of increased Indian grants for budget support. 
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Economic prospects
Growth is projected to accelerate to 8.2% in FY2017, mainly on 
stepped-up hydropower plant construction and the completion of 
projects included in the five-year plan. It is forecast to surge to 9.9% 
in FY2018 as electricity-generating capacity is added, provided that 
hydropower projects are commissioned as planned. 
Industry growth is expected to strengthen markedly in FY2017 as 
electricity output increases with the assumed return of normal weather, 
work on large hydropower projects continues, and infrastructure 
damaged by last year’s torrential rains is rehabilitated. It is expected 
to surge in FY2018 on much higher electricity output and exports 
following the completion of the Mangdechhu hydropower plant and 
the partial commissioning of the Punatsangchhu II hydropower plant. 
Services growth in FY2017 and FY2018 is projected to improve on 
faster expansion in industry, and a recovery in tourism as worries over 
earthquakes in the Himalayas fade. Currency demonetization in India 
in November 2016 should have no lasting impact in Bhutan. With the 
quickened pace of hydropower investment and production, consumer 
incomes and spending will accelerate in FY2017 and FY2018. 
Inflation is forecast to increase to 4.9% in FY2017 and 5.4% in 
FY2018 in line with higher wholesale prices expected in India and a 
three-year domestic electricity tariff hike that started to take effect in 
January 2017. While the projected increase in global oil prices would 
increase transportation costs, continued low global prices for other 
commodities and India’s strict monetary targeting will likely sustain 
broad price stability. 
The government plans to slow expenditure growth sharply to 
4.4% in FY2017 from over 36% a year earlier as capital expenditure 
drops with the completion of five-year plan activities in the next 
2 years. Investment in hydropower projects is unaffected by this 
decline, however, because financing and expenditure are under a 
public corporation. Total budget resources will slow in tandem to 4.9% 
with lower budgetary grants from India after the surge in FY2016. 
Tax revenue is projected to increase by 6.6%, mainly on higher 
corporate tax collection from hydropower. Notably, a much larger 
minimum personal income tax exemption is expected to deduct 2.5% 
from projected tax revenues, but it is budgeted to be offset by higher 
receipts from mineral royalties and rent. With growth in planned 
expenditure outpacing that of total revenue, the budget deficit is 
expected to widen to the equivalent of 5.3% of GDP in FY2017 from 
3.0% last year.
Monetary policy will continue to pursue price and exchange rate 
stability. An accommodative monetary policy will channel credit to 
growth drivers. Reform of the minimum lending rate, announced by the 
Royal Monetary Authority in July 2016, prompted banks to slash loan 
interest rates and is expected to boost credit expansion temporarily 
before equilibrium returns in the medium term. Rules and regulations 
for private moneylenders, adopted in December 2016, will bring this 
business under the formal financial sector, supplementing other strong 
measures to control credit after excessive lending in FY2011 put 
pressure on the balance of payments. 
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The current account deficit is projected to narrow slightly to 
the equivalent of 27.4% of GDP in FY2017 before narrowing more 
substantially to 22.8% in FY2018. Imports are expected to remain high 
in FY2017 to supply construction goods to hydropower projects as 
exports grow moderately on a rebound in electricity exports with the 
return to normal weather and an expected increase in mineral exports. 
Indian demonetization in November 2016 is expected to suppress 
border trade somewhat through the third quarter of FY2017 but is not 
seen to have a long-term impact as most of Bhutan’s trade with India is 
settled through bank drafts and checks rather than cash. The current 
account deficit is expected to narrow markedly in FY2018 as the new 
electricity generated from the Mangdechhu and Punatsangchhu II 
hydropower plants boosts exports to India. Improvement in the current 
account would have been greater if not for the further delays in the 
full commissioning of the Punatsangchhu II and Punatsangchhu I 
hydropower plants, which are now pushed further to FY2020 and 
FY2023, respectively.
Policy challenge—addressing the urban 
housing crunch
Rapid population growth and urbanization have created new housing 
challenges for Bhutan (Figure 3.16.9). In 2015, the population grew by 
1.6% to about 760,000, with 38.6% living in urban areas, many people 
having migrated to where the jobs are. The result is an urban housing 
shortage.
Housing has consistently been the greatest area of exposure for 
banks. In September 2016, loans for housing amounted to Nu20 billion, 
or nearly one-quarter of total bank lending. These loans, however, are 
made mostly to developers to build multi-storey apartment blocks that 
are rented out to tenants. Thus, although units in these buildings are 
counted under home ownership, they are actually owned by a limited 
number of landlords. High land prices and mortgages at market interest 
rates with very short repayment periods make the terms for repayment 
impossible and home ownership inaccessible to the low- and middle-
income people. 
The inability to purchase one’s own home means heavy dependence 
on rental housing, limiting urban families’ ability to save and build 
equity in their home, which in most other countries is a major 
personal asset. This is mainly an urban phenomenon as most rural 
households own their home, mostly owner built. In urban areas, 
only 17% of households own their home. Although the government 
provides some housing built by the National Housing Development 
Corporation, it is only for a small group of civil servants. Similarly, 
the quasi-governmental National Pension and Provident Fund provides 
housing loans but only to its members, mainly civil servants and the 
armed forces. These institutions solve the housing problem for only a 
small segment of the population.
After food, the largest expense for urban households is usually 
housing rental. Further, as housing construction cannot keep up with 
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urban population growth because basic infrastructure is inadequate, 
landlords decline to make repairs or improvements, knowing that 
tenants will likely stay rather than look for better housing that would 
be more costly. This causes the condition of urban housing stock to 
deteriorate.
The housing crunch is being addressed by reforms and initiatives. 
One model is the Amochhu land development and township project of 
Druk Holding and Investments, a government-owned holding company, 
set to begin in FY2017. It will develop a 160-hectare area adjacent the 
Amochhu River in Phuentsholing, the second largest city in Bhutan. 
The project will protect the area from flooding and erosion, and 
establish urban infrastructure, basic services, and housing complexes. 
Meanwhile, finance reform could aim to enable private developers 
to build for sale to individual home owners. The minimum lending rate 
reform in July 2016 brought more bank competition and lower lending 
rates, including an improved rate for noncommercial housing loans that 
should encourage home ownership. However, further improvements to 
mortgage terms are required to improve access, particularly for low- and 
middle-income groups, by substantially lengthening repayment periods 
and setting reasonable qualifying income standards and down payments.
More generally, Bhutan needs a comprehensive national land and 
housing policy that would provide a framework for urban development 
and housing. The existing national housing policy is being revised 
to address emerging housing issues as well as old ones. The policy, 
to be implemented after consultation with stakeholders, will create an 
enabling environment for a modern housing industry, promote finance 
mechanisms for middle- and low-income housing in particular, establish 
an agency to monitor the housing stock, and formulate strategies and 
legislation in response to emerging trends in the housing market.
This chapter was written by Johanna Boestel and Abhijit Sen Gupta of the 
India Resident Mission, ADB, New Delhi.
India
Growth slowed to 7.1% in FY2016 despite recovery in agriculture. While recent GDP data 
may not fully capture the effects of demonetization, the slowdown did reflect a continued 
slump in investment. Dragging on growth were excess production capacity, problems that past 
overinvestment left on corporate balance sheets, and new bank lending inhibited by too many 
stressed assets. Moderately higher growth is projected as consumption picks up and government 
initiatives boost private investment.
Economic performance 
In the middle of FY2016 (ended 31 March 2017), the government 
announced the withdrawal of legal tender status of all existing Rs500 
and Rs1,000 currency notes to counter black money hoarding and 
counterfeiting (Box 3.17.1). This move demonetized 86% of currency in 
circulation by value. New Rs500 and Rs2,000 notes were introduced, but 
the distribution of new notes picked up only gradually, leaving a cash 
crunch for 2 months and straining economic activity dependent on cash.
This was one reason economic growth slowed to 7.1% in FY2016, 
according to advance government estimates (Figure 3.17.1). This outcome 
was well below 7.9% growth in FY2015 and marginally above the ADO 
Supplement forecast of 7.0% issued in 2016. Much of growth came from 
strong agriculture and government services. Excluding government 
services, growth in value added dropped from 6.7% to 6.0%. Agriculture 
grew by a robust 4.4% as a healthy monsoon helped food grain 
production grow by 8.1% to new records. Livestock, forestry, and fisheries 
also recorded healthy growth. 
After growing by 8.2% in FY2015, industry decelerated to 5.8% in 
FY2016. Mining slowed considerably as oil and natural gas production 
contracted. Manufacturing value added grew by a healthy 7.7%, though 
down from the 10.6% recorded a year earlier. Growth reflected robust 
performance by large private manufacturers, which benefitted from 
lower input costs. However, healthy growth in manufacturing value 
added is at odds with the volume-based index of industrial production, 
which registered hardly any growth. Construction was muted, growing 
by 3.1% as the cash crunch possibly hit real estate activity in the second 
half of the fiscal year.
Services growth also moderated, to 7.9%, with notable slowdowns 
in finance and real estate, as well as in trade, hotels, and transportation 
and communication services. Anemic credit growth continued to weigh 
on financial services, though deposit growth picked up substantially 
immediately after demonetization as people deposited the discontinued 
banknotes. Contraction in railway ridership and tonnage, and 
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lackluster growth in commercial vehicle sales, subdued expansion 
in transportation services. By contrast, there was strong growth in 
government services, including public administration and defense, on 
account of salary hikes for central government employees.
Private consumption is estimated to have grown by 7.2%, much 
as in the previous year (Figure 3.17.2). However, this estimate may be 
optimistic because achieving it would require private consumption 
to grow by 8.2% in the second half of FY2016, significantly above the 
6.1% achieved in the first half—or, for that matter, in the past few 
years. Government consumption is estimated to have grown at its 
fastest pace since FY2011 to pay the higher wages and salaries. Despite 
a 10.6% increase in central government capital expenditure, overall 
investment remained flat, growing by only 0.6%, as private investment 
continued to be weighed down by low capacity utilization and slow 
progress toward deleveraging.
GDP growth got a further impetus from a robust increase in net 
taxes, buoyed by strong indirect tax collection.
Inflation remained subdued for a second year, averaging 4.7% 
(Figure 3.17.3). While food inflation inched up in the first few months 
of FY2016 with rises for vegetables, pulses, and sugar, subsequent 
months saw prices cooled by a better monsoon and summer crop. 
Retail inflation is down considerably since November because of 
lower prices for perishable food, supplies of which tend to be ample 
in winter. Compounding this was a fall in demand as the cash crunch 
followed demonetization, forcing suppliers to sell at lower prices. 
Domestic fuel inflation has remained relatively subdued at 3.0%. 
Core inflation was also stable in FY2016, ranging from 4.5% to 5.0%. 
Subdued inflation allowed the Reserve Bank of India, the central 
bank, to reduce policy rates by 50 basis points during FY2016 for a 
cumulative decline of 175 basis points since January 2015 (Figure 
3.17.4). Moreover, with deposit accretion far outweighing credit growth 
after demonetization, commercial banks lowered their lending rates by 
40–90 basis points as their new deposit costs came down.
Credit growth slumped in FY2016 to its lowest in over a decade, 
estimated at less than 8.0%. This slowdown masked growing 
divergence by sector. Credit to industry has trended lower for several 
years and contracted in FY2016 as investment demand stayed weak 
and corporations actively deleveraged to strengthen their balance 
sheets (Figure 3.17.5). On the other hand, retail credit including 
housing and vehicle loans trended higher, indicating robust household 
demand. Demonetization was a factor in the slump for some months, 
deferring demand and significantly affecting cash-dependent retail 
trade and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. 
Credit growth was further impeded as nonperforming loans 
proliferated to 9.1% of all loans in September 2016, up from 7.8% the 
previous March, pushing the ratio of stressed advances including 
restructured loans to all advances to 12.3% in September 2016 from 
11.5% in March (Figure 3.17.6). Most nonperforming loans and 
restructured assets are concentrated in state-owned banks, where 
the stressed advances ratio increased to 15.8% in September from 
14.4% in March. Particularly affected industries were base metals, 
3.17.1 Banknote demonetization 
On 8 November 2016, the government 
withdrew the legal tender status of all 
Rs500 and Rs1,000 banknotes. This 
demonetization intended to trip up 
corruption, counterfeiting, and the 
funding of terrorism. This decision 
augmented measures introduced earlier 
to fight corruption, including tax 
amnesties to encourage the disclosure 
of black money, agreements with other 
countries to share banking information, 
and the renegotiation of treaties to 
avoid double taxation. The decision was 
envisioned as fostering digitalization, 
improving tax compliance, and 
channeling additional savings through 
the formal banking system. 
India is a cash-intensive society, with 
an estimated 78% of consumer payments 
concluded in cash. The initial currency 
crunch, caused by the slow replacement 
of demonetized notes, therefore hit 
economic activity, causing a temporary 
drop in consumption and employment. 
However, steady progress in issuing new 
notes is expected to rapidly rectify the 
situation. 
The temporary drop in demand 
contributed to a decline in inflation. 
The return of demonetized notes caused 
bank deposits to surge and lending 
rates to drop. Because small enterprises 
generate a large share of India’s exports, 
and are highly dependent on cash, 
demonetization impeded exports of 
gems, jewelry, and garments for a few 
months before the situation normalized. 
Gold imports spiked in November, with 
buyers reportedly purchasing gold 
with discontinued notes even at large 
premiums.
Demonetization is likely to have 
a positive impact over the medium 
term. Along with the forthcoming 
implementation of the goods and 
services tax, demonetization will widen 
the tax net and improve tax compliance. 
With more people channeling their 
savings into the banking system, banks 
will have more money to lend at lower 
rates. Lower aggregate deposit costs 
should improve bank profitability, 
further increasing their lending capacity.
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construction, textiles, food processing, and infrastructure development. 
The implementation of the new bankruptcy code is likely to modernize 
and expedite the bankruptcy process.
The central government budget for FY2017 was presented a 
month earlier than usual at the beginning of February 2016 to speed 
appropriations. Another aim was to counter a practice in which the 
government asks Parliament for enough funding to cover expenditure 
in the first few months until Parliament formally approves the budget. 
The central government succeeded in narrowing the fiscal deficit to 
3.5% of GDP in FY2016 (Figure 3.17.7). Encouragingly, this reduction 
was accompanied by improved quality of expenditure. While capital 
expenditure was originally targeted to contract by 2.4% in FY2016 to 
compensate for higher government salaries, preliminary estimates show 
capital expenditure growing by 10.6%. Current expenditure grew by 
12.8%. Subsidy spending continued to decline from the equivalent of 1.9% 
of GDP in FY2015 to 1.7% as fertilizer and petroleum subsidies fell thanks 
to low oil prices and the expansion of a program that pays the cooking 
gas subsidy directly into recipients’ bank accounts to reduce leakage. 
Revenue grew by a healthy 16.7% in FY2016, aided by strong growth 
in tax revenue and public enterprise dividends and profits. Personal 
income tax witnessed robust growth at 22.8% as the government 
introduced in FY2016 two tax amnesties to encourage income disclosure. 
Excise tax collection also grew strongly for a second year, partly on 
higher revenues from several hikes to excise rates on petroleum products 
in FY2015. Buoyant excise tax collections can be attributed as well to 
growth from other products. Meanwhile, as in previous years, income 
from disinvestment in public corporations was a fraction of the target. 
A committee set up to review avenues to fiscal consolidation 
recommended sustainable debt as the principal macroeconomic anchor 
for fiscal policy and called for reining in the ratio of public debt to GDP 
from the current 67% to 60% by FY2023. To achieve this target, the 
committee recommended capping the fiscal deficit at 3.0% of GDP in the 
3 years following the proposed FY2017 budget, which has a deficit equal 
to 3.2% of GDP. In line with these recommendations, the government has 
adopted 3.0% of GDP as the target for FY2018–FY2020.
Imports declined for a second consecutive year, contracting by an 
estimated 3.7% in FY2016. Although oil imports fell by nearly 2% in 
FY2016, much of the contraction was concentrated in the first half of the 
fiscal year (Figure 3.17.8). Oil prices firmed considerably in the second 
half, and oil imports picked up. Gold imports declined substantially in 
FY2016 because of softening global prices and the cash crunch following 
demonetization. Imports other than oil and gold were relatively steady as 
commodity prices stabilized and domestic demand remained muted.
As with imports, exports revived in the second half of FY2016, 
growing by an estimated 2.5% for the year. The revival was driven largely 
by a pickup in refined petroleum exports and stronger demand from 
the advanced economies, especially the US and Germany. In particular, 
exports of gems and jewelry, iron and steel, and motor vehicles picked 
up in the second half of FY2016. The net services trade surplus narrowed 
in FY2016, tracking a slowdown in exports of software and financial 
services. Remittance inflows weakened a bit in FY2016 as low crude oil 
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prices squeezed host economies in the Middle East. In sum, the FY2016 
current account deficit is estimated to equal 1.0% of GDP. 
Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) remained strong for 
a second year in FY2016 at $36.7 billion after the government simplified 
guidelines and allowed more FDI in sectors like real estate, airport and 
air transport services, and e-commerce. Net portfolio flows remained 
subdued by comparison. The last quarter of 2016 brought a large 
outflow, possibly a result of a US interest rate hike in December 2016 
and uncertainty following demonetization. Net portfolio debt outflows 
amounted $2 billion in FY2016 (Figure 3.17.9). While varying month to 
month, equity inflows amounted to $7 billion in FY2016, which pushed 
stock prices on the Bombay Stock Exchange Sensex up by 16% over the 
year (Figure 3.17.10). Net deposits by nonresident Indians turned negative 
in FY2016 largely because of the repayment of maturing deposits that 
the central bank had attracted from them in FY2013. However, because 
these outflows were buffered by a forward sale-and-swap arrangement 
established earlier by the central bank, they did not significantly drain 
holdings of foreign reserves, which stood at $367 billion in March 2017 
(Figure 3.17.11).  
The Indian rupee remained stable against the US dollar in FY2016 
(Figure 3.17.12). However, it strengthened by 2.4% in nominal effective 
terms and by 4.1% in real effective terms, raising its value against the 
currencies of some trading partners.
Economic prospects
The growth slowdown in FY2016 was primarily the result of sluggish 
investment and of consumption slowing in the second half because 
of the cash crunch. With the central bank printing new currency to 
replace the demonetized notes and lifting limits on deposit withdrawals 
in March 2017, the cash crunch eased markedly toward the end of 
FY2016. Consumption deferred from the second half of FY2016 by the 
cash crunch will likely surface in FY2017 and lift consumption growth. 
Consumption will receive a further boost as several state governments 
hike salaries and pensions for their employees in FY2017 following 
a similar hike for central government employees in FY2016. A good 
monsoon in FY2017 would allow rural consumption to grow at a healthy 
rate, but early forecasts indicate a monsoon still affected by El Niño.
An uptick in consumption could engage excess capacity across 
sectors and invite fresh investment. Public investment will continue 
to be an important driver of growth as private investment remains 
listless. The increase in central government capital expenditure targeted 
in the FY2017 budget augurs well for public investment, but capital 
spending by states is also needed to push public investment higher. 
Public investment is likely to receive a boost if the government receives 
significantly more revenue from the tax amnesties introduced in FY2016. 
Current deleveraging by private corporations and a rising proportion of 
corporate debt instruments being upgraded signal some improvement 
in corporate financial health, which could aid investment recovery. The 
drop in commercial bank lending rates following demonetization will 
provide some relief to leveraged companies and reduce interest costs 
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for productive sectors. Although the number of stalled projects inched 
up in the quarter ending in December 2016 from the previous quarter, 
it remains near a 15-quarter low. Announcements of new investment 
projects leveled off (Figure 3.17.13).
Various outlook surveys indicate some improvement. The services 
and manufacturing purchasing managers’ indexes improved significantly 
from April to October 2016 before slipping in November and December 
as demonetization hit demand. However, they have recovered since 
January to signal a return to expansion with recovery in domestic and 
export orders (Figure 3.17.14). 
Improved growth prospects for the advanced economies in 2017 
could provide a boost to merchandise exports and to financial, telecom, 
business, and other tradeable services. However, this boon could be 
offset by any marked rise in global oil prices, considering that India 
meets four-fifths of its petroleum demand through imports. Resulting 
lower net exports could impinge on growth.
Policy options to bolster growth are limited. The central bank is 
unlikely to significantly reduce interest rates in the near term given 
the risk of inflation and of capital outflow with further US interest rate 
increases expected after the one on 15 March 2017. Higher oil prices and 
the government’s commitment to further reduce the budget deficit will 
limit the extent to which additional fiscal stimulus can be applied. 
On balance, growth is projected to pick up to 7.4% in FY2017, 
primarily on higher consumption. Public and private investment 
is expected to contribute to economic growth as the government 
revitalizes public–private partnerships and as deleveraging in the 
private sector bears fruit. Growth is expected to edge up further to 
7.6% in FY2018 with continued deleveraging and as the government 
works to strengthen the balance sheets of state-owned banks. The 
implementation of a new national goods and services tax beginning in 
July 2017 should lower prices for capital goods, providing impetus to 
investment.
After easing for 4 consecutive years, consumer price inflation 
is expected to inch up in FY2017. With global prices for oil forecast 
to increase by 20% in FY2017, and with most domestic fuel prices 
becoming deregulated, domestic fuel inflation is forecast to rise by 
10–20 basis points. Global food inflation as measured by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations started picking 
up in September 2016 after contracting for almost 5 years. Higher 
procurement prices for pulses and wheat pose, along with an uptick in 
rural wages, upside risks to the forecast for food inflation. The likely 
salary hike for state government employees in FY2017 will add further 
inflationary pressure. The central bank’s most recent survey of inflation 
expectations show them falling because of steep declines for food and 
housing likely due to demonetization. However, the duration of low 
inflation expectations will likely depend on how quickly new banknotes 
are distributed. Moreover, even at current lows, inflation expectations 
continue to be almost double the 4% midpoint in the central bank target 
range for inflation in the medium term. Inflation is likely to average 
5.2% in FY2017, accelerating to 5.4% in FY2018 with further firming of 
global commodity prices and strengthening of domestic demand.
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The central bank recently signaled a change in policy from 
accommodative to neutral, implying very limited scope for further 
policy rate cuts. Its focus has thus shifted to lowering inflation to the 
medium-term target of 4% while mindful that higher commodity prices 
and a stronger US dollar will tend to push inflation higher. Even though 
policy rates are unlikely to go lower in the near term, benign liquidity 
conditions allow bank lending rates to fall a bit.
The budget exhibited commitment to fiscal consolidation by 
targeting in FY2017 a fiscal deficit narrowed to 3.2% of GDP. However, 
the target of pegging the fiscal deficit at 3.0% of GDP has been put 
back by another year. Gross tax revenue is expected to grow by 12.2% 
in FY2017, yielding tax buoyancy at 1.0, which is revenue mobilization 
rising at par with nominal GDP growth. This is slightly lower than in 
recent years. Personal income tax collection is forecast to increase at 
a healthy rate as compliance improves because of legislative changes 
and tax amnesties, even though a cut in personal income tax rates for 
the lowest tax bracket was announced to help consumption recover. 
Growth in corporate tax collection is expected to be sluggish, dampened 
by a reduction in the tax rate for smaller companies, as is excise duty 
collection, inhibited by a rise in oil prices. The target for growth in 
services tax collection could be on the conservative side, especially if 
digital transactions increase. Finally, uncertainty clouds the forecast for 
revenues from indirect taxes with the impending implementation of the 
new national goods and services tax. As in previous years, the revenue 
target from disinvestment, equal to 0.4% of GDP, is ambitious and 
unlikely to be met. 
The quality of expenditure is expected to improve further with 
capital spending in FY2017 projected to grow by 10.7%, against growth 
in current expenditure by only 5.9%. The budget continues to prioritize 
infrastructure and rural development with higher outlay on roads and 
highways, railways, electric power, affordable housing, and irrigation. 
Subsidy payments are forecast to decline as petroleum and fertilizer 
subsidies are curtailed. However, any significant increase in global oil 
prices could force up subsidy payments. Similarly, higher allowances 
to civil servants, a decision on which was postponed to 2017, could 
undermine the fiscal deficit target.
Higher oil prices will boost refined petroleum exports, which have 
contracted in the past 2 years. Global growth improvement would 
help exports, though an appreciating rupee in real effective terms 
could dent India’s competitiveness. Price recovery for commodities 
like metals, chemicals, and food would lift exports, as export volumes 
for them have held up. Overall, exports are forecast to grow by 6.0% 
in FY2017. With petroleum import volume rising at an annual average 
of 4.4% during the last 5 years, higher global prices could push up the 
oil import bill considerably. Gold imports are expected to remain flat 
as the government’s gold securities programs are expected to contain 
import demand. Imports of capital goods such as machinery, transport 
equipment, and iron and steel are likely to pick up with the revival of 
investment, increasing total imports by 7.5%. While remittance inflows 
from oil-producing countries pick up as oil prices recover, remittances 
from the advanced economies could dip a bit owing to policy changes 
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there. In sum, the current account deficit is expected to widen to the 
equivalent of 1.3% of GDP in FY2017.
In FY2018, export growth is expected to rise further to 7.0% as 
demand in the advanced economies stabilizes. At the same time, imports 
are projected to grow by 9.0% with higher growth and oil prices, 
widening the current account deficit to the equivalent of 1.5% of GDP. 
The current account deficit is expected to be comfortably financed by 
stable inflows, especially as India continues to enhance its attractions 
as a FDI destination by improving the ease of doing business and 
liberalizing regulations and sector caps for FDI.
Policy challenge—defusing the threat from high 
oil prices
Global oil prices have been on an upswing since early 2016, climbing 
by more than 75% during the year. The rise has been a result of oil 
exporters scaling back their output. Because India imports four-fifths 
of its petroleum needs, it was profoundly affected as the average 
import price increased by 37.6% in FY2016. A rapid increase in the 
price of oil challenges macroeconomic stability in numerous ways 
as it undermines fiscal consolidation, stokes inflation, and swells the 
current account deficit. 
With Indian consumption of petroleum products increasing by an 
annual average of 5.6% over the past 5 years, any sharp increase in oil 
prices would widen the import bill considerably. With current import 
volumes, a $1 increase in oil prices raises the import bill by nearly $2 
billion. However, as India exports refined petroleum products, some 
of the increase in the import bill is offset by higher export earnings. 
On balance, every $1 increase in the price of oil widens the trade and 
current account deficits by $1.4 billion. 
Declining oil prices and price deregulation for petroleum products 
like gasoline and diesel have facilitated fiscal consolidation through 
petroleum subsidy contraction from the equivalent of 0.9% of GDP 
in FY2013 to 0.2% in FY2016. The government currently subsidizes 
cooking gas and kerosene, which comprise 14% of petroleum product 
consumption. To rationalize subsidies, the government has been 
expanding a program that pays the cooking gas subsidy directly 
into recipients’ bank accounts and incrementally raising the price of 
kerosene. Despite these measures, consumption of subsidized fuels is 
estimated to grow by 6% annually. Higher global oil prices will raise 
the subsidy cost and could divert resources from growth-enhancing 
capital expenditure. Further, a substantial rise in oil prices could force 
the partial rolling back of excise duty hikes enacted in the second 
half of FY2015. The consequent loss of revenue would constrain fiscal 
consolidation.
A rise in oil prices will directly affect decontrolled prices for various 
fuels with a combined weight of 2.4% on the consumer price index. 
However, as nearly 40% of the market price of these fuels is government 
tax that would be unaffected by higher global prices, a 20% increase in 
global oil prices would raise domestic prices for refined fuels by 12%, 
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lifting retail inflation by 30 basis points. The indirect effect will be 
larger as higher fuel prices spillover to transportation costs. Fares for 
buses, taxis, auto-rickshaws, railways, and so on have a combined weight 
of 2.1% on the index, and the effect of a 20% increase in global oil prices 
would lift consumer inflation by 50 basis points. 
To mitigate India’s vulnerability to oil price swings, the government 
has proposed reducing dependence on imported oil by 10% over the next 
5 years. This is to be done by making domestic production more efficient 
and attracting foreign and domestic private investment into the sector. 
A new hydrocarbon exploration and licensing policy introduced in 2016 
encourages participation by placing under a single license exploration 
for conventional and unconventional oil and gas resources including 
coal bed methane, shale gas and oil, tight gas, and gas hydrates. It also 
introduces a revenue-sharing model that is easy to administer and frees 
up the marketing and pricing of the oil and natural gas produced. In 
addition, the government approved a policy paving the way to auction to 
public or private buyers 100 prospective mineral blocks. State-owned oil 
firms are now free to determine their own oil import policies regarding 
sources and pricing to enable them to compete efficiently. Also allowed 
now are exploration and production projects 100% financed by FDI. 
Meanwhile, to enhance exports of refined petroleum products, India 
is augmenting its refining capacity by setting up new state-owned 
refineries and allowing up to 49% FDI in private projects.
This chapter was written by Masato Nakane of the South Asia Department, ADB, Manila; 
and Macrina Mallari and Remedios Baes-Espineda, consultants, South Asia Department, 
ADB, Manila.
Maldives
Tourism recovered slightly in 2016 but remained weak for a third year, leaving growth to be 
sustained by expansive fiscal policy. The current account deficit widened on imports for 
infrastructure development. Inflation stayed low. The outlook is for continued moderate growth. 
Careful fiscal management is needed to ensure the success of efforts to boost tourism and 
develop infrastructure to foster a more diversified economy.
Economic performance
Growth picked up slightly to an estimated 3.4% in 2016 from 2.8% 
in 2015 as construction remained prominent, though it grew at a more 
moderate pace than in the previous 2 years. Tourism recovered from 
a decline in 2015, but its subpar performance contributed little to 
growth. Most of the rest of the 0.6 percentage point increase in GDP 
growth came from modest gains in other sectors (except transport 
and communication) and a recovery in net indirect taxes less subsidies 
(Figure 3.18.1). 
Continued high public investment in construction pushed imports 
up. Notable among imports were materials and equipment to construct 
the Friendship Bridge linking Malé, the capital, to the nearby island of 
Hulhulé. 
Indicators showed some improvement in tourism, which supplies 
more than a quarter of GDP, but sector performance continued to be 
weak in 2016, mainly on account of disappointing tourist arrivals. 
Despite 4.2% growth, up from 2.4% in 2015, arrivals were, at 1.3 million, 
below target because of a further decline of 10% from the People’s 
Republic of China, the largest single market. Visitors from Europe, the 
Middle East, and South Asia all increased but managed to lift sector 
growth by only 1.2% (Figure 3.18.2). Tourism earnings measured by 
bed-night occupancy recovered minimally to 2.3% growth, but the 
average duration of stay shortened by 3.5%. 
 Fisheries recovered in 2016 with fish purchases up by 7.0% following 
a 10.4% decline in 2015. Growth in other sectors was modest. 
Following the government’s decision to remove subsidies on staple 
goods in October 2016, except on food for the poor, food prices jumped 
by 70%–100% in Malé and even more on far-flung atolls despite price 
controls. This pushed average consumer inflation up to 1.8% in the 
fourth quarter of 2016, though average inflation for the whole year was 
still at a record low of 0.5% on account of low international prices for 
commodities, especially food and fuel (Figure 3.18.3). 
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Lower expenditure and somewhat higher tax revenue, particularly 
from the newly introduced green tax and improved collection of the 
general goods and services tax, improved budget performance in 
2016 (Figure 3.18.4). Total revenue including grants increased by an 
estimated 4.9% to $1.2 billion, though it fell relative to GDP by 1.5 
percentage points to 31.3%. The government reprioritized spending by 
cutting recurrent expenditure in favor of capital spending. Recurrent 
expenditure fell by 5.3 percentage points to the equivalent of 26.4% of 
GDP, while capital expenditure rose to 12.3% from 8.9% a year earlier. 
Total expenditure including net lending was almost $1.5 million, 
falling as a share of GDP to 38.7% from 40.6% in 2015. As the quality of 
spending improved, the budget deficit shrank to 7.4% of GDP from 7.8%.
 As in previous years, domestic debt financed most of the budget 
gap, or 72%, through the issuance of Treasury bonds and bills sold to 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. By the end of 2016, 
the outstanding stock of government securities had grown by 16%. 
Treasury bills rose by 15% year on year with increased holdings by 
commercial banks, while an 18% expansion in bond issuance mirrored 
the pension fund’s conversion of Treasury bills to bonds. Treasury 
bills continued to be issued through a fixed-rate tap system. Interest 
rates were unchanged after being lowered in October 2015. More than 
a quarter of government debt is external, with public and publicly 
guaranteed debt to bilateral and multilateral organizations, commercial 
firms, and credit suppliers estimated at $668 million. At the end of 2016, 
total public debt was Rf36.7 billion, estimated to equal 63% of GDP, 
unchanged from a year earlier. 
Low inflation allowed the Maldives Monetary Authority (MMA) to 
maintain an accommodative policy in 2016. Banks’ required minimum 
reserve ratio and overnight deposit and borrowing rates were kept low. 
Growth in loans and advances to the private sector slowed marginally 
to 10.5% from 12.3% in the previous year. Growth in the money supply 
slowed substantially to 0.1% from 12.3% in 2015, mainly reflecting a 37% 
decline in MMA net foreign assets as it purchased a large bond from 
Maldives Airports that allowed the company to pay off a large foreign 
obligation (Box 3.18.1). Banks’ net domestic assets grew by almost 25% 
on account of increased investment in securities (Figure 3.18.5).
With lower tourism receipts but a persistently large trade deficit, the 
current account deficit deteriorated further to the equivalent of 17.7% 
of GDP from 9.5% in 2015 (Figure 3.18.6). Exports fell by 14.8% largely 
because re-exports of jet fuel declined; tuna exports were broadly 
unchanged. Meanwhile, imports grew by 6.5% on higher demand for 
machinery, building materials, and electrical equipment. Payments for 
services, interest, and worker remittances expanded moderately.
 Foreign direct investment and other financing inflows are 
estimated to have increased by 14% in 2016 from a year earlier 
but were still insufficient to plug the current account gap. The 
compensation payment for the cancelled airport contract reduced gross 
reserves in November by $200 million, pulling down usable reserves 
(gross reserves less commercial banks’ foreign currency deposits) to 
cover for only 0.6 months of imports. By the end of December 2016, 
usable reserves were rebuilt to $200 million, unchanged from a year 
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3.18.1  The airport debacle 
In 2010, the government transferred 
responsibility for operating the 
Ibrahim Nasim International Airport 
from Maldives Airports to Grandhi 
Mallikarjuna Rao Male International 
Airport (GMIAL) for a contracted 
25 years. Two years later, the next 
government cancelled the agreement 
as damaging to Maldives Airports 
and Maldivian citizens.
GMIAL filed a case in the 
Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre, and a settlement was reached 
on 25 October 2016. GMIAL had 
demanded $1.4 billion, but arbitration 
settled on an award of $208 million 
plus 4 years’ interest and costs for a 
total of $271 million, equal to 7.2% of 
GDP. 
The MMA paid GMIAL on 15 
November 2016, completing the 
settlement quickly because the 
government was concerned about 
rising interest. The government 
maintains that the money did not 
come from the state budget but from 
state institutions providing what it 
called “generous aid.” 
Of the total, $140 million was 
raised by the sale to the MMA of 
Maldives Airports bonds to be repaid 
within 3 years at 4.9% interest. The 
balance of $131 million apparently 
came from Maldives Airports bank 
accounts.
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earlier, but still less than 1 month of import cover. Gross international 
reserves then amounted to $467.1 million, down from $564.0 million in 
2015 (Figure 3.18.7).
Economic prospects 
Prospects for economic expansion in the near term will depend on 
the government sustaining high infrastructure investment and on the 
expected reinvigoration of tourism.
Growth in 2017 will come largely from robust construction as the 
government continues to invest in large infrastructure projects. Almost 
30% of the approved $1.7 billion budget will be allocated to 704 projects 
under a public sector investment program. After large and persistent 
fi scal defi cits, the government will try to cut expenditure further and 
expand its tax base and nontax revenue, targeting a 21% increase in 
budget resources including grants. The share of recurrent spending in 
total expenditure is programmed to drop further to 61% from 68% in 
2016, while capital spending will grow to 39%, though with a reduced 
allocation to the public sector investment program. The government 
projects the fi scal defi cit signifi cantly narrower, equal to 0.5% of GDP in 
both 2017 and 2018. However, taking into account previous budgets, in 
which revenue normally fell short by 10%–12% and expenditure overshot 
by 5%–7%, more realistic forecasts for fi scal defi cits are higher, at 6.4% of 
GDP in 2017 and 6.0% in 2018. 
Tourism will contribute to future growth prospects as well, with 
recovery expected in the next few years. The government renewed 
its marketing campaign, Travel Trade Maldives, to run from 2016 to 
2020, aiming to bring in 2 million tourists and $3.5 billion in earnings 
by 2020. Plans exist for 50 new resorts to be constructed in the next 4 
years, 20 of them scheduled to begin operations in 2017. More fl ights are 
planned to attract more tourists from neighboring countries, and airport 
expansion on outlying islands is expected to boost tourism. However, 
slow growth in the economies of the main tourist markets could slow 
recovery. Moreover, further appreciation of the US dollar could weaken 
tourists’ purchasing power. On balance, a moderate recovery of tourism 
is anticipated, with 5%–6% growth in arrivals.
Industries connected with construction and tourism will 
shape growth, as will presidential elections in 2018. The expected 
construction boom and a more vibrant tourism industry would have 
spillover on wholesale and retail trade, real estate, and transport and 
communications. The presidential election is expected to spur domestic 
spending and likewise stimulate growth, especially in 2018. However, a 
power struggle in the ruling party and mounting political tensions pose 
a risk that elections could undermine political stability and threaten 
growth prospects. 
With growth in construction and tourism accelerating, GDP is 
projected to pick up to 3.8% in 2017 and further to 4.1% in 2018. In these 
circumstances the current account defi cit would edge up to 18.9% of GDP 
in 2017 and 19.1% in 2018.
As the Maldives continues to depend heavily on imported diesel to 
generate electricity and power water supply, a large hike in oil prices 
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would have a substantial impact on domestic prices. The government is 
trying to cut fuel consumption by introducing renewable energy. Green 
energy systems were slated to become operational on five islands in the 
first quarter of 2017, and the government aims to generate a considerable 
percentage of electricity from renewable sources by the end of 2018. 
If followed through, this would substantially lower electricity prices. 
However, the outlook sees higher global prices for oil and food, reduced 
food subsidies, and inflationary pressures from the elections edging up 
average inflation to 2.1% in 2017 and 2.3% in 2018.
Policy challenge—the perils of rapid 
urbanization
Urbanization has gathered pace in the Maldives, with more than 
one-third of the population now living in Malé (Figure 3.18.8). As the 
capital area measures less than 6 square kilometers, urban growth has 
brought overcrowding, high unemployment, environmental degradation, 
and pressure on housing and other urban infrastructure such as roads, 
sewage systems, and facilities to manage solid waste.
To ease the housing shortage, the government has opened the 
sector to private developers, introduced socialized housing programs, 
and embarked on ambitious land reclamation and urban development 
projects. Results to date have been mixed, with the number of 
residential units markedly higher but prices still prohibitive. Further, 
some residents who moved to Hulhumalé complain about a lack of 
jobs. To address unemployment, the government has restricted foreign 
workers in certain jobs and industries. 
Waste management has been turned over to a state-owned company 
that introduced a new waste collection and management scheme last 
year. The government earmarked $100 million in the 2017 budget to 
build a waste management center for the greater Malé and the Kaafu, 
Alif Alif, and Vaavu atolls. Meanwhile, to control traffic in Malé, a 
congestion tax will be levied starting in 2017.
The socioeconomic problems brought by rapid urbanization in Malé 
require, however, more than one-time piecemeal solutions. Plans must 
be consolidated and strategies coordinated between state entities and 
other stakeholders. Development must reach beyond the capital and 
include nearby islands, ultimately creating a critical mass that would 
generate jobs and facilitate more efficient delivery and management of 
public services. The government’s planned development of greater Malé 
is a start. The challenge is to ensure that the process is inclusive and 
sustainable.
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Nepal 
Growth slowed in FY2016 after devastating earthquakes late in the previous fiscal year, a weak 
monsoon, and trade disruptions. The outlook is for robust recovery in the next 2 years on revived 
agriculture and accelerated spending on reconstruction. Slow growth in worker remittances, the 
major source of foreign exchange, is pushing the current account into deficit. Reform to boost 
investment is critical to lifting the growth trajectory.
Economic performance
In FY2016 (ending 15 July 2016) GDP growth slowed to its lowest rate 
since FY2002 because of an unusual series of shocks to the economy: 
large earthquakes in April and May 2015 that demolished productive 
capacity and incomes, subsequent delays in earthquake reconstruction, 
trade and supply disruption from September 2015 to February 2016 as 
some groups in the southern Terai plains bordering India protested 
against the new constitution, and a second year of poor monsoons. 
Together, these events held growth to only 0.8%, well below the 
4.2% average in FY2011–FY2015 and a recent high of 5.7% in FY2014 
(Figure 3.19.1).
Trade disruption and delayed reconstruction shrank manufacturing 
and construction sharply, while agriculture and services, which supply 
33% and 52% of GDP respectively, expanded slowly. Among services, 
trade, transport, and tourism (collectively 25% of GDP) either grew 
only marginally or contracted. Subsectors mostly reliant on domestic 
markets—such as fi nancial intermediation, real estate, education, 
and community, social, and personal services (collectively 24% of 
GDP)—expanded slightly faster with support from overseas workers’ 
remittances. 
Infl ationary pressures intensifi ed with the earthquakes and trade 
disruptions and, in the second half of FY2016, weak agriculture and 
higher infl ation in India, to whose currency the Nepali rupee is pegged. 
Consumer infl ation averaged 9.9% in FY2016 with sharp increases for 
both food (44% of the consumer price basket) and other goods and 
services, refl ecting shortages of essential commodities in the fi rst 3 
quarters of FY2016 (Figure 3.19.2). Upward deviation from infl ation 
in India expanded to 4.7 percentage points from 1.9 points in FY2015, 
dampening export competitiveness. 
The government budget registered a surplus equal to 1.4% of GDP 
in FY2016, in contrast with the anticipated 7.8% defi cit to support 
earthquake reconstruction and much-needed investment in 
infrastructure and social services. While revenue continued to rise 
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and exceeded the budget target, expenditure including net lending 
came to 23.1% of GDP, only two-thirds of the planned 34.7% as both 
recurrent and capital expenditure fell short of their targets. Although 
capital expenditure rose to 5.2% of GDP from 4.2% in the previous 
year, it underperformed the 9.3% planned in the FY2016 budget, 
reflecting delayed operationalization of the National Reconstruction 
Authority, trade and supply disruption, and long-standing weaknesses 
in government capacity to plan, prepare, and implement projects 
(Figure 3.19.3). 
With inflationary pressure mainly on the supply side, Nepal Rastra 
Bank, the central bank, pursued an accommodative monetary policy. 
Broad money supply (M2) rose in FY2016 at about the same rate as 
in the previous year. With the fiscal surplus, most of the increase 
was attributable to the rise in net foreign assets and credit to the 
private sector (Figure 3.19.4). 
Trade disruption and a stronger currency in inflation-adjusted terms 
added to long-standing structural constraints and a 29.0% decline in 
FY2016 merchandise exports in US dollar terms. Imports fell by 7.1% 
from a higher base, narrowing the trade deficit by 1.0 percentage point 
to the equivalent of 30.3% of GDP. Workers remittances rose but at a 
much slower pace than before as migrant numbers fell; many potential 
migrants were needed at home after the earthquakes, and demand fell 
for workers in oil-exporting economies, especially in the Persian Gulf 
and Malaysia. The reduced trade deficit and steady remittances 
contributed to a larger current account surplus, equal to 6.2% of 
GDP (Figure 3.19.5). They also pushed foreign exchange reserves to 
$9.7 billion, sufficient for 14 months of imports of goods and nonfactor 
services (Figure 3.19.6).
Economic prospects
Economic growth is expected to revive to 5.6% in FY2017 because trade 
and supply disruptions from the Terai unrest have receded, the monsoon 
has been favorable, and earthquake reconstruction is accelerating. 
Other supports for growth this year are spending on local elections 
scheduled for mid-May 2017 and, significantly, more reliable electricity. 
Kathmandu has suffered very little load-shedding since October 2016, 
in contrast with outages of more than 10 hours per day in previous 
winters. Other parts of the country have also enjoyed substantially 
better electricity supply. Electricity consumption rose sharply with sales 
up by 44% in January 2017 from a year earlier, the increases strong in 
all segments. Improved electricity provision reflects more judicious 
management of demand with more equitable distribution of electricity 
across big industries and other consumers, stricter monitoring that 
reduced transmission and distribution losses by 2 percentage points to 
23.8% as of mid-January 2017, and increased supply from both domestic 
generation and imports from India. If this trend is sustained, growth 
will be significantly enhanced over the medium term. 
Rice production, which accounts for 16% of agricultural output, is 
set to increase to 5.2 million tons in FY2017, a 21% jump over last year 
and a new record surpassing the 5.1 million tons recorded in FY2012 
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(Figure 3.19.7). Construction should benefi t from progress in earthquake 
reconstruction. Of some 532,000 families eligible for housing grants 
in the 11 districts worst aff ected by the earthquakes, 476,000 had by 
the end of December 2016 signed grant agreements and 452,500 had 
received the fi rst installment of NRs50,000 for new home foundations. 
The government has begun reconstructing some 8,900 classrooms 
(of 49,000 estimated to have been partly or completely destroyed) and 
313 kilometers of roads, as well as health centers, other government 
buildings, and water-supply systems. 
Growth in services is expected to nearly double to 5.2% in FY2017 
as positive economic trends off set the eff ect of lackluster remittance 
growth. The US dollar value of remittances is projected to rise by 
2.8% in FY2017, well below the 15.0% average from FY2012 to FY2015. 
The number of migrants going abroad is still declining, albeit more slowly 
after a sharp fall immediately following the earthquakes, refl ecting 
in part weaker demand for labor in oil-exporting host countries. 
Infl ation is likely to subside to an average of 6.0% in FY2017 as 
agriculture output increases, trade normalizes, and Indian infl ation 
abates. Higher public sector salaries and international oil prices appear 
to preclude a sharper decline. Food price infl ation is expected to slow 
considerably more than nonfood infl ation. As infl ation slows in Nepal 
more than in India, the gap between the two will narrow, improving 
Nepal’s export competitiveness. Monetary policy has aimed to restrain 
infl ation by slowing broad money growth. Net foreign assets will rise 
at a slower rate with moderation in remittance growth and a higher 
trade defi cit. Bank claims on the government for the full year may rise 
modestly to fund the fi scal defi cit. 
Credit to the private sector is likely to be signifi cantly higher, 
refl ecting a pickup in economic activity. Commercial bank credit 
to the private sector has risen steadily since the easing of trade 
disruptions in February 2016, while growth in deposits hovered 
around 20%, signifi cantly lifting the loan–deposit ratio (Figure 3.19.8). 
This has exerted upward pressure on nominal and real interest rates. 
Moderating infl ation gives the central bank scope to increase the money 
supply somewhat more quickly after taking into account prudential 
norms in the fi nancial sector. 
The FY2017 budget envisages a defi cit increase to an estimated 
11% of GDP with substantially higher allocations for both recurrent 
and capital expenditure, including earthquake rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. With expenditure historically falling short of allocation, 
the actual fi scal defi cit will likely be around 1% of GDP, modestly 
stimulating growth. Although capital expenditure in the fi rst half of 
FY2017 rose sharply from FY2016, it still fell well short of the budget 
target (Figure 3.19.9). Capital spending is likely to accelerate signifi cantly 
in the second half of the fi scal year, as usual, then revert in FY2017 to 
pre-earthquake norms at about 75% of allocations. Revenue is expected 
to track the budget projection as economic activity picks up and a sharp 
increase in imports means higher duty collections, which contribute 
about 40% of revenue.
The trade defi cit will widen signifi cantly in FY2017 to 41.5% of 
GDP on the surge in imports in early FY2017 to meet pent-up demand 
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and the slower but significant earlier increase following the easing 
of trade disruptions. The current torrid pace of import growth will 
moderate after February with erosion of the base effect, imports of rice 
partly replaced by the rise in domestic production, and savings on oil 
imports as better electricity supply lessens industry reliance on diesel 
generators. The current account is nevertheless expected to post a 
deficit equal to 1.6% of GDP in FY2017, a reversal by nearly 8 percentage 
points from FY2016, because of the larger trade deficit and the slower 
rise in remittances.
GDP growth should continue into FY2018 at 5.4%. This outlook 
assumes a normal monsoon in 2017 and no major political or social 
unrest as local, provincial, and national elections are conducted and the 
newly elected parliament is installed by January 2018 as mandated by 
the constitution. Growth should be supported by buoyant agriculture, 
further improvement in electricity supply, increased reconstruction 
momentum, and a likely increase in election-related spending. 
Higher real interest rates and a slower rise in remittances are likely 
drags on growth. Inflation may accelerate modestly to 6.5% on higher 
domestic demand, notably from reconstruction and election-related 
spending, and despite improved domestic supply of agricultural staples. 
Even with high domestic demand, import growth will be moderate 
after the catchup surge a year earlier. The current account deficit is 
nevertheless likely to widen further to equal 3.2% of GDP in FY2018 as 
growth in remittances continues to languish.
Policy challenge—investment for higher 
sustainable growth
Nepal needs more and better investment to achieve and sustain high 
rates of economic growth. Fixed capital formation has languished 
below the 30% average in South Asia (Figure 3.19.10). Foreign direct 
investment is a critical conduit for financial resources and new 
techniques and technology but has been miniscule despite a recent 
rise in commitments (Figure 3.19.11). Manufacturing and tourism, 
two sectors with substantial potential for more productive employment, 
are either shrinking or stagnant. Factors constraining investment are 
political and policy instability, deficient infrastructure particularly for 
energy and transport, and inadequate formulation and enforcement of 
regulations to promote vibrant and competitive industries.
Since the promulgation of the constitution in 2015, the prospects 
for relieving constraints on investment have improved because all the 
main political parties agree on the need to attract investment to fuel 
sustainable economic growth. The reduction in electricity load-shedding 
is a major milestone. The government is implementing a 10-year action 
plan to erase the energy deficit by increasing investment in generation, 
transmission, and distribution infrastructure and by instituting 
policy and regulatory reform to level the playing field for public and 
private participants. Public investment in transport infrastructure 
has increased, and some major projects such as the Kathmandu–Tarai 
Fast Track expressway are being planned. Further, the government 
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aims to complete the construction of transport and other infrastructure 
projects in a more timely way—to high quality and on budget—by 
improving project preparation, procurement, and contract management. 
To attract private investment in infrastructure, the government 
approved a public–private partnership policy in 2015 and is currently 
finalizing the draft Public–Private Partnership (PPP) Act. It will 
establish a PPP center and streamline procedures for PPP. Capacity needs 
buttressing, in particular for project preparation, assessing whether 
a project should be public or PPP, allocating risks appropriately in 
PPP projects, attracting the private sector, and executing transactions.
The government recently enacted some legal changes to improve 
the business climate. The Industrial Enterprise Act (IEA) and the 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act are good starts toward making the 
investment environment more predictable. The IEA has introduced 
online firm registration and acceptance of digital signatures, simplified 
environment impact assessment, and instituted a “no work, no pay” 
clause to discourage ad hoc labor strikes, which have been prevalent in 
recent years. Similarly, the SEZ Act prohibits labor strikes or any other 
disruption to business operations within a SEZ. A foreign investment 
act is in the final stages of enactment. The draft bill simplifies approval 
for foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and equity funds. 
An amendment to the Company Act to ease company exit conditions is 
expected soon.
Despite progress, a remaining implementation challenge is to ensure 
that various legal provisions are consistent and coherent. For example, 
provisions on “no work, no pay” and related labor issues under the 
IEA could be superseded by the current Labor Act. Similarly, incentive 
schemes offered under various laws suffer inconsistent interpretation 
and application. Different government offices approve foreign investment 
depending on its size, and investors are required to get approval from 
both the Department of Industry and the central bank for establishment 
and earnings repatriation. In addition, investors are required to register 
with the Office of Company Registrar and the tax and immigration 
offices. Businesses and investors often point to a complicated web 
of procedures and delays they often encounter at each agency. 
Eliminating regulatory inconsistency and transparently enforcing rules 
would enhance the prospects for investment.
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Growth accelerated in FY2016, benefitting from major economic reforms and improved security. 
Low oil prices helped slow inflation markedly and keep the current account deficit moderate 
despite weaker exports. The outlook is for higher growth, with inflation and current account deficit 
edging up on higher oil prices and substantial imports for a major investment project. Continued 
economic reform is essential to reach a high growth trajectory.
Economic performance 
Provisional estimates put GDP growth at 4.7% in FY2016 (ended 30 
June 2016), driven by robust growth in services and industry (Figure 
3.20.1). Growth recovery in large-scale manufacturing to 4.6% and 
in construction to 13.8% underpinned 6.8% expansion in industry. 
Automobiles, fertilizer, and cement were among manufactures with 
notable growth. Industry expansion, fi nancial sector strengthening, 
and increasingly active trade fueled 5.7% expansion in services, 
which was 1.4 percentage points higher than in the previous year. 
GDP growth was restrained, however, by a 0.2% fall in agriculture 
output caused by adverse weather and pest infestations that led to 
heavy crop losses, especially of cotton, which had knock-on eff ects on 
textile manufacturing and external trade. To cushion the impact on 
smallholder farmers, the government introduced a support package to 
subsidize agricultural inputs.
On the expenditure side, private consumption continued to drive 
growth, the substantial government contribution to it varying from 
year to year depending on the fi nancial situation and wage adjustments 
(Figure 3.20.2). Investment continued to be, at 15.1% of GDP, very low 
when compared with similar countries in the region, constraining 
growth. The main causes of low investment are infrastructure 
weaknesses exemplifi ed in crippling power outages, a diffi  cult business 
environment, security issues, and bouts of macroeconomic instability. 
Fixed investment from the government and public enterprises increased 
by 12.9% to equal 3.8% of GDP, but private investment fell slightly from 
10.2% of GDP to 9.8% (Figure 3.20.3). Net exports subtracted from 
GDP growth, but the roughly 40% plunge in global oil prices in FY2016 
improved the terms of trade by 10%, allowed the US dollar value of 
imports to fall from the year earlier even as the government and the 
private sector imported markedly higher volumes of goods other than oil. 
Average headline consumer infl ation fell from 4.5% to 2.9% in 
FY2016 because of lower global prices for oil and other commodities, 
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stable food supply, limited government borrowing, and exchange rate 
stability (Figure 3.20.4). At the same time, average core inflation, other 
than food and energy, improved from 6.6% in FY2015 to 4.2%. As 
inflation fell, the State Bank of Pakistan, the central bank, lowered its 
policy rate by a cumulative 75 basis points to 5.75% (Figure 3.20.5). With 
an improved economic environment and lower-cost borrowing, credit to 
the private sector doubled to PRs461 billion, the strongest expansion in 
recent years.
As the government improved revenue collection and restricted 
expenditure, the deficit in the general government budget, which 
consolidates federal and provincial budgets but excludes grants, 
narrowed by 0.8 percentage points to equal 4.6% of GDP in FY2016 
(Figure 3.20.6). The Federal Board of Revenue boosted tax collection 
to PRs3.1 trillion, or 11.4% of GDP, and this was the major factor 
accounting for a 21.0% increase in tax revenue. Despite a marked decline 
in nontax revenue, total budget revenue increased to equal 15.0% of 
GDP as planned, though achieving this required the implementation 
of additional excise and customs taxes to cover shortfalls in oil import 
duties in the second half of the year. 
Budget expenditure was, at the equivalent of 19.6% of GDP in FY 
2016, 0.2 percentage points higher than in the previous year. Growth in 
current expenditure slowed from 10.5% in FY2015 to 6.1%. Expenditure 
on interest payments fell because of interest rate cuts, as did those on 
subsidies owing to rationalized energy tariffs. Development expenditure 
increased by 17.0%, reversing a 2.0% decline in the previous year. At the 
equivalent of only 4.4% of GDP, however, it was held below target by 
constraints on spending. 
The lower budget deficit was financed largely from domestic 
sources. Domestic debt expanded in FY2016 by an amount equal to 1.7 
percentage points of GDP, raising it to 46.0% of GDP and all public debt 
to 66.4% (Figure 3.20.7). Public external debt increased slightly to 20.4% 
after declining by 10.4 percentage points over the previous 5 years. 
The increase in external debt was largely from expanded multilateral 
and bilateral inflows but also reflected exchange rate adjustments. An 
amendment in 2016 to the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation 
Act, 2005 redefined public external debt as debt serviced from the 
consolidated fund  and debt owed to the International Monetary Fund. 
The new definition excluded a minor category called external liabilities, 
which at the end of June 2016 equaled 1.3% of GDP, largely unchanged 
from a year earlier.  
The current account deficit widened from the equivalent of 1.0% 
of GDP in FY2015 to 1.2% as exports declined, net interest payments 
increased, and growth in worker remittances slowed (Figure 3.20.8). 
Exports fell by 8.8% as slow growth in the major industrial economies 
undercut demand, the cotton crop failed, world prices fell for Pakistan’s 
exports, and domestic production costs rose. The gains from a 32% 
fall in oil imports were partly offset by a 7.2% surge in other imports, 
especially cotton and machinery for textile production and electric 
power generation. Workers’ remittances reached $19.9 billion, but this 
growth at 6.4% was less than half of the 16.0% average over the past 
decade (Figure 3.20.9). Remittances were nevertheless sufficient to fund 
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the widening trade defi cit. Supported by net fi nancial account infl ows of 
$5.5 billion, mainly from multilateral and bilateral sources, and a near 
doubling of foreign direct investment to $1.9 billion, gross offi  cial foreign 
reserves increased to $18.1 billion, or cover for 4.3 months of imports.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is expected to edge up to 5.2% in FY2017 and 5.5% 
in FY2018, underpinned by higher growth in the major industrial 
economies. This outlook is supported by better security, macroeconomic 
stability, and improved economic fundamentals resulting from 
the continued implementation of government reform under 3-year 
International Monetary Fund program completed in September 2016, 
as well as ongoing and planned infrastructure and other investments 
under an economic corridor project called CPEC, which links Pakistan 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These favorable developments 
are refl ected in Standard & Poor’s and Fitch upgrading Pakistan’s credit 
rating to B in October 2016 and February 2017, respectively. Moreover, 
the Pakistan Stock Exchange scored the highest price increase in Asia in 
2016 (Figure 3.20.10). Pakistan’s reentry into the MSCI Emerging Market 
Index, scheduled for May 2017 after a 9-year hiatus, further underlines 
investor confi dence in the economy. In this connection, a consortium of 
three PRC stock exchanges invested $85 million in December 2016 to 
acquire 40% of strategic shares in the Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
Higher growth in FY2018 refl ects accelerated infrastructure 
investment through CPEC, which is steadily lifting consumer and 
investor confi dence and thereby further catalyzing economic activity. 
The government can lend policy support by maintaining macroeconomic 
stability and addressing structural issues that continue to inhibit exports 
despite the easing of regulatory constraints on doing business. With 
national elections scheduled for 2018, the budget to be announced in 
June 2017 will likely prioritize measures to foster economic expansion. 
The forecast for growth in FY2017 envisages revived agriculture as 
recovery in cotton and sugarcane off set a forecast decline in the rice 
crop. The revival is underpinned by special credit facilities, subsidized 
fertilizer, and improved global commodity prices. Favorable weather, 
including timely rains in January 2017, augurs a strong winter wheat 
crop. Prevailing low interest rates, improved electricity supply, and 
government budgetary incentives announced in June 2016 should boost 
large-scale manufacturing. The government announced in January 2017 
a support package worth $17 billion for exports of textiles, clothing, and 
related raw materials. It is expected to revitalize the textile industry, 
which suff ered from a weak cotton crop and frail global demand last 
year. Stronger growth in industry and agriculture will catalyze activity 
in the service sector. 
Average consumer infl ation is expected to accelerate to 4.0% 
in FY2017 on a rebound in oil prices, higher domestic demand, and 
expanded government borrowing from the central bank. Headline 
infl ation averaged 3.8% in the fi rst 7 months of FY2017, up from 2.3% in 
the same period last year, with increases for food and other goods. Core 
infl ation, which excludes food and energy, followed the trend and rose 
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by 1.1 percentage points to 5.0%. The government passed the global oil 
price increases on to domestic consumers by raising domestic oil prices 
three times from December 2016 to February 2017, after having kept 
them low for several months. A continued recovery in oil prices will 
likely accelerate inflation, which is projected to reach 4.8% in FY2018. 
The central bank will need to be vigilant and readjust its accommodative 
monetary policy if inflationary pressures intensify.
The general government budget deficit is projected to shrink to 
the equivalent of 3.8% of GDP in FY2017. This assumes total revenue 
equaling 15.8% of GDP, based on Federal Board of Revenue tax collection 
at 10.8% of GDP, and continued expenditure rationalization. To achieve 
the lower deficit, additional measures may be needed in the remaining 
months of FY2017 to bridge a revenue shortfall in the first half of the 
year, though higher imports and the pass-through of higher oil prices to 
consumers may be sufficient to boost indirect tax revenue. A shortfall in 
nontax revenue poses an additional challenge, but it should be mitigated 
somewhat by expected inflows under the Coalition Support Fund and, if 
accomplished, the budgeted sale of the 3G spectrum. 
Targeted expenditures in FY2017 equal 19.6% of GDP. Expenditures 
in the first half were, at 8.3% of GDP, about the same as last year 
because the government was able to contain current expenditure by 
curtailing domestic interest payments and spending on other categories 
including subsidies. Consolidated federal and provincial development 
spending was also low in this period at 1.5% of GDP, less than a third of 
the FY2017 full year target of 4.7%. Any provincial overspending in the 
full year, especially infrastructure development that looks ahead to the 
election, may challenge a key budgetary assumption that the provinces 
will record a cash surplus of PRs339 billion, equal to 1.0% of GDP. 
The current account deficit is projected to widen to equal 2.1% of 
GDP in FY2017. The deficit increased to $4.7 billion in the first 7 months 
of FY2017, almost double the $2.5 billion deficit in the same period of 
FY2016. Services and income account deficits worsened as receipts 
under the Coalition Support Fund were delayed. Meanwhile, the 
workers’ remittances that critically offset the large trade deficit fell for 
the first time in 10 years, by 1.9% to $10.9 billion, because of declining 
expenditures and income in oil-dependent Gulf economies.
The trade deficit widened in the first 7 months of FY2017  by 
21.1% to $13 billion as imports accelerated by 9.2%, driven by an 18% 
increase in investment goods and a 12% rise in oil import payments as 
prices recovered. Investment goods accounted for 40% of the increase 
in imports, and oil nearly 30%. Exports continued to decline, but by 
only 1.3%, which was much smaller than the 11.7% plunge in the same 
period of FY2016 . A third consecutive year of falling exports reflects 
weak global demand and low international commodity prices but also 
domestic structural issues such as power outages, scant investment 
in modernization, and currency appreciation in real effective terms, 
all of which hamper competitiveness. The nominal exchange rate was 
stable at PRs104.7 to the US dollar in the first 7 months of FY2017, but 
the Pakistan rupee continued to appreciate in real effective terms, 
undermining export competitiveness (Figure 3.20.11). 
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The current account balance will likely deteriorate further in FY2018 
to 2.5% of GDP with somewhat higher global oil prices and accelerating 
infrastructure investments connected with CPEC. Revived oil prices are 
likely to improve the prospects for remittances in the medium term as 
Gulf countries may relax their efforts to consolidate their finances. 
A significant increase in the current account deficit could pose a risk 
to official exchange reserves, which peaked at $18.9 billion in October 
2016 and then slid by $1.3 billion by February 2017 (Figure 3.20.12). The 
increased inflows in the financial account from multilateral and bilateral 
disbursements, along with non-debt inflows in the first 7 months of 
FY2017 are providing a cushion for the widening current account deficit. 
Portfolio investment jumped by more than fourfold to $670 million and 
foreign direct investment increased to $1.2 billion with investments into 
dairy, consumer electronics, electric power, and oil and gas. However, 
amortization payments on long-term government debt also increased 
markedly. Expected disbursements from multilateral development 
partners in the remaining months of the fiscal year will be needed to 
reverse contraction in the official reserves as of February 2017.  
Policy challenge—realizing potential from the 
economic corridor
The economic corridor project CPEC, which runs from the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region in the PRC to the Pakistani port of 
Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, is expected to bring substantial benefits 
to the economy. Announced in April 2015 as a $46 billion project, but 
subsequently increased to $55 billion, it provides for major investments 
in energy and transport infrastructure. CPEC will be financed largely 
by the PRC and is expected to be completed by 2030. The project will 
significantly address Pakistan’s infrastructure deficit caused by annual 
spending on infrastructure at only 2%–3% of  GDP in the past 4 decades. 
The government has identified “early harvest” infrastructure 
projects that will be completed in the next few years. Of these, $21 
billion will be on energy projects (Table 3.20.2). These will be financed 
by foreign direct investment from the PRC supported by borrowing from 
banks there. Independent electricity-generating firms will be offered 
guaranteed tariffs for their sales to distribution companies that will 
ensure at least 17% return on equity. About $10 billion in investments 
in transport infrastructure will be financed by a combination of 
concessional and commercial loans from the Government of the PRC.
For Pakistan, CPEC is expected to be a major opportunity to 
boost growth and development. CPEC is expected to provide many 
benefits, especially eliminating the power shortages that have held 
down economic growth in recent years. It will improve connectivity 
to domestic and international markets and so benefit Pakistan’s 
lagging regions. The large investment in infrastructure should boost 
construction and related industries, spurring job creation and growth. 
In the long run, goods from the PRC transiting from northern Pakistan 
to the seaport will bolster the transport sector, further stimulating 
private investment and activity. Moreover, the extensive upgrading of 
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Pakistan’s infrastructure is expected to attract direct investment from 
abroad, including mature industries in the PRC that seek lower-cost 
locations. 
At the same time, CPEC investments are likely to require significant 
increases in imports of equipment and services to implement the 
projects. In the medium-to-long term, these inflows will likely be 
followed by financial outflows as loans are repaid and profits repatriated 
to foreign investors. Higher foreign exchange earnings and exports will 
be needed to avoid pressure on the external account. 
To reap the potential benefits of CPEC and shift the economy of 
Pakistan to a higher growth trajectory, the government must continue 
to address key constraints on growth. Domestic security has improved 
significantly in recent years, but consolidating these gains will take 
continued efforts. Regulation remains burdensome, requiring more 
reform to provide an enabling environment that facilitates business and 
fosters investment. Reform to boost exports by diversifying products 
and markets and by adopting more flexible exchange rate policies are 
needed to maintain external stability. Similarly, structural reform to the 
energy sector and state-owned enterprises are required to fully realize 
investments’ productive potential.
3.20.2  CPEC-energy priority projects
Project Name Installed 
capacity
Estimated cost 
$ million
Progress update Estimated COD
Port Qasim Electric Company Coal Fired, 2x660, Sindh  1,320 1,980 65% Power Plant & 70% Jetty completed Jun-18
Sahiwal 2x660MW Coal-fired Power Plant, Punjab  1,320 1,600 Civil works 95% completed Dec-17
Engro thar 4x330MW Coal-fired, Thar, Sindh  1,320 2,000 Construction in progress Jun-19
Surface mine Thar Coal field, 6.5 metric ton per annum , 
Thar Sindh
1,470 IA/EA signed 2018/2019
Gwadar Coal /LNG / Oil Power Project, Gwadar  300 600 Expect to start work March 2017 -
HUBCO coal power plant 1X660 MW, Hub Balochistan  660 970 IA/EA signed 2018/2019
Rahimyar Khan Coal Power Project, Punjab  1,320 1,600 Feasibility in progress
SSRL Thar Coal Block 1 - 6.5 metric ton per 
annum(mpta) Thar, Sindh
1,300 Open pit mining 2018/2019
SSRL 2×660 MW Mine Mouth Power Plant,Sindh  1,320 2,000 Independent power producer 2018/2019
Zonergy 900MW Solar Park, Bahawalpur, Punjab  900 1,215 Operating Aug-16
Dawood 50MW wind Farm, Bhambore, Sindh  50 125 Construction started Jan-17
UEP 100MW wind Farm, Jhimpir, Sindh  100 250 61 of 66 turbines completed Jun-17
Sachal 50MW Wind Farm, Jhimpir, Sindh  50 134 Construction in progress Jun-17
Suki Kinari Hydro power Station, KPK  870 1,802 Contractor mobilized to start construction 2021/2022
Karot Hydropower Station, AJK & Punjab  720 1,420 Construction in progress 2021/2022
Matiari to Lahore Transmission line 1,500 Feasibility study completed,TSA/IA initialed 2018/2019
Matiari to Faisalabad Transmission line 1,500 Feasibility study completed,TSA/IA initialed 2018/2019
Total 10,250 21,466
COD = commercial operation date, EA = environmental assessment, IA = implementation agreement, LNG = liquified natural gas, MW = megawatt,  TSA = 
technical service agreement.
Source:  www//cpec.gov.pk.
This chapter was written by Tadateru Hayashi and Savindi Jayakody of the Sri Lanka 
Resident Mission, ADB, Colombo.
Sri Lanka
Growth slowed in 2016 with a marked fall in agricultural production, but a pickup in construction 
and investment helped to sustain growth. Inflation was highly variable over the year but moderated 
in general, as was the current account deficit. The outlook is for modest recovery in growth as the 
government implements an economic program of fiscal reform to tackle persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances and a large public debt.
Economic performance 
Over the past 4 years, growth has markedly slowed from the rapid 
pace of the economic boom that came with the end of civil conflict 
in May 2009. Economic growth in 2016 was affected by bad weather, 
with provisional estimates putting growth at 4.4% in 2016, lower 
than the 4.8% expansion a year earlier (Figure 3.21.1). To address 
persistent macroeconomic imbalances and deterioration in the balance 
of payments, the government in June 2016 obtained support from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a 3-year extended fund facility 
program  to pursue revenue-based fiscal consolidation.
On the supply side, agriculture contracted by 4.2% because of 
floods in May 2016 and a drought that has dragged on since August. 
Construction expansion at 14.9% provided the impetus for 6.7% growth 
in industry. Buoyant construction was driven by private sector projects 
supported by a rapid increase in bank credit to the private sector. 
Growth in manufacturing slowed from a year earlier, mainly because 
of weakness in the textile and garment industries. Services growth 
slackened to 4.2% from 5.7%, mainly with slowing in wholesale and 
retail trade and government-related services.
Provisional demand-side estimates of GDP show fixed investment 
rebounding to grow by 10%, up from 3% a year earlier, and a surge in 
inventory building, reversing a decline from change in stocks a year 
earlier, which make these two areas the main sources of growth in 
2016 (Figure 3.21.2). Consumption expenditure grew by only 1% as 
fiscal policies tightened following a 9% upsurge in spending fueled by 
highly expansive fiscal policies a year earlier, which put pressure on 
the balance of payments and on reserves. Net exports continued to be 
a sizable drag on GDP growth because a large fall in global oil prices 
improved the terms of trade and thus enabled nonoil imports to expand. 
Export volume fell by 1% in 2016 on weak agricultural sales, reversing 
expanded export volumes in recent years even as prices languished. 
Average annual inflation moderated to 4.0% in 2016 as measured 
by the national consumer price index. Food inflation pushed overall 
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inflation higher after major flooding in May 2016, subsiding later but 
spiking in January and February 2017 to 10.2% partly because of a low 
base effect but also as drought hit supplies (Figure 3.21.3). Nonfood 
inflation trended higher in the second half of the year because of 
Sri Lanka rupee depreciation and a value-added tax (VAT) rate hike 
in November 2016. Core inflation, which excludes fresh food, rice, 
coconuts, energy, and transport, more than doubled from 3.0% in early 
2016 to 6.7% in December, further quickening to 7.1% in January and 
February 2017. 
Monetary policy switched to tightening in 2016 to slow very rapid 
growth in credit to the private sector that began in mid-2014 and to ease 
pressure on the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves. The 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka first tightened monetary policy in January 
2016 by raising the statutory reserve ratio by 1.5 percentage points to 
7.5%. It subsequently increased its policy rates by 50 basis points each in 
February and July 2016 and then again in March 2017 by 25 basis points 
to bring the lending facility rate to 8.75% (Figure 3.21.4). The upward 
adjustment in bank lending rates started to slow growth in private 
sector credit only in August 2016, and growth remained high at 21.9% in 
December 2016 (Figure 3.21.5). 
Raising the country’s very low revenue ratio is the major priority 
of fiscal consolidation under the IMF program. As the first step, the 
government increased the VAT rate from 11% to 15% in May 2016, but 
the hike was suspended in July to complete legal procedures and took 
effect only from 1 November. With the delay in introducing the VAT rate 
increase, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in 2016 was an estimated 11.9%, 
a reduction of 0.2 percentage points  from 2015 when revenue benefitted 
from a one-off tax. To achieve 2016 budget deficit targets, recurrent 
expenditure was trimmed, and public investment cut to the equivalent 
of 4.8% of GDP from 5.4% in the previous year. As a result, the overall 
budget deficit shrank to an estimated 5.6% of GDP from 7.6% in 2015 
(Figure 3.21.6). Government debt increased to an estimated 79.4% of GDP 
in September 2016 from 77.6% in 2015 (Figure 3.21.7). 
Export earnings fell in 2016 by 2.2%, improving on the 5.6% drop 
a year earlier. Agricultural products such as tea and spices declined by 
6.3%, mainly because bad weather reduced production, though export 
prices firmed slightly. Garment exports, which bring in nearly half of 
all export earnings, increased by only 1.3% as a decline in sales to the 
European Union countered the benefits of expansion into new markets. 
Imports picked up by 2.5%, mainly on large increases for building 
materials and for machinery and equipment, as a 41.5% plunge in vehicle 
imports fully explained an 8.4% drop for consumer goods. Oil imports 
rose markedly during the fourth quarter, reflecting increased reliance 
on thermal power generation to offset hydropower losses caused by the 
drought. Nevertheless, the large average fall in global oil prices during 
the year meant a low fuel bill, which largely offset higher spending on 
other intermediate goods. The trade deficit in 2016 was $9.1 billion, up 
from $8.4 billion in 2015.
Worker remittances grew by 3.7% to $7.2 billion in 2016, posting 
recovery from a small decline in 2015 but languishing well below growth 
in earlier years. Earnings from tourism remained robust expanding by 
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18.0% to $3.5 billion, as visitor numbers expanded by 14% to 2.1 million. 
Worker remittances and tourism earnings thus more than off set a larger 
trade defi cit by $1.7 billion, slightly improving on the $1.6 billion surplus 
in 2015. The current account defi cit is estimated to have narrowed to the 
equivalent of 2.1% of GDP in 2016 from 2.5% in 2015. The offi  cial balance 
of payments estimate is not yet available. 
While the current account remained stable, the fi nancial account 
was weak despite a $1.5 billion sovereign bond issued in July 2016, as the 
government apparently suff ered net capital outfl ow as foreign investors 
exited government securities. The 2016 overall balance of payments 
defi cit is estimated by the central bank at $500 million, one-third of 
the defi cit in 2015. Gross offi  cial reserves fell to $6.0 billion at the 
end of December 2016 (Figure 3.21.8). The rupee depreciated slightly 
against the US dollar, by 3.4%, mostly in the second half of the year 
(Figure 3.21.9). The index of the real eff ective exchange rate depreciated 
by an average of 2.6% from a year earlier, suggesting improved 
competitiveness. 
Economic prospects
Economic growth in 2017 and 2018 will be constrained by tight fi scal 
and monetary policies under the IMF program. Because consumption 
will be subdued, private investment will again have to play a primary 
role in maintaining economic growth. The higher VAT introduced 
in 2016 and improved income tax collection in 2017 will depress 
consumption, outweighing the positive impact of a modest increase 
expected in worker remittance earnings. While the March maha rice 
harvest was expected to be aff ected by continuing drought, an assumed 
return to normal rainfall promises to allow agriculture production to 
rebound from the second quarter. 
Private investment is expected to continue to expand modestly in 
2017. While monetary tightening has slowed the expansion of credit to 
the private sector, credit for productive purposes would be available 
even with the boost in policy rates announced in March 2017. However, 
further monetary tightening in response to adverse developments 
cannot be ruled out in 2017. Further, a substantial increase in budgeted 
public investment will be realized only with strong revenue performance 
and rationalizing current expenditure to off set any increased cost of 
drought relief or other contingencies. Faster growth expected in the 
major industrial economies should lift export performance, but this will 
be off set to some degree by higher oil prices. On balance, GDP growth 
is expected to edge up to 5.0% in 2017, the rate maintained in 2018 with 
further consolidation reform. 
Under the IMF program, fi scal policy will pursue further revenue 
measures to eliminate the primary defi cit, which disregards interest 
payments. The government projected a budget defi cit equal to 4.6% 
of GDP in 2017, down from 5.6% estimated for 2016. The narrowing 
of the defi cit is attributable to an expected nominal 25% increase in 
tax revenue, against a 13%  increase in government expenditure. The 
goal is for total revenue to equal 15.0% of GDP in 2017. Apart from the 
VAT rate increase implemented in November 2016, additional revenue 
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is to come mainly from more effi  cient income tax collection with the 
full implementation of a new revenue administration management 
information system. Moreover, the tax net will be cast wider in 2017 
under amendments to the Inland Revenue Act aiming to foster tax 
collection and abolish tax exemptions. Expenditure is projected equal 
to 19.6% of GDP, or 0.4 percentage points higher than in 2016. Higher-
than-expected interest expenses from further monetary tightening or 
any other contingency such as payments in connection with the drought 
would likely cause the government to delay or cut infrastructure 
spending to meet the primary defi cit target under the IMF program. 
Infl ationary pressure from the higher VAT and modest depreciation 
of the rupee in the second half 2016 will add to the infl ation expected 
from slightly higher import prices. An automatic pricing formula for 
fuel and electricity has not yet been introduced. Infl ation will be under 
less pressure from the demand side because growth will accelerate only 
slightly and the public expects fi scal austerity. Accordingly, average 
infl ation is projected at 6.0% in 2017 and 2018. 
External demand is expected to recover gradually in 2017 and 2018. 
Exports are projected to grow by 4% in 2017 and 5% in 2018 on the 
bases of gradual recovery of global demand, the renewal of concessions 
under the Generalized System of Preferences Plus, the removal of the 
European Union ban on fi sh imports, and the possible fi nalization of 
several free trade agreements. A larger services surplus will be driven 
by continued rapid expansion in tourism over the next 2 years. Worker 
remittances are expected to increase at a moderate pace. Projected 
export revenues should allow imports to expand by 5% in 2017 and 6% 
in 2018 without much widening of the current account defi cit as a share 
of GDP. In addition to expected higher oil prices, imports will be on the 
rise because of continued imports of machinery and equipment and of 
building materials. The current account defi cit is expected to equal 2.2% 
of GDP in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 3.21.10).
Policy challenge—strategies for export-oriented 
manufacturing
Despite reaching per capita income close to the upper-middle-income 
threshold, Sri Lanka persistently relies on a narrow manufacturing 
base. Exports are still 60% apparel and tea, and worker remittances 
remain a major source of foreign currency earnings. Since the end of 
the civil confl ict in 2009, Sri Lanka has not attracted much foreign 
direct investment in manufacturing that could diversify manufacturing 
and exports. 
Also important is to expand economic activity beyond Colombo and 
Western Province. As of 2015, Western Province, one of nine provinces, 
produced 41% of GDP. Further, per capita GDP in Western Province is 
about 1.4 times higher than in other provinces, underlining the need for 
regional development to make economic growth more inclusive (Figure 
3.21.11).
The government recognizes the importance of diversifying the export 
base, and the Prime Minister’s economic statement to Parliament in 2016 
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highlighted export-oriented foreign direct investment. A World Bank 
loan with parallel cofinancing from the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency supports reform to make the private sector more competitive. 
The government is actively seeking bilateral trade agreements that would 
open markets for Sri Lankan products. 
The government has taken up economic corridor development as a 
policy instrument to promote economic growth and address geographic 
imbalances. The Prime Minister announced the development of two 
economic corridors, one in the southwest and the other in the northeast. 
The corridors will align with major transport networks and connect 
urban clusters and rural areas with industrial zones. They will be 
publicly planned but driven by the private sector, facilitating industrial 
investment by easing infrastructure constraints, improving access to 
markets, stimulating trade, and boosting production efficiency. These 
corridors have potential to diversify manufacturing and agriculture 
production bases, help domestic firms become part of global value chains, 
boost productivity across sectors, and create productive jobs. 
For the implementation of economic corridor development to succeed, 
it is imperative to identify new industrial clusters with future growth 
sectors and nodes along the corridors. Infrastructure requirements 
need to be identified to support node development. Policy reform will 
be needed, especially to improve the investment climate. Finding 
skilled labor and creating a sound regulatory framework for corridor 
development are among the challenges to be met. Setting up an effective 
institutional structure in the government is critical to coordinate line 
ministries and local authorities.
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Brunei Darussalam
After several years of declining GDP, falling consumer prices, and widening fiscal deficits, this 
hydrocarbon-dependent economy is poised for a mild turnaround. Large construction projects and 
recovering oil and gas production and prices are expected to lift GDP and inflation into positive 
territory and narrow the fiscal gap. Sustainable long-term growth demands substantial reform to 
the business environment to attract foreign investors to new industries.
Economic performance 
Declining oil and natural gas production, consequently lower 
government revenue, and selected spending cuts caused the economy to 
contract for a fourth consecutive year in 2016 (Figure 3.22.1). GDP fell 
by an estimated 2.5%.
Oil production fell by 5% in 2016, and natural gas by 2%. Oil 
production has slid by 45% since 2006 as oil fi elds aged and suff ered 
stoppages for repairs and maintenance (Figure 3.22.2). Last year also 
saw a methanol plant that uses natural gas as its main input closed for 
repairs for 2 months. The ripple eff ects of the decline in the oil industry 
last year were felt in the rest of the economy, which also contracted.
Reduced spending by the oil industry and the government hurt 
incomes and employment, curbing private consumption and causing 
fi xed investment to fall, according to data for the fi rst 3 quarters of 
2016. Car sales, for example, fell by 12%. Net external demand dragged 
on GDP growth as exports of goods and services fell in real terms while 
real imports were relatively steady. Exports of oil and liquefi ed natural 
gas, which account for the bulk of exports, fell in 2016 by 4.6% and 
1.2%, respectively, in volume terms.
Government consumption spending declined by 9% in real terms 
in the fi rst 3 quarters. Government revenue, largely from oil and gas, 
slumped by an estimated one-third in nominal terms in FY2016 (ending 
31 March 2017), following an even steeper decline in the previous year 
(Figure 3.22.3). Over the past 5 years, the estimated ratio of government 
revenue to GDP has plunged from 55% to 15%. In the meantime, despite 
trims to certain categories of government spending, the share of total 
government expenditure to GDP rose from 31% to 35%, turning budget 
surpluses enjoyed until 2013 into defi cits. The fi scal defi cit widened to 
an estimated 20% of GDP last year from 15% in 2015.
Consumer prices eased for a third consecutive year, with the 
consumer price index down by 0.7% in 2016. Bank lending to 
households fell by 1.7%, and lending to companies dropped by 22.2%. 
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Broad money supply increased by just 1.5% in the 12 months to 
December last year. Pegged at par to the Singapore dollar, the Brunei 
dollar depreciated by 2% against the US dollar. 
Lower export volumes and prices for hydrocarbons shrank the US 
dollar value of merchandise exports by 20%. Merchandise imports fell 
by 17%. The trade surplus narrowed by 24% in 2016 for a 75% decline 
since 2012 (Figure 3.22.4). Declining trade surpluses have weighed on 
the current account, narrowing the surplus in 2016 to an estimated 
equivalent of 11% of GDP. International reserves at $3.3 billion covered 
15 months of imports.
Economic prospects 
A projected modest increase in hydrocarbon exports for higher 
prices should restore GDP growth this year and next. Several large 
construction projects will provide additional impetus if they proceed 
as planned. GDP is forecast to grow by 1.0% in 2016, quickening to 
2.5% in 2018. 
Construction is expected to swing from contraction in 2016 to 
expansion in 2017. A company from the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) plans to start building this year a $2.5 billion oil refinery and 
aromatics cracker plant once a bridge and jetties are completed at the 
site on Pulau Muara Besar. Construction is expected to take at least 2 
years, with exports scheduled to start in late 2019. Public construction 
projects include the $1.1 billion Temburong Bridge, which will continue 
into 2019. 
The economy is showing tentative signs of gradual diversification 
away from oil and gas. A company from the PRC plans to develop 
Muara port, and another is building a $50 million plant to make carbon 
steel pipe. Turkish firms have pledged to invest $1.3 billion in a project 
to make ammonia and urea from natural gas—starting construction this 
year or next and producing fertilizer for export in about 3 years—and 
another $30 million in a factory to make margarine from imported 
palm oil. Investors from Singapore and Taipei,China are developing 
aquaculture, an industry that is expected to expand production from 
this year. Brunei Darussalam has attracted in recent years a center that 
trains helicopter and fixed-wing pilots and other ventures that produce 
animal feed, halal food, and pharmaceuticals. 
Consumer prices are seen turning up mainly on higher prices for 
food and fuel, though subsidies and price controls cushion the impact of 
global price movements on domestic prices (Figure 3.22.5).
Export earnings will get a lift from higher prices for hydrocarbons, 
but imports, too, are expected to rise as investment picks up. The 
current account surplus is forecast to fall to the equivalent of about 5% 
of GDP from 11% last year.
Higher global oil and gas prices augur well for government revenue. 
Nevertheless, the FY2017 budget trims nominal expenditure by 
5.4% from the previous year’s budget. At the same time, officials are 
considering how to target subsidies better and broaden the revenue 
base. Subsidies for household electricity consumption have been 
trimmed for bigger users, and progressive tariffs are expected for 
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commercial users. A proposal to sell a new premium gasoline at market 
prices, if implemented, could improve the targeting of fuel subsidies. 
Fiscal defi cits are projected to narrow over the forecast period. The 
defi cits are fi nanced by transfers from a fi scal stabilization fund.
Looking to the medium term, GDP growth is expected to pick up as 
work is completed to make existing fi elds more reliable and bring new 
gas fi elds on stream. Also, the oil refi nery and aromatics cracker project 
and the fertilizer plant are scheduled to start production in 2019–2020.
Policy challenge—attracting new industries
The prolonged economic downturn demonstrates how vulnerable this 
small economy, the second richest in Southeast Asia, is to hydrocarbon 
price swings and depletion. Oil and gas directly provide more than 
50% of GDP, over 90% of exports, and 80% of government revenue. 
Shifting growth toward other export-oriented industries will require 
deeper reform to the business environment to attract investment. 
Encouragingly, over recent years the government has taken steps to 
improve the business climate: lowering the corporate income tax rate 
to 18.5% with tax exemptions for pioneer industries, allowing 100% 
foreign ownership in domestic companies, competitively pricing land 
and utilities in industrial parks, and establishing a special offi  ce in the 
Brunei Economic Development Board to fast-track foreign investment 
projects. It has outlined plans for a free-trade zone to attract foreign 
direct investment.
These reforms enabled the country to move up signifi cantly in 
the latest World Bank Doing Business ranking, from 97 among 189 
countries surveyed in 2016 to 72 among 190 in 2017. Brunei Darussalam 
nevertheless lags less prosperous neighbors such as Malaysia and 
Thailand (Table 3.22.2). Moreover, it ranked a low 142 in terms of 
trading across borders and 134 in property registration, behind not 
only Malaysia and Thailand but also Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Viet Nam. It was far down the rankings in protecting the rights of 
minority shareholders (102) and contract enforcement (93).
Ranking Brunei Darussalam 58 among 138 economies, the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 of the World Economic Forum cited 
not only the country’s extremely small market but also its bureaucracy 
as signifi cant hindrances to doing business. Compliance with border 
procedures is highly time-consuming, discouraging investment in 
export-oriented industries. Substantial scope exists for the government 
to streamline procedures and make the country’s non-hydrocarbon 
sectors more attractive to foreign investors.
3.22.2  Performance in Doing Business 2017
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Source: World Bank. 2016. Doing Business 2017. 
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Cambodia
The economy grew by an estimated 7.0% in 2016, the same pace as in the previous year. A mild 
slowdown in industry and services was mitigated by a slight pickup in agriculture. GDP is forecast 
to grow by 7.1% this year and next, with inflation edging up and the current account deficit 
narrowing. Reviving agriculture is critical to sustaining rapid growth and poverty reduction.
Economic performance 
GDP is estimated to have grown by 7.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.23.1). Last 
year’s strong growth came on the heels of the country graduating in 
2015 from low-income to lower-middle-income status. 
Though delayed, rainfall improved last year to allow agriculture to 
grow by an estimated 1.8% following near stagnation in 2015. Growth in 
industry slowed somewhat but still came in at healthy 10.5% growth last 
year, against 11.7% in 2015. With subdued growth in the major industrial 
economies, growth in garment and footwear production decelerated 
from 9.8% in 2015 to an estimated 7.4% last year. 
Services posted 6.7% growth last year, down from the 2015 pace of 7.1% 
mainly because growth in wholesale and retail trade was lower, possibly 
indicating moderating growth in private consumption. Tourist arrivals 
increased by 5.0% last year, down from 6.1% in 2015 (Figure 3.23. 2). 
Exports posted 9.2% growth in 2016, down from 14.1% in 2015 with 
slower growth in garment exports, which account for some 70% of 
Cambodian exports. Meanwhile, import growth decelerated by half, 
from 12.3% in 2015 to 6.1%. As a result, the current account deficit 
narrowed from the equivalent of 11.1% of GDP in 2015 to 10.1% last year. 
The deficit was covered by official transfers and inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). International reserves thus rose to $6.7 billion by 
year-end, or cover for 5.5 months of imports (Figure 3.23.3 ). 
Net FDI rose to an estimated $2.2 billion last year, up by 30.5% from 
2015, after declining by 8.1% in 2014 and 1.4% in 2015. These inflows 
equaled 10.7% of GDP, with construction and telecommunications 
posting the highest growth rates in 2016, while inflows to 
manufacturing declined.  
Buoyant monetary and credit conditions and a turnaround in 
international prices for oil and other commodities drove average 
inflation up to 3.0% last year, more than double the previous year’s 1.2%.  
Money supply grew by 17.9% in 2016, up from 14.7% in 2015 and 
largely in line with expanded foreign currency deposits in banks (Figure 
3.23.4). Although growth in credit to the private sector moderated 
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from 27.1% at the end of 2015 to 22.5% at the end of last year, credit to 
construction, real estate, and mortgages edged up slightly last year, from 
30.0% to 31.5%. 
To ensure the health of fi nancial institutions, the National Bank 
of Cambodia, the central bank, introduced a minimum 60% liquidity 
coverage ratio compliant with Basel III starting from 1 September 2016, 
the minimum rising to 100% by 2020. It also announced that banks 
and microfi nance institutions would have to comply with much higher 
minimum capital requirements beginning in March 2018. 
Continued strengthening of tax administration raised the ratio of 
revenue to GDP from 16.8% in 2015 to 17.6% last year (Figure 3.23.5). 
While current expenditure increased from the equivalent of 12.3% 
of GDP in 2015 to 13.0%, capital spending appears to have slowed 
signifi cantly with slower disbursement of external funding for public 
investment projects. The fi scal defi cit is therefore estimated to have been 
far lower than the 4.2% of GDP planned under the Budget Law 2016.
Economic prospects 
Annual GDP growth is projected to be slightly higher at 7.1% this 
year and next (Figure 3.23.6). With growth fi rming up in the major 
industrial economies this year, Cambodia’s export prospects are robust. 
Agriculture is seen maintaining a similar pace of growth as last year, 
and government spending will likely increase. Industry is projected 
to grow by a slightly higher rate of 10.8% this year, with growth in 
garment and footwear production picking up. Meanwhile, the pace of 
construction is likely to moderate. 
Services are expected to expand by 6.7%, as in 2016. The key 
challenge for the tourism industry is to stay competitive as newer 
Southeast Asian attractions emerge, notably in Myanmar.
The potential for light manufacturing to relocate out of the People’s 
Republic of China into lower-cost economies in the region should off er 
Cambodia scope to attract FDI for a variety of pursuits beyond garments 
and footwear.  
Higher international prices for oil and other commodities should 
nudge infl ation up to 3.4% this year and 3.5% in 2018. As Cambodia is a 
highly dollarized economy, it must be careful to align minimum wage 
adjustments with productivity increases to keep wage costs in check and 
stay competitive as a manufacturer for export. 
As export markets fi rm up, exports are expected to expand by 11.0% 
this year, outpacing import growth at 9.0%. Tourism revenues should 
remain strong this year and next. The current account defi cit is thus 
likely to narrow to the equivalent of 9.4% of GDP this year and 9.0% 
next. While offi  cial transfers are likely to maintain their declining trend, 
FDI infl ows look robust in the foreseeable future. Foreign exchange 
reserves are seen to remain comfortable. 
The Budget Law 2017 expects to further improve in tax collection 
with the ratio of revenue to GDP increasing to 17.4% compared to 16.7% 
in the Budget Law 2016. On the expenditure side, the government 
continues to focus on implementing planned increases to civil servants’ 
wages as part of civil service reform. The budget has the wage bill 
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increasing by 20.7% in 2017. Overall public expenditure is expected to 
equal 21.7% of GDP, for a fi scal defi cit of 4.3%. 
The economic outlook is subject to downside risks, both domestic and 
external. Domestic risks stem from vulnerabilities in the fi nancial sector 
partly traceable to its rapid expansion, in particular the proliferation of 
microfi nance institutions. On the external front, the risks are weaker 
growth in the euro area, a sharper-than-expected global tightening of 
credit, and a surge in the US dollar, which could constrain exports and 
stiff en competition from other low-cost producers.
Policy challenge—reviving agriculture 
After growing at an average annual rate of 5.8% from 2003 to 2012, 
agriculture has averaged growth at just under 1.0% since 2013, even 
including last year’s pickup (Figure 3.23.7). Adverse weather may 
explain part of the recent slowdown, but other problems, deep-seated 
ones, plague the sector. Eff ectively addressing them is increasingly 
becoming a major priority.
During the years of strong agricultural growth before the onset of 
the recent slowdown, farmland expansion explained 60% of growth, and 
only 40% came from yield increases. As most arable land is now under 
cultivation, there is very little scope for extending farmland without 
unsustainable deforestation. Future agricultural growth will thus have 
to come largely from productivity gains. Most smallholder farms in 
Cambodia have hardly improved their productivity, and agricultural 
commercialization is still in its infancy. Reviving agriculture requires 
a two-pronged eff ort to improve the productivity of existing crops and 
to diversify agriculture away from low-yielding, low-value crops toward 
more productive commercial crops. 
A World Bank study of Cambodian agriculture in 2015 identifi ed 
the key constraints on productivity improvement and diversifi cation 
to be farmers’ slow adoption of high-quality seeds, low fertilizer use, 
inadequate irrigation infrastructure, and meager agricultural extension 
services. Policy measures with potential impact in the short-to medium- 
term are to reduce the regulatory costs of imported fertilizer, promote 
the safer use of agricultural chemicals, improve farmers’ access to high-
quality but aff ordable seeds, and rehabilitate existing irrigation systems.
Over the longer term, developing a domestic agro-processing 
industry could give a fi llip to agricultural growth by creating demand for 
high-quality raw materials from agriculture. Meanwhile, the Industrial 
Development Policy, 2015–2025 has not been implemented at the pace 
envisioned in the original plans. Speeding its implementation could help 
a vibrant agro-processing industrial base to emerge in Cambodia.
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Robust private consumption helped GDP growth reach 5.0% in 2016 even as investment weakened. 
Inflation was subdued, and the current account deficit narrowed. Reviving investment and external 
trade are likely to strengthen growth this year and next, accompanied by higher inflation and a smaller 
current account deficit. In addition to infrastructure development and structural reform, addressing 
the skills gap is one important measure needed to sustain growth over the medium- to long-term.
Economic performance 
GDP growth firmed up last year to reach 5.0% from 4.9% in 2015. 
Robust private consumption supported growth even as investment 
slowed (Figure 3.24.1). With the strengthening of consumer confidence, 
private consumption also grew by 5.0% last year, marking an 
improvement over the previous year’s 4.8%. 
Growth in fixed investment slowed by 0.5 percentage points to 4.5% 
in 2016, despite a series of policy reforms launched by the government. 
Investment was dampened by delays in implementing public investment 
projects and weak external demand. As a share of GDP, fixed investment 
edged down to 32.6% (Figure 3.24.2). 
Net external demand remained weak as both exports and 
imports continued to shrink in real terms, with imports falling faster 
than exports.
By sector, services contributed nearly half of GDP growth in 2016 
(Figure 3.24.3). Led by buoyant banking and finance, information 
and telecommunications, and transportation and storage, the sector 
expanded by 5.6%, up from 5.5% in 2015. However, growth in 
manufacturing remained subdued at 4.3% in 2016, largely reflecting 
stalled recovery in export markets. Still recovering from forest fires and 
El Niño weather disturbances in 2015, agriculture grew by 3.3% last 
year, half a percentage point less than in 2015. 
Robust growth helped the country to achieve a 3.1% rise in 
employment. The latest available data show that by August 2016 the 
unemployment rate had improved to 5.6% from 6.2% a year earlier. 
Partly reflecting the lower unemployment rate, the number of people 
living below the national poverty line in September 2016 had fallen by 
1.3 million, reducing poverty down to 10.7% from 11.1% a year earlier. 
At 3.5%, average inflation last year remained, thanks in part to 
slower growth in fuel prices, near the lower end of the target range of 
3%–5% set by Bank Indonesia, the central bank (Figure 3.24.4). Although 
food prices were elevated for some time by supply and distribution 
constraints, they eased after the government increased food imports. 
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The declining trend of exports and imports persisted during 
most of 2016, except in the last quarter when it finally showed signs 
of turning around (Figure 3.24.5). For the year as a whole, the value 
of merchandise exports declined by 3.1% and that of merchandise 
imports by 4.5%, in neither case as steeply as in the previous year. 
The surplus in merchandise trade thus expanded by 9.6% last year to 
reach $15.4 billion. The higher merchandise trade surplus, coupled 
with a reduced deficit in services trade, narrowed the 2016 current 
account deficit to the equivalent of 1.8% of GDP from 2.0% in 2015 
(Figure 3.24.6).
Increased net inflows of direct investment and portfolio capital 
more than offset the current account deficit last year. Foreign exchange 
reserves thus rose to $116.4 billion at the end of 2016, providing cover 
for 8.4 months of imports and repayment of official debt (Figure 3.24.7). 
This comfortable balance-of-payments position caused the Indonesian 
rupiah to appreciate last year by 2.3% against the US dollar, recovering 
some ground from the depreciation in 2015 by more than 10.0%.
Subdued inflation allowed the central bank to pursue an 
accommodative monetary policy by lowering the policy interest rate 
by a percentage point from 7.5% to 6.5% between January and June 
2016. Subsequently, with the aim of strengthening the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism, in August it adopted a shorter-term 7-day 
reverse repo rate as its new policy rate, and lowered it from 5.25% 
in September to 4.75% in October. The central bank followed up the 
policy rate cuts with lower rates on its deposit and lending facilities. 
Despite monetary easing, though, growth in credit and the money 
supply remained muted most of last year. 
At 2.5% of GDP, the fiscal deficit was roughly in line with the 
government’s target of 2.4% for 2016. Fiscal containment was achieved 
by a cut to expenditure as revenues fell short of targets. The 9-month 
tax amnesty introduced in July 2016 to elicit better tax compliance and 
widen the tax base brought in $10.2 billion last year. Revenue excluding 
income garnered through the tax amnesty came in 3.7% lower than in 
2015. Due to revenue shortfalls, capital spending declined by 23% and 
social spending by 49% from 2015. 
Coupled with a favorable balance of payments, fiscal containment 
helped the country to reduce its external debt burden from 36.1% of GDP 
in 2015 to 34.0% at the end of last year. Fitch and Moody’s upgraded 
Indonesia’s rating outlook from stable to positive, confirming the 
country as an investment-grade issuer. 
Economic prospects
The government unveiled from September 2015 to November 2016 
a series of 14 economic policy packages aiming to boost investment 
and diversify economic activity. The packages were designed to clear 
regulatory bottlenecks and open up new sectors to foreign investors. 
They have already helped move Indonesia up by several notches in the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 2017 report, from 106 in the previous year 
to 91. Encouragingly, 527 companies had responded to the reforms by 
the end of 2016 with planned investments of $12.9 billion. 
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Along with these reform packages, the 2017 budget promotes 
macroeconomic stability by continuing fiscal consolidation. It establishes 
a fiscal deficit target equal to 2.4% of GDP. The 2017 budget sets a 
slightly lower limit on total government expenditure than the revised 
2016 budget but with a higher allocation for infrastructure spending. 
A more realistic revenue mobilization target is another feature 
of this year’s budget. The ratio of revenue to GDP is set at 12.8%, 
marginally higher than the 12.5% result for 2016. After the successful 
implementation of the tax amnesty program, the government is 
deepening its reform of value-added tax, income tax, and stamp duties, 
as well as improving tax administration. An effective implementation 
of the tax amnesty presents an opportunity to kick-start broader 
tax reforms. 
The 2017 budget allocates $29.1 billion for infrastructure investment, 
up by 22% from the revised 2016 budget, to be spent by line ministries, 
subnational governments, and state-owned enterprises. Subnational 
governments are now required to invest in infrastructure at least 25% 
of the resources they receive from the general allocation fund and 
revenue sharing. While this policy will be effective only to the extent 
that subnational governments have adequate implementation capacity, 
it should help to focus fiscal spending on infrastructure. 
Monetary policy this year and next is likely to depend upon the 
pace at which the US Federal Reserve adjusts its interest rates. Bank 
Indonesia is therefore expected to be more cautious about further easing 
monetary policy. A banking survey it conducted in the last quarter of 
2016 nevertheless showed that banks expected to increase lending by 
13.1% in 2017, up significantly from 7.9% growth in 2016.
Recent structural reform and higher budget allocations for 
infrastructure in the 2017 budget should, along with rising income from 
commodity exports, give a boost to investment this year and next. 
Private consumption is also expected to pick up, supported 
by expectations of recovery in international commodity prices. 
Consumption will be further supported by an 8.3% increase in the 
minimum wage and by enterprises’ improved compliance with it. 
A large increase in budget allocations for the Village Fund should 
support rural consumption. The central bank’s consumer confidence 
index continued to rise in February 2017 (Figure 3.24.8). 
With the recovery of international prices for Indonesia’s exports 
of copper, coal, nickel, aluminum, crude palm oil, rubber, and coffee, 
export prospects should improve. Moreover, in January of this year, the 
Indonesian government eased its 2014 ban on ore exports, which was 
designed to promote the development of domestic processing industries. 
This should boost exports of raw minerals, notably nickel ore and 
bauxite. The Nikkei purchasing managers’ index for manufacturing 
showed an improving trend from late 2015 (Figure 3.24.9).
On balance, higher public infrastructure spending, a gradual 
improvement in investment and exports, and robust private consumption 
should help sustain GDP growth at 5.1% in 2017 and 5.3% in 2018. 
As growth improves and international oil and commodity prices 
recover, average inflation is expected to pick up to 4.3% this year and 
4.5% in 2018 (Figure 3.24.10). Upward adjustments to administered 
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prices for fuel and electricity would contribute to higher infl ation, 
but the rate is likely to remain within the central bank’s target range. 
Just as the outlook for Indonesian exports has improved, imports 
too are likely to grow to meet higher domestic demand, albeit at a slower 
pace than exports. The diff erence should gradually narrow the current 
account defi cit this year and next.
Domestic risks to the forecast include possible delayed 
implementation of policy reform and continuing low revenues, which 
could prompt midyear cuts to government spending. External risks to 
the outlook include uncertain trade policy in the advanced economies, 
weaker recovery for international commodity prices and economic 
growth among trading partners, and accelerated adjustments to interest 
rates internationally. Indonesia is now in a better position to weather 
external shocks than in the past, with an improving economic growth, 
a narrowing current account defi cit, a more credible fi scal framework, 
and a better grip on infl ation.
Recent policy initiatives to increase public investment in 
infrastructure and improve the business environment should help to 
make Indonesia more competitive and spur new engines of growth. 
They will need to be complemented, however, by measures to close the 
skills gap that is increasingly a factor constraining the country from 
realizing its growth potential.
Policy challenge—closing the skills gap
Indonesia’s workforce has improved its educational attainment in recent 
years. Still, almost 60% of workers, especially older ones, have not 
completed high school (Figure 3.24.11). Since 2002, the government has 
committed to education 20% of its budget, or 3.4% of GDP. While this 
investment has helped to improve educational attainment, education 
spending still lags behind that of other major economies in the region, 
with public spending on education in Malaysia and Viet Nam at 6% of 
GDP in recent years. A refl ection of low educational attainment is that 
half of employed people today can be considered underqualifi ed for their 
jobs (Figure 3.24.12). 
While most of Indonesia’s young people aged 15–24 years have 
now completed 9 years of schooling, one in four has not completed the 
full 12-year cycle before university. Moreover, the quality of education 
is a matter of continuing concern. Results from the Program for 
International Student Assessment of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development indicate that, although Indonesia’s 
performance has improved over time, on average Indonesia’s 15-year-
olds underperform their peers in other middle-income countries 
in Southeast Asia. For example, in the 2015 tests, Thailand and 
Viet Nam outscored Indonesia in all three subjects covered: science, 
mathematics, and reading. Meanwhile, the World Economic Forum’s 
Executive Opinion Survey identifi es a mismatch between the skills that 
graduates possess and those that employers require. These observations 
underscore the need to close the skills gap and strengthen Indonesia’s 
human capital. 
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The skills gap can be addressed in part through workplace training. 
However, at present Indonesian employers and workers invest little in 
skills development. Only a small percentage of workers continue training 
once they fi nd employment. Data from Statistics Indonesia highlight 
that less than 10% of the working age population has undergone 
certifi ed workplace training. Similarly, the World Bank’s enterprise 
survey indicates that only 7.7% of fi rms off er formal training, one of 
the lowest rates among the countries surveyed. One reason that private 
enterprises limit their investment in human capital is labor regulation 
that encourages hiring people on short-term contracts.
Closing the country’s skills gap requires a comprehensive program of 
education and training reform. It should focus on making spending on 
public education more effi  cient and developing strategies for mobilizing 
public and private resources for education and training. Education 
spending should aim not only to upgrade school infrastructure and 
training equipment but also raise the quality of instruction in schools by 
training teachers and improving the curriculum. 
The reform program should facilitate much greater engagement 
among the government, employers, and education and training providers 
to ensure that graduates can meet the demands of a labor market 
in a middle-income country. Industry associations need to play a 
stronger role by developing good collaboration models that can evolve 
into industrywide skills-development programs, with cost-sharing 
initiatives to support more and better skills training. Particular focus 
should be placed on technical and vocational education and training. 
Key ingredients for success include more autonomy for providers of 
education and training to enable them to respond to industry needs, 
equipping the institutions with adequate fi nancial and technical 
resources, and strengthening the industry qualifi cation framework and 
the accreditation system. 
Policy actions that address the reasons why private fi rms prefer 
to hire workers on short-term contracts, such as high severance pay, 
should encourage them to hire workers longer term. With improvements 
to the regulatory environment and strengthened collaboration for 
demand-based skills development, the private sector should be willing 
to shoulder greater responsibility for enabling their workers to receive 
quality training and to acquire newer skills for a fast-modernizing 
economy. A better safety net would protect unemployed workers as they 
upgrade their skills toward fi nding another job.
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Driven by solid expansion in electricity production for export and a bouyant service sector, 
growth held up well at 6.8% last year. Work on a major cross-border railway project should help 
strengthen growth this year and next. Both inflation and the current account deficit look set to 
rise. Major policy changes are needed to promote labor-intensive manufacturing and make the 
benefits of growth more inclusive.
Economic performance 
Weathering a rough external environment, including lower commodity 
prices, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) managed 
to maintain strong GDP growth at 6.8% last year, similar to the rate 
recorded in 2015 (Figure 3.25.1). 
The service sector, which provides 43.0% of GDP, posted 
stronger growth at 9.0%, up from the 2015 figure of 8.5%. Despite a 
decline in tourist arrivals, most major service subsectors—wholesale 
and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, financial services, and 
telecommunications—recorded strong growth. Partly because the 
government changed its definition of “tourist,” the number of tourist 
arrivals declined by 9.5% but revenue from tourism declined only 
marginally (Figure 3.25.2). 
Industry, which occupies 32.4% of the economy, maintained sturdy 
8.0% growth last year, even as mining output declined. Electricity 
generation and exports, mostly to Thailand, received a significant boost 
as sales from the Hongsa lignite-fired electric power plant rose, as did 
sales from new power plants. However, low international metal prices 
drove down output from mining by 1.0% for copper, 1.9% for gold, and 
1.7% for silver.
Despite drought early in the year, growth in agriculture picked up 
from 2.0% in 2015 to 2.5% in 2016 thanks to improved weather in the 
latter part. While rice production rose only marginally, livestock and 
fishery production grew by 4.2%. 
Reflecting low international oil and commodity prices, inflation 
remained subdued at an annual rate of 1.6% last year, only marginally 
higher than the 2015 figure of 1.3% (Figure 3.25.3).  
Growth in merchandise imports contracted further from 5.8% in 2015 
to an estimated 6.7% in 2016. Meanwhile, merchandise exports grew by 
12.3% in 2016, compared with a 12.9% decline in the previous year. The 
current account deficit thus shrank from the equivalent of 16.8% of GDP 
in 2015 to 14.1% last year. Foreign reserves remained precarious at $814 
million at the end of December, or cover for only 1.4 months of imports.
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A fi scal consolidation program that started in 2014 ran into problems 
last year as public expenditure outstripped budgeted amounts and 
revenues fell short of targets because of low metal prices, ineffi  cient tax 
collection, and failure to collect huge tax arrears. As a result, the fi scal 
defi cit for the year widened to equal nearly 6% of GDP, more than one 
percentage points higher than in 2015. 
As for monetary policy, the Bank of the Lao PDR, the central bank, 
imposed in mid-2015 caps on deposit and lending rates for the Lao kip. 
This encouraged faster growth in credit, up from 16.8% in 2015 to 21.0% 
in 2016 (Figure 3.25.4). Broad money was estimated to have grown by 
about 11.0%. The kip remained stable against both the US dollar and the 
Thai baht.
Economic prospects
As recovery fi rms up in the major industrial economies and 
international commodity prices move higher, economic growth in the 
Lao PDR should edge up to 6.9% this year and 7.0% next (Figure 3.25.5). 
Revenue from metal exports is expected to improve somewhat, while 
agricultural production—especially rice, cash crops, and livestock—should 
strengthen further as the rehabilitation of many old irrigation systems 
and the commissioning of newly completed irrigation schemes enable 
more dry-season cropping.
Construction began on 25 December 2016 on a railway linking the 
capital, Vientiane, to Yunnan Province in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). This $6.8 billion project should give a boost to domestic industry. 
As work on the project progresses, it could spur complementary 
investments. Industry stands to benefi t as well from other commitments 
of foreign direct investment to build power plants and commercial and 
industrial estates. 
Service should stay buoyant this year and next. Although the 
government target of attracting 5 million tourists this year looks 
diffi  cult to achieve, revenues from tourism are likely to remain strong. 
The composition of tourist arrivals is undergoing a promising change 
away from short-stay, low-spending tourists from neighboring countries 
toward longer-staying and higher-spending tourists from Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China within the region and from 
Western Europe and North America. 
With domestic economic activity getting a boost and international 
oil prices higher, the infl ation rate is likely to rise gradually to 2.5% in 
2017 and 3.0% in 2018.
As growth strengthens and infl ation edges up, imports will grow 
faster than exports. Imports of machinery, equipment, and materials 
needed for the railway project, hydropower projects, and other foreign 
direct investments are particularly likely candidates for sharp increases. 
The current account defi cit is thus forecast to widen to 19.0% this year 
and 20.0% in 2018 (Figure 3.25.6). Meager foreign exchange reserves are 
therefore unlikely to see much improvement soon. 
The Lao PDR urgently needs to resume fi scal consolidation. 
Recognizing this, the government plans to cut its fi scal defi cit to under 
5% this year and next, leaving little scope for fi scal stimulus to support 
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growth in the near term. Monetary policy is similarly constrained in 
its ability to be expansionary in the immediate future because the US 
is expected to raise its interest rates in 2017 and 2018, and low foreign 
exchange reserves already put the Lao PDR in a delicate position. 
Any further reversal to the fi scal consolidation program is a 
domestic risk to the outlook, especially as the Lao PDR is already at high 
risk of debt distress. The main external risk is a slowdown in the PRC 
that is sharper than expected.
Policy challenge—making growth more inclusive
The Lao PDR has been one of the fastest-growing economies in 
Southeast Asia for the past decade or so. Rapid growth enabled the 
country to meet its target under the Millennium Development Goals to 
halve extreme poverty by 2015. However, the rate of poverty reduction 
has not been commensurate with the strength of economic growth. To 
illustrate, from 2003 to 2012, every percentage point of GDP growth 
was matched on average by an unimpressive 0.47% decline in the 
poverty rate. This response is one of the smallest in Southeast Asia. 
Similar conclusions emerge if analysis uses international poverty lines to 
estimate poverty rates instead of the national poverty line used here. 
The muted eff ect of economic growth on poverty in the Lao PDR 
is primarily the result of a growth pattern that relies heavily on highly 
capital-intensive sectors such as hydropower and mining, rather than 
on labor-intensive manufacturing. Mining and hydropower investments 
create enclaves of growth and prosperity with limited links to the 
rest of the economy. Even when such enclave industries grow rapidly, 
they create far fewer jobs than do new businesses that manufacture 
such labor-intensive products as garments, footwear, and consumer 
electronics. This isolation stymies poverty reduction even when GDP 
growth is strong. The key to making growth more inclusive in the 
future is therefore to shift the sources of growth away from extractive 
industries toward more labor-intensive manufacturing. 
A two-pronged strategy is required to bring about such a structural 
transformation: liberalizing the business environment and improving 
the skills of young workers. The Lao PDR is ranked 139 among 190 
economies surveyed for the World Bank’s Doing Business 2017, behind 
every other member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
except Myanmar (Figure 3.25.7). The country ranks poorly particularly 
in terms of procedures and processes for starting a business, getting an 
electricity connection, protecting minority shareholders, and resolving 
insolvency. Lack of access to fi nance is another factor that constrains 
in particular small and medium-sized enterprises in labor-intensive 
manufacturing. 
There is thus huge scope for policy reform in these areas to attract 
investment, both domestic and foreign, in labor-intensive industries. 
Moreover, as the country also faces a skills gap that will constrain, 
sooner rather than later, the rise of a modern manufacturing sector, 
higher investment in education and training has to follow liberalization 
in the business environment. 
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Malaysia
A 2-year slowdown in economic growth likely bottomed out at 4.2% in 2016, with a modest 
recovery expected this year and next. Recovery will be accompanied by higher inflation at 
3.3% and a smaller current account surplus. Achieving the next big transition to high-income 
status will require higher productivity, which can be achieved through a major effort to 
strengthen innovation.
Economic performance 
A diversified economic base and a flexible exchange rate helped to 
cushion the economy from a slump in global oil and commodity markets 
over the past 2 years. Still, economic growth slowed further to 4.2% 
in 2016, weighed down by decelerating fixed investment, weaker 
government spending, and a fall in net exports of goods and services 
(Figure 3.26.1). As growth slowed, the unemployment rate edged up to 
3.5% in the fourth quarter of 2016 from 3.2% a year earlier. 
Annual growth in private consumption, which averaged 7.2% during 
2010–2014, has decelerated over the past 2 years. In 2016, it grew by a still 
robust 6.1% and made the largest demand-side contribution to GDP growth. 
Support for household spending came from increases in public sector 
salaries, a higher minimum wage, and government cash transfers. 
Growth in government consumption spending last year braked sharply 
to 1.0%, and fixed investment by the government contracted for a third 
consecutive year, reflecting efforts to rein in the fiscal deficit. Private fixed 
investment grew by 4.4%, decelerating for a fourth year in a row as the 
outlook weakened for both domestic and external demand (Figure 3.26.2). 
Net external demand dragged on GDP growth as imports of goods and 
services rose in real terms by 0.4%, while real exports rose by 0.1%.
By sector, services grew by 5.6%, contributing the bulk of the increase 
in GDP last year. Wholesale and retail trade, food and accommodation, and 
information and communications recorded robust growth, reflecting in part 
expansion in consumer spending and tourism. Construction grew by 7.4%, 
slowing from more vigorous expansion in 2015. Growth in mining slackened 
to 2.7% as oil production flattened, though output in natural gas rose. 
Weaker demand for automobiles and a fall in palm oil processing suppressed 
growth in manufacturing to 4.4%, down from 4.9% in 2015. Bad weather 
caused agricultural output to shrink by 5.1%. 
Consumer prices edged higher early in 2016 before easing later, putting 
average inflation for the year at 2.1%, unchanged from the preceding year 
(Figure 3.26.3). 
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Malaysia’s trade and current account surpluses continued to decline. 
Merchandise exports fell by 5.8% and imports by 4.4%, both in US dollar 
terms. In the process, the current account surplus shrank to the equivalent 
of 2.0% of GDP. Smaller net outflow in the capital and financial accounts 
enabled the overall balance of payments to post a surplus equal to 1.2% of 
GDP (Figure 3.26.4). Gross international reserves stood at $95 billion in 
February 2017, sufficient to cover 8.5 months of imports excluding imports 
for re-export. Viewed another way, reserves exceed the country’s short-term 
external debt. 
Last year, the Malaysian ringgit depreciated by 4.3% against the US 
dollar, after weakening by 19.1% in 2015, mainly on subdued exports 
and capital outflows. In December 2016, Bank Negara Malaysia, the 
central bank, required exporters to convert at least 75% of their export 
proceeds into ringgit, a move that helped to support the exchange rate 
and foreign reserves.  
Sagging economic growth and subdued inflation prompted the central 
bank to ease monetary policy. After lowering the reserve ratio for banks 
from 4.0% to 3.5% in January 2016, it cut its policy interest rate by 25 basis 
points to 3.0% in July. Growth in bank credit nevertheless slowed from 7.7% 
in 2015 to 5.3% last year.  
Fiscal consolidation remained on track. Revenue from a goods and 
services tax introduced in April 2015 went some way toward offsetting lower 
income from oil and gas, though total government revenue still declined by 
3.0%. The government reduced expenditure by 2.0%, narrowing the fiscal 
deficit to 3.1% of GDP from 3.2% in 2015 (Figure 3.26.5).
Economic prospects 
GDP growth is forecast to pick up this year and next but to remain 
well below the 5.3% average rate the country achieved in 2011–2015. 
Firmer growth in the major industrial economies and a mild recovery in 
domestic investment are likely to lift GDP growth to 4.4% this year and 
4.6% in 2018 (Figure 3.26.6). 
The outlook for private fixed investment is improving somewhat 
with higher prices for hydrocarbons, recovery in agriculture, and better 
prospects for semiconductors. However, concern over possible global 
trade disruption and the impact of the normalization of US monetary 
policy on capital flows to developing countries is likely to restrain 
recovery in investment. A pipeline of large infrastructure projects—such 
as the Pan Borneo Highway, the Pengerang refinery and petrochemical 
plant, mass rapid transport projects in Kuala Lumpur, and the East 
Coast rail link and high-speed rail line to Singapore—should stimulate 
both public and private investment. As for net external demand, its drag 
on GDP growth is forecast to diminish this year unless global trade is 
seriously disrupted.
Private consumption is expected to grow this year at around last 
year’s pace. Rising wages are seen to underpin household spending, 
as are government measures to bolster incomes, including tax breaks, 
higher cash transfers to lower-income groups, and a reduction in 
mandatory employee contributions to the national retirement fund. 
Recovery in agriculture and rural subsidies will support rural incomes. 
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However, dampeners on consumption spending include high household 
debt, which equals nearly 90.0% of GDP, and lackluster consumer 
confi dence (Figure 3.26.7).
By sector, growth in services will benefi t from rising inbound 
tourism aided by the depreciation of the ringgit. In a positive sign for 
industry, the purchasing managers’ index indicated in February 2017 
that the slowdown in manufacturing might be ending. Manufacturers 
reported that month that they raised production for the fi rst time in 
almost 2 years (Figure 3.26.8). Demand for semiconductors will get a lift 
from an increase in book-to-bill ratios in North America and Japan and 
the launch of new mobile phone models. 
Agriculture is forecast to recover this year, assuming the weather 
improves. Also, natural gas production is projected to rise, but oil output 
will likely decline as oil fi elds age and because of an international 
agreement by oil producers to temporarily trim output. Work on public 
infrastructure and aff ordable housing should give a helping hand to 
construction.
Higher fuel prices, cuts to subsidies, and a weaker ringgit are 
expected to push prices up. Infl ation is forecast to rise to 3.3% in 2017 
and then subside to 2.7% with the fading of the base eff ect from lower 
prices last year (Figure 3.26.9). Infl ation averaged 3.9% year on year in 
the fi rst 2 months of 2017. In March 2017, the central bank projected 
that higher global commodity and energy prices, and the impact of 
ringgit depreciation, would lift infl ation to 3%–4% in 2017. The central 
bank added, however, that it did not expect these infl ationary factors 
to have signifi cant spillover into broader price trends, and that core 
infl ation should increase only modestly. 
Merchandise exports started 2017 on a better note, rising in January 
by 10.7% in US dollar terms from January 2016. All major export 
categories—manufactures, oil and liquefi ed natural gas, and agricultural 
products—showed improvement. Imports also rebounded in January, by 
13.2%, on higher purchases of capital and intermediate goods. Growth 
in imports is expected to outstrip that of exports this year, narrowing 
the current account surplus to the equivalent of 1.8% of GDP, before the 
surplus edges up to 2.0% in 2018 as exports growth quickens.
With infl ation picking up and the current account surplus narrowing 
but still positive, the central bank could keep monetary policy steady for 
some time, though policy will be contingent on changes in US monetary 
policy and other external developments. Fiscal policy is expected to 
support economic growth. The government aims to narrow the fi scal 
defi cit to 3.0% of GDP in 2017 but has budgeted to increase operating 
expenditure for the fi rst time in 3 years and has also raised net 
development spending. 
A signifi cant risk to the outlook is potential disruption to global 
trade because Malaysia is closely integrated into the world economy. 
The main export markets are, in descending order, Singapore, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), the US, the European Union, and 
Japan. Sudden tariff  hikes by major partners would hamper the modest 
strengthening now forecast for this trade-dependent economy.
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Policy challenge—fostering innovation
As Malaysia nears graduation from upper-middle-income to high-income 
status, growth will have to come increasingly from sustained gains in 
labor productivity through a renewed focus on innovation. Recognizing 
this imperative, the government has set a target of nearly doubling 
annual labor productivity growth to 3.7% during 2016–2020, up from 
the 2.0% pace in 2011–2015. Building on this plan, the government is 
expected to unveil a productivity blueprint in the second half of 2017.
Malaysia ranked 35 among 128 countries on the Global Innovation 
Index 2016, ahead of many regional peers though slipping by three 
places in the ranking from 2015. The innovation index is an average 
of two subindexes, one on innovation inputs that captures a country’s 
institutions, human capital, infrastructure, market, and business 
sophistication, and another on innovation outputs that factors in 
knowledge and technology outputs and creative outcomes. As such, it 
is a proxy for the innovation potential of a country. How eff ectively 
that potential is realized is given for each country by the ratio of 
the output subindex to the input subindex, yielding the innovation 
effi  ciency score.
Although Malaysia outperforms many of its regional peers in terms 
of the composite innovation index, its innovation effi  ciency score is 
less impressive, ranking it at 59, behind such regional peers as the 
PRC, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Figure 3.26.10). The 
innovation index and the effi  ciency score may be only rough indicators, 
but they point to huge scope for making more of the country’s 
high innovation potential. A 2016 survey by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development highlighted that innovation 
in Malaysia is critically hampered by a lack of coordination across 
government agencies. 
Interestingly, World Bank enterprise surveys have found that 
Malaysian fi rms tend to focus on innovation that involves commercial 
and organizational issues such as improved distribution and 
marketing. Only 17% invest in developing new technologies. This 
compares unfavorably with 27% of companies in Southeast Asia 
as a whole, suggesting a need for Malaysian fi rms to invest more 
in research and development and for greater eff ort to encourage 
technology transfer from multinationals to domestic enterprises.
The World Bank enterprise surveys also found that fewer Malaysian 
fi rms train their workers than do fi rms in other countries. Only 19% 
of fi rms in Malaysia provide formal worker training, slightly less than 
the average for members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and far below the rate in high-income economies or the PRC. 
Such fi rm-level training gaps are particularly wide in manufacturing, 
where training programs are off ered to only 44% of their workers, 
compared with 85% in the PRC and 60% in other ASEAN countries. 
Within the country’s manufacturing industry, small fi rms off er much 
less formal training than do medium-sized and large fi rms.
How to use the country’s innovation capability much more 
effi  ciently is therefore a key issue that policy makers need to address in 
their quest to foster innovation and boost productivity.
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Myanmar
GDP growth slowed to 6.4% last year from 7.3% in the previous year. Inflation eased, but the 
current account deficit worsened. With recovery firming in the major industrial economies, growth 
should accelerate this year and next, inflation should edge up, and the current account deficit 
widen. Consolidating the country’s legal and regulatory framework is crucial to develop a vibrant 
private sector and tap Myanmar’s huge growth potential. 
Economic performance 
An already slowing economy decelerated further because of a weak 
external environment, unfavorable weather, and uncertainty about the 
direction economic policy will take under the newly elected government. 
GDP growth in FY2016 (ended 31 March 2017) came in at an estimated 
6.4%, down from 7.3% in the previous year (Figure 3.27.1). 
Most major sectors recorded slower growth last year. Held back by a 
slow recovery from floods in 2015 and subdued international commodity 
prices, growth in agriculture decelerated from 3.4% in FY2015 to an 
estimated 2.5% last year. Growth in industrial output slowed from 8.7% 
in FY2015 to 8.2%. Within industry, energy production suffered the 
most, dragged down largely by low international prices for oil and gas. 
Growth decelerated in services more than in other sectors, from 9.1% in 
FY2015 to an estimated 7.6% last year. 
Reliable data on the demand-side components of GDP are not 
available, but investment seems to have slowed while consumption 
was more resilient. As private investors adopt a wait-and-see approach, 
approvals of foreign direct investment declined by 28% in the first 9 
months of FY2016 (Figure 3.27.2).
A February 2017 report from the International Monetary Fund 
indicates that the value of merchandise exports hardly grew in FY2016 
after declining by more than 10.0% in the previous year. Meanwhile, 
merchandise imports seem to have risen by more than 7.0% in FY2016 
after being flat in FY2015. The current account deficit is thus estimated 
to have widened to the equivalent of 7.0% of GDP from 5.2% in FY2015 
(Figure 3.27.3). The worsening current account deficit put pressure on 
the Myanmar kyat, which has depreciated by 17.0% against the US dollar 
in the first nine months of FY2016. 
Inflation eased on subdued demand and slowing growth—and 
despite higher international prices for oil and other commodities, as well 
as kyat depreciation. It fell from a peak of 16.2% in October 2015 to less 
than 4.0% in October 2016. Average inflation declined to an estimated 
6.5% from 11.2% in FY2015 (Figure 3.27.4). 
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Against the backdrop of falling infl ation, monetary and fi scal policies 
remained accommodative to support growth. Available data indicate 
that credit growth continued to be strong in FY2016. The bulk of 
credit expansion went to fi nance the government’s fi scal defi cit, as the 
government borrowing  from the central bank without limit has been a 
common practice in the country. 
The International Monetary Fund report gave the fi scal defi cit in 
FY2016 as equivalent of 4.6% of GDP, up from 4.1% in the previous 
year. The ratio of government revenue to GDP continued a declining 
trend seen since FY2014 and is estimated to have been 17.2% in FY2016. 
Government expenditure had to adjust to falling revenue and is 
estimated to have equaled 21.8% of GDP in FY2016.
Economic prospects 
Myanmar’s export prospects have improved with the lifting of US 
sanctions in October 2016 and higher international prices for oil and 
other commodities. Its new investment law, eff ective at the beginning 
of April 2017, should attract more foreign investment if implemented 
eff ectively. Following recent years beset by droughts and fl oods, a return 
to normal weather would further boost agriculture, which provides 
nearly 30% of the GDP. 
Economic performance should improve, with GDP growth at 7.7% 
in FY2017 and 8.0% in FY2018 (Figure 3.27.5). With normal weather 
and higher international commodity prices, agriculture should sustain 
a growth rate of around 3% this year and next. Industry and services 
are both likely to grow more strongly. Newly emerging demand for 
telecommunications should give a further fi llip to the service sector. 
Industrial output is forecast to grow at an annual rate of around 10.0% 
this year and next. Growth in services is forecast to come in at a sturdy 
9.0% in FY2017 and 10.0% the following year. 
Exports are forecast to increase at an annual pace of 7.0% this 
year and next. With domestic demand gaining strength and foreign 
direct investment infl ows responding to the implementation of the new 
investment law, growth in imports will outpace that in exports. As a 
result, the trade and current account defi cits are both likely to worsen 
this year and next (Figure 3.27.6). Higher infl ows of foreign direct 
investment are seen to help fi nance the widening current account defi cit. 
As growth strengthens, infl ation is likely to edge up by half a 
percentage point this year and next, reaching 7.5% in FY2018 (Figure 
3.27.7). The Central Bank of Myanmar is thus likely to face the 
challenging task of restraining money supply and credit to contain 
infl ation. Encouragingly, the government has recently adopted a cap 
on its borrowings from the central bank, limited to not more than 40% 
of its total fi nancing needs. Government loans will have market-based 
interest rates rather than at a fl at rate of 4%, as has been past practice. 
This should signifi cantly reduce pressure on the central bank to extend 
credit to the government, enabling it to better manage monetary 
conditions. Moreover, the government plans to contain the fi scal defi cit 
to 3%–4% of GDP this year and next by strengthening revenue collection 
and enhancing expenditure effi  ciency.
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External risks to the outlook could arise from unexpectedly weak 
global recovery or volatility in international fi nancial markets. Domestic 
risks include unclear and inconsistent policy directions, excessive credit 
growth, delays in implementing reform initiatives, and disruptions to 
social stability. 
Policy challenge—developing the private sector 
through sound laws and regulations
A rapid transition to a market-oriented economy crucially requires the 
development of a sound legal and regulatory framework conducive to 
the private sector playing a lead role in the economy. It is encouraging 
that since 2011 a number of existing laws have been amended and new 
laws adopted to this end. More recently, two laws passed in 2012 and 
2013, one for domestic investors and another for foreign investors, were 
merged into the unifi ed Investment Law, slated to come into eff ect in 
April 2017. A new company law is expected to be passed in 2017 toward 
improving the operating and governance framework for both domestic 
and foreign investors.
These eff orts constitute a good beginning, but Myanmar still 
lacks a credible and consolidated legal and regulatory framework to 
support the emergence of a vibrant private sector. Multiple layers of 
laws, regulations, and procedures often hinder investment and private 
business, as does their inconsistent implementation. 
Major changes to the legal and regulatory framework for private 
business are needed to reform how laws are made, how they are 
translated in administrative rules and regulations, and how the rules 
and regulations are implemented. Laws and regulations need to be 
prepared with proper consultation both within the government and 
with other stakeholders including businesspeople. The process should 
ensure that the whole of government, not just one ministry alone, is 
involved. Rules and regulations should be fully consistent with the laws 
from which they are derived and easy to comply with because they 
satisfy the needs of business. To this end, ministries and government 
agencies need to deepen their understanding of modern business 
practice. The eff ective implementation and uniform enforcement of laws 
and regulations is as important as their formulation and enactment.
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Buoyant domestic demand drove economic growth up to 6.8% in 2016. Growth will moderate 
somewhat but still be strong at 6.4% this year and 6.6% next. Inflation is forecast to pick up, and 
the current account will continue to post a small surplus. Making growth more inclusive will require 
the effective implementation of the country’s development plan for 2017–2022. 
Economic performance 
GDP growth accelerated from 5.9% in 2015 to 6.8% last year 
notwithstanding weak external demand and a reduction in agricultural 
production largely caused by drought. Broad-based strength in domestic 
demand underpinned last year’s healthy growth rate, which was lifted 
as well by election spending. 
Investment, both public and private, made the biggest contribution 
to growth, followed by private consumption (Figure 3.28.1). Spurred by 
higher outlays for durable equipment and construction (Figure 3.28.2), 
the ratio of fixed investment to GDP reached 23.8% in 2016, its highest 
in over a decade, though still behind the ratio in other Southeast Asian 
economies (Figure 3.28.3).
Private consumption, providing nearly 70% of GDP, grew by 6.9% 
last year, up from a 6.3% rise in 2015. Consumer spending benefitted 
from higher employment and steady inflows of remittances from 
workers overseas. The unemployment rate declined to 5.5% in 2016, 
while remittances from overseas rose by 4.9% to reach $29.7 billion. 
Consumption got further impetus from an 8.3% rise in public spending on 
social programs including basic education, national health insurance and 
immunization, and conditional cash transfers to 4.4 million poor families, 
which were contingent on recipients acting to meet certain criteria. A 
salary increase for government staff further drove up public consumption. 
By sector, services and industry were the key growth drivers. 
Services—the largest sector, providing over half of GDP and 
employment—expanded by 7.5% and generated nearly two-thirds of GDP 
growth last year (Figure 3.28.4). Subsectors posting strong growth were 
retail trade, business process outsourcing (BPO), tourism, real estate, 
and financial services.
Industry turned in a sturdy 8.0% growth last year, improving on 
6.0% growth in 2015. Manufacturing, comprising two-thirds of the 
industry sector, accelerated its growth rate from 5.7% in 2015 to 7.0% 
last year. Benefitting from strong domestic demand, food processing, 
which constitutes a third of manufacturing, posted robust output gains. 
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A number of other industries such as chemicals, rubber products, 
machinery, and transportation equipment also performed well. 
Construction, both public and private, also contributed significantly 
to industry growth. Indeed, public construction expanded by 29.0% in 
2016, outpacing already impressive growth of 19.0% in 2015.  
Drought caused by El Niño, the periodic weather disturbance, cut 
agricultural output by 1.3% during the year, although there was a slight 
recovery in the second half. Agriculture’s share in GDP has shrunk to 
10%, although the sector still employs nearly 30% of working Filipinos. 
Notwithstanding buoyant domestic demand, inflation remained 
modest, averaging 1.8% last year. This was marginally higher than the 
previous year’s rate of 1.4% but was still lower than the target range of 
2%–4% set by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the central bank. Subdued 
global oil prices kept the lid on inflation, and timely imports of rice 
augmented domestic supplies and kept food prices low.
Against the backdrop of benign inflation, monetary policy remained 
accommodative. The central bank kept the overnight reverse repurchase 
rate unchanged at 3.0%. Monetary and credit conditions thus continued 
to support growth, with the money supply (M3) rising by 12.7% in 
2016, up from 9.4% in 2015. Demand for credit from the private sector 
remained the key driver of liquidity growth. 
Accelerated public spending, particularly on infrastructure, widened 
the fiscal deficit to the equivalent of 2.4% of GDP in 2016 from 0.9% in 
2015. Expenditure excluding interest payments rose by 16.8%. Nearly 
half of the increase in public spending was for infrastructure. Tax 
collection rose by 9.1% and provided 90% of revenues. The government 
debt to GDP ratio declined to 42.1% in 2016, lowest in over a decade, 
providing fiscal space to accommodate higher spending. Debt was 
largely denominated in local currency, accounting for about two-thirds.
Weak external demand trimmed the current account surplus from 
the equivalent of 2.5% of GDP in 2015 to 0.2% last year (Figure 3.28.5). 
As imports rose rapidly and exports increased only marginally, the 
merchandise trade deficit widened to equal 11.2% of GDP, up from 8.0% 
of GDP in 2015. However, remittances and strong earnings from services 
exports, particularly BPO and tourism, managed to maintain a surplus.
In the capital account, foreign direct investment net inflows rose 
to $7.9 billion, 40.7% higher year on year (Figure 3.28.6). Portfolio 
investments, however, registered net outflows. The overall balance of 
payments fell into a deficit equal to 0.1% of GDP, reversing a surplus of 
0.9% of GDP in 2015. Nevertheless, by February 2017, foreign exchange 
reserves stood at $81.1 billion, cover for 9.2 months of imports of goods 
and services and income payments. The peso depreciated by 5.3% against 
the broadly strengthening US dollar in 2016. A continuing decline in 
external debt from the equivalent of 59.7% of GDP in 2005 to 24.6% in 
2016 has helped strengthen the country’s external payments position.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is projected to moderate to 6.4% in 2017, reflecting in part 
the high base effect from last year’s figure but also rising commodity 
prices that could affect domestic demand (Figure 3.28.7). Growth is 
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expected to recover to 6.6% in 2018 as government plans to further 
ramp up public infrastructure investment. 
Private consumption will continue to rise robustly, though at a 
moderate pace than last year. A central bank survey conducted in the 
fi rst quarter of this year found consumers remaining optimistic, though 
expectations of higher infl ation may temper the pace of spending 
(Figure 3.28.8). Similarly, investor sentiment remains broadly positive, 
but at the same time businesses expressed some caution arising from 
higher oil prices, Philippine peso depreciation, and uncertainty about 
global trade and monetary policies. Encouragingly, bank lending to 
businesses, occupying 89% of the loan portfolio, continued to grow 
strongly, rising by 17.5% year on year in January this year.
Net exports are expected to contract and temper GDP growth 
somewhat. While merchandise exports are expected to rebound from 
last year, imports will likely rise at a faster pace, refl ecting growing 
consumer demand and investment.  
By sector, services will remain the lead growth driver, though 
moderating from last year’s brisk pace as domestic consumption growth 
eases somewhat. BPO and tourism should continue to support services 
growth. International tourist arrivals rose by 11.3% last year to reach 6 
million, and growth is expected to stay strong. In January 2017, tourist 
arrivals rose by 16.5% year on year. 
Growth in manufacturing is expected to hold up well even as it 
slows slightly from last year’s pace. The manufacturing production 
index rose in January 2017 by 9.3% year on year with strong gains in 
food processing and machinery and transport equipment. Construction-
related manufactures such as metals, glass, and wood products have also 
sustained an upward trend. High capacity utilization also augurs well 
for the manufacturing sector. Spurred by public infrastructure projects, 
construction is forecast to remain buoyant. Private construction is also 
showing momentum as demand for offi  ce space, housing, and retail 
space stays strong.
Even as growth moderates, rising international prices for oil should 
nudge domestic infl ation up to 3.5% this year and 3.7% next year (Figure 
3.28.9). In the fi rst 2 months of 2017, infl ation has already edged up to 3.0% 
largely because of higher fuel prices and fare hikes for public transportation 
consequently approved in February 2017. A weaker peso following the 
upward adjustment of US interest rates in December will exert additional 
upward pressure on domestic infl ation. Proposed tax reform to raise 
excise taxes on fuel—an important intermediate input into many economic 
activities—could exert still more pressure on domestic prices. 
As infl ation approaches the upper end of the central bank target 
range of 2%–4%, monetary policy will aim to strike a balance between 
supporting growth and containing infl ation. The central bank will have 
to factor into this delicate balance the future course of US interest rates. 
A measured hike in the central bank policy rate is likely. 
Current indications are for fi scal policy to remain supportive to 
growth. The government has raised the ceiling on the fi scal defi cit 
from 2.0% of GDP to 3.0%, mainly to accommodate higher development 
spending. The 2017 national budget plans a 12% increase in spending 
with signifi cantly increased outlays for infrastructure and social 
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programs. Allocation for social services sector was raised from 7.7% of 
GDP in 2016 to 8.4% of GDP in 2017. Infrastructure spending, including 
investments in roads, railways, ports, health facilities, school buildings, 
and agricultural works, is targeted to equal 5.3% of GDP in 2017, up from 
an average of 2% in the past decade. The government has developed a 
3-year rolling infrastructure program that prioritizes public projects. 
To expedite implementation, the government has streamlined its 
review and approval procedures, as well as its bidding and procurement 
processes. Further, it launched an online portal covering details of 
government projects and their status to improve project monitoring. 
The current account is expected to post a modest surplus equal to 
0.2% of GDP in 2017, as in 2016, and 0.5% in 2018. Only modest growth 
is foreseen for merchandise exports because prospects for major 
markets are uneven. The fi rming up of US growth is tempered by only 
modest expansion in Japan and the European Union and by growth 
moderation in the People’s Republic of China. Japan is the Philippines’ 
biggest market, taking a fi fth of all exports in 2016, followed by the US 
with a 15% share and the European Union with 12% (Figure 3.28.10). 
Higher prices for oil and other commodities will likely widen the 
merchandise trade defi cit. Continued strength in remittances, income 
from BPO, and tourism receipts will, however, counterbalance the 
merchandise trade defi cit. 
Risks to the outlook could arise from two external factors: lower-
than-expected growth in the Philippines’ major trading partners and 
uncertain trade policies in the industrial economies. Domestically, 
realizing growth prospects will hinge on the successful implementation 
of the government’s ambitious public investment program, especially 
infrastructure projects.
Policy challenge—making growth more inclusive
Improved macroeconomic fundamentals, resumption of strong growth 
since 2010, and the administration’s emphasis on regional development 
provide a foundation for the country to further reduce poverty and 
foster a more equal sharing of prosperity. However, income inequality 
and regional disparities hinder the benefi ts of growth from reaching the 
poor and vulnerable sections of society. 
The Gini coeffi  cient, a measure of income inequality, has improved 
in recent years from 0.46 in 2012 to 0.44 in 2015, but this fi gure is high 
among Southeast Asian neighbors (Figure 3.28.11). Government’s Family 
Income and Expenditure Survey found that the average per capita income 
of families in the poorest 30% of the population grew faster than the 
average for all income groups between 2012 and 2015. National poverty 
rate fell from 25.2% of the population in 2012 to 21.6% in 2015, although 
remains elevated in some regions. Families in 3 of the Philippines’ 18 
administrative regions—Metro Manila, Central Luzon, and Southern 
Tagalog—accounted for half of the national income in 2015.
 Access to markets and thus economic opportunity has been 
hindered for the poor by underdeveloped infrastructure, including 
for irrigation, road transportation and telecommunications. In The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017, the World Economic Forum 
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ranks the Philippines at 57 among 138 economies overall but at only 95 
for infrastructure (Figure 3.28.12). Recognizing this, the government 
announced a 10-point socioeconomic agenda shortly after it took office 
on 30 June 2016. The agenda intensifies efforts to sustain strong growth 
and at the same time ensure that the benefits of growth are shared more 
across the population. Addressing this challenge requires concerted 
efforts to bring about more equitable access to services such as sanitation, 
safe drinking water, health care, and education.
Building on the 10-point agenda, the Philippine Development Plan 
2017–2022 approved in February 2017 lays out government’s strategies 
to promote more inclusive growth and development. The plan aims 
to bring down the poverty rate from 21.6% in 2015 to 14.0% by 2022, 
specifically targeting poverty in lagging regions. Rural poverty is higher 
at 30%, with most of the poor in low-paid informal farm work. The 
government aims to reduce rural poverty to 20% by 2022.
Among the key programs to speed poverty reduction include raising 
agricultural productivity, building rural infrastructure such as irrigation 
systems and market roads, and establishing stronger links with industry 
and services to foster production and activities with higher value added. 
The plan calls for larger public investments in infrastructure, health care, 
education, and social protection. Infrastructure master plans will be fast-
tracked and give priority to interregional connectivity toward integrating 
poor provinces with growth centers to improve the ease of doing business, 
and enable the efficient delivery of public services. The share of development 
expenditure on social services and infrastructure is to increase from an 
average of 33% of the budget in 2010–2015 to 50% by 2022, boosting support 
for programs crucial to making growth more inclusive. 
To raise more revenue to finance infrastructure and human capital 
investments, the government is proposing a comprehensive tax reform. 
The Philippines has one of the lowest ratios of tax to GDP in Southeast 
Asia at 13.7% in 2016. The proposed reform aims to simplify the tax 
system and yield more revenue. At the same time, tax burdens will be 
made more progressive. The first reform package, presented to Congress 
in January 2017, includes lowering personal income tax rates except 
for the highest income earners. It also seeks to expand the value-added 
tax base by limiting exemptions to raw food and other necessities such 
as education and health. Excise taxes on automobiles and oil products 
will be raised. To protect the poor from the impact of higher oil taxes, 
targeted transfers and support programs will be implemented. Further 
reforms being considered include adjusting excise taxes on alcohol, 
tobacco, and sugar-sweetened beverages and reducing the corporate 
income tax while rationalizing fiscal incentives for investors. These tax 
reforms will be supported by stricter tax administration and collection.
Key to making growth more inclusive is the effective implementation 
of the strategies and programs under the government’s medium-term 
development plan. 
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Singapore
The economy grew faster in 2016, deflation persisted, and the current account improved. Growth 
is forecast to trend higher in 2017 and 2018, with the current account surplus widening in both 
years and prices rising for the first time since 2014. Faltering labor productivity could be improved 
in the coming years by encouraging small and medium-sized enterprises to innovate and adopt to 
new technologies.
Economic performance 
Recovery in manufacturing and higher government expenditure 
lifted the GDP growth rate to 2.0% in 2016 from 1.9% in 2015. 
Manufacturing reversed 5.1% contraction in 2015 with 3.6% growth 
led by higher output in the semiconductor and biomedical industries, 
contributing 0.6 percentage points to GDP growth. Construction grew 
by only 0.2%, slowing from 3.9% in 2015. Services grew by 1.0% and 
contributed 0.7 percentage points to growth, with expansion in all 
subsectors except business services, which declined owing mainly to a 
downturn in the real estate market (Figure 3.29.1). 
External demand was the driver of growth in 2016. In real terms, 
exports of goods and services grew by 1.6% and imports by 0.3%, 
raising net exports by 9.8% to contribute 2.7 percentage points to 
growth (Figure 3.29.2). Global economic uncertainties continued to 
weigh on investment confidence and caused a 2.5% decline in gross fixed 
capital formation including change in inventories, which subtracted 
0.9 percentage points from growth. Consumption expenditure grew 
by 1.8% on the strength of public spending, slowing from 5.3% in 2015 
as household expenditure fell by 0.6% but contributing on balance 
0.8 percentage points to growth. 
Singapore endured more deflation in 2016 as the consumer price 
index declined by an average of 0.5%. Housing and utilities posted the 
largest decline, followed by communications and, as gasoline prices fell, 
private transport costs. Core inflation, which excludes accommodation 
and private road transport, was 0.9% because of higher costs for 
education services, food, and household durables (Figure 3.29.3).
Merchandise exports declined by 5.5% in 2016 as both oil and 
non-oil exports slumped. As oil imports shrank as well, imports 
fell by 5.2% to leave a trade surplus of $46.0 billion, equal to 15.5% 
of GDP. The current account surplus therefore rose to 19% of GDP, 
with the services surplus increasing by 0.5% on higher receipts from 
travel, transport, and insurance services. However, the overall balance 
of payments slipped into a deficit of $1.8 billion, or 0.6% of GDP, 
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as net capital outflows increased (Figure 3.29.4). Official foreign reserves 
rose to $246.6 billion, or cover for 7 months of imports.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) managed monetary 
conditions for price stability by keeping the policy band for the Singapore 
dollar’s nominal effective exchange rate unchanged in 2016; while the 
currency strengthened by 1.1% by this measure, it weakened slightly 
against the US dollar in nominal terms (Figure 3.29.5). The 3-month 
Singapore interbank offered rate, used to price home loans, fell to 
0.97% in December 2016 from 1.25% in December 2015. Credit to the 
private sector rose by 5.2%, pushing up total credit by 4.6%, and growth 
in broad money supply (M2) accelerated to 8.0%. 
Fiscal policy was contractionary in FY2016 (ended 31 March 2017), 
with the budget recording a surplus of 1.3% of GDP. Operating revenue 
and expenditure both grew by 5.8%. Revenues increased mainly on 
the higher receipts from personal income tax, motor vehicle taxes, and 
vehicle quota premiums as purchases of certificates of entitlement for 
private cars increased. Expenditures grew as outlays rose for education, 
national development, trade and industry, and especially health care 
subsidies (Figure 3.29.6).
Economic prospects 
Continued restocking of technology products globally could spur 
expansion in both electronics manufacturing and external trade, 
pushing GDP growth higher to 2.2% in 2017. The purchasing managers’ 
index for manufacturing and electronics breached the 50 threshold 
in September 2016 pointing to expansion in the first half of this year. 
However, services will weigh on growth as transport and storage lag, 
along with accommodation and real estate, though information and 
communication technology and essential social services will be robust. 
GDP growth is expected to improve to 2.3% in 2018 as manufacturing 
remains strong, and as services and construction improve (Figure 3.29.7).
Consumption will drive growth in 2017, with budgetary expenditures 
expected to increase by 5.2% and target education, health care, housing 
subsidies, and infrastructure. Investment will recover from contraction 
as indicated by investment commitments reported by the Economic 
Development Board, with fixed asset investment in 2017 forecast to 
reach almost S$10 billion, equal to 2.4% of GDP. Net foreign investment 
commitments in manufacturing reached S$1.6 billion in the fourth 
quarter of 2016, growing by 48.7% year on year. Government spending 
coupled with higher infrastructure investment, including significant 
investment in the Malaysia–Singapore high speed rail and a new 
industrial park in Jurong District, will boost growth in 2018 to 2.3%.
The deflationary trend appears to have ended as the consumer price 
index inched up by 0.6% in January 2017. Consumer prices are expected 
to rise by 1.0% in 2017, in the middle of the MAS forecast of 0.5%–1.5%, 
as the government increases water prices by 30% in two phases starting 
in July 2017 and raises diesel taxes based on volume usage. Inflation 
is forecast to rise further to 1.5% in 2018 on higher global oil prices, 
healthy wage growth, and continued increases in prices for food, 
utilities, and social services, especially education. 
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With moderate improvement in external demand in 2017 as partner 
economies strengthen, Singapore should see exports grow modestly 
(Figure 3.29.8). Merchandise exports and imports alike picked up 
signifi cantly in January 2017. With some growth forecast for net 
services receipts as well, the current account surplus will expand 
modestly to equal 19.5% of GDP in 2017 and 19.8% in 2018, though the 
Singapore dollar is expected to appreciate marginally against US dollar 
in 2017.
The MAS is expected to manage the exchange rate in response to 
economic developments over the forecast period to avert adverse impact 
on exports. Fiscal policy will continue to be prudent, with the budget 
surplus for FY2017 forecast to rise to the equivalent of 0.4% of GDP. 
Higher expenditure will be matched by rising revenue as new taxes, 
such as a water conservation tax on potable water, are introduced and 
diesel taxes are restructured. 
External risks to the outlook include uncertainty regarding global 
economic conditions and a changing policy environment. The rising 
specter of protectionism has heightened these risks and can weaken 
sentiments in the fi nancial markets and dampen external demand and, 
hence, trade-related activity. Domestically, persistent weakness in 
the residential property market could choke investment growth, and 
rising labor costs and stagnant labor productivity could hinder growth 
in labor-intensive sectors, slowing overall economic growth in the 
forecast period.
Policy challenge—raising labor productivity 
in an aging society
Over the past 3 years, labor productivity growth in Singapore, measured 
as average growth in value added per actual hour worked, has been 
nearly fl at (Figure 3.29.9). It grew by a compounded annual growth 
rate of only 2.6% during 2009–2016. Excluding the 2010 rebound 
following the global fi nancial crisis of 2008–2009, the same measure 
of productivity growth yielded only 1.5%, well below the government 
target of 2%–3% growth per annum to 2020. This stagnation is partly 
explained by recent changes in employment patterns. According to a 
recent Ministry of Trade and Industry economic survey, actual hours 
worked in more productive sectors, mainly the externally oriented 
industries that need to stay competitive in the global market, have 
declined relative to actual hours worked in less productive areas, 
including construction and food services, dragging down overall 
productivity (Figure 3.29.10).
Government policies have focused on raising productivity in 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as they contribute 
about half of the GDP and employ 70% of the workforce. SMEs suff er 
lower productivity because of ineffi  cient service delivery and poor 
management skills. They need to improve their productivity as they 
face stiff ening competition from neighboring economies. The authorities 
have launched several initiatives to raise SME productivity.
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In 2016, it announced the continuation of a program that provides 
working capital loans to SMEs, which can be used to fund modern 
information technology businesses and help SMEs install digital 
platforms. The 2017 budget has allocated S$600 million for public 
partnerships with SMEs to scale up their operations and enable them to 
engage in international trade. SMEs can deduct from tax liability twice 
their expenses on market expansion and development. Other initiatives 
to improve SME productivity include identifying both appropriate 
technologies tailored to SMEs’ specific needs and co-investors that can 
help SMEs expand and internationalize. 
The government-chaired Committee on the Future Economy has 
proposed providing SMEs with easy access to finance, catalyzing 
the supply of growth capital, and assisting with international trade 
procedures. SMEs Go Digital is a program introduced in the 2017 budget 
that aims to enhance digital capability in SMEs, especially in sectors 
with room to significantly improve productivity such as retail, food 
services, wholesale trade, logistics, cleaning, and security. 
These and similar initiatives are bearing fruit. In the recent survey 
conducted by Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
88% of SMEs have adopted measures to improve productivity, and 
more SMEs are attempting to change their business model toward 
undertaking activities with higher value added. SMEs in manufacturing 
and services have innovated their business practices and organization. 
These efforts can be enhanced by helping SMEs to streamline and 
harmonize business practices toward enabling them to take advantage of 
opportunities in the ASEAN Economic Community.
Despite these efforts, significantly improving labor productivity is 
a challenge in a land-constrained economy with an aging workforce 
and few natural resources. Policies can nevertheless be implemented to 
alleviate land and age constraints. Land should be allocated to activities 
with higher value added and those that use it efficiently. The constraint 
of an aging population can be addressed through retraining and 
senior-friendly wellness programs. The alleviation of these constraints 
can, combined with SME willingness to innovate, promise important 
productivity gains for Singapore over the medium term. 
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Thailand
The economy grew by 3.2% last year, inflation barely slipped back into positive territory, and the 
current account posted a substantial surplus. Growth is likely to be slightly higher this year and 
next, while inflation should edge up and the current account surplus narrow. How effectively the 
Thailand 4.0 development agenda reignites growth will hinge on how well Thailand’s youngsters 
upgrade their skills.
Economic performance 
GDP grew by 3.2% in 2016, marginally higher than the previous year’s 
rate of 2.9% (Figure 3.30.1). A turnaround in agriculture contributed to 
the mild pickup in growth, while most other major sectors either slowed 
or maintained their 2015 pace. 
Improved weather in the second half of the year enabled agriculture 
to post growth at 0.6% last year, marking a significant turnaround from 
the previous year’s 5.7% contraction. Growth in construction was a 
strong 8.3% but less than half of the previous year’s impressive 17.0%. 
Construction was led by public works, especially by state enterprises. 
Manufacturing, which had grown by 1.5% in 2015, was still sluggish 
but steady with 1.4% growth last year. Aided by expansion in hotels, 
restaurants, and other tourism-related businesses, the service sector 
held up well with robust 4.7% growth, which was very similar to its 
2015 pace. 
On the demand side, private consumption grew by 3.1%, enabled by 
agriculture’s turnaround to improve on 2.2% growth in 2015. Rising 
prices for agricultural products and the end of drought in the second 
half of the year boosted farm income in nominal terms by 2.8% over the 
whole year, reversing a steep 9.6% reduction in 2015. Also aiding private 
consumption, the government offered tax rebates for a few weeks of 
shopping and dining, initially during the Thai New Year in April and 
then during the Christmas season in December. 
Having contracted by 2.2% in 2015, private investment picked up by 
an estimated 0.4% last year on a gradual recovery in business sentiment. 
As the government maintained an expansionary fiscal stance, public 
investment continued to be an important driver of growth in 2016, 
though it slowed from a whopping 29.3% growth in 2015 to a still sturdy 
9.9% last year (Figure 3.30.2). 
Partly reflecting the fragile external environment, merchandise 
exports hardly grew last year, having contracted by 5.6% in 2015. 
Encouragingly, signs of an export recovery were evident by the second 
half of the year. For the first time in 7 quarters, merchandise exports 
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increased in the third quarter of 2016 and continued their recovery in 
the next quarter. Exports of manufacturing products expanded by 2.6%, 
led by electrical appliances, electronics, chemicals, and petrochemicals. 
Meanwhile, merchandise imports continue to contract by 4.7% last 
year on top of a 10.6% contraction in 2015. Imports of consumer goods 
expanded by 5.8%, and beginning in the fourth quarter imports of 
capital goods also picked up. The trade balance still registered a large 
surplus of $35.8 billion (Figure 3.30.3). Although tourist arrivals slowed 
in the fourth quarter of 2016 from the same quarter in 2015 because 
of the mourning period for the King, who died on 13 October, and a 
crackdown on fraudulent tours targeting low-end visitors from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), net services exports for the year as a 
whole posted strong growth at 26.5% (Figure 3.30.4). The country thus 
accumulated a current account surplus of $46.4 billion, equal to 11.4% 
of GDP, boosting international reserves in December to $171.9 billion to 
cover for 9.4 months of imports or 3.2 times short-term external debt.
Slack in the manufacturing sector kept a lid on prices last year 
despite rising international prices for oil and other commodities. 
Inflation for the year as a whole came in at 0.2% (Figure 3.30.5). 
Consumer prices excluding food and beverages started to increase in 
the last quarter of 2016, following decreases for 9 quarters in succession. 
Inflationary pressure nevertheless remained low as drought eased and 
price rises for fresh food slowed in the second half. 
On the fiscal front, the government implemented a number 
of subsidized public welfare programs: cash transfer schemes for 
low-income earners, housing loans at low interest rates, and soft loans 
for farmers, small and medium-sized enterprises, and startups, as well 
as tax deductions. These measures involved the government paying to 
special financial institutions the difference between the discount rate at 
which they lent to program beneficiaries and the market rate at which 
they raised funds. Moreover, the government injected public funds into 
the countryside through newly established revolving village funds.
Government revenues increased by 9.3% in FY2016 (ended 30 
September 2016), pushing the ratio of revenue to GDP from 16.1% in 
FY2015 to 16.8%. At the same time, expansionary fiscal policy raised 
government expenditure by 9.0%, causing the ratio of expenditure to 
GDP to climb as well, from 18.4% in FY2015 to 19.1%. Of $2.4 billion in 
capital expenditure in FY2016, more than half was on large transport 
infrastructure projects under the government’s transport infrastructure 
master plan to 2022. Adjusting for changes in the government’s 
off-budget cash account, the overall fiscal deficit edged up from 2.5% of 
GDP in FY2015 to 2.7% last fiscal year.
Despite low inflation and ample foreign exchange reserves, the 
central bank kept its policy interest rate unchanged at 1.5% in the 
second half of 2016, reflecting its perception that the economy was on a 
recovery path in the face of global uncertainties.
Economic prospects
Sustained recovery in the major industrial economies, robust domestic 
consumption, and the continued implementation of large public 
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infrastructure projects should help GDP grow by 3.5% this year and 
3.6% next (Figure 3.30.6). A gradual rise in the international price of rice 
should provide a further fi llip.
Domestic consumption is expected to continue to expand, albeit 
modestly. Farm incomes should rise further along with commodity 
prices, assuming a return to normal weather. In 2018, the new personal 
income tax structure that allows more tax-deductible expenditures 
promises to lend support to consumption. The consumer confi dence 
index plunged in October and November 2016 following the death of the 
King but recovered in December 2016 and continued to rise in January 
2017 (Figure 3.30.7). Because high household debt remains a drag on 
domestic consumption, the government introduced measures to fi x 
the longstanding problem of microfi nance institutions overcharging 
their vulnerable borrowers. A “pico fi nance” license scheme went into 
operation in March 2017 to encourage informal lenders to conduct their 
business more transparently, and new legislation caps their lending rates. 
Public investment will be a key driver of growth over the short term 
if the government expeditiously implements its planned $40 billion 
infrastructure investment program. Projects under the program include 
the construction of a double-track rail line and a major motorway 
and the expansion of a deepwater seaport. Bidding for several more 
infrastructure projects began in 2016. According to the Ministry of 
Transport, another 36 transport infrastructure projects worth $25.6 
billion will be ready for investment this year. Financing for the projects 
will come from multiple sources, with the public budget providing 8.3%, 
loans 64.3%, public–private partnerships 22.1%, the Thailand Future 
Fund 4.9%, and state-owned enterprises 0.4%. 
The implementation of large public infrastructure projects should 
spur private investment by boosting business confi dence. Private 
investment is projected to pick up slowly this year and next as prospects 
for exports improve and manufacturers expand production. Although 
average utilization of industrial capacity is not high, standing at 60.5% in 
January 2017, in some subsectors—notably electronics, electrical parts, 
and chemical products—it exceeds 90%. 
As growth edges up and international oil prices rise, infl ation should 
rise but remain subdued at 1.8% this year and a somewhat higher rate 
next year (Figure 3.30.8). The combination of modest infl ation and 
comfortable foreign exchange reserves off ers scope for easing monetary 
policy to support growth.
Merchandise exports show signs of recovery since the end of 2016. 
Having increased by 3.6% year on year in the last quarter of 2016, exports 
of goods continued to rise in January of this year by 8.5%. Demand for 
electronic parts essential to the so-called “internet of things” such as 
integrated circuits is projected to rise this year. The gradual recovery 
of international oil prices should boost exports of petroleum products. 
Prices have risen for some agricultural products, such as rubber and 
sugar, so their production should increase in response. Merchandise 
export growth is set to return to positive territory this year and continue 
to strengthen next year. 
Thailand’s tourism sector looks strong. The adverse eff ects of the 
mourning period and the crackdown on fraudulent tours dented tourist 
3.30.1  Selected economic indicators (%)
2017 2018
GDP growth 3.5 3.6
Infl ation 1.8 2.0
Current account balance 
(share of GDP)
9.0 7.0
Source: ADB estimates.
3.30.6 GDP growth
0
2
4
6
8
%
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Forecast
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
3.30.7  Consumer confidence and 
business sentiment indexes
20
40
60
80
100
Jan
2015
Jul Jan
2016
Jul Feb
2017
Index
Business sentiment in the next 3 months
Consumer confidence in the future
Note: A reading of less than 50 denotes a deterioration 
in business sentiment; a reading of less than 100 denotes 
deterioration in consumer confi dence.
Sources: Bank of Thailand. http://www.bot.or.th; CEIC Data 
Company (both accessed 8 March 2017).
Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia: Southeast Asia Thailand  257
arrivals in the last quarter of 2016, but these eff ects have already started 
to wane. The number of tourist arrivals increased in January 2017 by 
6.5% year on year. A promotion begun in December 2016 that temporarily 
waves or reduces visa fees for the holders of selected passports could 
further support tourism in 2017. Tourism is expected to expand this year 
and next at its 2016 pace. The Tourism Authority of Thailand projects 
that the number of tourist arrivals will increase by 8.1% in 2017 to reach 
35.3 million.  
Merchandise imports are projected to grow in line with higher 
private investment and demand for manufacturing components, as well 
as higher oil prices. As imports start to grow, the current account surplus 
should shrink further from 11.4% of GDP last year to 9.0% this year and 
7.0% in 2018 (Figure 3.30.9).  
Risks to the outlook come from the potential impact of changes in 
US trade policy. Although the share of Thailand’s exports going directly 
to the US is only about 11%, the Thai economy is tightly interwoven with 
Asian production networks and supply chains such that Thai exports 
could be hurt indirectly. An increase in US tariff s on imports from the 
PRC, for example, could translate into lower Thai exports of electronics, 
electrical parts, and machinery to the PRC. Volatility in capital fl ows is 
another risk, but the country’s comfortable foreign exchange position 
should provide a good buff er. On the domestic front, undue delays in 
implementing the transport infrastructure program and other core 
components of the recently approved Thailand 4.0 development policy 
agenda could weigh on the economic prospects, as could a sudden 
discontinuity in the general direction of economic policy.
Policy challenge—reigniting growth through 
Thailand 4.0
With Thailand suff ering subpar growth in recent years when compared 
with growth in its Southeast Asian peers or with its own past 
performance, concern is growing that the country may have slipped onto 
a low-growth path that leads to the middle-income trap. The economy 
grew at an average annual rate of 9.5% in the decade to 1996, before the 
Asian fi nancial crisis of 1997–1998, then slowed to an average of 5.2% 
from 1999 to 2005. Since then, growth has plummeted further to an 
average of 3.3%. At this juncture, reigniting growth is the government’s 
most pressing policy challenge. 
Recognizing the problem, the government embarked last year on an 
ambitious program of strategic reform dubbed Thailand 4.0, which aims 
to lift the country’s long-term growth path. In a nutshell, Thailand 4.0 
is built on three strategic components: an agricultural transformation 
away from traditional farming to what it calls “smart farming,” 
industrial restructuring to convert small and medium-sized enterprises 
into “smart enterprises,” and service sector upgrading to wean tourism-
related services in particular away from short-stay, low-spending 
tourists toward high-value guests. 
Achieving the objectives of Thailand 4.0 requires a big push in 
infrastructure development and a substantial upgrading of the country’s 
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skills base. The government has announced that it plans to spend more 
than $57 billion on infrastructure development during the next 8 years. 
In addition to the expeditious implementation of the infrastructure 
program, it is crucial that policy makers address the country’s growing 
skills gap in earnest.
A 2014 survey by the Economic Intelligence Center, the research unit 
of Siam Commercial Bank, showed that a shortage of skilled workers 
severely constrains business expansion in a number of sectors. What is 
more, the shortage will only worsen in the years ahead as the country’s 
population ages rapidly and the absolute number of people of working 
age, from 15 to 64 years old, begins to shrink in 2018. Moreover, the 
survey found the quality of education and training that the country’s 
youth receive is woefully inadequate to meet labor market needs. In a 
similar vein, The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 of the World 
Economic Forum indicates that business expansion in skills-intensive 
sectors is hampered by shortcomings in the Thai workforce in terms of 
both quantity and quality (Figure 3.30.10). 
The skills gap may persist for years because Thai high school 
students generally underperform their peers in Viet Nam and Malaysia, 
for example, on standardized tests conducted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, scoring particularly poorly 
in science and mathematics. Even higher education suffers a wide 
mismatch between the skills that education institutions impart to their 
students and what the labor market requires (Figure 3.30.11). Education 
institutions churn out many graduates in liberal arts, for whom there 
is limited demand, but far fewer graduates in science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics, for whom demand is rapidly rising in 
Thailand, as in other upper-middle-income economies. 
These education and training inadequacies need to be effectively 
addressed if the Thailand 4.0 development agenda for rapidly moving 
the country toward high-income status is to get much traction in the 
coming years. A quickly aging population makes education reform and 
upgrading the skills base of the young even more urgent. Education and 
training institutions need to engage far more with business to ensure 
the success of education reform.
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Viet Nam
Weaker agriculture and oil production offset booming services, manufacturing, and construction 
to slow GDP growth to 6.2% in 2016. Inflation remained modest, and the current account 
strengthened. A pickup in agriculture and strength in investment should boost growth this year 
and next. Inflation will edge up and the current account surplus shrink. Deeper agricultural 
transformation will be critical for sustaining strong growth in the future. 
Economic performance 
Economic growth slowed to 6.2% in 2016 from 6.7% in 2015 (Figure 
3.31.1). Despite somewhat better weather in the second half of 
the year, agriculture growth slowed from 2.4% in 2015 to 1.4% as 
adverse weather in the first half affected production, particularly in 
the Central Highlands and the Mekong Delta. Field crops were the 
worst performers, their growth easing to 0.7%, but they were partly 
compensated by growth in fisheries at 2.8% and forestry at 6.1%. 
Despite 4.0% contraction in mining output with continued weakness 
in international oil prices and aging domestic oil fields, industry 
and construction grew by 7.6%, albeit slowing from 9.6% in 2015. 
Manufacturing benefitted from brisk foreign investment up by 11.9%, 
and high credit growth contributed to 10.0% growth in construction.
Services performed strongly, accelerating to 7.0% growth from 6.3% 
in 2015. The uptick was driven by a boom in tourist arrivals, which 
soared by a whopping 26.0% in 2016, lifting tourism–related services by 
6.7%. Banking and finance also grew strongly, expanding by 7.8%.
Domestic demand remained strong, underpinned by a continuing 
surge in investment and a robust rise in consumption. Supported by 
buoyant foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and credit, investment 
surged by 9.7% last year on top of a 9.0% rise in the preceding year. 
Although growth in private consumption eased from 9.3% in 2015, 
it was still robust at 7.3%. Net merchandise exports made a positive 
contribution to GDP growth as export growth exceeded import growth. 
Inflation averaged 2.7% in 2016, up from 0.6% in 2015. Contributing 
to the rise were a pickup in international oil prices, rising food prices 
because of drought, and upward adjustments to fees for public education 
and health care. In the first 2 months of 2017, inflation edged up further, 
bringing the year-on-year rate to 5.0% (Figure 3.31.2).
Against the backdrop of rising but moderate inflation, the State 
Bank of Viet Nam, the central bank, kept policy interest rates steady in 
This chapter was written by Aaron Batten, Chu Hong Minh, and Nguyen Luu Thuc 
Phuong of the Viet Nam Resident Mission, ADB, Ha Noi.
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2016 while commercial lending rates were trimmed by 0.5%–1.0% in the 
last quarter of the year. As a result, credit grew by an estimated 19% as 
money supply (M2) increased by an estimated 18% (Figure 3.31.3). The 
adoption of a more fl exible exchange rate and the central bank’s timely 
implementation of sterilization measures quite eff ectively managed 
external fi nancial shocks during the year. Despite fl uctuations in 
international fi nancial markets, the Viet Nam dong remained relatively 
stable, depreciating by about 1% against the US dollar during the year 
(Figure 3.31.4).
The current account surplus expanded to an estimated equivalent 
of 3.3% of GDP last year, up from 0.5% in 2015, as the country posted a 
large trade surplus of around $14 billion, equal to 6.9% of GDP (Figure 
3.31.5). Merchandise exports rose by an estimated 8.5%, while import 
growth slowed sharply to an estimated 4.6%. The biggest export gains 
were in mobile phones and their components, which increased by 14% 
and now comprise 20% of total exports. A 15% drop in oil imports and 
an 11% drop in imports of transportation equipment and spare parts 
slowed the pace of import growth. Refl ecting both strong investment 
and buoyant consumption, growth in imports of electronic components 
and consumer goods was in the range of 9%–13%. 
The capital account posted an estimated surplus equal to 3.4% of 
GDP, bolstered by strong FDI disbursement. The overall balance of 
payments surplus reached 4.2% of GDP. The strengthening balance of 
payments allowed the central bank to build up its foreign exchange 
reserves to an estimated 2.7 months of import cover, up from the 2.3 
months at the beginning of 2016 (Figure 3.31.6).
Eff orts to rein in the fi scal defi cit had only limited success. Although 
government revenue grew by 12% to reach the equivalent of 23.1% of 
GDP, it was outstripped by expenditure growth, resulting in an on-budget 
defi cit equal to 4.4% of GDP, signifi cantly higher than the 2015 fi gure 
of 4.0%. This is a matter of concern, especially as public debt including 
government-guaranteed debt is now estimated to exceed 63% of GDP, 
nearing the 65% limit set by the National Assembly. 
Progress in reforming the fi nancial sector has been elusive. Although 
the offi  cially reported nonperforming loan (NPL) rate in 2015 and 2016 
remained low at about 2.5% of outstanding loans, this largely refl ected 
the transfer of $12.7 billion in NPLs from banks to the state-owned Viet 
Nam Asset Management Company. By the end of 2016, the company had 
resolved only 18% of the NPLs purchased from banks. Real progress 
in reining in NPLs would thus depend on how fast it can resolve its 
impaired assets and at what cost. Moreover, progress in consolidating 
the banking system continues to languish, with no mergers or 
acquisitions completed in 2016.
Economic prospects
GDP growth is projected to be higher at 6.5% in 2017 and 6.7% in 2018 
(Figure 3.31.7). With strong growth in manufacturing and services likely 
to continue, a modest pickup in agriculture and mining output should 
give an additional fi llip to the economy.  
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Manufacturing will be boosted by the continued opening of new 
foreign-invested factories on the back of record FDI disbursements last 
year (Figure 3.31.8). Manufacturing and exports should expand further 
with continued strengthening in the US economy and the opening up of 
more trade opportunities with the European Union through a new free 
trade agreement eff ective at the beginning of 2018. 
Construction will continue to benefi t from high FDI disbursements 
to set up new factories, a strengthening housing sector, and continued 
high public investment in transport and energy. 
Growth in services, strong in 2016, is projected to remain so in 2017 
and 2018 with tourist arrivals further boosted by the new e-marketing 
campaign launched recently by the government.
Agriculture is expected to pick up somewhat in 2017 given the 
outlook for higher global food prices and assuming a return to normal 
weather. The government targets agriculture growth at 2.8% in 2017. 
On the demand side, private consumption is expected to expand 
robustly. Consumer sentiment remains buoyant, as indicated by a 
November 2016 survey showing that 43% of businesses expected retail 
sales to improve in 2017 and another 39% expected conditions to 
remain stable. 
Prospects for private investment look bright. Reform to business 
practices has helped move Viet Nam up in the World Bank’s Doing 
Business rankings from 91 among 189 countries surveyed in 2016 to 82 
among 190 in 2017. Ongoing reforms to allow greater foreign ownership 
of domestic stocks and state-owned enterprises along with reforms to 
facilitate private participation in building infrastructure should encourage 
private investment. The number of newly established enterprises hit 
a record high of 110,000 in 2016, up by 16.2% from 2015. The Nikkei 
purchasing managers’ index, which measures expectations for business 
inventory, reached a record high in February 2017, with a particularly 
sharp rise in new orders to manufacturers (Figure 3.31.9). 
As growth strengthens, infl ation is expected to edge up to 4.0% this 
year and 5.0% in 2018 (Figure 3.31.10). The expected rise in global food 
and fuel prices, higher US interest rates, and a stronger dollar will add 
to imported infl ation. Another likely source of infl ation is the continued 
implementation of the government road map on administered prices for 
education, health, electricity and water tariff s, and minimum wages. 
Higher growth and infl ation will cause the current account surplus 
to narrow. Merchandise exports are seen rising by an annual rate of 10% 
over the next 2 years as new foreign-invested factories start producing and 
new trade agreements take eff ect. Imports are likely to rise even faster 
as larger FDI infl ows draw in additional imports of capital goods and 
manufacturing inputs. The current account surplus is thus expected to 
moderate to 2.0% of GDP this year and 2.5% in 2018 (Figure 3.31.11).
Public debt pressures have prompted the government to set ambitious 
targets for the budget defi cit, reining it into the equivalent of 3.5% of GDP 
in 2017 and holding it to about 4.0% next year. Most of the reduction in 
the fi scal defi cit would, however, be due to higher receipts from the sale 
of equity in state-owned enterprises, which the government treats as 
revenue. Excluding those receipts, fi scal defi cit reduction will be much 
more modest. On the expenditure side, the government plans to cut 
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recurrent expenditure by 6% while raising capital expenditure by 36%. 
Achieving fi scal consolidation over the medium term will be challenging 
and require deeper tax reform, better revenue administration, and much 
more effi  cient public expenditure.
Vulnerability in the fi nancial sector poses a risk to the outlook. 
Progress on bank restructuring and NPL resolution has been slower 
than hoped, leaving banks exposed to large contingent liabilities. 
As the central bank targets credit growth at 18% in 2017, the rise of 
domestic lending at a faster rate than deposit growth also challenges the 
maintenance of adequate bank liquidity. The capital adequacy ratio was 
reported at an estimated 12.8% at the end of 2016, comfortably above 
the regulatory minimum of 9.0%, but it was not calculated according to 
international Basel II standards. With the government planning to have 
all commercial banks meet Basel II capital standards by 2020, they will 
likely need capital injections from foreign investors. This will require 
signifi cant improvements to the legal framework, including the lifting of 
limits on foreign ownership of banks.
Another threat to the outlook is any sudden weakening in global 
demand. Slower growth in the People’s Republic of China, a major 
trading partner, would undermine Viet Nam’s trade position. Further, 
any worsening of global fi nancial volatility could spill over into the 
domestic market even though Viet Nam’s capital market is not fully open.
Policy challenge—creating a more effi  cient and 
sustainable agriculture sector
As Viet Nam begins to recover from its most severe drought in a decade, 
the role of agriculture in the economy and the country’s ability to move 
up from lower- to upper-middle-income status have received heightened 
policy attention. 
In the past, agriculture was a signifi cant driver of growth and 
poverty reduction. The removal of trade barriers and the abolition 
of collective farming during the late 1980s and 1990s encouraged 
infusions of human and physical capital into the sector and boosted 
output. However, past reform to agriculture generated only one-off  
gains for the most part and did little to boost agricultural productivity 
per worker. As a result, even after 20 years of reform, Viet Nam has 
one of the lowest levels of agricultural labor productivity in the region 
(Figure 3.31.12). 
Major transformation in the sector to make it more effi  cient and 
sustainable is vital to lifting GDP growth in Viet Nam and enabling 
it to graduate to upper-middle-income status. Achieving such a 
transformation requires addressing four main policy challenges.  
The fi rst is market structure and competitiveness. State-owned 
enterprises currently dominate input supply, postharvest processing, 
and the marketing of produce. State enterprises also monopolize 
wholesaling, which means that an unnecessarily large share of the 
output price is absorbed by ineffi  cient intermediaries. This suppresses 
farm incomes and incentive for investment. 
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Secondly, rural infrastructure development needs to be expanded 
and more integrated to sustain strong growth in agriculture. 
Higher public investment is needed both to maintain existing 
rural infrastructure and to build new infrastructure for irrigation, 
transport, postharvest handling, and storage. Further, farmers need 
to adopt improved agricultural technology and methods that are 
more productive and environmentally friendly. This requires stronger 
engagement between agricultural research institutions and farmers.
A third requirement is more sustainable natural resource 
management, including policies to encourage the consolidation of 
landholdings into larger plots. More than 80% of farms in Viet Nam 
are smaller than 1 hectare. Farmers rely increasingly on marginal 
plots and use ever-increasing quantities of chemical fertilizer to 
spur production with little concern for long-term environmental 
impacts. Worsening water quality is a particularly important concern. 
Agriculture already uses 82% of available freshwater in Viet Nam. 
Water pollution in Viet Nam’s rivers is threatening the sustainability of 
water use for agriculture. 
Finally, there is an urgent need to address the worsening impacts 
of climate change on agriculture. Viet Nam is among the countries 
most vulnerable to climate change, with agriculture particularly at 
risk because it relies heavily on stable agro-ecological and climatic 
conditions. Aside from drought, water resources will likely be affected 
by increasingly unreliable river flow patterns, which forces farmers to 
depend more on groundwater. Fisheries and other coastal resources 
are highly vulnerable to temperature change, uncontrolled inundation, 
and salinity intrusion. To adequately prepare for climate change, 
Viet Nam will require strong leadership that ensures climate change 
considerations are integrated into policy making, and to prioritize 
smart green investments such as improved water resource planning 
and more efficient water use.
3.31.12 Agriculture output per worker, 2015
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Fiji
Economic growth slowed in 2016 because of damage from Cyclone Winston estimated to equal 
28% of GDP, with agriculture and forestry the hardest hit. Substantial resources from development 
partners supported relief and rehab ilitation, and reasonable progress was made despite capacity 
challenges. Continuing reconstruction is expected to accelerate growth in 2017 and 2018, as will 
fiscal policies supporting ambitious works to develop economic infrastructure, especially roads.
Economic performance 
Fiji has experienced 7 consecutive years of economic expansion, but 
growth slowed in 2016 as a result of substantial damage and losses 
sustained from Cyclone Winston in February 2016 (Figure 3.32.1). 
The cyclone severely aff ected public infrastructure, particularly 
in rural Fiji, and forced agriculture and forestry into recession. 
Sugarcane production, which contributes 27% of agricultural output 
and had stabilized in 2015 after 3 years of growth, plunged by 25% 
(Figure 3.32.2).
Other sectors refl ected the resulting slowdown as well, but growth 
was sustained in mining and quarrying, construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, and professional services. Tourism continued to be the 
main driver of growth. Signifi cant growth in visitor arrivals from 
New Zealand and Asia—the latter by 24.7% but from a fairly small base—
led 5.0% growth in arrivals overall, despite a 1.9% decline from Australia, 
Fiji’s largest market by far (Figure 3.32.3). 
Signifi cant investment to improve public infrastructure has boosted 
the growth potential of the economy over the long run. However, growth 
in credit to the private sector was, at 12.6% in 2016, down from 14.4% 
in 2015. This slowdown refl ected weaker economic activity as a result of 
Cyclone Winston.
Consumption grew strongly in 2016. This was refl ected by indicators 
such as 32% growth in new vehicle sales and 9% growth in secondhand 
vehicle sales during the year. Commercial bank lending for consumption 
expanded by 7.9%, and imports of consumer goods increased by 14.7%. 
Inward remittances are estimated to have risen by 10.2%, further fueling 
growth in consumption. 
After 2 years of low infl ation, the consumer price index rose by an 
annual average of 3.9%, mainly because of disrupted domestic food 
supply following Cyclone Winston but also because of higher taxes on 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco. Declines in prices for fuel, transport, 
communication, household equipment and furnishings, recreation, and 
miscellaneous items could not off set the increases. 
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After Cyclone Winston, the government changed its fiscal year 
from the calendar year to one ending on 31 July of the year for which 
it is named. Although there was significant reallocation of budgetary 
resources following the cyclone to meet immediate relief and 
rehabilitation needs, the deficit for FY2016 came to the equivalent of 
only 1.6% of GDP (Figure 3.32.4), substantially lower than deficits of 
4.1% in 2014 and 3.2% in FY2015. The reduced fiscal deficit resulted 
from higher direct and indirect tax revenues and lower-than-expected 
capital expenditure. At the end of July 2016, public debt equaled 47.9% 
of GDP, more than 70% of it domestic. The Fiji National Provident Fund 
holds 46.9% of government debt.
Monetary policy remained accommodative with the policy interest 
rate at 0.5%. Commercial bank lending rates are still low by historical 
standards, but recent liquidity developments have stirred interest rates 
for deposits. Liquidity fell by 7.5% in 2016 as commercial banks’ demand 
deposits with the central bank declined. Average rates for time deposits 
of more than 24 months edged upward to 2.95%, an increase of 25 basis 
points over the previous year. This could induce commercial banks to 
increase their lending rates.
Imports fell in 2016 despite strong consumer demand and 
cyclone reconstruction. This allowed robust growth in earnings from 
tourism and remittances to push the current account surplus excluding 
aircraft to the equivalent of 3.4% of GDP in the first 3 quarters of 2016. 
Foreign reserves stood at $960 million at the end of the year, sufficient 
to cover 5.4 months of retained imports of goods and nonfactor services.
Economic prospects 
As the economy recovers from Cyclone Winston, growth is projected 
to reach 3.5% in 2017. All sectors are expected to register positive 
growth given the uptick in demand, with major contributions from 
manufacturing, transport and storage, finance and insurance, wholesale 
and retail trade, accommodation and food services, and construction. 
Public spending is expected to rise in 2017 as the reconstruction of 
schools and homes damaged by Cyclone Winston picks up pace. 
More building permits were issued in 2016 than in the previous year, 
signaling that construction will grow strongly in 2017. Further, an 
increase of 12.5% in visitor numbers in January augurs well for tourism 
in 2017. Inward remittances have been growing strongly over the past 
few years (Figure 3.32.5). This trend is expected to continue in 2017 
with increasing labor exports, not only of seasonal workers but also of 
professional athletes and military personnel deployed on peacekeeping 
missions. Higher remittances will support higher consumption and 
investment, adding to economic stimulus. 
Rising international prices for fuel and food will bring some 
inflation, but price increases will not be as significant as in 2016 
(Figure 3.32.6). Higher taxes on alcoholic beverages and tobacco will 
continue to contribute to inflation. Domestic food prices are expected to 
normalize in the coming months as supplies are restored. 
Exports are expected to grow strongly as agriculture recovers. 
With earnings from tourism and remittances higher than expected, 
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the current account will likely remain stable even with rising imports 
for cyclone reconstruction. Public spending is expected to remain 
high as rehabilitation and reconstruction pick up momentum. 
Beyond reconstructing public infrastructure and buildings, public 
expenditure will continue to support the rebuilding of homes and the 
restoration of livelihoods, particularly in rural areas.
On top of construction and recovery in agriculture, continued 
growth in tourism, transport, and public spending is expected to 
support growth at 4.0% in 2018.
Policy challenge—building for climate change
Fiji is, like other small island states in the Pacifi c, highly susceptible to 
climate change and extreme weather. Impacts on health care, coastal 
infrastructure, water resources, agriculture, forestry, and fi sheries 
are often substantial and widespread, as shown by the aftermath of 
Cyclone Winston. 
The country is fi nalizing its national development plan, which 
will be integrated with its Green Growth Framework to address 
adverse climate eff ects on economic assets. Climate resilience is being 
mainstreamed into public investment decisions. 
The government’s recent switch to a fi scal year that begins and 
ends well outside of the November–April cyclone season is intended to 
facilitate the timely funding of disaster response. The mainstreaming 
approach goes further, though, and includes shifting away from an 
emphasis on post-disaster emergency response toward community 
preparedness and disaster mitigation, and on integrating into national 
development planning the inevitable impacts of disasters.
A signifi cant challenge for Fiji is to expand its infrastructure in 
line with economic growth, and to make it resilient under climate 
change so it can help sustain growth even as adverse weather becomes 
increasingly frequent and intense. For example, growth over the 
past 7 years has strained the transport network, all the more so as 
adverse weather hastens road deterioration. It is therefore vital that 
the government integrate climate resilience considerations into its 
public investment decisions to reduce the need for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction following natural disasters. 
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Papua New Guinea
Growth at 2.0% in 2016 was considerably lower than in previous years and came largely from 
mineral resources. The economy is expected to grow by 2.5% in 2017 and, with the hosting of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, by 2.8% in 2018. While the short-term 
outlook skews to the downside, the medium-term outlook remains positive thanks to foreign 
investments in the pipeline.
Economic performance 
The economy is estimated to have grown by 2.0% in 2016, marking 
a sharp slowdown from high growth rates in the previous 4 years 
(Figure 3.33.1). Economic growth was weighed down by slowing foreign 
investment, soft global commodity prices, and unfavorable weather.
Preliminary estimates show that the oil and gas sector contracted 
by 1.2% in 2016 as oil production declined in maturing oil fi elds and gas 
production reached full capacity. Mining and quarrying grew by 8.0% 
in 2016 as the Ok Tedi gold and copper mine resumed operations in the 
fi rst quarter. This off set the closure of the Ramu nickel mine for several 
months because of noncompliance with safety standards, as well as the 
Porgera gold and silver mine being forced to scale down operations by a 
landslip and sabotage to power transmission lines. 
Agriculture, forestry, and fi sheries, which provide about one fi fth 
of economic output, grew by 3.0% in 2016. Higher copra and copra oil 
production came largely from higher prices, but an increase in cocoa 
output refl ected an expanded area under cultivation, and improved 
management. Coff ee production recovered from drought in the 
previous year. 
Wholesale and retail trade, which accounts for about 12% of 
economic output, experienced weak sales because a shortage of foreign 
currency disrupted supply. Driven mostly by public investment, 
electricity, gas, and water grew by 3.0%. Transport, storage, and 
communication grew by an estimated 4.0%. 
Foreign investment in Papua New Guinea (PNG)  continued 
to fall in 2016, with net foreign assets declining by 11.5% largely 
because construction on a liquefi ed natural gas (LNG) project reached 
completion. Other factors include a poor investment environment 
outside of mining, a ban on imports of some agricultural products, and 
the introduction of foreign exchange controls in 2016. 
The slowdown in economic growth and private business dragged 
down public revenue. The 2016 national budget targeted a defi cit equal 
to 4.1% of GDP (Figure 3.33.2). However, the government’s mid-year 
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economic and fi scal outlook warned that because of a shortfall in 
revenue, the defi cit would be larger than anticipated. A supplementary 
budget for 2016, approved in August, sought to remedy the situation by 
cutting expenditure and raising new fi nancing. 
Infl ation is estimated at 7.0% in 2016 (Figure 3.33.3). In the fi rst 
quarter of 2016, headline infl ation accelerated to 6.5% from 6.2% in the 
fi rst quarter of 2015, and this upward trend continued for the rest of the 
year. Prices rose in all the larger urban centers. The increase in domestic 
infl ation refl ects price rises across domestic goods and services, notably 
betel nut and mustard up 33.5%, housing rentals up 28.1%, fruit and 
vegetables up 25.5%, hotel accommodation up 18.9%, and medical 
services up 17.0%. 
The Bank of Papua New Guinea, the central bank, continued its 
neutral monetary policy stance by maintaining its policy interest rate, 
called the kina facility rate, at 6.25% throughout the year. Broad money 
supply expanded by 5.0% in 2016 largely on the continued issuance of 
securities to fi nance government expenditure. As a result, net claims 
on the government soared by 25.7%. Credit to the private sector rose 
by 3.1%. 
The current account surplus, estimated to equal 9.4% of GDP in 2016, 
was down from 13.4% in 2015 as imports increased by 10.2% and exports 
were lower by 6.4% (Figure 3.33.4). The capital and fi nancial account 
defi cit was $1.7 billion in 2016. The overall balance of payments defi cit of 
$121 million was fi nanced using foreign exchange reserves, which at the 
end of 2016 stood at $2.2 billion, or cover for 8.8 months of imports.
Economic prospects 
Growth is expected to accelerate to 2.5% in 2017, driven by output 
increases in mining and agriculture (Table 3.33.1). The Ok Tedi gold and 
copper mine is foreseen returning to full capacity and the Ramu nickel 
mine to 90% capacity. 
Agriculture, forestry, and fi shery output is forecast to grow by 
3.6% with increases in both price and production, assuming favorable 
weather. Palm oil production is expected to recover from a slump 
caused by El Niño in 2015, while prevailing high prices for cocoa 
should add momentum to the supply response that is bringing new 
areas into production. Copra production will continue to increase in 
response to higher prices, while growth in coff ee production is set to 
moderate in 2017 following a bumper season in 2016. 
A gradual pickup in the global economy can be expected to boost 
commodity prices and stimulate activity in sectors outside of resource 
extraction. These sectors will likely enjoy further support from 
spending related to the elections   in June and July 2017, preparations 
for the 2018 Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting, and 
continued government investment in infrastructure. 
Economic growth is expected to be 2.8% in 2018, still supported 
mostly by agriculture and mining. 
Uncertainties about global and domestic policy pose large risks 
to the forecast. An aggressive fi scal stance in the US could cause 
interest rates to surge, thereby increasing the cost of borrowing for 
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the government and the private sector in PNG. The adoption of a more 
restrictive trade regime in the US could slow global trade and thus 
reduce demand for PNG exports.  Given the importance of exports 
to the economy, any exogenous shock would have adverse effects on 
the whole economy, which has yet to recover fully from the recent 
downturn in commodity prices. 
The government’s plan to return to a balanced budget over the 
medium term is helping to rebuild the fiscal position necessary to 
absorb external shocks, and its focus on making public expenditure 
more effective promises better use of public resources. For 2017, the 
government targets a deficit equal to 2.5% of GDP, with revenue 
expected at $4.2 billion and expenditure budgeted at $4.6 billion. 
The government plans to finance the deficit through domestic and 
international borrowing.    
The central bank is expected to continue its neutral monetary 
policy and leave the kina facility rate unchanged. The foreign exchange 
shortage is likely to persist in 2017 without substantial improvement in 
commodity prices. The central bank has tried to manage the shortage 
by selectively intervening in currency markets. The foreign exchange 
trading band continues to determine the speed of kina depreciation. 
In the absence of a freely floating kina, the economy may prove to 
be unable to absorb an exogenous shock. Such a shock could force a 
disorderly switch to a free float.  
There are also important political risks to the forecast. Delays 
in royalty payments to landowners at LNG production sites could 
destabilize outputs. Reports suggest growing discontent among 
landowners. In December 2016, the government mobilized security 
forces in response to violence at production sites. How this issue is 
handled could affect other projects in the pipeline and substantially 
compromise growth.   
Inflation is projected to accelerate to 7.5% in 2017 and 2018. 
Imported inflation is expected to rise with kina depreciation and 
recent increases in global oil prices. Further, spending related to 
the elections  in 2017 and the hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting will probably intensify inflationary 
pressures. However, these pressures will likely subside as the 
government continues along the path of fiscal consolidation.  
The current account is projected to record a surplus of $1.4 billion 
in 2017, equal to 7.7% of GDP. This reflects increased output from 
the Ok Tedi and Ramu mines and increased exports of agricultural 
products in response to higher world food prices.
The current account balance is forecast to remain in surplus 
equivalent to 6.7% of GDP in 2018, buoyed by continued gas and gas 
condensate production and further increases in agriculture exports, 
particularly coffee, cocoa, and palm oil. These inflows are expected 
to be offset somewhat by large outflows in the income and financial 
balances to cover dividend payments to overseas investors.
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Policy challenge—an eff ective medium-term 
fi scal strategy 
PNG was able to withstand the global fi nancial crisis of 2008–2009 but 
was severely aff ected by the global commodities downturn in 2014–
2015. While the nature of the two shocks diff ered, fi scal and monetary 
stances preceding them provide important lessons. PNG had built 
fi scal buff ers and reduced public debt in the years preceding the global 
fi nancial crisis. However, an expansionary fi scal stance starting 2012 
and the rapid depletion of fi scal and monetary reserves forced a sharp, 
unplanned adjustment during the commodities downturn.
The government is developing a new medium-term fi scal strategy 
for 2018–2022 to replace the current strategy, which expires this year. 
A credible and sound strategy will be important to reinforce the ability 
of PNG to respond to external shocks, rebuild fi scal buff ers, and make 
public expenditure more eff ective. Institutions necessary to mitigate 
exogenous shocks, in particular a well-functioning sovereign wealth 
fund, are urgently needed. PNG must meet four imperatives.
The fi rst imperative is to rebuild fi scal buff ers to restore fi scal 
resilience under external shocks. For instance, fi scal guidelines should 
include a defi cit target stated as a percentage of non-mining GDP. The 
medium-term fi scal strategy for 2008–2012 included prudent limits on 
the use of mineral revenues. The strategy estimated mineral revenue 
at the time to equal about 4% of GDP and therefore targeted a defi cit 
for the non-mineral budget at the same 4% of GDP. Further, a 70:30 
ratio governed the use of mineral revenue, with 70% earmarked for 
investment and 30% for repaying public debt. At the end of 2012, 
public debt had been retired to the equivalent of 19.1% of GDP from 
31.4% in 2008 and 63.6% in 2002 (Figure 3.33.5). These guidelines 
were subsequently relaxed, and the budget defi cit was allowed to rise 
sharply on the expectation of windfall revenue. This made PNG less 
able to absorb the exogenous shock from sharply worse terms of trade 
experienced in 2015. To avoid a repeat of this scenario, it is important 
that the new medium-term fi scal strategy include strong guidelines to 
rebuild the fi scal buff er.  
Second, the agenda for public fi nance reform should include getting 
greater value for money from public expenditure. Expenditure for 
health, for example, was equivalent to about 4% of GDP in 2013, well 
above the 1.6% average in lower-middle-income economies, but PNG 
has struggled to translate high public expenditure into improved social 
and economic outcomes. Female life expectancy at birth in PNG is 64 
years, well below the lower-middle-income average of 69 years. High 
operating costs in a vast interior with a sparse population make cost-
eff ective service delivery diffi  cult. This constraint is exacerbated by 
institutional fragmentation and overlapping responsibilities for service 
delivery to the poor. The upshot is that public fi nance does not reach 
frontline service providers in an effi  cient and timely way.
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Third, PNG should strengthen revenue collection and domestic 
resource mobilization. The bulk of expected annual revenue does 
not materialize until halfway into  the year, which undermines 
expenditure effectiveness. This complicates cash-flow management, 
and the problem is magnified when a revenue shortfall occurs due to 
cyclical factors such as commodity price swings or extreme weather. 
The situation is further complicated when the government invests 
in large infrastructure projects with cash needs that vary from one 
quarter to the next because of factors that are difficult to accurately 
forecast. Such issues are masked when revenue collection outpaces 
expenditure, but the reverse situation suddenly applies the brakes, 
delaying investments needed for medium-term development.
Fourth, structural reform is needed to attract more private 
investment and participation in services. Service delivery in PNG 
is largely binary, public or private. A multi-institutional approach 
that leverages complementarity market, public, and civic solutions 
has a better chance of delivering lasting results. Public policy is to 
pursue such solutions through national development plans, but the 
operationalization of this policy needs further support. Many private 
companies and other nongovernment agencies in remote areas are 
involved in providing basic services. Strengthening and scaling up 
these services should be a policy priority. Finally, the challenge for 
public policy, particularly from the perspective of social equity, is 
to deliver such essentials as books, pencils, and medicine effectively 
in remote places where instant noodles and chocolates have already 
found markets.
Solomon Islands
Although economic growth is broadly steady, it relies on expansionary fiscal policy and 
unsustainable logging. Growth is likely to slow as their short-term benefits dissipate. Taking 
a longer view, tourism has potential as an untapped source of economic growth. Steady 
progress is being made in implementing a national tourism development strategy, but significant 
impediments remain.
Economic performance 
Economic growth accelerated modestly to an estimated 3.2% in 2016 
from 2.9% in 2015 (Figure 3.34.1). The government maintained its 
strategy of supporting growth through fi scal expansion. Aggressive 
logging also added signifi cantly to growth as the industry continued 
to stave off  expectations of eventual decline. Logging exports rose by 
12.7% in 2016 to reach an annual record of 2.6 million cubic meters 
(Figure 3.34.2). 
Exports of other commodities were mixed as fi shery, cocoa, and 
mineral exports all contracted in volume terms while palm oil exports 
rose. Meanwhile, the pace of private investment appears to have 
slowed, with growth in credit to the private sector decelerating slightly, 
imports of capital goods falling, and construction softening. 
The government continued to pursue an expansionary budget, 
taking advantage of signifi cant fi scal reserves built up under repeated 
budget surpluses in the past. In 2016, the budget recorded a sizeable 
defi cit, equal to 5.9% of GDP, as the government maintained high 
expenditures even as lower fi shery revenue and external grant receipts 
dragged down total revenues. To fi nance the defi cit, the government 
drew down its cash reserves held at the Central Bank of Solomon 
Islands, signifi cantly eroding them to less than 1 month of cover for 
projected spending. 
Annual infl ation in 2016 is estimated at 1.1%, reversing a 0.5% 
decline in consumer prices in 2015 (Figure 3.34.3). Infl ation for local 
goods and services was 3.3% but off set by a 2.1% decline in import 
prices, refl ecting low international commodity prices. Monetary policy 
continued to be broadly accommodative as the central bank left the 
cash reserve requirement for commercial banks unchanged at 7.5% of 
deposits and held steady on its issuance of central bank paper. 
The current account defi cit almost doubled to the equivalent of 
7.3% of GDP from 3.7% in 2015, mainly because lower grant infl ows 
from development partners more than off set a slightly narrower trade 
defi cit (Figure 3.34.4). Foreign exchange reserves are ample, however, 
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at coverage for 10.3 months of imports. Export earnings rose by 2.1%, 
driven by logging, coconut products, and palm oil. Mineral exports 
remain depressed following the closure of the country’s sole gold mine 
in 2014 and a government clampdown on bauxite strip mining. The 
import bill was nearly fl at in 2016, held to only 0.2% growth by low 
international commodity prices.
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to slow to 3.0% in 2017 and 2.8% in 2018 as current 
short-term growth drivers fade (Table 3.34.1). After 2 years of fi scal 
expansion, policy is set to tighten. Private investment will likely 
continue to moderate, and net exports are expected to detract from 
growth. Log export volumes are projected to decline gradually in 2017 
and 2018, but logging has routinely surprised on the upside for many 
years, defying expectations of eventual decline. Logging therefore 
poses a signifi cant risk to the outlook, especially as it accounts for a 
growing share of exports. Meanwhile, years of unsustainable logging 
heighten the risk of an eventual collapse that is more rapid and 
disruptive than anticipated. 
The state budget is set to tighten signifi cantly in 2017. The 
government is targeting a fi scal defi cit equal to 1.2% of GDP, fi nanced by 
further drawdowns on its cash reserves (Figure 3.34.5). The depletion 
of cash reserves over the past 2 years will limit the government’s ability 
to maintain its policy of high public spending, given legal constraints 
on borrowing to fi nance recurrent budget defi cits. To meet its spending 
targets, the government has budgeted signifi cantly higher domestic 
revenue collection, projecting it to increase from the equivalent of 35.3% 
of GDP in 2016 to 39.9% in 2017. The budget provides little detail on how 
such an ambitious increase will be achieved. The risks posed by this 
uncertainty are counterbalanced, however, by likely underperformance 
on the expenditure side as the development budget continues to 
face implementation diffi  culties. In addition, low cash reserves may 
hinder cash-fl ow management and further impede eff ective budget 
implementation.
The central bank is expected to maintain a broadly accommodative 
stance. Higher international commodity prices are likely to feed into 
higher imported infl ation while local infl ation is forecast to pick up 
slowly. Infl ation is projected to stay relatively subdued at 1.8% in 2017 
and 2.2% in 2018. Broad money growth is expected at 8.1%, down from 
9.2% in 2016, as growth in private credit slows modestly and as the 
government draws down cash reserves less than before and therefore 
injects less liquidity into the system. The current account defi cit is 
projected to widen to the equivalent of 8.3% of GDP in 2017 as net 
exports deteriorate amid fl at export earnings and rising import costs, 
and as grant infl ows from development partners remain subdued. In 
2018, the current account defi cit will likely widen signifi cantly to 10.7% 
of GDP to meet the import needs of planned major infrastructure 
projects, including the Tina River Hydropower Project.
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Policy challenge—unlocking tourism potential
New economic drivers are urgently needed to replace logging and 
external assistance, which are expected to decline over the medium 
term. Solomon Islands is widely considered to have world class tourism 
potential that remains largely untapped. Diving is currently the main 
attraction, but other attractions with potential include World War II 
historical sites, indigenous culture, bird watching, surfi ng, and fi shing. 
Visitor arrivals have been on an upwards trajectory but from a very 
low base. Arrivals by air rose from 19,440 in 2009 to a peak of 24,431 
in 2013 (Figure 3.34.6). Severe fl oods in Honiara disrupted tourism in 
2014, and arrivals by air have since hovered at a little over 20,000 a year. 
This may partly refl ect substitution in favor of cruise tourism, which 
is growing rapidly. Visitors by sea rose from none offi  cially recorded 
in 2013 to about 3,900 in 2015 and 13,400 in 2016. Contributing to this 
performance are stepped-up marketing by the Solomon Islands Visitors 
Bureau, a perception that public safety has improved somewhat, and 
the commencement of direct fl ights between Honiara and Sydney, as 
Australia is the major source market. Yet visitor arrivals remain far 
lower than in other Pacifi c destinations with more developed tourism 
infrastructure. 
Numerous challenges confront eff orts to unlock the tourism 
potential of Solomon Islands. Most fundamentally, public safety remains 
a concern, and key infrastructure lacking beyond Honiara includes 
adequate roads, reliable and aff ordable domestic air connections, cruise 
ship-capable wharves, dependable electricity supply, and modern 
telecommunications. Tourism is further constrained by regulatory 
issues, in particular the diffi  culty of acquiring land for tourism 
development. The marketing of Solomon Islands as an attractive tourism 
destination remains weak, recent eff orts notwithstanding. There are 
no internationally branded or luxury hotels to create awareness and 
instill trust. The tourism workforce is small and needs professional 
development.  
In 2015, the government launched its National Tourism Development 
Strategy, 2015–2019, which aims to develop Solomon Islands as a 
niche destination for small-scale adventure tourism that capitalizes 
on unique off erings related to its land, marine, and cultural resources. 
Good progress has been made in implementing the strategy in terms of 
restructuring the tourism ministry, increasing funding for the visitors 
bureau, instituting reform to support more sustainable fi nancing, 
and creating an online booking portal to support small-scale tourism 
operators. The government has started to develop new tourism products, 
including cruise opportunities and niche products such as game fi shing, 
and to profi le investment-ready tourism sites.
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Timor-Leste
Growth accelerated in 2016 as the government implemented a large fiscal stimulus ahead of 
elections in July 2017. Growth is expected to moderate in 2017 before reaccelerating in 2018 as 
large public and private investments move forward. Decentralization provides an opportunity to 
improve public service delivery. Well-designed rules for allocating funding to municipalities will 
help to ensure that decentralization also promotes equity.
Economic performance 
Growth picked up in 2016 as GDP excluding the large off shore 
petroleum sector (hereafter GDP) expanded by an estimated 5.4% 
(Figure 3.35.1). Public spending was the main driver of growth, rising by 
an estimated 17.7%. Grants from Timor-Leste’s development partners fell 
by an estimated 3.4% and accounted for 11.7% of public spending in 2016, 
while government expenditures excluding grants rose by 21.2%.
The surge in public spending followed the approval of a 
supplementary budget in June that doubled planned capital investment 
and raised the 2016 budget by 25.0% to $1.95 billion, equal to 129% of 
GDP. Actual capital expenditure rose by 82.2% to $590 million with 
increased investment in transport infrastructure (Figure 3.35.2). Transfer 
payments, which increased by 6.3%, also contributed to the growth 
of public spending. Transfers to the Special Administrative Region of 
Oe-Cusse Ambeno rose by 57.6% to $217 million. Other components of 
public spending showed a modest decline, with salaries and wages down 
by 2.7% and payments for goods and services 3.7% lower.
The surge in public investment improved business prospects 
and strengthened private sector growth, as indicated by business 
electricity consumption rising by 17.5% year on year in the fi rst half. 
Manufacturing received a boost in 2016 as Heineken completed Timor-
Leste’s fi rst major brewery, but commissioning of a new private port 
and a cement bagging plant was delayed. In the petroleum sector, state-
owned Timor Gap initiated a multiyear program to fi nd more oil and 
gas in an area of Timor-Leste’s exclusive economic zone for which it has 
been granted an exclusive license. 
Coff ee production rose in 2016, but quality was harmed by rain 
during the harvest. In coastal areas, El Niño continued to aff ect 
agricultural production. Maize harvests fell by 8% to 21% below the 
average for 2011–2015, and rice production fell by 6% to 30% below the 
average for the period.
Increased food imports helped to off set the infl ationary impact 
of reduced local production. Thanks to the continued pass-through 
of previous falls in international food prices, improved logistics, and 
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increased retail competition, consumer prices fell by an average of 1.3% 
in 2016 (Figure 3.35.3). Defl ation was more pronounced in the capital, 
Dili, where prices fell by 1.6%, compared with 0.5% defl ation in the rest 
of the country. 
Domestic revenue collection strengthened in 2016 by 28.6% with 
invigorated private business and intensifi ed collection eff ort. Customs 
was a notable area of improvement, with revenues up by 20.9% despite 
a 14.4% decline in merchandise imports. Planning for fi scal reform 
continued in 2016 with the fi nalization of draft legislation for a value-
added tax and the approval of legislation to restructure customs and tax 
administration under two new independent authorities. 
Income from off shore petroleum production continued its sharp 
decline in 2016, when Timor-Leste received $223.9 million in taxes and 
royalties, down from $978.9 million in 2015 and an average of $2.5 billion 
per annum during 2008–2014. The fall in revenue came from both falling 
production, down by 6.8% in 2016, and lower oil prices, down by an 
average of 15.9%. Another factor was the settlement in the fi rst quarter 
of 2016 of four tax disputes between the Government of Timor-Leste 
and ConocoPhillips, the lead operator of the Bayu-Undan oil fi eld. The 
settlement terms have not been disclosed, but analysis of tax and royalty 
payments to Australia and Timor-Leste suggests that Timor-Leste had to 
forego $152.4 million in tax revenue in 2016 (Figure 3.35.4). 
Lower petroleum tax income was partly balanced on paper by 
investments of Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Fund that earned $647.7 million 
in 2016. The fund’s equity and bond holdings both outperformed their 
benchmarks for an overall return on assets of 4.7%, compared with a 
benchmark yield of 4.0%. The fund maintained its investment strategy 
in 2016, but new procedures for cash management were introduced in 
June to reduce its exposure to losses from short-term volatility. 
As in previous years, withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund fi nanced 
most public spending. Withdrawals reached $1.24 billion in 2016, more 
than double the estimated sustainable income of $544.8 million. As a 
result, the fund balance declined by 2.3% in 2016, ending the year with 
$15.8 billion of assets, or 10.5 times GDP. The sharp decline in income 
from oil production and elevated spending on imported goods and 
services was refl ected in the current account, which went from a surplus 
equal to 16.4% of GDP in 2015 to a defi cit estimated at 49.9%.
Economic prospects
Growth is forecast to slow to 4.0% in 2017 before recovering to 6.0% 
in 2018 as major public and private investments move ahead. The 
implementation of public investments is likely to falter in 2017 as 
attention shifts to national elections in July and the formation of a new 
government. A supplementary budget may be passed immediately after 
the elections to refl ect changes in government structure and priorities. 
The 2017 budget includes new appropriations for almost $1.39 billion 
in expenditure this year excluding grants from development partners. 
This is down from an average of $1.63 billion during 2011–2016. Of 
the total, $361 million is for capital investment and $1.03 billion for 
recurrent expenditures. Recurrent expenditure includes a $172 million 
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transfer to Oe-Cusse Ambeno, of which 72.8% is allocated to capital 
works. Allocations for salaries and wages are 14.8% higher in 2017 
because of increases across many ministries. However, setting aside 
transfers to Oe-Cusse Ambeno, the allocation for recurrent items is 3.9% 
lower than in 2016. Most of the savings have been achieved by allocating 
less for transfers and for goods and services. 
The 2017 budget maintains the growth strategy in force since 2011, 
led by public investment. The budget for the autonomously managed 
Infrastructure Fund during 2017–2021 is $4.5 billion, or 3 times the GDP 
in 2016. Of this, 80% is allocated to roads and bridges, airports, seaports, 
public buildings, and the Tasi Mane project to develop a petrochemical 
industry on the south coast (Figure 3.35.5).  An operations and 
maintenance program has been included in the Infrastructure Fund 
plan for 2017–2021 with an initial allocation of $9.6 million in 2017 and 
an average of $9.1 million per annum in 2018–2021. Despite the large 
capital budget, planned investments in water and sanitation, education, 
and health care may not be suffi  cient to achieve national targets for 
service delivery. 
The discounted forecast for petroleum revenues during 2017–2022 is 
44% less than in the 2016 budget, refl ecting updated oil price forecasts 
(Figure 3.35.6). As a result, the estimated sustainable income from the 
Petroleum Fund has been reduced to $481.6 million, well below the 
$787.0 million peak in 2013. Projections for domestic revenue growth 
have been lifted, refl ecting strong collections in 2016 and the expected 
impact of fi scal reforms. Non-oil revenues are now projected to rise to 
$247.9 million by 2020, compared with a forecast of $210.3 million in the 
2016 budget (Figure 3.35.7). 
With revenues from oil and gas production in steep decline, 
the current account position is increasingly determined by income 
from Petroleum Fund investments and the magnitude of defi cits in 
merchandise and services trade. The current account defi cit is projected 
to narrow to 12.2% of GDP in 2017 as the trade defi cit shrinks with 
lower government spending. 
A current account defi cit equal to 40.2% of GDP is forecast for 2018 
as the trade defi cit widens and income from petroleum production 
declines further. In the absence of new oil and gas developments or 
substantial fi scal consolidation, Timor-Leste is likely to see widening 
fi scal and current account defi cits and a steady drawdown of Petroleum 
Fund assets in the years after 2018. 
In January 2017, Timor-Leste and Australia announced their shared 
intention to negotiate a permanent maritime boundary between the two 
countries by September 2017. The termination of their revenue-sharing 
agreement and demarcation of a permanent border in the Timor Sea 
could clarify ownership of the Greater Sunrise oil fi eld and pave the way 
for its development. This would not aff ect government revenues during 
the forecast period but could make fi scal consolidation less urgent. 
Consumer prices are expected to increase in 2017 and 2018 with 
private business picking up and higher international food and fuel 
prices. Consumer price infl ation is forecast at 1.2% in 2017, rising to 
3.0% in 2018 as international food prices continue to rise and increased 
investment stimulates demand. 
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The outlook for private investment is positive during 2017 and 2018 
with the Heineken brewery set to expand its operations in 2017 and the 
Tibar Bay port likely to garner the approvals necessary to commence 
construction in the second half of the year. Elections are a wild card in 
2017, and final decisions could slip to 2018 regarding the development of 
the cement factory in Baucau and two large tourism investments near Dili. 
The finalization of a range of legislative reforms could stimulate 
private investment and business activity. In February 2017, the national 
parliament approved a package of land laws that provides the first clear 
framework for regulating landownership and resolving competing 
historical claims since Timor-Leste achieved independence in 2002. Other 
notable reforms targeted for completion before the 2017 elections are a 
new mining code, investment law, and framework for secured lending.
Policy challenge—managing the decentralization 
of service delivery
The decentralization program that began with establishment of the 
Special Administrative Region of Oe-Cusse Ambeno in 2014 is set to 
expand in 2017. The government approved in 2016 a new law defining the 
structures, roles, and responsibilities of new municipal authorities in the 
four largest municipalities—Baucau, Bobonaro, Dili, and Ermera—and 
new municipal administrations in the remaining eight municipalities. 
The new law provides a framework for administrative 
decentralization and assigns significant responsibilities for health, 
education, public works, and other public services to the new municipal 
bodies. The law empowers central government agencies to delegate 
additional functions to subnational administrations and authorities.
Timor-Leste can benefit from the lessons learned in other countries 
as it moves forward with its own decentralization. While the legal 
framework has now been established, many details still need to be 
worked out. It will be important to ensure that the transfer of functions 
to subnational governments aligns with capacity in the new municipal 
bodies, which is currently limited, and that funding allocations from the 
central government are consistent with their service delivery mandates. 
Fiscal policy is one area where further analysis is needed. Analysis 
of data from the 2014 Survey of National Living Standards and the 2015 
census highlight significant regional variation in poverty rates and 
other human development indicators (Figure 3.35.8). While a number 
of government programs target poverty, current patterns of subnational 
spending do not reflect regional differences in poverty rates (Figure 
3.35.9 and Figure 3.35.10). 
Decentralization will better promote equity if fiscal rules provide 
a clear and objective framework for aligning funding allocations to 
regional variations in poverty, human development, and the cost of 
service delivery. It may also provide scope to incentivize service delivery 
by delegating selected revenue collection functions to subnational 
governments and establishing revenue-sharing arrangements.
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ADB, Sydney, and Nancy Wells of the Vanuatu Extended Mission, ADB, Port Vila.
Vanuatu
The economy is recovering after several shocks over the past 2 years, not least a devastating 
cyclone in 2015. Growth is driven by ongoing recovery in tourism and agriculture, cyclone 
reconstruction, and new infrastructure investment. However, the improved outlook faces risks 
from rising public debt and a legacy of policy inaction in key areas. Reform is needed to improve 
infrastructure management and enhance productivity for faster and more sustainable growth.
Economic performance 
Growth rebounded to an estimated 3.8% in 2016, following contraction 
by 1.0% in 2015, as tourism and agriculture gradually recovered from a 
series of shocks, including Tropical Cyclone Pam in March 2015 (Figure 
3.36.1). Reconstruction following the cyclone reinforced growth, as did 
the initiation of several large infrastructure projects.
Growth in export volumes for agricultural commodities was uneven, 
as cyclone damage and a long drought caused by El Niño continued to 
weigh on production into 2016. However, the value of exports of kava, 
cocoa, and copra rose signifi cantly (Figure 3.36.2). This saw total export 
earnings increase by an estimated 28.2% in 2016, clawing back much of 
the 30.3% decline in 2015. External demand for kava increased, especially 
after restrictions eased in Europe and after Fiji was hit by Tropical 
Cyclone Winston. However, volumes for such export commodities as 
coconut oil, coff ee, and beef continued to contract under the enduring 
impact of recent natural shocks and, in some cases, structural decline. 
The tourism recovery in 2016 was similarly uneven as disruptions 
to international air services set back recovery following the cyclone. In 
January, two major airlines in the region, Air New Zealand and Virgin 
Australia, stopped fl ying to Port Vila over concern about the safety of the 
runway at Bauerfi eld International Airport. Qantas, a third major carrier, 
ended its codeshare agreement with government-owned Air Vanuatu. The 
government successfully completed emergency repairs by May, but only 
Virgin Australia resumed services. Visitors by air recovered by 5.7% in 
2016 but remain 12.6% fewer than in 2014. By contrast, cruise ship arrivals 
rose by an estimated 28.9% in 2016, outperforming 2014 by 15.6% (Figure 
3.36.3). 
Government spending, including activities fi nanced by development 
partners, delivered a major stimulus but resulted in a budget defi cit equal 
to an estimated 10.6% of GDP, reversing a 6.4% surplus in 2015. The defi cit 
fi nanced the initiation of major cyclone reconstruction and infrastructure 
projects, with considerable help from development partners. 
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3.36.3 Visitor arrivals by mode of travel
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The Reserve Bank of Vanuatu, the central bank, has kept monetary 
settings unchanged since raising the policy rate by 100 basis points in 
March 2016 as it sought to gradually wind down policy support to the 
banking system introduced following Tropical Cyclone Pam. Inflation 
decelerated to 0.9% from 2.5% in 2015 (Figure 3.36.4). Slower inflation 
reflected low international commodity prices and base effects from the 
spike in consumer prices in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone. The 
current account deficit widened to the equivalent of 13.8% of GDP from 
9.2% in 2015, reflecting a drop in grants for emergency cyclone response 
and recovery, as well as higher imports to supply heightened construction 
activity (Figure 3.36.5). The 2016 deficit was well financed by development 
partners funding construction projects.
Economic prospects
Growth is expected to pick up to 4.3% in 2017 on continued recovery 
in agriculture and tourism and as the implementation of major 
reconstruction and infrastructure projects continues to ramp up. It 
is seen to slow slightly to 3.8% in 2018 as construction peaks and the 
recovery in agriculture and tourism plays out. Government plans for 
a significant infrastructure push are expected to drive medium-term 
growth prospects, with the total investment pipeline during 2016–2020 
amounting to almost half of annual GDP. 
Inflation is seen to remain subdued, though rising international 
commodity prices and heightened construction are expected to push it 
to 2.4% in 2017 and 2.6% in 2018. Higher imports for construction and 
higher international prices will likely widen the current account deficit 
to 17.7% of GDP in 2017, but it should be financed by inflows of external 
development assistance. The central bank is thus expected to maintain a 
broadly accommodative stance even as it continues to gradually tighten 
policy in line with economic recovery and rising inflation.
Despite the positive outlook, Vanuatu’s economy faces acute risks 
from a legacy of policy inaction in several areas. Notable are deficiencies 
in meeting international standards for combatting money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism and in safeguarding the safety of vital 
international air and maritime transport links. Progress is being made 
in all these areas and needs to be pursued diligently to keep risks from 
becoming eventualities that could derail Vanuatu’s continued recovery. 
Rapid increases in public debt are another concern. The government 
expects to incur a consolidated fiscal deficit in 2017 equal to 16.9% of 
GDP. The deficit is currently being financed by the development partners 
that support the major infrastructure projects that drive the deficit 
(Figure 3.36.6). However, as the infrastructure push continues, external 
debt could reach over 50% of GDP by 2020, leaving Vanuatu increasingly 
vulnerable to shocks, including natural disasters. 
Containing external debt will be essential, but equally critical will 
be ensuring that much-needed infrastructure investment is not crowded 
out by lower-quality expenditure. This places a premium on strong 
fiscal discipline regarding the recurrent budget, through expenditure 
prioritization and the mobilization of additional domestic revenue. The 
government is consulting with the community on the introduction of 
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personal and corporate income taxes, which if introduced would be a 
fi rst in the history of Vanuatu. Such taxes would provide important new 
sources of domestic revenue and help to rebuild public fi nances while 
avoiding excessive reliance on more regressive taxes such as the value-
added tax.
Policy challenge—delivering Vanuatu 2030
In January 2017, the government released its new national strategic 
development plan, Vanuatu 2030: The People’s Plan. The plan sets out 
a vision for a “stable, sustainable, and prosperous Vanuatu.” Economic 
growth that is higher yet sustainable will be critical to delivering on the 
ambitions of Vanuatu 2030. The infrastructure push currently underway 
is the main growth catalyst so far pursued by the government. While the 
infrastructure is sorely needed, it alone will be insuffi  cient to deliver the 
required lift to growth. 
Limited capacity for managing public investments risks undermining 
the benefi ts of the infrastructure push. The current investment pipeline 
amounts to over Vt10 billion each year in 2017 and 2018, equal to more 
than 12% of GDP. By comparison, the average annual value of public 
investment projects implemented during 2008–2010, the most recent 
previous peak in public investment, amounted to only Vt3.5 billion, not 
much more than 5% of GDP. The sudden scaling up could overwhelm 
limited project implementation capacity. Meanwhile, inadequate 
infrastructure planning could skew project selection, and the historical 
pattern of inadequate attention to maintenance threatens to undermine 
return on investment. There is a need to review the institutional 
structures for infrastructure management, including the role of the 
Vanuatu Project Management Unit, which manages, under the Prime 
Minister’s Offi  ce, all projects valued at $10 million or more.
A further concern is the need for complementary reform to enhance 
productivity and support growth led by the private sector. Productivity 
growth has been deteriorating in recent years, by an average estimated 
at 1.5% during 2010–2014. Insuffi  cient progress in implementing reform 
designed to enhance private sector development and productivity 
appears to be the key issue. Private investment in Vanuatu was relatively 
high in recent years, estimated at the equivalent of 28.0% of GDP during 
2010–2014, but it did not translate into commensurate dividends in 
terms of economic growth. 
In the absence of productivity-enhancing reform, Vanuatu’s 
medium-term growth prospects will be constrained to 3.7% annually 
to 2020, delivering per capita growth of only 1.5% annually despite 
the planned massive increase in infrastructure investment. Moreover, 
growth is likely to slow thereafter because it will be diffi  cult for the 
government to sustain the current high rate of public investment. 
Productivity-enhancing reform will therefore be critical to delivering a 
more prosperous Vanuatu by 2030.
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North Pacifi c economies
Growth in the North Pacific was modest in 2016. Delayed implementation of public investments 
slowed growth in the Federated States of Micronesia. Despite a steep drop in tourist arrivals, Palau 
continued to grow, supported by election-related spending. Stagnation persisted in the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands. While ra pidly rising revenue from fishing license fees has generated structural 
fiscal surpluses, medium-term fiscal challenges remain. 
Economic performance 
The economy of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is estimated 
to have grown by 3.0% in FY2016 (ended 30 September 2016), driven by 
fi sheries, retail trade, and manufacturing, notably newly operating water 
bottling plants (Figure 3.37.1). Although infrastructure grants under the 
FSM Compact of Free Association with the US became available after 
the update of its Infrastructure Development Plan in FY2015, project 
implementation has been constrained by limited capacity in the national 
and state governments. Defl ation deepened slightly in FY2016 to an 
estimated 0.3% from 0.2% in the previous fi scal year with lower prices 
for fuel imports and electricity. The national government and four state 
governments have recorded combined fi scal surpluses since FY2012 
thanks to soaring revenues from fi shing license fees. In FY2016, this 
consolidated fi scal surplus equaled 11.0% of GDP. High fi shing license 
fees also helped the current account record a surplus equal to 6.0% of 
GDP in FY2016, as did cheaper fuel and food imports.
The Palau economy is estimated to have grown by 2.2% in FY2016 
despite a signifi cant drop in tourism (Figure 3.37.2). Visitor arrivals fell 
by 11.7%, mainly refl ecting a 21.2% drop in visitors from the People’s 
Republic of China (Figure 3.37.3) due to reduced charter fl ights and 
widespread trip cancellation during the drought in early 2016. However, 
because this segment of the tourist market spends relatively little, 
the sharp drop in arrivals did not push the economy into contraction. 
Election-related spending supported the economy. Stable food prices 
and lower fuel prices brought about defl ation of 1.3% in FY2016 despite 
tax increases for tobacco products. The fi scal balance recorded a 
surplus equal to 2.0% of GDP, down from 4.8% in FY2015 because of 
slower economic growth and a rising wage bill adjusted for the cost 
of living. The current account has been in defi cit in most recent years 
with defi cits in goods trade more than off setting large surpluses in 
trade in services and in the primary and secondary income accounts, 
which are buoyed by fi shing license fees, offi  cial development assistance, 
and remittances to households. Despite lower fuel imports and higher 
income from fi shing license fees, the current account defi cit is estimated 
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to have widened in FY2016 to 12.0% of GDP from 3.4% as tourism 
receipts decreased. 
GDP growth in the Marshall Islands in FY2016 improved slightly 
to 1.5% from 0.6% in FY2015 with fi sheries strengthening and the 
resumption of infrastructure projects connected with the Compact 
of Free Association with the US (Figure 3.37.4). Refl ecting lower 
international fuel prices and stable food prices, the Marshall Islands 
experienced defl ation for the second successive year. The consumer 
price index declined by 1.3% in FY2016. Despite a 26% increase in 
expenditure, the FY2016 fi scal defi cit was able to remain at around 2.0% 
of GDP thanks to a soaring fi shing license fees. Subsidies to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are estimated to have reached $11.5 million in FY2015, 
equivalent to 6.2% of GDP or 11.5% of total government expenditure in 
that year, and considerably more than government capital spending of 
$7.4 million (Figure 3.37.5). Lower imports and surging revenues from 
fi shing license fees have left a current account surplus since FY2015, 
which in FY2016 is estimated to have reached 16.0% of GDP.
Economic prospects 
The FSM economy is expected to grow by 2.5% in both FY2017 and 
FY2018. The national government amended legislation in FY2016 to 
transfer responsibility for project implementation to the states. While 
grants are expected to increase in the coming years, public investments 
will grow only gradually because of states’ limited capacity to implement 
projects. Infl ation is expected to remain low at 1.5% in FY2017 and 2.0% 
in FY2018, refl ecting minor increases in global food and fuel prices. 
The strong fi scal performance of the national government is expected to 
continue, generating fi scal surpluses equal to 10% of GDP in the next 2 
years. Current account surpluses are seen to shrink to 4.5% of GDP in 
both years because of higher global fuel prices.
Palau is expected to grow by 3.0% in FY2017 and 5.5% in FY2018, 
supported by a rebound in tourist arrivals, private investment in new 
resort hotels, and public investments in water supply and sanitation 
supported by development partners. On the demand side, growth will be 
boosted by capital formation, both public and private. Infl ation is expected 
to remain low at 1.5% in FY2017 and 2.0% in FY2018 as global food and 
fuel prices rise modestly. The fi scal situation will likely turn around with 
the expected recovery in visitor arrivals and higher revenue generated 
by a doubling of the departure tax in FY2017 from $50 to $100. The fi scal 
surplus in FY2017 and FY2018 is expected to reach the equivalent of 4.0% 
of GDP with the forecast economic recovery. Current account defi cits are 
expected to widen to 12.5% of GDP in FY2017 and 15.0% in FY2018 as 
imports of construction materials increase for tourism ventures and for 
infrastructure projects funded by development partners, and despite an 
increase of tourism receipts and stable fuel imports. These defi cits will be 
fi nanced with capital grants and infl ows of foreign direct investment.
The Marshall Islands economy is projected to accelerate to 4.0% 
growth in FY2017 because of public investments funded by development 
partners and infrastructure grants connected with its Compact of Free 
Association with the US. Growth is expected to slow to 2.5% in FY2018, 
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however, because of limited capacity to implement projects. Inflation 
is projected to remain at 1.5% in FY2017 and FY2018 for the same 
reasons as in the FSM and Palau. Despite an anticipated increase in 
revenues from fishing license fees, the fiscal deficit is projected to stay 
at 2.0% of GDP because of slow implementation of SOE reform. Despite 
higher fishing license revenue, the current account surplus will narrow 
sharply to the equivalent of 4.0% of GDP in FY2017 because of expected 
increases in imports of construction materials and fuel for public 
investments. Then it will recover slightly to 4.5% in FY2018. 
While geographic disadvantages will probably continue to limit 
hopes for economic diversification, adjustments are needed to spur 
growth and create jobs. Workers continue to leave the North Pacific 
economies to seek jobs abroad, even as jobs at home are filled by foreign 
workers. With proper matching of skills, jobs could be the key channel 
for distributing the benefits of economic growth to local people.
Policy challenge—ensuring fiscal sustainability
The planned cessation of compact grants in FY2023 makes fiscal 
sustainability over the medium term a key policy challenge for the FSM. 
In the past few years, the government has prudently saved a portion of 
its fiscal surpluses in the FSM Trust Fund. However, this fund can offset 
only part of the shortfall projected for the Compact Trust Fund, which 
is intended to generate replacement income for expiring compact grants. 
Since tax and tax administration reforms were repealed in FY2015, 
the ratio of tax receipts to GDP has languished at around 12% of GDP, 
one of the lowest ratios in the Pacific (Figure 3.37.6).
Challenges created by the rapid growth in tourist arrivals in Palau 
have confirmed that capacity constraints limit the extent to which 
it can depend on low-value package tourism. Restrictions on charter 
flights forced down tourist arrivals and temporarily allowed mounting 
environmental concerns to be addressed. The future is unclear. 
Despite a strong desire to shift toward high-end tourism, weak 
coordination between government bodies and with the private sector 
continues to prevent the emergence of coherent policies and concerted 
efforts. Palau needs to establish a clear and shared vision toward 
high-end tourism. The lack of a long-term development strategy is 
reflected in the composition of public spending. Even with fiscal balances 
in surplus since FY2011, public investments declined to the equivalent 
of 4.4% of GDP in FY2013–FY2015, less than half of the average of 9.2% 
maintained in FY2000–FY2012 (Figure 3.37.7). 
In the RMI, poorly performing SOEs and social security liabilities 
continue to pose the major fiscal risks. Subsidies remain high for 
inefficient SOEs and to support social welfare in communities on outer 
islands and atolls. The SOE Act, approved in FY2015, has been amended 
to allow more public officials—politicians, ministers, and government 
officials—on SOE boards. This is done at the risk of continued political 
intervention in SOE management. An actuarial valuation in 2014 
identified unfunded liabilities in the Social Security Fund amounting to 
$228 million, equal to 122% of FY2014 GDP. Under the current system, 
the fund is expected to be depleted by FY2021.
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South Pacific economies
The South Pacific economies of the Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga grew robustly in 2016 on 
strong agriculture and tourism and, in Samoa and Tonga, the implementation of infrastructure 
projects financed by development partners. Growth is projected to moderate in all three economies 
in the near term. A major policy challenge is to maintain prudent macroeconomic management 
against rising risks from economic and climatic shocks.
Economic performance 
The Cook Islands economy grew by 5.5% in FY2016 (ended 30 June 
2016) (Figure 3.38.1), supported by public investment and an 11.0% 
increase in visitor arrivals (Figure 3.38.2). The higher visitor numbers 
boosted performance in tourism-related retail trade, which grew 
by 9.8%, and in hotels and restaurants, which expanded by 14.2%. 
Transport and communications realized growth at 13.4%, helped along 
by low international fuel prices. 
Samoa’s economy grew by 6.6% in FY2016, driven by a 41.0% increase 
in fisheries and a 9.4% increase in visitor arrivals. High growth in the 
relatively small fishery sector was the result of a new fishing operation 
that saw a fleet of 22 fishing vessels relocating to Samoa, their catch 
processed in Apia for export. Hotels and restaurants grew by 36.9% on 
higher visitor spending despite slower growth in visitor arrivals. Strong 
tourism and low fuel prices contributed to 21.9% growth in transport 
during the year. Construction and the manufacturing of food and 
beverages also grew strongly.  
Tonga’s economy grew by an estimated 3.1% in FY2016, led by 
recovery in agriculture and construction, as well as strong private 
demand. This continues a trend since FY2013 of growth supported by 
post-disaster reconstruction, improved tourism, and strong recovery in 
remittances and private sector lending. 
In the Cook Islands, prices declined by 0.1% on average, reversing 
3.0% inflation in FY2015 as lower international fuel prices cut costs 
in transport and utilities (Figure 3.38.3). Prices rose in Samoa and 
Tonga on domestic factors. Electricity tariff adjustments saw annual 
average inflation at 0.1% in Samoa. Inflation in Tonga reversed from 
1.0% deflation in FY2015 to 2.0% in FY2016, accelerating on higher 
prices for locally produced food following Cyclone Winston in February 
2016, higher customs duties on imported food products, and increased 
construction, primarily on the International Dateline Hotel, which 
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reopened in November 2016, and the St. George Palace office complex. 
These upward pressures offset declining global food and fuel prices. 
Inflation remains well below the reference range of 6%–8% set by the 
National Reserve Bank of Tonga.
The Cook Islands habitually realizes current account surpluses 
generated by its large tourism services trade surplus, which offsets 
chronic deficits in merchandise trade and investment income. In FY2016, 
the current account surplus increased to the equivalent of 20.3% of GDP 
from 18.8% in FY2015 because of lower service imports and higher fish 
exports (Figure 3.38.4). In Samoa, the current account deficit widened to 
6.6% of GDP from 3.9% in the previous year on higher imports, largely 
of fuel and lubricants. In Tonga, the current account deficit narrowed to 
3.2% of GDP from 11.7% in FY2015 because of lower international food 
and oil prices. At the end of FY2016, Samoa’s gross international reserves 
provided 4.2 months of cover for merchandise imports, and Tonga’s 
reserves provided 8.8 months.
The Cook Islands realized a fiscal surplus equal to 3.7% of GDP in 
FY2016, reversing a small deficit in the previous year (Figure 3.38.5). 
This reflected higher collections of income and value-added taxes, 
including a one-off collection of withholding taxes, as well as a 43.7% 
drop in capital expenditure as no new projects were begun during the 
period. An analysis of debt sustainability undertaken in 2015 as part 
of a macroeconomic assessment found the Cook Islands at low risk of 
external debt distress. Net public debt, all of it external, rose from the 
equivalent of 9.7% of GDP in FY2010 to 26.2% in FY2016 but is still well 
below the government’s ceiling of 35.0%. The government maintains a 
debt-service reserve equal to 4.6% of GDP.
In Samoa, the fiscal deficit fell in FY2016 to the equivalent of 0.4% 
of GDP. This was achieved largely through rigorous expenditure control 
in line with the government’s current emphasis on consolidation while 
sustaining quality spending in priority areas, as well as through higher 
tax collections, particularly excise and value-added taxes. At the end of 
the fiscal year, net external debt equaled 52.6% of GDP, down from 57.8% 
at the end of FY2015. 
Tonga incurred a fiscal deficit equal to 3.1% of GDP in FY2016, up 
from 1.1% in FY2015 despite a strong increase in public revenue thanks to 
higher tax collection and customs revenue. The reasons for the increase 
were higher current spending, led by wages, and a 60.3% drop in budget 
support grants, which were replaced by concessional loans. Net external 
debt was estimated to equal 43.1% of GDP at the end of FY2016
Economic prospects 
Growth is seen to moderate in all three South Pacific economies during 
the forecast period. The Cook Islands is projected to decelerate to 5.0% 
growth in FY2017 and FY2018. The main constraint on growth is tourist 
accommodation capacity that is inadequate for the peak holiday season. 
The prospects for expanding capacity are limited because of issues 
pertaining to landownership and arrangements for leasing.
In Samoa, fishery output is expected to level off, while public 
sector activity and agriculture look poised to decline. The forecast is 
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for significantly lower growth at 2.0% in FY2017 and, with the closure 
in August 2017 of a plant manufacturing automotive wire harnesses, 
further deceleration to 1.5% in FY2018. 
The outlook for Tonga remains positive. The economy is forecast to 
grow by 2.6% in both FY2017 and FY2018, supported by construction, 
tourism, and wholesale and retail trade in the run-up to the 2019 South 
Pacific Games. 
Inflation is expected to accelerate across all three economies during 
the forecast period in line with international price movements. In 
particular, higher international oil prices are seen to support inflation 
at 0.5% in FY2017 and 1.2% in FY2018 in the Cook Islands and, in both 
fiscal years, at 2.0% in Samoa and 2.5% in Tonga. 
The Government of the Cook Islands will likely return to incurring 
fiscal deficits in the near term. A deficit equal to 3.9% of GDP is 
expected for FY2017 with the scheduled commencement of a number of 
public investment projects in water supply, renewable energy, and roads. 
These projects will double capital expenditure. The deficit projection 
further takes into account an estimated 6.5% decline in tax collections. 
In FY2018, the fiscal deficit is expected to narrow slightly to 3.1% of 
GDP with lower capital spending and improved tax collection. Despite 
the projected fiscal deficits, strong economic growth should push net 
public debt lower to the equivalent of 24.8% of GDP in FY2017 and 
22.0% in FY2018.
Samoa’s fiscal deficit is expected to equal 3.5% of GDP in FY2017. 
Following stringent expenditure control and increased focus on revenue 
collection, this is considerably higher than the deficit in FY2016, the 
difference largely coming down to the construction of the airport 
terminal buildings. A deficit equal to 3.0% of GDP is projected for 
FY2018.  
In Tonga, the fiscal deficit is forecast to narrow to the equivalent 
of 1.6% of GDP in FY2017. A budget surplus of 0.4% on a cash basis is 
projected for FY2018, narrowed mainly by strong revenue performance, 
restraint on wages, and a decline in personal emoluments in real terms. 
Primarily as a result of a government policy to avoid any new borrowing 
that is not concessional, Tonga’s external debt is expected to stay within 
the target ceiling of 50% of GDP, about 44% in FY2017 and 42% in 
FY2018.
The Cook Islands is forecast to realize current account surpluses 
equal to 24.5% of GDP in FY2017 and 21.0% in FY2018. Tourism 
earnings will likely offset higher imports of goods and services for 
public investment projects. Samoa’s current account deficit is projected 
to narrow to the equivalent of 4.9% of GDP in FY2017 and 2.8% in 
FY2018 with contributions from rising remittances and a declining 
merchandise trade deficit. In Tonga, the current account deficit is 
expected to increase to the equivalent of 7.7% of GDP in FY2017 and 
further to 11.9% in FY2018, the gap widened by imports needed to 
prepare for the South Pacific Games and higher international prices.
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Policy challenge—prudent macroeconomic 
management for economic resilience
Staying the course on prudent macroeconomic management is vital to the 
economic outlook for all three South Pacific economies. Across the Pacific, 
progress is fragile and easily reversible in small states that lack livelihood 
diversity or economies of scale and are vulnerable to climate shocks.
The Cook Islands has taken steps to mitigate the risks that disasters 
pose to its tourism sector, but further efforts are needed to ensure 
sustainable economic growth over the long term. The government needs 
to address structural impediments to private sector development such 
as restrictions on foreign investment. The exclusion of foreign investors 
from most sectors and uncertainty over how applications are processed 
prevent the economy from fully enjoying the benefits that foreign 
capital, technology, and knowhow can offer. A strategic review of foreign 
investment policy and more rules-based consideration of proposals could 
facilitate investment inflows and reduce costs for both investors and 
the government. Meanwhile, any intervention needs to strike a balance 
between spurring growth and upholding local cultural values.
Samoa’s main challenge is to maintain macroeconomic stability 
while responding to disasters and fluctuations in the global economic 
environment. Declining foreign exchange reserves pose a real risk to 
economic stability and may necessitate an appropriate policy response 
such as making recurrent spending more efficient toward achieving fiscal 
consolidation and rebuilding buffers over the medium term. As Samoa is 
vulnerable to disasters, it requires sufficient fiscal and foreign exchange 
buffers to finance disaster response and recovery. Because a disaster can 
erode both these buffers, the authorities are contemplating contingent 
facilities with multilateral development partners to cover the risk.
Tonga is faced with a growing need to restrain public wage 
growth to decrease wages’ share of current spending, which was 45% 
in FY2016. The public sector wage bill gradually increased from the 
equivalent of 11.4% of GDP in FY2012 to 13.8% in FY2016, crowding out 
capital outlays and spending on operations and maintenance, as well as 
undermining the implementation of policy priorities under the national 
development plan. A new formula for the cost-of-living allowance now 
under development could become a useful annual target starting from 
FY2017. Broader civil service reform informed by the results of the 
recent remuneration review should be undertaken in parallel to ensure 
that employment in government is rationalized and that pay scales 
adequately reflect responsibilities, while maintaining the quality of 
public services.
This chapter was written by Roland Rajah of the Pacifi c Liaison and Coordination Offi  ce, 
ADB, Sydney; and Laisiasa Tora of the South Pacifi c Subregional Offi  ce, ADB, Suva.
Small island economies
The economies of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu all grew in 2016. The major contributor to growth 
was public sector activity, particularly externally funded infrastructure projects. Inflation was stable. 
Current account deficits in Kiribati and Tuvalu are expected to persist or widen with the waning 
of El Niño and its transitory boost to fishing revenues. Prudent macroeconomic management is 
needed to rebuild fiscal buffers and stimulate growth.
Economic performance 
From 2011 to 2015, growth averaged 3.5% in Kiribati. It was driven by 
public expenditure supported by revenues from fi shing license fees and 
investment in transport, water supply, and sanitation infrastructure 
funded by development partners. Growth moderated to 1.8% in 2016 
with the completion of these major projects and a falloff  in fi sheries as a 
fading El Niño and cooler waters drew fewer fi sh to the central Pacifi c, 
and as fewer fi shing days were allocated to US ships (Figure 3.39.1). 
Nauru, by contrast, saw growth accelerate in FY2016 (ended 30 June 
2016) to an estimated 7.2% from 2.8% in FY2015. The recovery refl ected 
progress in restoring phosphate exports, growth in services, and the 
gradual absorption of the refugee community into the local workforce. 
Government spending continued to increase, but the rate of increase 
slowed considerably from the previous year. Revised national account 
estimates suggest that growth in recent years has been much higher 
than previously estimated. The rebased GDP estimates eff ectively place 
a higher weight on service sectors, which have been booming, and less 
weight on mining and industry, which have been depressed by problems 
hitting phosphate exports. 
Growth in Tuvalu accelerated to 3.0% in 2016 from 2.6% the 
previous year on spending to expand accommodation capacity ahead 
of the Pacifi c Island Leaders Meeting in September 2019 and large 
government-funded infrastructure projects, including waterfront 
reclamation and the building of public schools.  
Kiribati’s fi scal balance improved markedly from 2012 to 2015, largely 
thanks to higher revenue from fi shing license fees. However, revenue 
from the sale of fi shing licenses peaked in 2015 and fell by almost half 
to about A$116 million, equivalent to 53% of GDP in 2016 (Figure 3.39.2). 
This has reversed the government’s fi scal position, turning a surplus in 
2015 equal to 45.7% of GDP into an 11.8% defi cit last year. 
In Nauru, the fi scal surplus in FY2016 is estimated at the equivalent of 
11.1% of GDP, slightly lower than the 12.5% surplus seen in FY2015. While 
government spending continued to increase, the 13.5% pace of growth 
3.39.1 GDP growth
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was much slower than in previous years, notably the 72.2% surge in 2015, 
when government spending rose in response to large revenue windfalls. 
In Tuvalu, revenue from fi shing licenses reached a record high 
estimated at A$37.3 million in 2016, or the equivalent of 82.6% of GDP, 
up from A$26.5 million in 2015, or 61.6% of GDP. The resulting fi scal 
surplus was the equivalent of 34.3% of GDP in 2016. With higher fi shing 
revenues, the government has been able to strengthen fi scal buff ers 
through greater investment in the Tuvalu Trust Fund. It also invested 
A$5 million in the Tuvalu Survival Fund. This new fund, established 
following Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015, sets aside resources for disaster 
response and projects that mitigate and adapt to climate change.
Infl ation in 2016 remained steady at 0.7% in Kiribati and moderated 
in Tuvalu to 2.0% from 3.2% in 2015 (Figure 3.39.3). In Nauru, infl ation 
relented from 11.4% in FY2015 to an estimated 7.2% in FY2016 as growth 
in domestic demand slowed but damage to the port mooring system 
continued to hinder supply. All three countries use the Australian dollar 
as their currency, which helps to keep prices stable.
The current account position of Kiribati switched from a large surplus 
equal to 44.7% of GDP in 2015 to a 7.0% defi cit in 2016 because of the sharp 
decline in income from fi shing licenses and higher imports, which were 
driven by large infl ows of capital equipment for projects both ongoing and 
about to commence. Tuvalu’s current account surplus almost halved from 
the equivalent of 10.0% of GDP in 2015 to 5.6% in 2016 as defi cits in goods 
and services trade widened, more than off setting record high collections of 
fi shing license revenue.
Economic prospects
In Kiribati, economic growth is likely to pick up to 2.0% in 2017 as large 
capital works get under way, mostly with funding from development 
partners. Especially notable is a project to repair and upgrade Bonriki 
International Airport, the main gateway. Growth is likely to moderate 
to 1.5% in 2018 as fi shing license revenues continue to fall, weighing on 
public spending and economic output. The government is in a better 
position than in the past to withstand a downturn, however, having saved 
much of the surplus revenue generated from fi sheries in the good years to 
replenish fi scal buff ers in its Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund.
For Nauru, the forecast is for growth to moderate to 4.3% in 
FY2017 because of only gradual recovery in phosphate exports and the 
plateauing of government spending and activities connected with the 
Regional Processing Centre (RPC) for asylum seekers and refugees. 
The outlook for FY2018 is clouded by uncertainty surrounding a 
potential winding down of the RPC program in connection with a deal 
announced by Australia that could see many of the refugees currently 
in Nauru resettled in the United States. Unknown at this stage are the 
pace, scale, and timing of any change at the RPC, which has become a 
major source of government revenue since FY2013 (Figure 3.39.4). The 
assumed scenario has the RPC start to wind down in FY2018, exerting 
considerable downward pressure on the economy. This should be partly 
off set by continued recovery in phosphate exports and the start of 
3.39.4  Revenues from Regional Processing 
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construction on a new seaport facility. Nevertheless, output would likely 
contract by 4.5%. 
The macroeconomic outlook for Tuvalu remains upbeat. Growth is 
expected to hold steady at 3% in 2017 and 2018, supported by stimulus 
from the implementation of projects funded by development partners, 
notably one to upgrade maritime infrastructure on outer islands. 
Inflation in Kiribati is expected to accelerate to 2.0% in 2017 and 
2018 on mildly rising prices for imported food and fuel. It is expected to 
moderate in Nauru to 5.7% in 2017 and 1.8% in 2018 as supply constraints 
ease and domestic demand continues to slow. In Tuvalu, inflation is 
forecast stable at 2.0% in 2017 and 2018 in line with steady growth. 
The current account deficit in Kiribati is projected to narrow to 
the equivalent of 2.4% of GDP in 2017 and further to 1.5% in 2018 as 
imports fall from last year’s peak. Tuvalu is expected to return to 
current account deficits, equal to 20.8% of GDP in 2017 and 25.4% in 
2018, because fishing license revenues are likely to have peaked and the 
import bill is set to rise to meet continuing demand for imported capital 
inputs for ongoing projects.
Policy challenge—prudent macroeconomic 
management
Volatile external revenue flows into small island economies have impacts 
that require prudent macroeconomic management and especially reform 
to facilitate private sector growth. In Kiribati, the steep decline in 
fishery revenue sharply constrains state finances. Prospects for growth 
therefore depend on sustaining a program of reform to address problems 
posed by inefficient state-owned enterprises, weak tax compliance, and 
low collections of corporate tax.  
Nauru is challenged to manage public infrastructure assets 
sustainably. Recent years have seen significant public capital investment 
related to the RPC, as well as investments by development partners. 
More investment is planned. However, with the future of the RPC 
uncertain, its winding down or eventual closure threatens economic 
and fiscal sustainability, putting into jeopardy the sustainability of the 
significantly expanded infrastructure stock. Moreover, some new assets 
may not be needed in the absence of the RPC, forcing Nauru to face 
difficult challenges adjusting the quantity and mix of its infrastructure 
assets to its shifting requirements. The government needs to develop 
and adopt a sustainable infrastructure strategy for financing and 
implementing effective asset maintenance, as well as for directing any 
additional investment toward projects that are economically viable. 
Tuvalu’s heavy reliance on externally sourced income and 
susceptibility to climate change makes it important for the government 
to continue pursuing fiscal and structural reforms that boost investment 
and improve economic performance. The establishment of the Tuvalu 
Survival Fund enhances the government’s ability to respond to disasters. 
Further strengthening of fiscal buffers in these small island 
economies would mitigate fiscal volatility and support sustained growth 
(Figure 3.39.5).
3.39.1  Selected economic indicators (%)
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STATISTICAL 
APPENDIX
Statistical notes and tables
The statistical appendix presents selected economic indicators for the 45 
developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
18 tables. The economies are grouped into five subregions: Central Asia, 
East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. Most of the tables 
contain historical data from 2012 to 2016; some have forecasts for 2017 
and 2018.
The data were standardized to the degree possible to allow 
comparability over time and across economies, but differences in 
statistical methodology, definitions, coverage, and practices make full 
comparability impossible. The national income accounts section is 
based on the United Nations System of National Accounts, while the 
data on balance of payments are based on International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) accounting standards. Historical data were obtained from 
official sources, statistical publications and databases, and documents 
of ADB, the IMF, and the World Bank. For some economies, data for 
2016 are estimated from the latest available information. Projections 
for 2017 and 2018 are generally ADB estimates made on the bases of 
available quarterly or monthly data, though some projections are   from 
governments.
Most economies report by calendar year. The following record 
their government finance data by fiscal year: Armenia; Azerbaijan; 
Brunei Darussalam; Fiji; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; the Kyrgyz 
Republic; the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR); Singapore; 
Taipei,China; Tajikistan; Thailand; and Uzbekistan. South Asian 
countries (except for the Maldives and Sri Lanka), the Cook Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Myanmar, Palau, Samoa, and Tonga report all variables by fiscal year.
Regional and subregional averages or totals are provided for seven 
tables (A1, A2, A6, A11, A12, A13, and A14). For tables A1, A2, A6 and 
A14, the averages are computed using weights derived from gross 
national income (GNI) in current US dollars following the World Bank 
Atlas method. The GNI data for 2012–2015 were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators online. Weights for 2015 
were carried over through 2018. The GNI data for the Cook Islands 
and Taipei,China were estimated using the Atlas conversion factor. 
For tables A11 and A12, the regional and subregional averages were 
computed on the basis of a consistent sum, which means that if there are 
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missing country data for a given year, the sum of the prior year used for 
computing the growth rate excludes the corresponding country data. 
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5. These tables show related data on 
output growth, production, and demand. Changes to the national income 
accounts series for some countries have been made to accommodate 
a change in source, methodology, and/or base year. The series for 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan reflect fiscal year 
data, rather than calendar year data, while those for Timor-Leste reflect 
GDP excluding the offshore petroleum sector.
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, 
or basic prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value 
added of all resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes 
less subsidies on imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar 
taxes. Constant factor cost measures differ from market price measures 
in that they exclude taxes on production and include subsidies. Basic 
price valuation is the factor cost plus some taxes on production, such 
as property and payroll taxes, and less some subsidies, such as labor-
related subsidies but not product-related subsidies. Most economies use 
constant market price valuation. Pakistan use constant factor costs, 
while Fiji, the Maldives and Nepal use basic prices. 
Table A2: Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year). The table 
provides the growth rates of real per capita GDP, which is defined as 
GDP at constant prices divided by the population. Data on per capita 
gross national income in US dollar terms (Atlas method) for 2015 
are also shown, sourced from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators online. The data for the Cook Islands and Taipei,China were 
estimated using the Atlas conversion factor.
Table A3: Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year). 
The table shows the growth rates of value added in agriculture at 
constant prices and its corresponding share in 2015 at current prices. 
The agriculture sector comprises agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, 
fisheries, and forestry.
Table A4: Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year). The 
table provides the growth rates of value added in industry at constant 
prices and its corresponding share in 2015 at current prices. This sector 
comprises manufacturing, mining and quarrying, construction, and 
utilities.
Table A5: Growth rate of value added in services (% per year). 
The table gives the growth rates of value added in services at 
constant prices and its corresponding share in 2015 at current prices. 
Subsectors generally include trade, banking, finance, real estate, public 
administration, and other services. For Malaysia, electricity, gas, water, 
and waste management are included under Services.
Table A6: Inflation (% per year). Data on inflation rates represent 
period averages. The inflation rates presented are based on consumer 
price indexes. The consumer price indexes of the following economies 
are for a given city or group of consumers only: Afghanistan is for 
Kabul (until 2011), Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, the Marshall Islands 
is for Majuro, Solomon Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban 
consumers.
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Table A7: Growth in money supply (% per year). This table tracks 
the annual percentage change in the end-of-period supply of broad 
money as represented by M2 for most countries. M2 is defined as the 
sum of M1 and quasi-money, where M1 denotes currency in circulation 
plus demand deposits, and quasi-money consists of time and savings 
deposits including foreign currency deposits.
Tables A8, A9, and A10: Government finance. These tables give 
the revenue and expenditure transactions and the fiscal balance of 
the central government expressed as a percentage of GDP in nominal 
terms. For Cambodia (since 2006), the People’s Republic of China, 
India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, and Tajikistan, 
transactions are those reported by the general government.
Table A8: Central government revenues (% of GDP). Central 
government revenues comprise all nonrepayable receipts, both current 
and capital, plus grants. These amounts are computed as a percentage 
of GDP at current prices. For the Republic of Korea, revenues exclude 
social security contributions. For Singapore, revenues include the net 
investment returns contribution. For Kazakhstan, revenues include 
transfers from the national fund. Grants are excluded in Cambodia, 
the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand; revenues from 
disinvestment are included for India; and only current revenues are 
included for Bangladesh.
Table A9: Central government expenditures (% of GDP). Central 
government expenditures comprise all nonrepayable payments to 
both current and capital expenses, plus net lending. These amounts 
are computed as a share of GDP at current prices. For Thailand, 
expenditures refer to budgetary expenditures excluding externally 
financed expenditures and corresponding borrowing. Those for
Tajikistan include externally financed public investment programs. 
One-time expenditures are excluded for Pakistan.
Table A10: Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP). Fiscal 
balance is the difference between central government revenues and 
expenditures. The difference is also computed as a share of GDP at 
current prices. Data variations may arise from statistical discrepancies, 
e.g., balancing items for both central and local governments, and from 
differences in the concept used in the individual computations of 
revenues and expenditures as compared with the calculation of the 
fiscal balance. For Fiji, the fiscal balance excludes total loan repayments. 
For Thailand, the fiscal balance is a cash balance composed of the 
budgetary and nonbudgetary balances. Some off-budget accounts are 
included in the computation of the fiscal balance for Turkmenistan.
Tables A11, A12, A13, and A14: Balance of payments. These tables 
show selected international economic transactions of countries as 
recorded in the balance of payments. These items cover annual flows.
Tables A11 and A12: Growth rates of merchandise exports and 
imports (% per year). These tables show the annual growth rates of 
exports and imports of goods. Data are in million US dollars, primarily 
obtained from the balance-of-payments accounts of each economy. 
Exports are reported free on board. Import data are reported free on 
board, except for the following economies, which value them on the 
basis of cost, insurance, and freight: Afghanistan; Bhutan; Cambodia; 
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Hong Kong, China; India; the Lao PDR; Myanmar; Samoa; Singapore; 
and Thailand.  
Table A13: Trade balance ($ million). The trade balance is the 
difference between merchandise exports and merchandise imports. 
Figures in this table are based on the exports and imports amounts used 
to generate tables A11 and A12. 
Table A14: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current 
account balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, 
net trade in services and factor income, and net transfers. The values 
reported are divided by GDP at current prices in US dollars. In the case 
of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, official transfers are excluded 
from the current account balance. 
Table A15: Exchange rates to the US dollar (annual average). 
Annual average exchange rates are quoted as the local currencies per US 
dollar.
Table A16: Gross international reserves ($ million). Gross 
international reserves are defined as the US dollar value of holdings of 
foreign exchange, special drawing rights, reserve position in the IMF, 
and gold at the end of a given period. For Taipei,China, this heading 
refers to foreign exchange reserves only. In some economies, the 
rubric is foreign assets and reserves of national monetary authorities 
and national oil funds, i.e., foreign assets of the Maldives Monetary 
Authority, net foreign reserves of the State Bank of Pakistan, and assets 
of the National Oil Fund of Azerbaijan. The data for India are as of 10 
March 2017.
Table A17: External debt outstanding ($ million). For most 
economies, external debt outstanding, public and private, includes 
medium- and long-term debt, short-term debt, and IMF credit. For 
Cambodia, and the Lao PDR, only public external debt is reported. For 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand, 
the figures for 2016 are as of the end of September.
Table A18: Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services). 
This table generally presents the total debt service payments of each 
economy, which comprise principal repayments (excluding on short-
term debt) and interest payments on outstanding external debt, as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services. For Cambodia and the Lao 
PDR, debt service refers to external public debt only. For Viet Nam, 
exports of goods are used as the denominator in the calculation of the 
ratio; for the Philippines, exports of goods, services, and income are 
used as the denominator. For Bangladesh, the ratio represents debt 
service payments on medium- and long-term loans as a percentage of 
exports of goods, nonfactor services, and workers’ remittances; and for 
Azerbaijan, the ratio represents public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt service payments as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor 
services.
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 5.5 6.6 5.2 3.1 2.1 3.1 3.5
Armenia 7.2 3.3 3.6 3.0 0.2 2.2 2.5
Azerbaijan 2.2 5.8 2.8 1.1 –3.8 –1.1 1.2
Georgia 6.4 3.4 4.6 2.9 2.7 3.8 4.5
Kazakhstan 4.8 6.0 4.2 1.2 1.0 2.4 2.2
Kyrgyz Republic –0.1 10.9 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.0 3.5
Tajikistan 7.5 7.4 6.7 6.0 6.9 4.8 5.5
Turkmenistan 11.1 10.2 10.3 6.5 6.2 6.5 7.0
Uzbekistan 8.2 8.0 8.1 8.0 7.8 7.0 7.3
East Asia 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.6
China, People’s Rep. of 7.9 7.8 7.3 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.2
Hong Kong, China 1.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.9 2.0 2.1
Korea, Rep. of 2.3 2.9 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.7
Mongolia 12.3 11.6 7.9 2.4 1.0 2.5 2.0
Taipei,China 2.1 2.2 4.0 0.7 1.5 1.8 2.2
South Asia 5.5 6.1 6.7 7.2 6.7 7.0 7.2
Afghanistan 11.4 3.9 1.3 0.8 2.0 2.5 3.0
Bangladesh 6.5 6.0 6.1 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.9
Bhutan 6.4 3.6 4.0 6.1 6.4 8.2 9.9
India 5.5 6.5 7.2 7.9 7.1 7.4 7.6
Maldives 2.5 4.7 6.0 2.8 3.4 3.8 4.1
Nepal 4.6 3.8 5.7 2.3 0.8 5.6 5.4
Pakistan 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.0 4.7 5.2 5.5
Sri Lanka 9.1 3.4 5.0 4.8 4.4 5.0 5.0
Southeast Asia 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 5.0
Brunei Darussalam 0.9 –2.1 –2.5 –0.4 –2.5 1.0 2.5
Cambodia 7.3 7.4 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1
Indonesia 6.0 5.6 5.0 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.3
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 7.9 7.8 7.5 6.7 6.8 6.9 7.0
Malaysia 5.5 4.7 6.0 5.0 4.2 4.4 4.6
Myanmar 7.3 8.4 8.0 7.3 6.4 7.7 8.0
Philippines 6.7 7.1 6.2 5.9 6.8 6.4 6.6
Singapore 3.9 5.0 3.6 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3
Thailand 7.2 2.7 0.9 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.6
Viet Nam 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.7 6.2 6.5 6.7
The Pacific 5.7 4.1 9.6 8.3 2.6 2.9 3.3
Cook Islands 4.0 0.5 4.5 4.8 5.5 5.0 5.0
Fiji 1.4 4.7 5.6 3.6 2.0 3.5 4.0
Kiribati 5.2 5.8 2.4 3.5 1.8 2.0 1.5
Marshall Islands 3.7 2.4 –0.9 0.6 1.5 4.0 2.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of –1.7 –3.0 –2.4 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.5
Nauru 10.1 34.2 36.5 2.8 7.2 4.3 –4.5
Palau 3.9 –2.1 4.8 11.6 2.2 3.0 5.5
Papua New Guinea 8.1 5.0 13.3 12.0 2.0 2.5 2.8
Samoa 0.4 –1.9 1.2 1.6 6.6 2.0 1.5
Solomon Islands 2.3 2.8 2.0 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.8
Timor-Leste 5.8 2.9 5.9 3.5 5.4 4.0 6.0
Tonga 0.8 –3.1 2.0 3.7 3.1 2.6 2.6
Tuvalu 0.2 1.3 2.2 2.6 3.0 3.0 3.0
Vanuatu 1.8 2.0 2.3 –1.0 3.8 4.3 3.8
Developing Asia 6.4 6.5 6.3 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.7
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 7.1 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.2
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A2 Growth rate of per capita GDP (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Per capita GNI, $, 
2015
Central Asia 4.1 5.1 3.7 1.7 0.9 1.7 2.1
Armenia 7.6 3.1 3.9 3.2 0.6 2.2 2.5 3,880
Azerbaijan 0.9 4.5 1.5 –0.1 –5.0 –2.2 0.1 6,560
Georgia 5.7 3.7 4.4 2.6 2.7 3.8 4.5 4,160
Kazakhstan 3.3 4.5 2.7 –0.3 –0.2 0.9 0.7 11,390
Kyrgyz Republic –1.4 8.7 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.0 1,170
Tajikistan 8.2 3.6 2.8 4.2 5.2 1.5 3.3 1,280
Turkmenistan 9.8 8.9 8.9 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.6 7,380
Uzbekistan 5.6 6.3 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.1 5.4 2,160
East Asia 6.2 6.3 6.1 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.1
China, People’s Rep. of 7.3 7.2 6.8 6.4 6.2 6.0 5.7 7,930
Hong Kong, China 0.6 2.7 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.4 41,000
Korea, Rep. of 1.8 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.3 27,450
Mongolia 10.2 9.4 5.6 0.2 –2.1 0.5 0.0 3,870
Taipei,China 1.7 2.0 3.8 0.5 1.3 1.9 2.0 22,452
South Asia 4.3 4.6 5.3 5.8 5.3 5.9 5.8
Afghanistan 9.2 1.9 –0.6 –1.1 0.0 –0.8 1.0 610
Bangladesh 5.2 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.7 5.5 5.5 1,190
Bhutan 4.6 1.8 2.3 3.4 5.9 6.7 8.4 2,380
India 4.2 5.2 5.9 6.6 5.8 6.5 6.2 1,600
Maldives 0.4 2.6 3.6 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.8 6,950
Nepal 3.1 2.3 4.2 0.9 –0.6 4.2 3.9 730
Pakistan 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.7 3.2 3.5 1,440
Sri Lanka 11.5 2.6 4.0 3.9 3.2 4.7 4.7 3,800
Southeast Asia 4.5 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.8
Brunei Darussalam –0.7 –3.7 –3.9 –1.7 –5.1 –5.4 2.2 38,010
Cambodia 5.6 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.7 1,070
Indonesia 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.2 4.2 3,440
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 6.5 5.7 5.4 2.5 3.8 5.4 5.5 1,740
Malaysia 4.1 2.7 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.6 10,570
Myanmar 6.5 7.5 10.1 6.4 6.1 7.5 7.9 1,160
Philippines 4.8 5.2 4.4 4.8 4.5 4.7 4.9 3,550
Singapore 1.4 3.3 2.2 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 52,090
Thailand 6.6 2.2 0.4 2.0 2.7 3.0 3.1 5,720
Viet Nam 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.5 5.1 5.5 5.7 1,990
The Pacific 3.4 1.8 7.1 5.9 0.3 0.6 1.0
Cook Islands 2.9 5.3 4.5 4.2 1.2 5.0 5.0 24,071
Fiji 0.6 4.0 5.1 3.0 1.5 2.9 3.5 4,830
Kiribati 3.0 3.6 0.3 1.4 –0.3 –0.1 –0.5 3,390
Marshall Islands 3.3 2.0 –1.3 0.3 –0.7 3.6 2.1 4,770
Micronesia, Fed. States of –2.2 –3.0 –2.4 3.8 3.1 2.7 2.8 3,560
Nauru 7.0 30.4 34.8 –0.1 4.2 1.4 –7.2 15,420
Palau 5.8 –1.6 3.8 10.5 1.2 2.0 4.5 12,180
Papua New Guinea 4.8 1.8 9.9 8.6 –1.1 –0.6 –0.3 2,199
Samoa –0.3 –2.7 0.5 0.9 5.8 1.3 0.8 3,930
Solomon Islands 0.0 0.5 –0.3 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.3 1,920
Timor-Leste 3.9 1.0 4.0 1.6 3.5 2.1 4.1 2,180
Tonga 0.7 –3.2 2.0 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.7 4,280
Tuvalu –1.0 0.0 –0.2 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.3 6,230
Vanuatu –0.8 –0.5 –0.1 –3.3 1.5 2.0 1.5 3,282
Developing Asia 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.4
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A3 Growth rate of value added in agriculture (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Sector share, 2015, %
Central Asia
Armenia 9.5 7.6 6.1 13.2 –5.8 19.0
Azerbaijan 5.8 4.9 –2.6 6.6 2.6 6.8
Georgia –3.8 11.3 1.6 1.6 0.0 9.1
Kazakhstan –17.4 11.2 1.3 3.5 5.5 5.0
Kyrgyz Republic 1.2 2.6 –0.5 6.2 3.0 15.9
Tajikistan 10.4 7.6 4.5 3.2 5.2 24.7
Turkmenistan 8.1 10.0 4.2 7.9 12.0 9.3
Uzbekistan 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.8 6.6 18.3
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 4.5 3.8 4.1 3.9 3.3 8.8
Hong Kong, China –3.3 4.9 –6.0 –6.8 –3.2 0.1
Korea, Rep. of –0.9 3.1 3.6 –1.5 –2.8 2.3
Mongolia 21.1 19.2 13.7 10.7 4.8 14.6
Taipei,China –3.2 1.3 0.5 –7.3 –6.9 1.7
South Asia
Afghanistan 30.2 0.0 –0.1 –5.0 2.0 21.7
Bangladesh 3.0 2.5 4.4 3.3 2.8 15.5
Bhutan 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.5 4.0 17.6
India 1.5 5.6 –0.3 0.8 4.4 17.5
Maldives 0.0 5.1 0.2 –0.5 7.2 3.3
Nepal 4.6 1.1 4.5 0.8 1.3 31.8
Pakistan 3.6 2.7 2.5 2.5 –0.2 25.1
Sri Lanka 3.9 3.2 4.6 4.8 –4.2 8.8
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 8.1 –1.2 4.7 6.4 –3.6 1.1
Cambodia 4.3 1.6 0.3 0.2 1.8 28.2
Indonesia 4.6 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.3 13.9
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 2.5 3.5 2.9 2.0 2.5 27.4
Malaysia 1.0 2.0 2.1 1.2 –5.1 8.6
Myanmar 1.7 3.6 2.8 3.4 ... 26.7
Philippines 2.8 1.1 1.7 0.1 –1.3 10.3
Singapore 3.7 4.5 13.4 –3.6 –1.4 0.0
Thailand 2.7 0.7 –0.6 –5.7 0.6 8.7
Viet Nam 2.9 2.6 3.4 2.4 1.4 18.2
The Pacific
Cook Islands 16.3 –2.8 17.3 –4.4 5.5 8.3
Fiji –1.9 6.7 1.9 6.3 ... 11.3
Kiribati 2.9 –0.2 3.7 ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 10.5 0.7 –1.1 –0.2 ... 14.3
Micronesia, Fed. States of –0.2 –3.0 5.0 6.2 ... 27.8
Nauru 2.2 5.3 9.5 5.2 ... 4.0
Palau 0.7 –9.2 –5.3 –4.6 ... 3.4
Papua New Guinea –1.6 1.8 3.3 2.4 3.1 23.3
Samoa –7.2 –2.4 9.6 –0.3 6.5 9.4
Solomon Islands –0.5 –0.8 7.1 ... ... 27.5
Timor-Leste 26.6 0.0 –2.5 ... ... ...
Tonga 0.5 3.7 3.1 ... ... ...
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 2.2 4.8 4.2 ... ... ...
... = data not available.
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Table A4 Growth rate of value added in industry (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Sector share, 2015, %
Central Asia
Armenia 5.7 0.5 –2.3 3.7 –0.9 28.2
Azerbaijan –0.6 4.9 0.5 –1.9 –7.1 49.3
Georgia 9.6 2.4 4.6 4.1 5.5 24.7
Kazakhstan 1.8 3.1 1.5 –0.3 0.6 32.5
Kyrgyz Republic –11.7 30.5 5.7 2.9 5.9 28.4
Tajikistan 10.4 3.9 13.3 11.2 16.0 27.5
Turkmenistan 8.6 7.3 11.4 3.1 1.2 56.9
Uzbekistan 8.0 9.0 8.6 8.0 6.6 34.6
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 8.4 8.0 7.4 6.2 6.1 40.9
Hong Kong, China 4.7 1.6 7.6 2.4 1.5 7.4
Korea, Rep. of 1.9 3.3 3.1 1.7 2.9 38.0
Mongolia 14.8 14.6 12.7 9.7 –1.2 33.8
Taipei,China 3.3 1.7 7.0 –0.7 1.9 36.2
South Asia
Afghanistan 7.2 3.1 2.4 4.1 3.1 23.3
Bangladesh 9.4 9.6 8.2 9.7 11.1 28.1
Bhutan 5.4 5.3 3.8 6.0 7.3 43.1
India 3.4 4.2 6.9 8.2 5.8 29.6
Maldives 0.8 –7.6 12.9 18.3 9.7 23.0
Nepal 3.0 2.7 7.1 1.5 –6.3 14.9
Pakistan 2.5 0.8 4.5 4.8 6.8 20.0
Sri Lanka 9.0 4.1 4.7 2.1 6.7 29.5
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam –1.4 –5.6 –4.4 0.0 –2.9 60.2
Cambodia 9.3 10.7 10.1 11.7 10.5 29.4
Indonesia 5.3 4.3 4.2 3.0 3.9 41.3
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 13.7 9.7 8.5 8.0 8.0 30.9
Malaysia 4.9 3.6 6.1 5.2 4.3 36.9
Myanmar 8.0 11.4 12.1 8.7 ... 34.5
Philippines 7.3 9.2 7.8 6.0 8.0 30.8
Singapore 2.3 2.0 3.4 –3.1 2.8 26.1
Thailand 7.3 1.6 0.0 2.8 2.0 36.4
Viet Nam 7.4 5.1 6.4 9.6 7.6 38.6
The Pacific
Cook Islands 19.3 –3.7 –6.8 6.3 –24.0 9.4
Fiji –2.2 4.4 1.2 2.2 ... 18.1
Kiribati 30.1 37.3 –1.4 ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 2.9 7.9 –16.7 –1.6 ... 10.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of –1.3 –19.5 –28.5 –7.5 ... 6.5
Nauru 1.2 –28.5 –3.6 –17.1 ... 6.1
Palau –5.4 –15.6 1.6 26.4 ... 8.7
Papua New Guinea 14.6 9.3 28.6 24.0 1.0 53.0
Samoa 0.2 –3.2 3.8 –6.2 6.1 24.0
Solomon Islands –1.4 –2.0 –13.2 ... ... 15.0
Timor-Leste –4.0 –9.7 15.8 ... ... ...
Tonga 1.2 –14.3 1.3 ... ... ...
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu –22.2 9.8 3.2 ... ... ...
... = data not available.
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Table A5 Growth rate of value added in services (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Sector share, 2015, %
Central Asia
Armenia 6.9 2.8 6.7 0.0 4.0 52.8
Azerbaijan 6.9 7.2 7.4 4.5 –0.7 43.9
Georgia 6.2 3.5 4.6 3.1 2.5 66.2
Kazakhstan 10.4 6.9 5.7 3.1 0.8 62.5
Kyrgyz Republic 6.5 4.7 4.6 3.7 3.0 55.6
Tajikistan 14.5 19.3 1.0 –7.1 –0.3 47.8
Turkmenistan 14.7 12.7 10.6 10.0 11.0 33.8
Uzbekistan 10.4 8.8 9.4 9.8 10.7 47.1
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 8.0 8.3 7.8 8.2 7.8 50.2
Hong Kong, China 1.8 2.7 2.5 1.7 2.3 92.6
Korea, Rep. of 2.8 2.9 3.3 2.8 2.5 59.7
Mongolia 10.3 7.8 7.8 1.0 1.7 51.6
Taipei,China 1.5 2.1 2.8 1.6 1.3 62.1
South Asia
Afghanistan 6.8 5.3 2.2 1.6 1.4 55.0
Bangladesh 6.6 5.5 5.6 5.8 6.2 56.3
Bhutan 6.6 1.1 5.0 8.3 7.1 39.4
India 8.3 7.7 9.5 9.8 7.9 53.0
Maldives 1.5 6.4 4.6 1.6 –1.1 73.7
Nepal 5.0 5.7 6.2 3.6 2.7 53.3
Pakistan 4.4 5.1 4.5 4.3 5.7 54.9
Sri Lanka 11.2 3.8 4.8 5.7 4.2 61.7
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 5.5 4.7 0.6 –1.2 –1.6 38.7
Cambodia 8.1 8.7 8.7 7.1 6.7 42.3
Indonesia 6.8 6.4 6.0 5.5 5.6 44.7
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 8.0 9.7 9.0 8.5 9.0 41.7
Malaysia 6.5 5.9 6.6 5.1 5.6 54.5
Myanmar 12.0 10.3 9.1 9.1 ... 38.7
Philippines 7.1 7.0 6.2 6.8 7.5 59.0
Singapore 4.6 2.0 3.9 3.2 1.0 73.8
Thailand 8.4 4.1 1.9 4.8 4.7 54.9
Viet Nam 6.7 6.7 6.2 6.3 7.0 43.3
The Pacific
Cook Islands 1.8 0.0 4.8 5.3 8.8 82.4
Fiji 3.0 4.5 7.4 3.6 ... 70.7
Kiribati 2.0 2.6 0.4 ... ... ...
Marshall Islands 1.8 1.4 2.5 2.3 ... 75.1
Micronesia, Fed. States of –1.7 –0.8 –1.2 2.7 ... 65.8
Nauru 8.7 60.7 41.9 11.6 ... 89.9
Palau 3.7 –0.6 6.1 10.7 ... 87.9
Papua New Guinea 11.2 4.7 4.2 56.4 6.2 23.6
Samoa 1.6 –1.1 –1.1 5.1 6.7 66.6
Solomon Islands 5.3 7.2 3.6 ... ... 57.4
Timor-Leste 9.7 –0.9 ... ... ... ...
Tonga 0.5 –0.5 1.6 ... ... ...
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 4.4 0.1 2.4 ... ... ...
... = data not available.
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Table A6 Inflation (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 5.1 5.9 5.9 6.3 11.1 7.8 7.3
Armenia 2.6 5.8 3.0 3.7 –1.4 1.2 1.8
Azerbaijan 1.1 2.4 1.4 4.0 12.4 9.0 8.0
Georgia –0.9 –0.5 3.1 4.0 2.1 4.2 4.5
Kazakhstan 5.1 5.8 6.7 6.6 14.6 8.0 7.0
Kyrgyz Republic 2.8 6.6 7.5 6.5 0.4 5.0 4.0
Tajikistan 6.4 3.7 6.1 5.1 6.1 8.0 7.0
Turkmenistan 5.3 6.8 6.0 6.4 6.0 6.0 6.0
Uzbekistan 11.9 11.7 9.1 8.5 8.4 9.5 10.0
East Asia 2.6 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.6
China, People’s Rep. of 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.4 2.0 2.4 2.8
Hong Kong, China 4.1 4.3 4.4 3.0 2.4 2.0 2.1
Korea, Rep. of 2.2 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.0 1.7 1.8
Mongolia 14.3 9.9 12.8 6.6 1.1 3.5 3.9
Taipei,China 1.9 0.8 1.2 –0.3 1.4 1.3 1.2
South Asia 9.8 8.9 6.3 4.9 4.6 5.2 5.4
Afghanistan 6.4 7.4 4.7 –1.5 4.5 5.5 5.8
Bangladesh 8.7 6.8 7.3 6.4 5.9 6.1 6.3
Bhutan 10.2 8.8 9.6 6.6 3.3 4.9 5.4
India 9.9 9.4 6.0 4.9 4.7 5.2 5.4
Maldives 10.9 3.8 2.1 1.0 0.5 2.1 2.3
Nepal 8.2 9.9 9.1 7.2 9.9 6.0 6.5
Pakistan 11.0 7.3 8.6 4.5 2.9 4.0 4.8
Sri Lanka 7.5 6.9 3.3 3.8 4.0 6.0 6.0
Southeast Asia 3.7 4.2 4.1 2.8 2.1 3.3 3.5
Brunei Darussalam 0.1 0.4 –0.2 –0.4 –0.7 0.1 0.1
Cambodia 2.9 3.0 3.9 1.2 3.0 3.4 3.5
Indonesia 4.0 6.4 6.4 6.4 3.5 4.3 4.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4.3 6.4 4.2 1.3 1.6 2.5 3.0
Malaysia 1.7 2.1 3.1 2.1 2.1 3.3 2.7
Myanmar 2.8 5.7 5.9 11.4 6.5 7.0 7.5
Philippines 3.2 2.9 4.1 1.4 1.8 3.5 3.7
Singapore 4.6 2.4 1.0 –0.5 –0.5 1.0 1.5
Thailand 3.0 2.2 1.9 –0.9 0.2 1.8 2.0
Viet Nam 9.1 6.6 4.1 0.6 2.7 4.0 5.0
The Pacific 5.4 4.9 3.5 4.0 4.6 5.2 5.4
Cook Islands 2.8 2.6 1.6 3.0 –0.1 0.5 1.2
Fiji 3.4 2.9 0.6 1.4 3.9 2.5 2.5
Kiribati –3.0 –1.5 2.1 0.6 0.7 2.0 2.0
Marshall Islands 4.3 1.9 1.1 –2.2 –1.3 1.5 1.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of 6.3 2.2 0.7 –0.2 –0.3 1.5 2.0
Nauru –0.1 0.5 3.0 11.4 7.2 5.7 1.8
Palau 5.4 2.8 4.0 2.2 –1.3 1.5 2.0
Papua New Guinea 4.6 5.0 5.2 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.5
Samoa 6.2 –0.2 –1.3 1.9 0.1 2.0 2.0
Solomon Islands 5.9 5.4 5.2 –0.5 1.1 1.8 2.2
Timor-Leste 10.9 9.4 0.7 0.6 –1.4 1.2 3.0
Tonga 1.1 0.8 2.5 –1.0 2.0 2.5 2.5
Tuvalu 1.4 2.0 1.1 3.2 2.0 2.0 2.0
Vanuatu 1.4 1.4 1.0 2.5 0.9 2.4 2.6
Developing Asia 4.0 3.8 3.0 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.2
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 4.2 4.1 3.2 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.5
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A7 Change in money supply (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia 19.5 14.8 8.3 10.8 17.5
Azerbaijan 20.7 15.0 11.8 –1.1 –4.9
Georgia 11.4 24.5 13.8 19.3 20.2
Kazakhstan 7.9 10.2 10.5 34.3 15.7
Kyrgyz Republic 23.8 4.4 21.1 14.9 14.6
Tajikistan 19.6 19.7 7.1 18.7 27.9
Turkmenistan 35.6 31.2 11.4 16.1 7.2
Uzbekistan 27.5 22.4 18.0 20.7 14.9
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 14.4 13.6 11.0 13.3 11.3
Hong Kong, China 11.1 12.4 9.5 5.5 7.7
Korea, Rep. of 4.8 4.6 8.1 8.2 7.1
Mongolia 20.4 19.3 24.7 –1.3 10.4
Taipei,China 3.5 5.8 6.1 5.8 3.6
South Asia
Afghanistan 8.8 9.4 8.3 3.3 7.5
Bangladesh 17.4 16.7 16.1 12.4 16.3
Bhutan 5.9 3.3 26.0 3.8 18.6
India 13.6 13.4 10.9 10.1 8.4
Maldives 4.9 18.4 14.7 12.3 0.1
Nepal 22.6 16.4 19.1 19.9 19.5
Pakistan 14.1 15.9 12.5 13.2 13.7
Sri Lanka 17.6 16.7 13.4 17.8 18.4
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 0.9 1.5 3.2 –1.8 1.5
Cambodia 20.9 14.7 29.9 14.7 17.9
Indonesia 15.0 12.8 11.9 9.0 10.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 31.0 18.6 23.5 14.7 11.0
Malaysia 9.0 7.3 7.0 2.6 3.0
Myanmar 46.6 31.7 17.6 26.3 24.2
Philippines 9.4 31.8 11.2 9.4 12.7
Singapore 7.2 4.3 3.3 1.5 8.0
Thailand 10.4 7.3 4.7 4.4 4.2
Viet Nam 18.5 18.8 17.7 16.2 18.0
The Pacific
Cook Islands 19.2 –25.6 3.0 9.6 –2.7
Fiji 6.3 23.2 10.6 14.3 6.3
Kiribati ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of 24.1 –4.9 5.1 –5.1 –3.8
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 22.7 4.5 24.7 2.6 ...
Papua New Guinea 11.0 6.7 3.4 8.1 3.8
Samoa –4.0 –0.8 18.7 0.6 7.1
Solomon Islands 17.4 12.5 5.5 15.0 ...
Timor-Leste 26.2 22.9 19.9 7.1 2.6
Tonga –1.6 7.0 7.9 2.4 12.6
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu –0.6 –5.5 8.6 ... ...
... = data not available.
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Table A8 Central government revenues (% of GDP)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia 22.2 23.5 23.7 23.2 22.8
Azerbaijan 31.6 33.5 31.2 31.5 29.2
Georgia 28.9 27.7 27.9 28.2 28.5
Kazakhstan 18.7 17.7 18.5 18.7 20.4
Kyrgyz Republic 28.8 26.9 23.4 29.8 28.5
Tajikistan 25.2 26.9 28.4 30.1 32.1
Turkmenistan 21.0 17.1 16.9 16.6 15.1
Uzbekistan 32.8 32.8 33.1 33.3 32.9
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 21.7 21.7 21.8 22.1 21.4
Hong Kong, China 21.7 21.3 21.2 18.8 22.5
Korea, Rep. of 18.1 20.0 17.1 17.3 18.9
Mongolia 29.7 31.2 28.4 25.8 24.5
Taipei,China 11.4 11.4 10.7 11.3 11.1
South Asia
Afghanistan 25.4 24.3 24.0 25.0 29.3
Bangladesh 10.9 10.7 10.4 9.6 9.9
Bhutan 35.8 30.2 33.6 28.8 31.2
India 20.1 21.2 21.3 20.3 21.3
Maldives 26.2 27.7 31.9 32.8 31.3
Nepal 18.6 19.5 20.6 20.9 24.5
Pakistan 12.8 13.3 14.5 14.3 15.0
Sri Lanka 12.2 12.0 11.6 13.3 14.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 49.4 41.8 34.4 21.7 14.7
Cambodia 14.4 13.5 17.2 16.8 17.6
Indonesia 15.5 15.1 14.7 13.1 12.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 17.7 18.1 17.2 20.0 18.5
Malaysia 21.4 20.9 19.9 18.9 17.3
Myanmar 19.0 20.1 21.9 18.8 17.2
Philippines 14.5 14.9 15.1 15.8 15.2
Singapore 15.4 15.1 15.6 15.9 16.7
Thailand 16.0 16.7 15.7 16.1 16.8
Viet Nam 22.7 23.1 22.3 22.1 23.1
The Pacific
Cook Islands 34.3 34.3 39.8 40.5 38.8
Fiji 27.2 27.2 27.4 25.8 28.2
Kiribati 84.1 91.0 137.1 164.2 135.9
Marshall Islands 51.2 53.4 53.2 58.6 60.6
Micronesia, Fed. States of 65.9 62.0 64.8 66.0 64.4
Nauru 64.8 87.2 106.3 ... ...
Palau 45.2 41.0 43.3 40.5 ...
Papua New Guinea 21.3 20.9 27.4 23.3 25.9
Samoa 28.1 29.7 32.5 29.9 34.2
Solomon Islands 54.4 54.3 46.2 ... ...
Timor-Leste 337.0 328.9 196.1 92.5 85.3
Tonga 27.5 25.3 27.5 28.2 27.3
Tuvalu 86.0 110.7 131.8 151.5 160.3
Vanuatu 21.8 21.4 23.5 31.4 28.2
... = data not available.
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Table A9 Central government expenditures (% of GDP)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia 23.6 25.1 25.6 28.0 28.2
Azerbaijan 31.8 32.8 31.7 32.7 29.6
Georgia 31.7 30.3 30.7 32.0 33.0
Kazakhstan 21.6 19.7 21.2 20.9 22.0
Kyrgyz Republic 34.1 32.2 22.6 31.3 33.1
Tajikistan 25.1 28.2 29.0 32.4 33.8
Turkmenistan 14.7 15.9 16.0 17.3 15.9
Uzbekistan 32.3 32.8 32.6 34.2 33.9
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 23.3 23.6 23.6 25.5 25.2
Hong Kong, China 18.5 20.3 18.0 18.2 18.7
Korea, Rep. of 19.4 16.5 19.1 19.8 21.3
Mongolia 35.9 32.2 32.1 30.9 39.9
Taipei,China 12.9 12.2 11.5 11.4 11.4
South Asia
Afghanistan 24.3 25.0 25.7 26.4 27.7
Bangladesh 14.4 14.5 14.0 13.5 13.0
Bhutan 36.9 34.4 29.8 27.3 34.2
India 27.0 28.3 28.5 27.6 27.9
Maldives 33.9 31.5 34.5 40.4 38.6
Nepal 20.9 18.8 20.0 21.9 23.1
Pakistan 21.6 21.5 20.0 19.6 19.6
Sri Lanka 17.8 17.4 17.3 20.9 19.7
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 31.4 34.1 35.4 37.1 35.7
Cambodia 21.0 20.4 20.7 19.5 17.8
Indonesia 17.3 17.3 16.8 15.7 15.0
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 24.6 29.4 27.6 27.9 24.4
Malaysia 25.7 24.7 23.3 22.1 20.4
Myanmar 18.1 21.4 22.9 22.9 21.8
Philippines 16.8 16.3 15.7 16.8 17.6
Singapore 13.6 13.7 14.5 16.5 17.4
Thailand 17.9 18.4 18.2 18.4 19.1
Viet Nam 28.2 28.8 26.4 26.1 27.5
The Pacific
Cook Islands 37.3 34.0 39.9 42.1 35.1
Fiji 28.3 27.7 31.6 28.9 29.7
Kiribati 80.7 81.9 113.7 118.6 147.7
Marshall Islands 52.0 53.7 50.0 55.8 60.9
Micronesia, Fed. States of 65.0 59.1 53.6 55.5 53.4
Nauru 65.6 86.9 106.2 ... ...
Palau 44.2 40.3 39.8 34.5 ...
Papua New Guinea 22.4 27.8 35.7 32.0 30.0
Samoa 35.3 33.5 37.8 33.7 34.5
Solomon Islands 50.6 49.9 44.2 ... ...
Timor-Leste 112.4 102.2 116.1 106.6 120.5
Tonga 30.2 26.5 25.7 29.3 30.4
Tuvalu 85.4 87.3 102.0 140.9 126.0
Vanuatu 23.3 21.6 22.5 25.0 38.8
... = data not available.
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Table A10 Fiscal balance of central government (% of GDP)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia –1.4 –1.6 –1.9 –4.8 –5.4
Azerbaijan –0.2 0.7 –0.5 –1.2 –0.4
Georgia –2.8 –2.6 –2.9 –3.8 –4.5
Kazakhstan –2.9 –1.9 –2.7 –2.2 –1.6
Kyrgyz Republic –5.5 –5.3 0.8 –1.5 –4.6
Tajikistan 0.1 –1.3 –0.6 –2.3 –1.7
Turkmenistan 6.3 1.2 0.8 –0.7 –0.8
Uzbekistan 1.3 0.7 0.4 –0.9 –1.0
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of –1.6 –1.8 –1.8 –3.4 –3.8
Hong Kong, China 3.2 1.0 3.2 0.6 3.7
Korea, Rep. of –1.3 3.5 –2.0 –2.4 –2.4
Mongolia –6.2 –0.9 –3.2 –3.1 –3.1
Taipei,China –1.6 –0.9 –0.8 –0.1 –0.3
South Asia
Afghanistan 1.1 –0.6 –1.7 –1.4 1.6
Bangladesh –3.6 –3.8 –3.6 –3.9 –3.1
Bhutan –1.1 –4.2 3.8 1.5 –3.0
India –6.6 –6.9 –4.1 –3.9 –2.9
Maldives –7.7 –3.8 –2.6 –7.6 –7.4
Nepal –2.2 0.7 0.6 –1.0 1.4
Pakistan –8.8 –8.2 –5.5 –5.3 –4.6
Sri Lanka –5.6 –5.4 –5.7 –7.6 –5.6
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 18.0 7.7 –1.0 –15.4 –21.0
Cambodia –6.8 –7.2 –3.8 –2.6 –0.3
Indonesia –1.8 –2.2 –2.1 –2.6 –2.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –6.9 –5.6 –4.2 –4.7 –5.9
Malaysia –4.3 –3.8 –3.4 –3.2 –3.1
Myanmar 0.9 –1.3 –0.9 –4.1 –4.6
Philippines –2.3 –1.4 –0.6 –0.9 –2.4
Singapore 1.6 1.3 0.1 –1.0 1.3
Thailand –2.3 –1.6 –2.5 –2.5 –2.7
Viet Nam –5.5 –5.7 –4.1 –4.0 –4.4
The Pacific
Cook Islands –3.0 0.2 –0.1 –1.6 3.7
Fiji –1.1 –0.5 –4.2 –3.1 –1.5
Kiribati 3.5 9.2 23.5 45.7 –11.8
Marshall Islands –0.7 –0.2 3.2 2.8 –2.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.9 2.9 11.2 10.5 11.0
Nauru –0.9 0.3 0.0 –5.7 –0.1
Palau 1.0 0.7 3.5 5.9 2.0
Papua New Guinea –1.2 –6.9 –8.3 –8.7 –4.1
Samoa –7.2 –3.8 –5.3 –3.9 –0.4
Solomon Islands 3.8 4.4 2.0 –2.2 –5.9
Timor-Leste 224.6 226.7 80.0 –14.1 –35.2
Tonga –2.8 –1.3 1.7 –1.1 –3.1
Tuvalu 0.6 23.3 29.8 10.6 34.3
Vanuatu –1.5 –0.2 1.0 6.4 –10.6
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Table A11 Growth rate of merchandise exports (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 1.1 0.8 –7.5 –34.6 –13.7 12.9 7.1
Armenia 5.9 7.9 3.8 –4.4 14.0 6.5 5.0
Azerbaijan –5.4 –2.6 –11.1 –44.8 –15.8 22.6 15.0
Georgia 7.6 21.3 –4.1 –23.9 –3.6 8.2 10.5
Kazakhstan 2.0 –1.5 –6.2 –42.1 –20.0 15.2 4.8
Kyrgyz Republic –13.1 43.6 –12.4 –35.3 5.1 6.0 5.5
Tajikistan 8.2 –14.4 –16.0 –8.9 0.9 5.0 10.0
Turkmenistan 18.9 –4.7 2.0 –38.5 –15.4 12.0 12.0
Uzbekistan –7.6 6.5 –14.8 –12.3 –3.6 2.0 3.0
East Asia 8.8 7.6 3.6 –5.5 –6.8 4.3 2.5
China, People’s Rep. of 9.2 8.9 4.4 –4.5 –7.2 4.5 2.5
Hong Kong, China 7.0 8.0 1.6 –2.4 0.2 1.8 2.4
Korea, Rep. of 2.8 2.4 –0.8 –11.4 –5.7 4.0 3.0
Mongolia –6.2 –0.3 44.3 –18.7 7.8 9.0 –1.0
Taipei,China 19.2 –1.6 –0.8 –11.1 –7.3 2.3 2.4
South Asia –1.6 4.1 0.7 –12.9 0.4 5.5 8.1
Afghanistan –77.3 18.1 8.9 –14.8 3.0 11.9 15.5
Bangladesh 6.2 10.7 12.1 3.1 8.9 6.0 7.0
Bhutan –7.3 –11.5 –2.0 8.4 –15.0 2.0 7.0
India –1.1 3.9 –0.6 –15.9 1.1 6.0 9.0
Maldives –9.2 5.3 –9.1 –20.3 –14.8 –3.6 –1.4
Nepal 5.7 –2.9 5.1 –3.9 –28.8 15.0 12.5
Pakistan –2.5 0.3 1.1 –3.9 –8.8 1.0 2.5
Sri Lanka –7.4 6.3 7.1 –5.6 0.1 4.0 5.0
Southeast Asia 3.2 –0.5 1.7 –11.4 –1.7 4.4 6.2
Brunei Darussalam 4.1 –8.1 –6.1 –44.9 –20.4 27.0 8.0
Cambodia 11.9 15.9 13.4 14.1 9.2 11.0 9.5
Indonesia –2.0 –2.8 –3.7 –14.9 –3.1 7.0 9.9
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 6.1 9.5 10.0 7.1 6.5 7.0 9.5
Malaysia –3.0 –3.1 2.5 –15.4 –5.8 1.5 4.5
Myanmar 1.1 8.9 11.2 –11.1 2.0 7.0 7.0
Philippines 21.2 –4.0 11.9 –13.3 0.6 6.2 6.4
Singapore 0.4 2.3 –1.1 –14.2 –4.7 –3.5 –3.0
Thailand 2.9 –0.1 –0.3 –5.6 0.0 2.0 4.0
Viet Nam 18.2 15.3 13.8 7.9 8.5 7.0 9.0
The Pacific 3.3 –13.3 28.4 –2.2 –2.5 5.2 2.6
Cook Islands 10.6 21.0 26.4 –50.3 –0.1 47.7 –45.8
Fiji 12.6 –5.5 5.9 –22.5 –1.5 6.4 5.8
Kiribati –11.4 1.1 8.0 –13.1 –9.3 7.6 –11.3
Marshall Islands 20.1 –2.5 –16.2 –13.0 ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of 42.8 –13.2 –23.9 4.4 ... ... ...
Nauru 80.8 –13.7 –12.8 ... ... ... ...
Palau 17.2 –3.0 35.0 –15.3 ... ... ...
Papua New Guinea –8.3 –6.0 47.2 1.6 –6.4 3.0 2.0
Samoa 25.8 –6.3 –9.5 11.6 33.2 –23.0 4.9
Solomon Islands 19.9 –10.3 1.6 –7.5 ... ... ...
Timor-Leste 16.0 –46.9 –12.4 16.6 11.1 19.7 8.3
Tonga 22.8 –10.2 19.3 0.0 –8.9 –0.6 2.5
Tuvalu 95.1 –11.0 –5.2 –14.4 1.3 3.3 –7.3
Vanuatu –13.9 –31.2 66.7 –13.5 ... ... ...
Developing Asia 6.1 5.7 2.7 –8.0 –5.3 4.7 3.9
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 6.0 6.3 3.2 –7.6 –5.3 5.0 4.2
... = data not available. 
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A12 Growth rate of merchandise imports (% per year)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 15.7 6.2 –7.1 –17.4 –11.6 2.9 5.3
Armenia 2.4 5.6 –2.0 –25.1 –1.0 2.5 2.5
Azerbaijan 2.5 7.1 –16.3 4.7 –12.7 –6.2 12.5
Georgia 14.3 0.3 8.0 –10.8 25.9 –3.7 5.5
Kazakhstan 20.9 4.1 –13.3 –23.2 –17.6 5.0 3.0
Kyrgyz Republic 26.2 13.0 –5.8 –28.5 –3.7 10.0 5.5
Tajikistan 18.6 9.1 5.3 –20.8 –11.8 –5.0 0.0
Turkmenistan 27.9 11.7 1.8 –31.5 –16.7 10.3 10.3
Uzbekistan 8.2 9.0 11.0 –11.0 –1.2 3.0 4.0
East Asia 5.3 6.0 0.6 –13.6 –4.9 5.0 4.9
China, People’s Rep. of 5.2 7.7 1.1 –12.9 –4.6 5.1 5.1
Hong Kong, China 9.5 9.6 2.4 –4.0 –0.9 2.5 2.0
Korea, Rep. of –0.7 –3.4 –2.1 –19.8 –7.0 6.0 5.0
Mongolia 1.6 –6.2 –16.9 –27.1 –10.7 11.0 10.0
Taipei,China 18.4 –3.3 –2.7 –17.2 –8.0 2.9 2.9
South Asia –0.1 –5.8 0.5 –11.0 –4.4 7.9 9.2
Afghanistan –198.9 –9.3 –5.0 –9.7 1.5 3.5 3.7
Bangladesh 2.4 0.8 8.9 3.0 5.5 9.0 10.0
Bhutan –10.0 –8.8 0.5 8.8 2.4 6.0 2.9
India 0.5 –7.2 –1.0 –14.1 –5.8 7.5 9.0
Maldives –8.2 8.1 15.1 –3.4 6.5 9.3 10.4
Nepal 4.7 10.9 13.9 8.0 –7.1 39.5 13.5
Pakistan 12.5 –0.5 3.8 –0.9 –2.3 9.0 11.0
Sri Lanka –5.3 –6.2 7.9 –2.5 –0.6 5.0 6.0
Southeast Asia 9.5 0.7 –0.9 –11.7 –0.6 4.6 6.1
Brunei Darussalam 9.6 19.3 –25.3 –12.3 –17.0 46.0 10.0
Cambodia 13.4 19.8 8.9 12.3 6.1 9.0 8.5
Indonesia 13.6 –1.3 –4.5 –19.7 –4.5 6.4 8.9
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 34.5 17.4 5.0 11.0 5.8 13.0 10.0
Malaysia 1.7 –0.3 0.6 –14.7 –4.4 1.6 4.1
Myanmar 20.2 14.5 16.2 –0.3 12.0 18.0 18.0
Philippines 11.3 –4.8 8.0 –1.0 16.6 7.0 6.7
Singapore 0.8 1.5 –3.1 –17.8 –6.0 –5.6 –4.0
Thailand 8.8 –0.1 –7.9 –10.6 –4.7 4.0 6.0
Viet Nam 8.7 16.5 12.0 12.0 4.6 5.0 6.0
The Pacific 25.9 –4.9 –19.3 –22.8 5.2 5.8 7.7
Cook Islands 15.6 2.3 0.1 –5.0 –4.6 6.7 4.4
Fiji 2.5 16.8 –3.2 –14.5 0.7 3.3 2.4
Kiribati 14.9 –7.5 26.4 –17.5 12.3 –21.1 –11.8
Marshall Islands 4.5 13.0 –7.5 –11.3 ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of 5.0 –2.3 –13.0 7.8 ... ... ...
Nauru 17.5 59.3 59.1 ... ... ... ...
Palau 11.3 5.4 21.1 –11.5 ... ... ...
Papua New Guinea 22.7 –16.1 –36.4 –33.1 10.2 7.9 6.1
Samoa 19.0 –8.1 8.1 –3.8 –4.4 –1.4 –1.8
Solomon Islands 3.0 7.0 –1.0 –4.7 ... ... ...
Timor-Leste 67.1 3.7 10.9 –15.4 –14.4 2.4 31.5
Tonga 0.0 –7.9 0.1 15.4 0.3 9.6 11.8
Tuvalu 21.6 41.7 –15.6 –4.3 14.0 4.1 –10.3
Vanuatu 2.8 3.8 –6.3 23.7 ... ... ...
Developing Asia 5.4 3.4 0.1 –13.1 –4.4 5.3 5.7
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 5.5 4.2 0.4 –12.4 –4.1 5.6 6.1
... = data not available. 
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A13 Trade balance ($ million)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 56,713 49,418 45,017 7,971 2,273 10,522 12,839
Armenia –2,112 –2,196 –2,055 –1,186 –931 –880 –853
Azerbaijan 22,217 20,621 18,928 5,812 4,586 8,078 9,483
Georgia –4,214 –3,493 –4,280 –4,356 –6,395 –5,801 –5,956
Kazakhstan 38,145 34,792 36,245 12,679 9,444 13,715 14,899
Kyrgyz Republic –2,993 –2,780 –2,808 –2,176 –1,722 –1,935 –2,041
Tajikistan –2,419 –2,958 –3,361 –2,544 –2,132 –2,239 –2,463
Turkmenistan 6,527 4,032 4,143 1,485 1,386 1,700 2,066
Uzbekistan 1,561 1,400 –1,795 –1,742 –1,964 –2,116 –2,296
East Asia 388,439 465,798 551,922 739,798 658,864 548,760 522,393
China, People’s Rep. of 311,570 358,981 435,042 566,998 485,200 499,308 471,343
Hong Kong, China –18,918 –27,913 –32,359 –22,871 –17,522 –21,477 –19,861
Korea, Rep. of 49,406 82,781 88,885 122,269 120,446 117,437 112,664
Mongolia –3,031 –2,619 146 566 1,330 1,380 942
Taipei,China 49,412 54,567 60,209 72,835 69,410 69,549 69,969
South Asia –245,822 –193,043 –192,670 –178,638 –153,186 –173,690 –192,445
Afghanistan –9,499 –8,449 –7,928 –7,200 –7,299 –7,493 –7,678
Bangladesh –9,320 –7,009 –6,794 –6,965 –6,274 –7,842 –9,690
Bhutan –395 –377 –393 –430 –540 –592 –589
India –195,656 –147,609 –144,940 –130,079 –104,155 –116,006 –126,447
Maldives –1,261 –1,372 –1,660 –1,655 –1,814 –2,010 –2,241
Nepal –4,623 –5,263 –6,079 –6,689 –6,427 –9,139 –10,381
Pakistan –15,652 –15,355 –16,590 –17,191 –18,370 –21,781 –26,064
Sri Lanka –9,416 –7,609 –8,287 –8,430 –8,306 –8,826 –9,356
Southeast Asia 107,099 99,958 132,240 126,877 126,083 122,159 124,483
Brunei Darussalam 8,766 6,924 7,443 2,910 2,206 2,294 2,399
Cambodia –2,506 –3,219 –3,206 –3,467 –3,415 –3,538 –3,736
Indonesia 8,680 5,833 6,983 14,049 15,390 17,242 20,322
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –2,567 –3,299 –3,265 –3,002 –3,982 –4,800 –5,307
Malaysia 36,593 30,642 34,626 28,050 24,393 24,618 26,298
Myanmar –2,167 –3,053 –4,109 –5,441 –7,208 –9,755 –12,847
Philippines –18,926 –17,662 –17,330 –23,309 –34,079 –36,813 –39,418
Singapore 70,404 75,024 81,709 82,850 82,789 85,882 85,936
Thailand 109 55 17,263 26,841 35,752 28,618 26,053
Viet Nam 8,714 8,713 12,126 7,396 14,116 18,341 25,089
The Pacific –3,847 –3,552 1,643 3,276 3,102 3,102 2,884
Cook Islands –80 –78 –72 –82 –78 –77 –91
Fiji –770 –1,168 –1,027 –975 –1,003 –1,007 –997
Kiribati –89 –82 –105 –86 –99 –75 –66
Marshall Islands –44 –61 –63 –56 ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of –125 –129 –117 –128 ... ... ...
Nauru 26 4 –27 ... ... ... ...
Palau –125 –133 –160 –142 ... ... ...
Papua New Guinea –1,373 –517 4,646 6,151 5,305 5,320 5,294
Samoa –307 –281 –309 –294 –270 –275 –268
Solomon Islands 66 –16 –5 –18 ... ... ...
Timor-Leste –638 –679 –756 –635 –539 –548 –726
Tonga –187 –172 –170 –199 –201 –222 –250
Tuvalu –2 –13 –9 –10 –14 –15 –13
Vanuatu –198 –225 –184 –251 ... ... ...
Developing Asia 302,582 418,579 538,152 699,284 637,014 628,220 583,123
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 152,278 234,119 339,708 444,201 381,891 376,829 334,415
... = data not available. 
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A14 Current account balance (% of GDP)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Central Asia 2.9 1.9 2.0 –3.3 –5.9 –3.0 –1.7
Armenia –10.0 –7.3 –7.6 –2.7 –2.6 –2.3 –2.0
Azerbaijan 21.4 16.6 13.9 –0.4 –2.1 5.9 11.4
Georgia –11.4 –5.7 –10.6 –11.9 –13.1 –12.0 –11.5
Kazakhstan 0.5 0.5 2.7 –3.0 –6.1 –3.4 –3.0
Kyrgyz Republic –15.8 –14.1 –17.2 –15.2 –10.0 –13.0 –13.5
Tajikistan –2.5 –2.9 –9.1 –5.9 –4.8 –5.5 –6.0
Turkmenistan 0.0 –7.2 –7.5 –10.3 –18.5 –15.0 –13.0
Uzbekistan 1.2 1.6 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4
East Asia 3.0 2.4 3.3 3.9 3.0 2.5 2.3
China, People’s Rep. of 2.5 1.5 2.6 3.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
Hong Kong, China 1.6 1.5 1.4 3.3 4.5 3.1 3.1
Korea, Rep. of 4.2 6.2 6.0 7.7 7.1 5.8 5.3
Mongolia –43.8 –37.6 –15.8 –8.1 –4.0 –2.1 –6.3
Taipei,China 8.9 10.0 11.7 14.3 13.4 6.8 6.5
South Asia –4.2 –1.4 –1.1 –0.9 –0.8 –1.4 –1.6
Afghanistan 5.9 8.7 2.4 4.7 4.4 1.4 –0.2
Bangladesh –0.3 1.6 0.8 1.5 1.7 –1.0 –0.7
Bhutan –21.5 –25.4 –26.4 –28.3 –29.4 –27.4 –22.8
India –4.8 –1.7 –1.3 –1.1 –1.0 –1.3 –1.5
Maldives –7.4 –4.6 –3.8 –9.5 –17.7 –18.9 –19.1
Nepal 5.0 3.4 4.6 5.1 6.2 –1.6 –3.2
Pakistan –2.1 –1.1 –1.3 –1.0 –1.2 –2.1 –2.5
Sri Lanka –5.8 –3.4 –2.5 –2.5 –2.1 –2.2 –2.2
Southeast Asia 2.3 1.7 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.1 3.0
Brunei Darussalam 29.8 20.9 30.7 16.0 11.0 5.3 5.5
Cambodia –10.2 –14.9 –11.7 –11.1 –10.1 –9.4 –9.0
Indonesia –2.7 –3.2 –3.1 –2.0 –1.8 –1.7 –1.6
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. –28.5 –30.6 –25.0 –20.3 –18.0 –19.0 –20.0
Malaysia 5.2 3.5 4.4 3.0 2.0 1.8 2.0
Myanmar –4.0 –4.9 –3.3 –5.2 –7.0 –8.0 –8.0
Philippines 2.8 4.2 3.8 2.5 0.2 0.2 0.5
Singapore 17.9 16.9 19.7 18.1 19.0 19.5 19.8
Thailand –0.4 –1.2 3.7 8.1 11.4 9.0 7.0
Viet Nam 5.9 4.5 4.9 0.5 3.3 2.0 2.5
The Pacific 20.8 11.7 10.2 8.9 0.6 3.0 –0.5
Cook Islands 19.8 23.4 26.1 18.8 20.3 24.5 21.0
Fiji –1.3 –9.8 –6.9 –5.6 3.4 3.5 3.0
Kiribati 0.5 15.1 24.1 44.7 –7.0 –2.4 –1.5
Marshall Islands 0.1 –7.7 0.0 17.9 16.0 4.0 4.5
Micronesia, Fed. States of –13.4 –10.1 1.2 4.2 6.0 4.5 4.5
Nauru 29.0 16.5 –8.2 ... ... ... ...
Palau –11.2 –11.8 –14.5 –3.4 –12.0 –12.5 –15.0
Papua New Guinea –36.1 –31.4 3.7 13.4 9.4 7.7 6.7
Samoa –7.7 –2.5 –7.0 –3.9 –6.6 –4.9 –2.8
Solomon Islands 1.5 –4.3 –5.4 –3.7 –7.3 –8.3 –10.7
Timor-Leste 211.9 182.1 76.0 16.4 –49.9 –12.2 –40.2
Tonga –12.4 –4.5 –7.9 –11.7 –3.2 –7.7 –11.9
Tuvalu 14.7 1.5 13.0 10.0 5.6 –20.8 –25.4
Vanuatu –6.1 –1.1 0.2 –9.2 –13.8 –17.7 –15.0
Developing Asia 1.8 1.7 2.6 3.0 2.3 1.9 1.7
Developing Asia excluding the NIEs 0.9 0.7 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.9
... = data not available. 
Note: The newly industrialized economies (NIEs) are the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taipei,China, and Hong Kong, China.
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Table A15 Exchange rates to the United States dollar (annual average)
Currency Symbol 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia Dram AMD 401.8 409.6 415.9 477.9 480.5
Azerbaijan Azerbaijan new manat AZN 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.6
Georgia Lari GEL 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.4
Kazakhstan Tenge T 149.1 152.1 179.2 221.7 342.2
Kyrgyz Republic Som Som 47.0 48.4 53.7 64.5 69.9
Tajikistan Somoni TJS 4.8 4.8 5.0 6.2 8.0
Turkmenistan Turkmen manat TMM 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.5
Uzbekistan Sum SUM 1,885.4 2,095.0 2,311.2 2,573.5 2,968.9
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of Yuan CNY 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.7
Hong Kong, China Hong Kong dollar HK$ 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8
Korea, Rep. of Won W 1,124.5 1,095.4 1,052.2 1,133.1 1,163.3
Mongolia Togrog MNT 1,359.2 1,523.9 1,817.9 1,970.3 2,145.5
Taipei,China NT dollar NT$ 29.6 29.8 30.4 31.9 32.3
South Asia
Afghanistan Afghani AF 50.9 55.4 57.4 61.1 67.8
Bangladesh Taka Tk 79.1 79.9 77.7 77.7 78.3
Bhutan Ngultrum Nu 50.3 54.9 61.5 62.1 66.3
India Indian rupee/s Re/Rs 54.4 60.5 61.0 64.2 67.2
Maldives Rufiyaa Rf 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 15.4
Nepal Nepalese rupee/s NRe/NRs 80.7 87.7 98.0 99.2 106.1
Pakistan Pakistan rupee/s PRe/PRs 89.2 96.7 102.9 101.5 104.4
Sri Lanka Sri Lanka rupee/s SLRe/SLRs 127.6 129.1 130.6 135.9 146.0
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam Brunei dollar B$ 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Cambodia Riel KR 4,033.0 4,027.0 4,030.0 4,025.0 4,030.0
Indonesia Rupiah Rp 9,386.6 10,461.2 11,865.2 13,389.4 13,307.4
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Kip KN 7,994.0 7,818.0 8,150.0 8,147.9 8,400.0
Malaysia Ringgit RM 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.9 4.1
Myanmar Kyat MK 856.9 964.4 995.0 1,223.0 1,259.1
Philippines Peso P 42.2 42.4 44.4 45.5 47.5
Singapore Singapore dollar S$ 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
Thailand Baht B 31.1 30.7 32.5 34.3 35.3
Viet Nam Dong D 20,828.0 20,934.6 21,148.8 21,675.6 21,931.0
The Pacific
Cook Islands New Zealand dollar NZ$ 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5
Fiji Fiji dollar F$ 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1
Kiribati Australian dollar A$ 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3
Marshall Islands US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Micronesia, Fed. States of US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Nauru Australian dollar A$ 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3
Palau US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Papua New Guinea Kina K 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.1
Samoa Tala ST 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6
Solomon Islands Sol. Islands dollar SI$ 7.4 7.3 7.4 7.9 8.1
Timor-Leste US dollar US$ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Tonga Pa'anga T$ 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.2
Tuvalu Australian dollar A$ 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3
Vanuatu Vatu Vt 92.6 96.9 102.4 111.0 109.2
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Table A16 Gross international reserves ($ million)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia 1,799 2,252 1,489 1,775 2,200
Azerbaijan 11,277 15,014 15,549 7,910 7,142
Georgia 2,873 2,800 2,695 2,500 2,756
Kazakhstan 28,269 24,715 29,209 27,871 29,530
Kyrgyz Republic 2,067 2,238 1,958 1,778 1,969
Tajikistan 649 636 511 494 745
Turkmenistan 26,400 29,300 32,400 ... ...
Uzbekistan 22,133 22,515 24,140 24,400 24,650
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 3,387,863 3,880,383 3,899,285 3,406,100 3,097,845
Hong Kong, China 317,362 311,209 328,516 358,823 386,241
Korea, Rep. of 326,968 346,460 363,593 367,962 371,102
Mongolia 3,630 1,193 1,627 1,300 1,300
Taipei,China 403,169 416,811 418,980 426,031 434,204
South Asia
Afghanistan 6,867 6,873 7,230 7,000 7,500
Bangladesh 10,364 15,315 21,508 25,025 30,168
Bhutan 674 917 998 958 1,119
India 292,046 304,223 330,213 346,788 364,109
Maldives 305 368 615 564 467
Nepal 4,960 5,614 6,939 8,148 9,737
Pakistan 10,803 6,008 9,098 13,525 18,143
Sri Lanka 6,877 7,495 8,208 7,304 6,019
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam 3,291 3,406 3,479 3,218 3,329
Cambodia 3,463 3,642 4,391 5,093 6,731
Indonesia 112,781 99,387 111,862 105,931 116,362
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 740 666 816 987 814
Malaysia 139,724 134,911 115,937 95,290 94,525
Myanmar 3,156 4,419 4,803 4,511 4,436
Philippines 83,831 83,187 79,541 80,667 80,692
Singapore 259,307 273,065 256,860 247,747 246,575
Thailand 181,608 167,289 157,108 156,514 171,853
Viet Nam 25,399 25,955 34,330 28,298 41,000
The Pacific
Cook Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Fiji 915 755 750 926 915
Kiribati ... ... ... ... ...
Marshall Islands ... ... ... ... ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of ... ... ... ... ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau ... ... ... ... ...
Papua New Guinea 4,001 2,826 2,305 2,105 2,219
Samoa 157 137 155 167 178
Solomon Islands 499 532 507 527 ...
Timor-Leste ... ... ... ... ...
Tonga 145 148 159 143 159
Tuvalu ... ... ... ... ...
Vanuatu 180 180 185 268 ...
... = data not available.
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Table A17 External debt outstanding ($ million)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia 3,739 3,899 3,785 4,316 4,806
Azerbaijan 5,470 6,059 6,478 6,894 6,913
Georgia 10,057 10,542 10,718 11,983 12,927
Kazakhstan 136,918 150,033 157,428 153,697 165,364
Kyrgyz Republic 5,190 5,930 6,371 6,670 6,874
Tajikistan 2,171 2,152 2,098 2,183 2,276
Turkmenistan 6,365 8,653 8,043 8,354 ...
Uzbekistan 6,660 7,500 8,399 10,521 11,413
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 736,986 863,167 1,779,900 1,416,200 ...
Hong Kong, China 1,029,853 1,160,364 1,301,216 1,300,314 1,329,266
Korea, Rep. of 408,928 423,505 424,325 396,058 393,736
Mongolia 13,112 18,280 20,951 21,590 23,785
Taipei,China 130,821 170,134 177,945 158,954 172,238
South Asia
Afghanistan 1,320 1,400 1,330 1,380 1,270
Bangladesh 22,095 22,381 24,388 23,901 25,963
Bhutan 1,334 1,607 1,759 1,855 2,316
India 409,374 446,178 475,045 485,614 512,300
Maldives 814 720 744 696 753
Nepal 3,491 3,510 3,617 3,391 3,584
Pakistan 60,268 59,592 65,544 64,609 65,449
Sri Lanka 37,098 39,905 42,914 44,797 47,302
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia 4,274 4,828 5,279 5,648 6,200
Indonesia 252,364 266,109 293,328 310,730 316,968
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4,262 5,489 6,061 6,495 7,422
Malaysia 196,861 212,279 213,951 194,272 202,564
Myanmar 13,700 10,200 8,800 9,600 9,900
Philippines 79,949 78,489 77,674 77,474 74,763
Singapore 1,521,944 1,683,822 1,771,416 1,778,228 1,743,584
Thailand 130,747 141,933 141,715 131,427 131,362
Viet Nam 42,158 45,243 ... ... ...
The Pacific
Cook Islands 38 59 61 73 77
Fiji 523 595 664 593 632
Kiribati 14 14 14 36 45
Marshall Islands 96 98 95 90 91
Micronesia, Fed. States of 88 88 90 81 ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 69 65 71 64 ...
Papua New Guinea 1,128 1,357 1,150 1,180 1,691
Samoa 383 415 415 462 413
Solomon Islands 110 102 89 88 75
Timor-Leste 0 6 22 46 153
Tonga 197 204 186 195 171
Tuvalu 8 20 22 18 17
Vanuatu 369 132 149 242 400
... = data not available.
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Table A18 Debt service ratio (% of exports of goods and services)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Central Asia
Armenia 8.2 27.3 6.8 4.4 4.9
Azerbaijan ... ... ... ... ...
Georgia 22.5 18.1 13.5 15.4 12.9
Kazakhstan 34.8 35.1 36.6 71.5 17.1
Kyrgyz Republic 18.2 28.1 36.7 65.0 26.8
Tajikistan ... ... ... ... ...
Turkmenistan 1.8 2.3 ... ... ...
Uzbekistan 6.4 3.5 5.1 5.9 5.6
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of 1.6 1.6 2.6 5.0 ...
Hong Kong, China 49.1 49.0 60.0 65.8 68.9
Korea, Rep. of 7.0 7.2 7.9 8.9 9.0
Mongolia 39.8 50.6 39.8 41.6 88.6
Taipei,China 0.9 1.7 1.4 1.6 2.1
South Asia
Afghanistan 1.0 6.8 ... ... ...
Bangladesh 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.0
Bhutan 12.9 17.5 27.1 19.9 14.5
India 5.9 5.9 7.6 8.8 7.8
Maldives 2.9 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.7
Nepal 10.6 9.5 8.9 8.1 8.8
Pakistan 15.2 20.6 23.0 18.1 21.5
Sri Lanka 19.7 26.8 20.8 27.7 ...
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam ... ... ... ... ...
Cambodia 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4
Indonesia 17.3 18.4 24.0 20.7 20.5
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. 4.2 5.1 5.6 5.2 7.1
Malaysia 10.8 10.7 11.4 15.6 16.2
Myanmar 2.2 4.9 5.0 4.7 4.7
Philippines 7.3 8.2 6.3 5.6 6.9
Singapore ... ... ... ... ...
Thailand 4.2 4.0 4.9 6.4 6.4
Viet Nam 4.3 ... ... ... ...
The Pacific
Cook Islands 7.6 6.7 5.9 6.5 6.1
Fiji 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 ...
Kiribati 32.8 12.8 36.0 2.5 4.6
Marshall Islands 7.7 6.4 6.5 10.0 ...
Micronesia, Fed. States of 5.8 6.8 10.6 10.0 ...
Nauru ... ... ... ... ...
Palau 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.5 ...
Papua New Guinea 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.7 1.4
Samoa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Solomon Islands 3.5 6.8 3.3 3.3 ...
Timor-Leste 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tonga 4.9 7.5 9.2 9.8 9.4
Tuvalu 2.0 2.9 2.9 12.2 12.0
Vanuatu 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 ...
... = data not available.
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